The "art" of rhetoric

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THE LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY

EDITED BY

E. CAPPS, pu.p., LL.D. T. E. PAGE, rrtt.p.
W. H. D. ROUSE, tirv.p.

ARISTOTLE

THE “ART” OF RHETORIC

A
Fan

“ARISTOTLE

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION

THE “ART” OF RHETORIC

BY

JOHN HENRY FREESE

FORMERLY FELLOW OF ST. JOHN’S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE

LONDON: WILLIAM HEINEMANN

NEW YORK: G, P. PUTNAM’S SONS
MCMXXVI

587423

2754

Printed in Great Britain

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION .
Bibliography
Analysis

Book I.

Book II.

Boox III.

GLOssARY
InpeEx or Names

GeENERAL INDEX

PAGE
vii

. XXViii

XXXi

vil

bb

ae

INTRODUCTION

The beginnings of rhetoric—the Homeric poems—Themi-
stocles and Pericles—the influence of the Sophists—Sicily
the birthplace of rhetoric as an art—the Western or Sicilian
school (Corax—Tisias—Gorgias—A gathon—Polus—Licym-
nius — Evenus — Alcidamas — Lycophron — Polycrates —
Callippus — Pamphilus) —'Thrasymachus — the astern or
Ionic school (Protagoras—Prodicus—Hippias—Theodorus—
Theodectes)—decay of rhetoric—Demetrius of Phalerum—
treatment of rhetoric in Plato’s Gorgias and Phaedrus-——
other rhetorical works by Aristotle—date of the Rhetoric—
Aristotle and Demosthenes—Aristotle and Isocrates—the
Rhetorica ad Alexandrum—text of the Rhetoric.

Rueroric, in the general sense of the use of language
in such a manner as to impress the hearers and in-
fluence them for or against a certain course of action,
is as old as language itself and the beginnings of
social and political life. It was practised and highly
esteemed among the Greeks from the earliest times.
The reputation of Odysseus and Nestor as speakers,
the reply of Achilles to the embassy entreating him
to take the field again, the trial-scene represented on
the shield of Achilles, bear witness to this, and justify
the opinion of the ancient Greeks that Homer was
the real father of oratory. After the age of Homer
and Hesiod and the establishment of democratic in-
stitutions, the development of industry and com-
merce and the gradually increasing naval power of

vii

INTRODUCTION

Athens compelled statesmen to become orators.
Themistocles and Pericles were the foremost states-
men of their time. The former, although not
specially distinguished for eloquence, was regarded
as a most capable speaker; the latter was a great
orator. It is much to be regretted that none of his
speeches has survived ; but some idea of their lofty
patriotism may be gained from those put into his
mouth by Thucydides, while the genuine fragments,
several of which have been preserved in Aristotle,
are characterized by impressive vividness.

The next step in the development of Greek prose
and Rhetoric must be set down to the credit of the
Sophists. Whatever opinion may be held, from a
moral standpoint, of the teaching of these much-
discussed professors of wisdom and of its effects on
the national life and character, it is generally con-
ceded that they have a claim to be considered the
founders of an artificial prose style, which ultimately
led to the highly-finished diction of Plato and Demo-
sthenes. It is usual to make a distinction between
eastern (Ionic) and western (Sicilian) sophistical
rhetoric, the representatives of the former paying
attention chiefly to. accuracy (dpOoérea), those of
the latter to beauty (evérea), of style.

The birthplace of Rhetoric as an art was the island
of Sicily. According to Cicero,* Aristotle, no doubt
in his lost history of the literature of the subject
(Luvaywyi texvov), gives the following account of
its origin. After the expulsion of the “ tyrants”
(467 B.c.), a number of civil processes were insti-

9 Cicero, Brutus, xii. 46.
Vili

INTRODUCTION

tuted by citizens, who had been previously banished
and then returned from exile, for the recovery of
property belonging to them which had been illegally
confiscated by the tyrants. This made it necessary
for the claimants to obtain assistance from others,
and the Sicilians, ‘an acute people and born con-
troversialists,” supplied the want in the persons of
Corax and Tisias (both of Syracuse), who drew up a
system which could be imparted by instruction, and
a set of rules dealing with such questions as were
likely to arise. These two may therefore claim to
have been the founders of technical Rhetoric, al-
though Aristotle, in an early lost work called the
Sophist, gives the credit to the philosopher Empedo-
cles, whose pupil Gorgias is said to have been.
_Corax “ was the author of the first of the numerous
“ Arts” (réxvat, handbooks of Rhetoric), and to
him is attributed the definition of it as “ the artificer
of persuasion” (zevOots Sypsovpyés). The speech
was divided into three parts—exordium (rpootpwov),
arguments constructive and refutative (dy@ves), and
epilogue (éziAoyos), or into five, with the addition of
narrative (dujynors), which followed the exordium,
and apexBdoes.® It may be assumed that he
also wrote speeches® for his clients to learn and
deliver in the courts, as it was no doubt the rule in

« The sophists and rhetoricians here mentioned are limited
(with the exception of Demetrius of Phalerum) to those whose
names actually occur in the Rhetoric.

» Apparently not to be understood in the more usual
senses of ** perversions ”’ (of forms of government), or “‘ digres-
sions”’ (in a book or speech), but in that of “ auxiliaries,”
subsidiary aids to the speech (mpés émrtxoupiay Trav Neyouévwr,
quoted in Stephanus, Thesaurus, from the Prolegomena to

Hermogenes).
¢ Such writers were called ‘‘ logographers ”’ (see ii. 11.7).

ix

INTRODUCTION

Syracuse, as at Athens, that the litigant should at
least create the impression that he was conducting
his own case.

His pupil Tistas, also the author of an “ Art,” is
said to havé-been the tutor of Gorgias, Lysias, and
Isocrates, and to have accompanied the first-named
on his embassy to Athens. He laid even greater
stress than his master on the argument from prob-
ability (e¢xés) which he regarded as more valuable
than truth @

Goretas of Leontini (c. 483-375 B.c.) first attraeted
the attention of Greece proper when he visited
Athens as an ambassador (427 B.c.) from his native
place, with the object of obtaining assistance against
Syracuse. His view of rhetoric was that it was only
a means of persuasion, and he was careful to explain
that his only object was to make his pupils skilful
rhetoricians, able to speak on every subject, either
for or against, and not, like certain other sophists,
to teach them virtue or wisdom. This made him
pay greater attention to the style than to the subject
matter of his discourses. In addition to fragments
of these, from which there are several quotations
preserved in the Rhetoric, two extant orations (En-
comium of Helen and Defence of Palamedes) are now
generally considered to be his. An “ Art” of Rhe-
toric has also been assigned to him. Regarded as
the creator of artificial Greek prose, his writings were
distinguished by flowery ornamentation, poetical
colouring, unusual phraseology (as shown in the use
of rare, compound, and poetical words), and many

@ On the relation of a fragment in Dorie (Oxyrhynchus
Papyri, iii. p. 27) to the réxva: of Corax and Tisias see W.
R. Roberts in Classical Review, Feb. 1904.

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INTRODUCTION

new rhetorical figures, for the employment of which
the contemptuous term “ to gorgiaze ”’ was invented.
He further introduced an artificial and symmetrical
structure of sentences and periods, which gave the
impression of metre. According to Diodorus Siculus
(xii. 53), the Athenians were astounded at his un-
common style, his use of antitheses, his evenly
balanced clauses of equal length, and the similarity
of the (beginnings or) endings of words. Gomperz ®
remarks that the English counterpart of the style of
Gorgias is euphuism. In the Platonic dialogue, in
the first part of which Gorgias takes a prominent
part, it is noticeable that he is treated more leniently
than might have been expected, considering Plato’s
opinion of rhetoric as taught and practised by him
and his successors.

AcaTuon (c. 447-401 B.c.), an Athenian, was by
profession a tragedian. His beauty and affected
manners made him the butt of the comic poets.2 A
pupil of Gorgias, he imitated the flowery language,
antitheses, and parallelisms of his master, and was
fond of using the rhetorical figure antonomasia, the
use of an epithet or patronymic instead of the name
of a person. His first victory with a tragedy at the
Lenaea is celebrated in the Platonic dialogue Sym-
posium, in which he is one of the interlocutors.

Potus, of Agrigentum, the favourite pupil of
Gorgias, is one of the interlocutors in the Platonic
Gorgias. In this he is attacked by Socrates, and the
special attention paid by him to the ornamentation
of his speeches and his affected style are severely
criticized. He was the author of an “ Art,” of

® Greek Thinkers, i. 478 (Eng. tr.).
» Aristophanes, Thesmophoriazusae, 100.

xi

INTRODUCTION

which some fragments are preserved in Plato and
Aristotle.

Licymnius, pupil of Gorgias and a dithyrambie
poet, was the author of an “ Art.” He invented a
number of unnecessary technical terms,* and classified
nouns under the heads of the proper, compound,
synonymous or quasi-synonymous, and single words
or periphrases intended to take the place of nouns
(xipva, civOera, ddeAdhd, eriOera). By some he is
considered to be a different person from the dithy-
rambic poet.

Evenus, of Paros, elegiac poet and sophist, contem-
porary of Socrates, wrote an ‘“‘ Art” and rhetorical
rules or examples in verse.?

Aucipamas, of Elaea in Aeolis in Asia Minor, was
the pupil and successor of Gorgias, the chief and last
representative of his rhetorical school. A rival and
opponent of Isocrates, against whom his treatise On
the Sophists (now generally accepted as genuine), is
directed, he lays stress upon the superiority of ex-
tempore speeches to those written out. His writings
are characterized by a bombastic style, excessive use
of poetical epithets and phrases, and far-fetched
metaphors. They are drawn upon in the Rhetoric
(iii. 3. 1) to illustrate the “ frigid” or insipid style.

Another critic ° describes his style as rather coarse
and commonplace (xovvérepov). He was also the author
of an “ Art” and of a show-speech Messeniacus,4 a
reply to the Archidamus of Isocrates.

Lycopuron, pupil of Gorgias, and, like Aleidamas,
condemned in the Rhetoric for the frigidity of his style.
“ Rhetoric, iii. 12.2; Plato, Phaedrus, 267 c.
>» Phaedrus, 267 B.

° Dion. Halic., De Isaeo, xix. (v.l. xevérepor, * emptier ”’).
4 Rhetoric, i. 13. 2.

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INTRODUCTION

He appears to have specially affected the use of
periphrases. He declared that the accident of noble
birth was utterly valueless, and described law as
merely a compact, “‘ a mutual guarantee among men
that justice will be preserved.” 4

Potycrates, of Athens, sophist and rhetorician,
contemporary of Isocrates, whose displeasure he
incurred by his Defence of Busiris and Accusation of
Socrates. ‘The former is criticized by Isocrates in his
Busiris and its defects pointed out. A Panegyric on
Helen, formerly attributed to Gorgias, is by some
considered the work of Polycrates. He also wrote
eulogies on such trifling subjects as mice (Rhetoric,
ii. 24. 6), pots, salt, pebbles. He appears to have at
one time enjoyed a certain reputation as an orator,
but Dionysius of Halicarnassus severely censures his
style, describing him as “empty in things that
matter, frigid and vulgar in epideictic oratory, and
without charm where it is needed.” ?

Of Caturepus and Pampuinus, each the writer of
an “ Art,” nothing more seems to be known than the
reference to them in the Rhetoric.’ They are said
to have paid special attention to skill in drawing
conclusions.

Turasymacuus, of Chalcedon (c. 457-400 B.c.),
sophist and rhetorician, was regarded as the inventor
of the “ mixed ” style of oratory, half-way between
the varied and artificially-wrought style of Antiphon
and Thucydides and the plain and simple style of
Lysias. Its excellence consisted in condensing the
ideas and expressing them tersely, which was especi-
ally necessary in genuine rhetorical contests. Al-
though he rounded off his sentences in periods,

@ Politics, iii. 9. 8. >’ De Isaeo, 20. ¢ ii, 23, 21.
xiii

INTRODUCTION

marked by a paeanic rhythm? at the beginning and
the end, he by no means favoured the reduction of
prose to rhythmical verse. He was the first to direct
attention to the importance of delivery (iré«pwxs).
In addition to an ‘‘ Art,” and a work on common-
places (dpoppai, starting-points ; or, resources), he
wrote ‘“‘ Compassion. speeches,” ’ intended to excite
the emotions of the hearers, a method of persuasion
to which he attached great importance.

The rhetoricians mentioned above, with the ex-
ception of Thrasymachus, may be regarded as repre-
sentatives of the Sicilian or western school. A brief
account may here be given of the best known sophists
(the name by which they distinguished themselves
from the mere rhetorician) belonging to Greece
proper and the eastern colonies.

Proracoras (c. 485-415 B.c.), of Abdera, was a fre-
quent visitor to Athens and a friend of Pericles. He
was the author of the famous dictum, “‘ Man is the
measure of all things,” that is, there is no such thing
as absolute truth, but things are such as they appear
to one who perceives them. He was the first to
enter upon the scientific study of language, and
wrote on accuracy of style (dpOoérea)*; he also
distinguished the genders of nouns,? the tenses and
moods of verbs, and the various modes and forms of
address (interrogation, response, command, entreaty).
He taught his pupils to discuss commonplaces from

@ See Rhetoric, iii. 8. 4-6.

> Rhetoric, iii. 1.7 3 ep. Plato, Phaedrus, 267 c.

¢ Others take this to mean that he adopted a simple or
straightforward style as contrasted with the affected Sicilian
rhetoric (Thompson on Phaedrus, 267 c).

4 See iii, 5. 5 note.

xiv

INTRODUCTION

opposite points of view and the art of making
the weaker (worse) cause appear the stronger, by
- which success in a case which otherwise appeared
hopeless was frequently attained. The first to call
himself a sophist, he was the first teacher who de-
manded a fee for his instruction. His character is
- severely handled in the Platonic dialogue cailed afer
him, and his theory of knowledge attacked in the
Theaetetus.

Propicus, of Ceos, an island in the Aegean, is best
known for his moral apologue of the Choice of Her-
cules (between virtue and vice). The date of his
birth and death is uncertain, but he was at any rate
junior to Protagoras. He paid special attention to
the use of synonyms and the accurate distinction of
words of kindred meaning.

Hirpias, of Elis, depicted in the two Platonic
dialogues (of doubtful genuineness), was a veritable
polymath. His numerous studies embraced grammar
and the cultivation of a correct and elevated style of
expression. He also interested himself in political
matters, and, by comparing the forms of government
and institutions of different states, laid the foundation
of political science.

TueEoporus (fl. c. 412 B.c.), of Byzantium, is men-
tioned by Plato ¢ as a most excellent “ tricker-out ”
of speeches (AoyodaiSados). He was the author of
an “ Art,’’ and invented a number of new terms or
“novelties ”’ (xawvd), introducing additional divisions
of the speech. According to Cicero,’ Lysias once
gave lessons in rhetoric, but abandoned it for writing
forensic speeches for others, on the ground that

* Phaedrus, 266 ©; Cicero, Orator, xii. 39.
>» Brutus, xii. 48.

XV

a tS
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INTRODUCTION

Theodorus was more subtle than himself in techni-:/"
calities, although feebler in oratory. ee

Tuxopectes (c. 380-344 B.C.), of Phaselis in Pam- or
phylia, Greek tragic poet and rhetorician, was the
pupil of Isocrates and an intimate friend of Aristotle. ¢
He at first wrote speeches for litigants, but later
turned his attention to tragedy. He is said to have 45
written at least fifty dramas. The Mausolus was
written at the request of Artemisia, widow of the es
prince of Caria, to be recited at his funeral. Theo- ?
dectes was the author of an “ Art? in both prose and 9
verse, and is coupled by Dionysius of Halicarnassus® ;
with Aristotle as the author of the division of the :

z

parts of speech into nouns, verbs, and connecting
particles (conjunctions). He agreed with Aristotle
as to the use of the paeanic rhythm, and supported
the view that prose should be rhythmical, but not
metrical.? His extraordinary memory and skill in
solving puzzles were celebrated.

After Greece had lost her freedom and Athens
her independence as the result of the battle of
Chaeronea (338), political oratory gradually declined,
its place being subsequently taken by the rhetoric
of the schools, characterized by a highly artificial
and exaggerated style, the so-called Asianism.
Mention may be made, however, of DemeTRIUS 0
Phalerum (c. 350-283 B.C .), appointed ruler of Athens
by Cassander (317-307 p.c.). A versatile writer,
he was the author of historical, political, and
philosophical treatises, collections of the fables of
Aesop and noteworthy moral maxims (xpetat)s and

@ Demosthenes, 48 3 Quintilian, i. 4. 18.
» For the Theodectea (Rhetoric, iii. 9. 9) see later.

xvi

INTRODUCTION

of a lost treatise on Rhetoric in two books.* The
work On Interpretation, dealing with the different
kinds of style, the period, hiatus, and rhetorical
figures, which has come down to us under his name,
is really of much later date. According to Cicero,?
‘he was the first who altered the character of oratory,
rendering it weak and effeminate, and preferred to
be thought agreeable rather than dignified. His
flow of language is calm and placid, embellished by
metaphor and metonymy. But his speeches seem
to me to have a genuine Attic flavour.” Quintilian
says: “although he was the first to alter the style
of oratory for the worse, I must confess that he
was an able and eloquent speaker, and deserves to
be remembered as almost the last of the Attic orators
worthy to be called by that name.” ¢

The writers of the “ Arts”’ which preceded the
great work of Aristotle had almost entirely devoted
their attention to forensic oratory, adapted to the
requirements of the law courts, for which delibera-
tive oratory, the language of the public assembly,
although the nobler of the two, was neglected. Epi-
deictic or display oratory ¢ may certainly be said to

@ A list of his works is given in the life of him by Diogenes
Laértius. > Brutus, ix. 38, lxxxii. 2853; Orator, xxvii. 92.
© Inst. Orat. x. i. 80.
__# The chief object of epideictic or show-speeches was to
give pleasure to the hearers, whose function in regard to
them is defined (Rhetoric, i. 3. 2) as that of “critics” of the
intellectual performance and ability of the speaker, rather
than that of “judges” of anything of serious importance,
as in deliberative and forensic oratory. Funeral orations
_and speeches at the great public assemblies come under this
head (see also iii. 12. 5). Quintilian (Inst. Orat. iii. 8. 7)
Says that the only result or gain in epideictic oratory is
praise, not anything of practical value.

XVii

INTRODUCTION

have existed since the time of Gorgias, but it is not
spoken of as being on an equality with the two other
branches. The creator of a systematic and scientific
“ Art” of Rhetoric is Aristotle. The unsatisfactory
character of previous productions, whose compilers
had neglected the all-important subject of “ proofs ”
and confined themselves chiefly to appeals to the
emotions and things irrelevant to the matter in
hand, induced him to attack the subject from the
point of view of a philosopher and psychologist, not
from that of the mere rhetorician, which assuredly
Aristotle was not.

Two of the Platonic dialogues, the Gorgias and the
Phaedrus, deal more or less with the subject of
rhetoric, although they differ as to the manner in
which it is discussed and in the attitude adopted
towards it. In the Gorgias, the earlier dialogue, the
discussion mainly turns upon the meaning of the
term—the nature of rhetoric not its value, and vari-
ous definitions proposed are critically examined,
amended, or narrowed down. Rhetoric is the arti-
ficer of persuasion, and its function is to persuade the ©
unintelligent multitude in the law courts and public —
assemblies in regard to justice and injustice. But
the result of such persuasion is not the acquisition of |
knowledge ; it merely produces belief, which is—
sometimes false, sometimes true, whereas knowledge _
is always true. The time at the speaker’s disposal is —
not sufficient for the thorough discussion of such im-~
portant subjects that leads to truth. Nevertheless, ©
the practised rhetorician will be more successful than _
the expert in persuading his hearers on any subject.
whatever, even such matters as the building of walls

XViii

:

:
:

INTRODUCTION

and dockyards, although he knows nothing about
them. It is sufficient for him to have acquired the
power of persuasion, which will enable him to con-
vince an ignorant audience that he knows more than
those who possess real knowledge. This is sufficient
to show the great power of the rhetorician, which
must not, however, be abused; but if it is, the
teacher cannot be blamed.

Socrates himself, being asked to give his definition

_of rhetoric, replies that it is not an art at all, but a
mere knack of gratifying and pleasing the hearer.

It is a species of the genus flattery, like cookery (the
art of making dainties), cosmetic (of adorning the
person), and sophistic. Mind and body have, each
of them, a really healthy condition and a condition
that is only apparently healthy. The art that is
concerned with the mind is the political art, its
branches are legislation and justice ; that which is
concerned with the body has no special name, its
branches are gymnastic and medicine. Each of
these true arts has a sham counterpart; sophistic
corresponding to legislation, rhetoric to justice,
cosmetic to gymnastic, cookery to medicine. The
end of the true arts is what is good for mind or body ;
of the false, immediate gratification. Rhetoric is
not a true art, and the power of the rhetorician is of
the slightest, since he can only carry out what seems
to him to be best, not what he really wishes to attain
—happiness and well-being. The paradoxes, that
it is worse to do wrong than to suffer wrong, and that
it is better for the wrongdoer to be punished than to

* Aristotle (Rhetoric, i. 1. 13) points out that the objection

that rhetoric may be abused is applicable to everything
that is good and useful, except virtue.

4 xix

INTRODUCTION

escape punishment, lead to the conclusion that the
only use of rhetoric is, if we have done wrong, to —
enable us to accuse ourselves (and similarly our
parents, children, friends, or country) and to bring
our misdeeds to light, that we may be punished and
healed ; but, if an enemy is the offender, to prevent
his being punished, so that he may spend the rest
of his life in misery.

The difference between Plato’s treatment of
rhetoric in the Phaedrus and in the Gorgias and his
attitude towards it are obvious.?. The latter dealt
chiefly with various definitions of rhetoric and its
nature as expounded by its professors; the former
is a philosophical theory of rhetoric as it ought to be,
if it is to justify its claim to be considered a true art.
It is not an out-and-out condemnation of sophistical
rhetoric. Although the rules contained in the
“ Arts’ of Thrasymachus, Theodorus, and others
are rejected as absurd and useless, it is admitted that
there is some practical benefit in its teaching?” But
it is unsystematic and, not being based upon truth,
cannot be properly called an art, but is merely a
preliminary training.

The basis of the discussion is an erotic speech by
Lysias (read by Phaedrus), which is criticized by
Socrates with the object of showing the superiority
of his own speech and method. According to him,
this is chiefly shown in the due observation of the
two great principles of generalization and division,
which are effected by Dialectic, “ the coping-stone
of all learning and the truest of all sciences,’’* to

4 Cope, however, does not admit this.

» On this ep. Rhetoric, i. 1. 12.

¢ Republic, 534 ©. On the relation of Rhetoric to Dialectic
see Glossary.

XX

INTRODUCTION

which rhetoric is indebted for nearly everything of
value that it contains.

But the most important point is that the founda-
tion of true rhetoric is psychology, the science of
mind (soul), as already hinted in the definition here
accepted by Plato (Yvyxaywyia dud Adyov, “ winning
men’s minds by words,” as contrasted with the vague
mevOovs Syprovpyds). The true rhetorician is as-
sumed to have already settled the question whether
all mind is one, or multiform. If it is multiform, he
must know what are its different varieties ; he must
also be acquainted with all the different forms of
argument, and know what particular forms of it are
likely to be effective as instruments of persuasion
in each particular case. But a merely theoretical
knowledge of this is not sufficient; he must have
practical experience to guide him, and must be
able to decide without hesitation to which class
of mind his hearers belong and to seize the
opportune moment for the employment of each
kind of discourse. A knowledge of the various
rhetorical styles and figures of diction is also a
useful accessory.

In view of these facts, the three (in particular the
first two) books of Aristotle’s Rhetoric have been
described as ‘‘ an expanded Phaedrus.’’* Thus, the
_ first book deals-with the means_of_persuasion, the
logical proofs based upon dialectic ; the second with
the psychological or ethical proofs, based upon a
knowledge of the human emotions and their causes,
and of the different types of character. The ques-
tions of style and arrangement (which are only
cursorily alluded to in the Phaedrus in reference to

2 Thompson, Introduction, p. xx.
Xxi

INTRODUCTION

the superiority of oral to written instruction) are
treated, but less fully, in the third book.

In addition to the Rhetoric, Aristotle was the author
of several other rhetorical works, which have been
lost. Six of these are mentioned in the Life of him
by Diogenes Laértius: (1) A collection of previous
“ Arts” of Rhetoric (Svvaywy) texvdv), a kind of
literary history of the subject *; (2) a dialogue called
Gryllus, written in commemoration of his friend of
that name, who was the son of Xenophon and fell in
the battle of Mantinea (362 B.c.) ; (3), (4), (5) simply
called “ Arts ” of Rhetoric in two, one, and two books
respectively ; (6) the T'heodectea (Rhetoric, iii. 9. 9).
There has been considerable discussion as to the
authorship of the last, but it is now generally agreed
that it is an earlier work of Aristotle, re-edited later,
dealing mainly with style and composition, and that
he named it after his friend and pupil. Its identifica-
tion with the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum is rejected.

The date of the Rhetoric, which was written at
Athens, is assigned to his second residence there
(335-322), about 330 B.c. (at the earliest 335), al-
though the exact year cannot be determined. The
latest historical events which are referred to are :
(ii. 23. 6) the embassy of Philip of Macedon to the
Thebans, asking for a free passage for his army
through their territory, so that he might attack
Attica (Oct. Nov. 339); (ii. 23. 18) the peace con-
cluded at Corinth soon after the accession of Alex-
ander (autumn, 336); (ii. 24. 8) the attribution by

* Cicero, De Oratore, xxxviii. 160: librum, in quo exposuit
dicendi artes omnium superiorum.

Xxii

INTRODUCTION

Demades of the responsibility for the misfortunes of
Greece to Demosthenes, but there is nothing to
show whether the reference is to a time before or
after Chaeronea. In this connexion it may be noted
that the political opponents of Demosthenes de-
elared that all that was best in his speeches was
borrowed from Aristotle, whereas Dionysius of Hali-
carnassus “ endeavours to show that the Rhetoric was
not written until after the delivery of the orator’s
most important speeches.

It is remarkable that Aristotle, while freely draw-
ing upon Isocrates, whose name is mentioned seve: al
times, to illustrate points of style, never once quotes
from Demosthenes. The name of the latter occurs
three times in the Rhetoric : in iii. 4. 3 it is suggested
that the Athenian general, not the orator, is meant ;
in ii. 24. 8 it occurs in reference to the fallacy of
treating as a cause what is not really so; in ii. 23.3
it is also doubtful whether the orator is referred to.
Nothing is known of Nicanor, and if necessary to con-
nect Demosthenes with the affair, it has been suggested
to read Nicodemus, in whose murder he was suspected
of being concerned (Demosthenes, Midias, p. 549).

Isocrates is most highly spoken of in the Phaedrus,
but his relations with Aristotle were, according to
ancient authorities, the reverse of friendly. The
chief reason for this seems to have been that Aristotle
had started a school of Rhetoric, which threatened to
endanger the popularity of that of his older rival.
According to Cicero,® “ Aristotle, seeing that Iso-
crates was prospering and had a number of dis-
tinguished pupils (the result of having removed his

® First Letter to Ammaeus (ed. W. R. Roberts), 1901.

» De Oratore, iii. 35. 141.
xxiii

INTRODUCTION

disputations from forensic and political causes and
transferred them to an empty elegance of style),
himself suddenly changed the form of his teaching
almost entirely, slightly altering a verse in the
Philoctetes.* The original has, ‘ It is disgraceful to
remain silent and allow barbarians to speak,’ where
Aristotle substituted Jsocrates for barbarians. And
so he ornamented and embellished the entire system
of teaching rhetoric and united a knowledge of
things with practice in speaking.”’ Further, Aristotle
had attacked Isocrates, either in the Gryllus or the
treatise on the different “‘ Arts’ of rhetoric, which
called forth a lengthy reply from Cephisodorus, one
of the pupils of Isocrates, in which various theories of
Aristotle were criticized, and the philosopher himself
stigmatized as a drunkard and a gourmandizer. Iso-
crates himself is said to have entered the lists; for
the reference to “three or four sophists of the
common herd who pretended to know everything,” ?
is supposed to be meant for Aristotle, who is also
attacked in the fifth Letter of Isocrates. The numer-
ous citations from Isocrates in the Rhetoric have been
explained by the assumption that, in a revised edition
of his work, Aristotle retained the examples of an
earlier Ms., dating from a time (347) when Isocrates
held the field and Demosthenes had not yet made
his name. But the view is generally held that the
Rhetoric was not published till at least ten years later,
and in any case there seems no reason why a writer
should not quote from the works of an unfriendly
rival, if they seemed best suited for his purpose.

A brief notice must here be given of the Rhetorica

* A lost play of Euripides. » Panathenaicus, 20.
Xxiv

INTRODUCTION

ad Alexandrum, which gets its title from the admit-
tedly spurious letter of dedication to the great
Macedonian. More than half the length of our
Rhetoric, it was formerly printed with Aristotle’s
works as his. Its genuineness was first doubted by
Erasmus, followed by the well-known commentator
Vittorio (Victorius), who did not hesitate to ascribe
it to Anaximenes (c. 380-320), an historian and rhe-
torician of the time of Alexander the Great, whose
tutor and friend he was and his companion in his
Persian campaigns. Anaximenes is said to have
been the first to practise extempore speaking, to have
devoted his attention to all three branches of Rhe-
toric, and to have written an “ Art.” The question
of authorship is generally regarded as settled in
favour of Anaximenes by the arguments of Spengel
(who certainly is obliged to take considerable liberties
in some passages of the text without ms. authority)
and Wendland. Cope, whose Introduction to Aris-
totle’s Rhetoric contains a detailed analysis of the
work and its language, and a full discussion of the
question, supports Spengel’s view, while admitting
that “ the evidence for the authorship of Anaximenes
is not quite all that could be desired.” His opinion
of the work itself, which he says may be fairly called
“An Art of Cheating,” is in the highest degree un-
favourable.

Other views are: (1) That it is a genuine work of
Aristotle. This is supported by the former Presi-
dent of Corpus Christi College, Oxford.* (2) That

it is a compilation by two, or even three hands, dating

* Thomas Case (president 1904-1924), in his article
** Aristotle” in the eleventh edition of the Encyclopedia
Britannica.

XXV

INTRODUCTION

at the earliest from the first or second century 4.D.,
and showing such numerous and striking resemblances
to the Rhetoric of Aristotle that it must have been
based upon it.* (3) That it is a hodge-podge of very
much later date. Other critics, however, maintain
that the author (or authors) was unacquainted with
Aristotle’s work, and that the resemblances between
the two are not sufficiently strong to justify the
theory of dependence. Further, the historical
allusions in the Ad Alexandrum (regarded chronologic-
ally) are taken to show that it preceded the Rhetoric
of Aristotle, and was written about 340 B.c. There is
nothing about the relations of Athens with Philip
and Alexander, but the Athenian naval league,
Sparta, and Thebes are often mentioned. The
latest event referred to is the defeat of the Carthagin-
ians in Sicily by Timoleon (343). The beginning of
the treatise is first definitely spoken of by Syrianus
(In Hermogenem Commentaria, 133. 9) a Neo-Platonist
of the fifth century a.p2

Full information concerning the mss. of our
Rhetoric and other matters connected with the text
and arrangement of the work is given by A. Roemer
in his critical edition (Teubner Series, 1899). The
oldest and by far the best of the first-class Mss. is
the Paris A° of the eleventh century, which also
contains the Poetics ; those of the second class are
all inferior. Midway between the two in point of

* Barthélemy St. Hilaire, who includes it in his translation
of the works of Aristotle, with a Preface in which he supports
the above view.

® For another account of the work consult Brzoska’s
article Anaximenes in Pauly-Wissowa, Real-Encyklopddie.
To the Bibliography P. Wendland, Anaximenes von Lam-
psakos, 1905, may be added.

XXvi

INTRODUCTION

value is placed the old Latin translation by William
of Moerbeke (thirteenth century), which, being ex-
tremely literal, is frequently of considerable service
in determining the text of the original ms. from
which the translation was made. It is not, however,
to be taken for granted that this vetusta translatio
(Vet. Tr.) reproduces the text of only one Ms. ;
further, it may represent in places a marginal gloss
or conjectural reading ; also, Moerbeke’s knowledge
of Greek is said to have been very limited. The
conclusion arrived at by Roemer (p. xix) is that the
present text represents the fusion of two copies of
unequal length, the shorter of which contains a
number of haphazard insertions by the copyist from
the longer recension or alterations of his own. The
original text has perished.

The genuineness of the whole of Book III., which
originally may have been an independent supple-
ment, has been disputed, but it is now generally
recognized as Aristotle’s. The numerous gaps, lack
of connexion and arrangement“ (a common feature,
indeed, of all the Aristotelian writings), and textual
errors have been attributed to the unsatisfactory
manner in which the reports of three different lectures
were made and put together by his pupils and to the
lecturer’s own faulty enunciation.

The present text (which makes no pretence of
being a critical one) is based upon that of Bekker
(Oxford, 1837), but numerous alterations, suggested
by Roemer and others, have been incorporated.
Several of these are also mentioned in the Notes to
the Translation.

@ Such as the position of ii. 18-26, which should properly
come before 1-17.

XXVil

BIBLIOGRAPHY ¢

Grenerat.—L. Spengel, Artiwm Scriptores, 1828; A.
Westermann, Geschichte der Beredtsamkeit, 1833-35; E.
Havet, Etude sur la Rhétorique d’Aristote, 1846; E. M.
Cope in the Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology, i., ii.,
ili., Cambridge, 1854, etc., and translation, with Intro-
duction, of Plato’s Gorgias, 1864; W. H. Thompson,
editions of Plato’s Phaedrus, 1868, Gorgias, 1871; G.
Perrot, L’ Eloquence politique et judiciaire & Athénes, pt. i.
1873 ; A.S. Wilkins, Introduction to his edition of Cicero,
De Oratore, 1879 ; Grote’s Aristotle, 1880; J. E. Sandys,
Introduction to his edition of Cicero, Orator, 1885, and
History of Classical Scholarship, i. pp. 76-82, ed. 3, 1921;
Grant’s Ethics of Aristotle, i. 104-153 (1885); R. Volk-
mann, Die Rhetorik der Griechen und Rémer, ed. 2, 1885 ;
F. Blass, Die attische Beredsamkeit, ed. 2, 1887-98; E.
Norden, Die antike Kunstprosa, 1898; R. C. Jebb, The
Attie Orators from Antiphon to Isaeus, 1893; Octave
Navarre, Essai sur la rhétorique grecque avant Aristote,
Paris, 1900; W. Suess, Ethos. Studien zu der alten grie-
chischen Rhetorik, 1910; 'T. Gomperz, Griechische Denker,
Eng. trans., i. pp. 412-490, iv. pp. 435-460 (1901-1912) ;
Aristotle, Politics, ed. W. L. Newman, 1887-1902; W. R.
Roberts, The Literary Letters of Dionysius of Halicarnassus,
1901, and On Literary Composition, 1910, Demetrius, On
Style, 1902, Longinus, On the Sublime, 1907 (text, Eng.
trans., notes, and glossaries); Aristotle’s Poetics, ed.

“ To most of the books here mentioned the translator, in
one way or another, desires to acknowledge his obligations.

He ought, perhaps, to mention that his translation was
completed before he consulted those of Jebb and Welldon.

XXViii

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bywater, 1909; Histories of Greek Literature: Miiller
and Donaldson, ii., 1858; M. Croiset, 1887-1899, abridged
ed. (Eng. trans.), 1904; J. P. Mahaffy, ed. 3, 1895;
Gilbert Murray, 1897 ; W. Christ, ed. 6, 1912, i. pp. 541-
607 ; numerous articles in German periodicals, the most
important of which are given by Roemer and Christ. In
addition to the glossaries in W. R. Roberts’ works, consult
also J. C. G. Ernesti, Lewicon Technologiae Graecorum
Rhetoricae, 1795, the only separate work of the kind;
Bonitz, Index Aristotelicus, will also be found useful.

Eprrions.—Text only: I. Bekker, Oxford, 1837; A.
Roemer, ed. 2, 1898, with long critical Introduction and
Notes, references to the source of quotations, and full
Apparatus Criticus (see also Zur Kritik der Rhetorik des
A,, an article by him in Rheinisches Museum, xxxix. 1884,
pp. 491-510). With Notes: P. Victorius (Vittorio,
Vettori), 1579; E. M. Cope, an exhaustive commentary
in 3 vols., ed. J. E. Sandys, 1877. The last, together with
Cope’s Introduction to the Rhetoric of Aristotle, 1867,
stands first and foremost (in fact, almost alone) as a help
to the English reader of the original. It must be ad-
mitted, however, that the diffuseness, lengthy parentheses,
and wealth of detail sometimes make it difficult “‘ to see
the wood for the trees,’’ while many of the purely gram-
matical notes might have been shortened or omitted.*
Spengel’s edition, 1867, with notes in Latin and containing
William de Moerbeke’s old translation, is strongest on
the critical side and in illustrations from the ancient
orators, but less helpful exegetically ; Variorum Edition,
Oxford, 1820 (the name of Gaisford, the real editor, does
not appear); F. J. Parsons, Oxford, 1836.

TrRaANsLAtiIons.—Barthélemy St. Hilaire (including
Rhetorica ad Alexandrum) in his translation of A.’s works;

# It may be noted that Prof. W. R. Roberts, of Leeds, well
known for his work in kindred fields, in the Preface to his
edition of the Literary Letters of Halicarnassus, promises a
critical and annotated edition of the Rhetoric with notes.

XXix

BIBLIOGRAPHY

T. A. Buckley (including the Poetics), 1850 (Bohn’s
Classical Library); N. Bonafous, Paris, 1856; J. E. C.
Welldon, 1886, with notes and full analysis; R.C. Jebb
(edited by J. E. Sandys with Introduction and additional
notes), 1909.

The following abbreviations have been used in the
Notes :

P.L.G.—T. Bergk, Poetae Lyrici Graeci, ii. (1915), iii.
(1914).¢ 7.G.F.—A. Nauck, Tragicorum Graecorum Frag-
menta, 1889. C.A.F.—T. Kock, Comicorum Atticorum
Fragmenta, 1880-88.

@ Reference should also be made to Lyra Graeca(J. M.
Edmonds, 1922, in the Loeb Classical Library).

XXX

ANALYSIS
Boox I

(i) Rurroric is a counterpart of dialectic, which
it resembles in being concerned with matters of
common knowledge, and not with any special science.
Rhetoric is also an art ; since it is possible to reduce
to a system the means by which the rhetorician
obtains success. Previous compilers of “‘ Arts’ of
Rhetoric have neglected enthymemes, which are “ the
body ” of proof, and have confined themselves to
appeals to the passions, which are irrelevant and only
have the effect of biasing the judge.

Although deliberative oratory is nobler than foren-
sic, men prefer the latter, because it offers more
opportunity for irrelevance and chicanery. Ae

The_rhetorical (as contrasted with the strictly
scientific) method of demonstration is the enthy-
meme, which is a kind of syllogism, Therefore one _
who is thoroughly acquainted with the nature of the
logical syllogism will be most likely to prove a master
of enthymemes.

However, notwithstanding the unsatisfactory
nature of previous “ Arts,” rhetoric is undoubtedly
useful: (1) when truth and justice fail through in-
efficient advocates, the skilled rhetorician will set
this right ; (2) it enables a man to state his case in

; XXxi

ANALYSIS

popular, not in scientific language, which would be
unintelligible to some of his hearers ; (3) it enables
him to prove opposites, and to refute an opponent
who makes an unfair use of arguments ; (4) it pro-
vides an efficient defence. If it be objected that it
does much harm when unfairly used, this applies to
every good thing, except virtue.

(ii) Rhetoric may be defined as the faculty of
discerning the possible means of persuasion in each
particular case. These consist of proofs, which are
(1) inartificial (see xv.); (2),artificial. The latter
are of three kinds: (1) ethical, derived from the
moral character of the speaker; (2) emotional, the
object of which is to put the hearer into a certain
frame of mind ; (3) logical, contained in the speech
itself when a real or apparent truth is demonstrated.
The orator must therefore be a competent judge of
virtue and character; he must have a thorough
knowledge of the emotions (or passions) ; and he must
possess the power of reasoning. This being so,
rhetoric must be considered as an offshoot of dialec-
tic and of politics (including ethics).

There are two kinds of logical proof: (1) deduc-
tive—the enthymeme ; (2) inductive—the example.
Enthymeme is a rhetorical syllogism, example a
rhetorical induction.

Rhetoric does not consider what is probable for
individuals, but for certain classes of individuals ;
and derives its material from the usual subjects of
deliberation, which are necessarily contingent, for
no one deliberates about what is certain. Hence
enthymeme and example are concerned with things
which, generally speaking, admit of being otherwise
than they are.

XXxii

ANALYSIS

Enthymemes are formed from (1) probabilities ;
(2) signs. Signs are of two kinds: (1) necessary
(tekméria) ; (2) unnecessary, which have no distinctive
name, and are related (a) as particular to universal,
(6) as universal to particular. The example defined.
Enthymemes are of two kinds: those which are de-
duced from (1) general truths, (2) special truths—
from general or special ‘‘ topics ’’ or commonplaces.

(iii) There are three kinds of rhetoric, correspond-
ing to the three kinds of hearers; for the hearer
must be either (1) a judge of the future ; or (2) a
judge of the past ; or (3) a mere “ spectator ”’ (critic)
of the orator’s skill. Hence the three kinds of rhe-
toric are: (1) deliberative ; (2) forensic; (3) epi-
deictie. ;
~The business of the deliberative kind is to exhort
or dissuade, its time the future, its end the expedient
or the harmful: of the forensic to accuse or defend,
its time the past, its end the just or the unjust ; of
the epideictic praise or blame, its time the present
(sometimes the past or the future), its end the noble
or the disgraceful.

All orators must, in addition, have ready for use a
stock of propositions relating to the possible and the
impossible ; to the truth (or the contrary) of a past
or a future fact; to the great and small, and the
greater and less. .

(iv) Deliberative oratory deals with contingent
things, not with all, but only with such as are within
our control; that which necessarily happens, or
cannot possibly happen, is not a subject for con-
sideration. Its most important topics are: (1) ways
and means ; (2) war and peace; (3) defence of the
country ; (4) imports and exports; (5) legislation.

c XXxXili

ANALYSIS

(v) The aim of all men is happiness, which is the
subject of all exhortation and dissuasion. Definition
of happiness. Its component parts are: noble birth ;
many and good friends; wealth; the blessing of
many and good children; a good old age; health ;
beauty ; strength; stature; athletic skill; a good
reputation ; good fortune ; virtue.

(vi) The special end of the deliberative orator
is that which is expedient; and since that which
is expedient is a good, he must establish the
general principles of the good and the expedient.
Definition of the good. Indisputable and disputable
goods.

(vii) The greater and less degree of the expedient
and the good.

(viii) The deliberative orator must also be ac-
quainted with the different forms of government ;
democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, monarchy, the
ends of which are freedom, wealth, education in
accordance with the constitution. An unrestricted
monarchy is called a tyranny, and its end is personal
protection.

(ix) Epideictic oratory deals with praise or censure,
the objects of which are the noble and the disgraceful,
virtue and vice. (In discussing these, incidentally
the orator will be able to produce a certain impres-
sion as to his own moral character, the ethical kind
of proof mentioned in ii.)

The component parts of virtue are: justice,
courage, self-control, magnificence, magnanimity,
liberality, mildness, wisdom (both practical and
speculative).

For purposes of praise or censure qualities which
are closely akin may be regarded as identical. We

XXXiv

ANALYSIS

should consider our audience, and praise that to
which they attach special importance; and also
endeavour to show that one whom we praise has
acted with deliberate moral purpose, even in the
case of mere coincidences and accidents.

Praise and encomium differ, in that the former com-
mends the greatness of a virtue, while the latter is
concerned with the things actually achieved.

Amplification also should be frequently made use
of, and the person whom it is desired to praise should
be compared with men of renown, or at any rate with
other men generally. Amplification is most suitable
to epideictic oratory; example to deliberative ;
enthymeme to forensic.

(x) Forensic oratory, which deals with accusation
and defence, requires the consideration of (1) the
motives of wrongdoing ; (2) the frame of mind of
the wrongdoer ; (3) the kind of people to whom he
does wrong. Wrongdoing is defined as voluntarily
inflicting injury contrary to the law. A voluntary
act is one committed with full knowledge and without
compulsion, and as a rule with deliberate purpose.
The causes of wrongdoing are depravity and lack of
self-control. Its motives arise from human actions
generally, which are voluntary or involuntary. There
are four causes of voluntary action: habit, reason,
anger, desire ; of involuntary action, three: chance,
nature, compulsion. The motives of the first are
the good or the apparently good, and the pleasant or
the apparently pleasant. The good has been already
discussed (vi.), so that it only remains to speak of
the pleasant.

(xi) Definition of the pleasant and a list of
pleasant things.

XXXV

ANALYSIS

(xii) The frame of mind of the wrongdoer, and the
classes of people liable to suffer wrong.

(xiii) Laws being special or general, so also are
just and unjust acts, according as they affect the in-
dividual or the community. Hence it is necessary
to have an exact definition of acts of injustice, be-
cause it often happens that a person, while admitting
the commission of an act, will deny the description
of it and its application.

There are two kinds of rules in regard to just and
unjust acts, written (prescribed by the laws) and un-
written. The latter refer to the excess of virtue or
vice, involving praise or disgrace, honour or dis-
honour ; or they supply the omissions, voluntary or
involuntary, in the written law. This supplementary
justice is equity, defined as justice independent of
the written law. “‘ Equitable ’’ acts-are such as may
be treated with leniency, and equity considers the
intention or moral purpose of the agent rather than
the act itself.

(xiv) The degrees of wrongdoing.

(xv) Inartificial-proofs, which are specially adapted
to forensic oratory, are five in number: laws, wit-
nesses, contracts, torture, oaths. or

Boox II

(i) Since, in both deliberative and forensic oratory,
it is a question of a decision being reached, the orator
should consider, not only how to convince or persuade,
but also how to create a certain impression of him-
self, and to put the judge into a certain frame of
XXXV1

ANALYSIS

mind, ‘The former is more important in the assembly,
‘the latter in the law courts. The three qualities
necessary to enable the speaker to convince the
audience of his trustworthiness are : practical wisdom,
virtue, and goodwill. How to obtain a reputation for
wisdom and virtue will be clear from what has already
been said concerning the virtues (i. 9); goodwill
requires a knowledge of the—emotions. Each of
these falls under three heads : (1) the frame of mind
which produces it ; (2) those who are the objects of
it ; (3) the usual occasions of it.

(ii) Anger and Slight. There are three kinds of
the latter: contempt, spite, and insolence. The
frame of mind in which, and towards whom, men feel
anger.

(iii) Mildness. The frame of mind and the situa-
tions in which, and the persons towards whom, men
feel mildness.
men feel friendship, and for what reason. Its
opposite is hatred, the causes of which are anger,
spite, and slander. Anger and hatred compared.

(v) Fear. Things which are objects of fear, and
the feélings of those affected by it. Its opposite is
boldness or confidence.

(vi) Shame and shamelessness. Persons in whose
presence men feel shame, and the frame of mind in
which they feel it.

(vii) Favour or benevolence. The means of dis-
posing the hearer favourably or the reverse in regard
to acts of benevolence.

(viii) Pity. Persons who are inclined to pity or
the reverse. Things and persons that arouse pity.
The difference between pity and horror.

XXXVii

ANALYSIS

(ix) The particular opposite of pity is virtuous in-
dignation. Envy also is an opposite of pity, but in a
different way, being a pain at the good fortune of
others (not because they are undeserving of it) who
are our likes and equals. Those who arouse virtuous
indignation, those who are likely to feel it, and on
what occasions.

(x) Envy defined more at length. Persons who
are liable to be the objects of envy, and the things
which excite it.

(xi) Emulation. How it differs from envy.
Persons likely to feel it, and the things which arouse
it. Its opposite is contempt.

(xii) The characters of men must be considered
with reference to their moral habits (i. 9) and their
emotions (ii. 1), and their ages : youth, the prime of
life, old age. Character of the young.

(xiii) Character of the old.

(xiv) Character of those in the prime of life.

(xv-xvii) Character as affected by the goods of
fortune, such as noble birth, wealth, power, and good
fortune.

(xviii, xix) The topics common to all three kinds
of rhetoric are : (1) the possible and the impossible ;
(2) whether a thing has happened or not ; (3) whether
a thing will happen or not ; (4) greatness or small-
ness, including amplification and depreciation.

(xx) The proofs common to all three kinds of
rhetoric are : example and enthymeme (maxims being
included under the latter). Examples are either (1)
statements of things that have actually happened ;
or (2) invented by the speaker, consisting of (@) com-
parisons, (b) fables.

(xxi) Maxims are general statements relating to

XXXViii

ANALYSIS

human actions, and teach what should be chosen
or avoided. Maxims are the conclusions and
premises of enthymemes, when the form of the
syllogism is absent ; when the why and the wherefore
are added, the result is a true enthymeme. The
four kinds of maxims. Directions for their use.

(xxii) Enthymemes must be neither too far-
fetched nor too general; they must not be drawn
from all opinions, but from such as are defined (e.g.
by the judges) : and conclusions must not be drawn
only from necessary, but also from probable, pre-
mises. The speaker must also be acquainted with
the special elements of the case. Enthymemes are :
(1) demonstrative, which draw a conclusion from
acknowledged premises ; (2) refutative, which draw
a conclusion which is not admitted by the opponent.-

(xxiii) Twenty-eight topics or elements (for the
two are identical) of demonstrative and refutative
enthymemes.

(xxiv) Ten topics of apparent enthymemes
(fallacies).

(xxv) Solution (refutation) of arguments may be
effected by (1) counter-conclusions, (2) objections.
The latter are obtained: (1) from the thing itself
(the opponent’s enthymeme) ; (2) from an opposite ;
or (3) similar thing ; (4) from previous decisions of
well-known persons. There are four sources of
enthymemes: the probable; the example; the
necessary, and the fallible, sign. As the probable is
that which happens generally, but not always, an
enthymeme from probabilities and examples may
always be refuted by an objection, not always real
but sometimes fallacious ; fallible signs also may be
refuted, even if the facts are true (i. 2.18). Infallible

XXXIX

ANALYSIS

signs cannot be refuted, unless the premises can be
shown to be false.

(xxvi) Amplification and depreciation are not
topics of enthymemes, but are themselves enthy-
memes, intended to show that a thing is great or
small. Refutative and constructive enthymemes are
of the same kind, for each infers the opposite of what
has been demonstrated by another. An objection
is not an enthymeme ; it consists in stating a gener-
ally received opinion, from which it appears either
that the argument is not strictly logical or that a
false assumption has been made.

Examples, enthymemes. and, generally speaking,
everything connected with “ the intellect” (duévova),
the inventive part of rhetoric (inventio), having been
discussed, there only remain the questions of style
and arrangement.

Boox III

(i) Style. It is not sufficient to know what to say ;
we must also know how to say it. Delivery (declama-
tion, oratorical action) is chiefly concerned with the
management of the voice, and the employment of
the tones and rhythms. It has hitherto been
neglected, and has not yet been reduced to a system.

(ii) The two chief excellences of style are (1)
clearness, (2) propriety. The first is attained by the
use of terms in their proper sense ; the other terms
enumerated in the Poetics (xxii.) contribute to eleva-
tion and ornamentation,

The language should have a “ foreign’ air, some-

xl

ANALYSIS

thing removed from the commonplace. In’ prose—
and indeed;-in-poetry also—the appearance of arti-
ficiality must be concealed, and that of naturalness
maintained. In prose the only terms suitable are
those in general use and those used in their ordinary
meaning ; also metaphors, for all use metaphors in
ordinary conversation. They produce clearness and
a “foreign” air. They should be proportional, and,
if the object be adornment, taken from the better
things in the same class, if censure, from the worse ;
they should be euphonious; not too far-fetched ;
and taken from things beautiful to the ear or other
senses. Epithets may be taken from the worse or
from the better side.

(iii) Frigidity of style is due to the use of (1) com-
pound words ; (2) uncommon words ;~(3) long, mis-
placed, or heaped up epithets ; (4) unsuitable meta-
phors—ridiculous, too pompous, or too tragic.

(iv) Simile is metaphor enlarged by a particle
of comparison prefixed. Simile is useful in prose,
but must not be used too frequently, for this gives
an air of poetry.

(v) In regard to composition (as contrasted with
the use of single words), the first consideration is
purity ;. which is obtained by (1) the proper use of

‘connecting particles or of clauses; (2) the use of
special, not general terms; (3) of unambiguous
terms ; (4) correct use of genders ; and (5) of numbers.

Written compositions should be easy to read and
easy to utter ; they should neither contain too many
connecting particles, nor be badly punctuated; if
there are two words referring to different senses,
connecting them with a verb which denotes the
operation of only one of these senses should be

xli

ANALYSIS

avoided ; the meaning should be stated at the out-
set, if a number of parentheses are to be inserted,
otherwise obscurity results.

(vi) To secure dignity of style, one should (1) use
definitions instead of names, or vice versa for concise-
ness; (2) if there is anything indecent in the de-
finition, use the name, and vice versa; (3) illustrate
by metaphors and epithets (but avoiding the poetical) ;
(4) use the plural for the singular ; (5) avoid joining
several terms with one article; (6) use connecting
particles or omit them for conciseness, but without
destroying the connexion of ideas; (7) amplify by
using negative epithets to describe anything.

(vii) Propriety of style consists in its being emotional,
ethical, and proportionate to the subject. The first
creates a feeling of sympathy ; the second expresses
character, because every condition of life and moral
habit has a language appropriate to it; the third is
a caution against treating important subjects offhand
or trivial matters in the grand style; nor should
voice and gesture agree too exactly, for then the
artifice is obvious. Compound words, a fair number
of epithets, and “ foreign ’’ words should only be
used by one who is under the influence of passionate
emotion. “

(viii) Prose should not be metrical, but must have
rhythm. Metre distracts the hearer’s attention,
while the absence of rhythm creates unpleasantness
and obscurity. The different kinds of rhythm are :
the heroic, which is too dignified ; the iambic, which
is too ordinary; the trochaic, which is too like a
comic dance ; and the paean, which is of two kinds,
—one (~ uv) suitable to the beginning, the other
(Uv —) to the end of the sentence.

xlii

ANALYSIS

(ix) Style must be (1) continuous or (2) periodic.
The former is unpleasing, because it has no end.in
itself ; whereas in the latter the period has a begin-
ning and end in itself and its length can be taken in
at a glance, so that it is pleasant and easily imparts
information. The period must end with the sense,
and must not be cut off abruptly. Periods contain
either several members (clauses) or one only (simple
periods). But neither members nor periods must
be too short or too prolix. The period of several
members is (1) divided by disjunctives, or (2) anti-
thetical ; in which there is a contrast of sense (there
are also false antitheses). Parisosis is equality of
members, Paromoiosis similarity of sound, either at
the beginning,* or end (Homoeoteleuton) of the
sentence. All three (or four) may occur in the same
sentence,

(x) Easy learning is naturally agreeable to all, ,
and is the result of smartness of style and argument. /
Those arguments are most approved, which are |
neither superficial (obvious at once) nor difficult to
understand, but are understood the moment they
are uttered, or almost immediately afterwards.
Smart sayings and arguments depend upon anti-
thesis, metaphor, and actualization. Metaphors are
of four kinds, the most approved being the propor-
tional.

(xi) Actualization (putting things before the eyes)
consists in representing things in a state of activity
(e.g. representing inanimate things as animate). It
is produced by metaphors and similes, which must
be taken from things-that are familiar, but not

* The technical term is Homoeokatarkton, not mentioned
by Aristotle.

xliii

ANALYSIS

obvious. Apophthegms, well-constructed _ riddles,
paradoxes, jokes, play upon words, proverbs (which
are metaphors from species to species) and hyperbole
are also smart and pleasant.

(xii) Each kind of rhetoric has its own special
style. The written style is ~most~refined; the
agonistic (that of debate) is best suited for declama-
tion, and is ethical or emotional (pathetic). The
deliberative style resembles a rough sketch; the
forensic is more finished; the epideictie is best
adapted for writing and, next to it, the forensic.
Unnecessary classifications of style. This concludes
the treatment of the subject of style.

(xiii) Arrangement. There are two necessary
parts of a speech: (1) statement of the case; (2)
proof. To these may be added exordium and epilogue.
Further divisions are absurd ; even the epilogue is
not always necessary.

(xiv) Exordium is the beginning of a speech, re-
sembling the prologue in poetry and the prelude in
flute-playing. In an epideictic speech it resembles
the musical prelude, and is connected with the body
of the speech by the key-note; it is derived’ from
topics of praise or blame. In a forensic speech, it
resembles the prologue of a play or epic poem;
hence it must declare the object of the speech. In
a deliberative speech, the proems are derived from
those of the forensic, but they are rarest in this kind!
of rhetoric (deliberative), being only needed (1) on!
account of the speaker himself, or (2) of his op-
ponents ; (3) to impress the hearer with the im-
portance or otherwise of the case ; (4) for ornament.

Other exordia are collective and general. The
are derived (1) from the speaker, or (2) from the

xliv

ANALYSIS

opponent ; (3) from the hearer, to make him well-
disposed towards us or ill-disposed towards the op-
ponent ; (4) from the subject, making it out to be
important or unimportant. Arousing the hearer’s
attention belongs to any part of a speech.

(xv) The topics that may be employed in dealing
with slander or prejudice.

(xvi) Narrative, in epideictic speeches should not
be continuous, but disjointed. In forensic, it must
make the subject clear, and the speaker should
narrate what tends to show his own good character
or the opposite in the adversary, or is agreeable to
the judges.

It is of less importance to the defendant, who
should only give a summary of past events unless an
account of them as actually taking place produces.
horror or pity. The narrative should also be ethical
and show the moral purpose, and the various moral
traits that accompany each particular character.
The speaker should also use emotional features.

Narration finds least place in deliberative oratory.

(xvii) Proof, in deliberative oratory, has reference
to (1) the fact, (2) the harm done, (3) the degree
of harm, (4) the justification. In epideictic oratory,
where there is little dispute as to the fact, amplifica-
tion is the chief means of proof. In deliberative
oratory, we must contend that what is predicted by
the adversary will not take place ; or, if it does, that
it will be unjust or inexpedient, for which the re-
sponsibility will rest with him; or that it will be of
less importance than he asserts. We must also look
out for any false statement of his, for they are part
of our proof.

Examples are best suited to deliberative, enthy-

xlv

ANALYSIS

memes to forensic oratory. Enthymemes should
not be used in a series, nor on all subjects, nor to
appeal to the emotions. Maxims may be used in
both proof and narrative, for maxims are ethical.

Deliberative oratory is harder than forensic, for it
deals with the unknown future, while forensic deals
with the past, and has law for a foundation ; nor does
deliberative oratory offer so many opportunities for
digression. If you have enthymemes, you should
speak both ethically and demonstratively ; if not,
only ethically.

Refutative enthymemes are more highly thought
of than demonstrative. In dealing with an adversary,
the first speaker should give his proofs and anticipate
the arguments of the other side ; the second speaker
should attack the arguments of the first and draw
counter-syllogisms.

The character of the speaker, since statements
may be made by him that are tactless, offensive, or too
favourable to himself, is best conveyed by putting
them into the mouth of some other person.

Enthymemes may sometimes be stated in the form
of maxims.

(xviii) Interrogation and Ridicule. The first should
be used when the adversary has already made an
admission of such a kind that, when one more ques-
tion is asked, the absurdity will be complete ; when
your conclusion will be established by it ; when his
arguments are shown to be self-contradictory or
paradoxical; when he is reduced to giving sophis-
tical answers. An ambiguous question should be
answered by a regular definition, not too concise ;
by a direct answer before the adversary has finished ;
and by adding the reason for our action at the con-

xlvi

ANALYSIS

clusion. Ridicule is of some use in debate, but the
jokes must be such as befit a gentleman.

(xix) The peroration (epilogue) is composed of
four elements: (1) making the hearer favourable
to yourself and unfavourable to the adversary ; (2)
amplification or depreciation ; (3) putting the hearer
into an emotional frame of mind ; (4) recapitulation.
The speaker must begin by asserting that he has done ~
what he promised ; he must compare his arguments
with those of the adversary, by irony or by interroga-
tion. At the end of a speech connecting particles
may be omitted, to show that it is not an oration, but
a peroration.

xlvii

ARISTOTLE’S
“ART” OF RHETORIC

APIS TOTEAOTS

TEXNH> PHTOPIKH>

A
1354a11, ‘H pyropucy €oTw dyriarpopos Th Suarer-

TU” dupdrepat yap mept TovovTEy Twov eioly a
Kowd Tpomov Twa amavTew €oTl yvwpilew Kal
ovdepds emornpns adwpiopevns. 81d Kal mdvres
TpoTrov TWO. peTéxovow dppotv mavres yap [EXpL
TWos Kal eeralew kal UareXew Adyov Kal dro -
2 Aoyetobar Kai KaTnyopetv eyyeipodow. Ta@v pwev ovv
ToAA@v ot bev elk Tatra. dpaow, ot dé dua ovv-
HOevav dao eLews. eel &° apdorépws evdexera,
OfjAov ore ein dy adra Kal ddorroveiv: 3c" 6 yap
emiTuyxdvovow ot Te dua ovv7Pevav Kal of dard Tav-
Topdrov, TH airiay bewpetv evdexeTat, TO de
Tovovrov On TavTEs av Ouoroynaaey Téxvns Epyov
elvat.
3 Nov pev ody of tas Téxvas TOV Adywv ovvTievTes
OAiyov memopikacw adbris popiov’ at yap mioreis
1 These figures refer to the pages of Bekker’s Berlin
edition (1831).
@ Not an exact copy, but making a kind of pair with it,
and corresponding to it as the antistrophe to the strophe in a

choral ode.
2

ARISTOTLE’S
SCART” OF “RHETORIC

BOOK I

1. Rueroric is a counterpart* of Dialectic; for
both have to do with matters that are in a manner
within the cognizance of all men and not confined °
to any special science. Hence all men in a manner
have a share of both; for all, up to a certain point,
endeavour to criticize or uphold an argument, to
defend themselves or to accuse. Now, the majority
of people do this either at random or with a famili-
arity arising from habit. But since both these
ways are possible, it is clear that matters can be
reduced to a system, for it is possible to examine
the reason why some attain their end by familiarity
and others by chance; and such an examination all
would at once admit to be the function of an art.¢

Now, previous compilers of “ Arts’? of Rhetoric
have provided us with only a small portion of this
art, for proofs are the only things in it that come

» Or “and they (Rhetoric and Dialectic) are not confined.”
¢ The special characteristic of an art is the discovery of a
system or method, as distinguished from mere knack
(€urrecpia).
@ Manuals or handbooks treating of the rules of any art
or science.

3

ARISTOTLE

wv / > / \ > ” ond 3 i
evrexvov eat. povov, Ta 5 dAAa mpoobAKar, ot Se
mepi pev evOvpnudtrwy odbdev A€yovow, Omep €arTi
c@pa ths miotews, mept de tov Ew Tod mpay-

4 patos Ta mAcioTa mpaypatevovTau SuaBoAn yap Kat
€Xcos Kal dpyt) Kal Ta Tovatra 7dOn THs yuyAs od
Tept TOO mpayyatds eoTw adAa mpos Tov SuKaoTiHV.
Wor el mepl mdoas Hv tas Kploes Kabdmep ev
eviais Te vov €oTt THv toAewv Kal pddvera Tats

5 evvomovupevais, ovdev ay elyov 6 TL Aeywow* amravTes
yap ot ev olovras Seiv oTw ToOds vojous ayopeveL,,
of dé Kal yp@vrar Kat KwAvovow e€w Tod mpay-
patos Aéyew, kabdrep Kat ev ’Apelw maya, 6p0ds
TOOTO vopilovres: od yap det TOV Sucaorny dia-
oTpepew els opynv mpodyovras H pOdvov 7 éAcov"

A ”“ ww
OpLovov yap Kav el tis, pe et xphobar Kaveve,
6 robrov Tojocre oTpeBAdv. ere SC havepov dre Tod
\ > B ~ 35 / > Ef A by 1é \
pev dyupoo nrobvros ovdev cor efw Tob SetEar ro
mpayyua OTL €oTW 1 OvK EoTW H yeyovev 7) Ov
/, 2 de / BA A a / a“ 19
yéyovev’ et de péya 7 puuKpov 7) SiKaoy 7 GduKor,
doa pn 6 vopobérns Sudpixev, adrov 8% mov Tov
Suxaorny det yryywoxew Kat od pavOdvew mapa
Tov audvopntrovvTwr.

7 Maddrora pev obv poorer rods 6p0ds Kewevovs
vomous, daa evdéyerar, mavTa Siopilew adrovs, Kal
ort eAdyrora KaTadreirew emi Tots Kpivover, mpOrov
pev Ore Eva AaBely Kai dAiyous paov 7) moAAods ed

1354b Ppovodvras Kal Suvvapevous vouobereiv Kal duxalew-
eve?” at pev voobecia, €x modAod xpdvov oxKe-

@ His functions were a combination of those of the modern
judge and juryman.

» That is, forbid speaking of matters that have nothing
to do with the case.

4

RHETORIC, I. 1. 3-7

within the province of art ; everything else is merely
an accessory. And yet they say nothing about
enthymemes which are the body of proof, but chiefly
devote their attention to matters outside the sub-
“ject; for the arousing of prejudice, compassion,
anger, and similar emotions has no connexion with
the matter in hand, but is directed only to the

dicast.¢ The result would be that, if all trials were —

now carried on as they are in some States, especially
those that are well administered, there would be
nothing left for the rhetorician to say. For all men
either think that all the laws ought so to prescribe,?
or in fact carry out the principle and forbid speaking
outside the subject, as in the court of Areopagus,
and in this they are right, For it is wrong to warp
the dicast’s feelings, to arouse him to anger, jealousy,
or compassion, which would be like making the rule
crooked which one intended to use. Further, it is
evident that the only business of the litigant is to
prove that the fact in question is or is not so, that it
has happened or not; whether it is important or
unimportant, just or unjust, in all cases in which the
legislator has not laid down a ruling, is a matter for
the dicast himself to decide ; it is not the business
of the litigants to instruct him.

First of all, therefore, it is proper that laws, 3

properly enacted, should themselves define the issue
of all cases as far as possible, and leave as little as
possible to the discretion of the judges ; in the first
place, because it is easier to find one or a few men
of good sense, capable of framing laws and _ pro-
nouncing judgements, than a large number; secondly,
legislation is the result of long consideration, whereas

5

<

y

ARISTOTLE

paevw yivovrar, ai dé Kploes e& droyviov, ware
XaAerov arodiddvar TO Sikaov Kal Td aupdépov
KaA@s tovs Kplwovras. TO dé mavTwWY peyLoTOr,
OTL 7) bev TOD vowobéerov Kpicis od KaTa [Lepos,
GAAG rept pedAdvtTwy te Kat Kabddov eotiv, 6 &
exkAnoaoTns Kal SiKaoThs on mEept mapovTwy
Kai adwpiopevwy Kpivovaw: mpos ods Kat TO dideiv
70n Kal TO pucely Kal TO tdiov cupudepov auvijprynrat
moAAdKis, WoTe pnkét. Sivacbar Jewpeiv tkavas
70 aAnbés, GAN emuoKoreivy TH Kpicer TO Wiov Hdd
q Avanpov.

8 Ilept pev obv rdv GAAwv, worep AEéyomer, Set cds
eAaxiorwy troveiy KUpiov Tov KpiTiv> mep) Sé Tod
yeyovevar 7) 17) yeyovevar, 7) €oecOan 7) pn EoeoOar,
7 elvar 7) pn elvar, avayKn emt toils Kpurats Kara-
Neirew: od yap Suvarov radra Tov vowobéerny mpo-

9 et. ei 57 TabO’ otTws exer, davepov Ori Ta Ew
To0 mpdypwatos TtexvoAoyodow dco taAAa Stopi-
Covow, olov ti det 7d mpooipiov 7 Thy Sinynow
exew, Kal TOV dAAwy ExacTov popiwy: ovdey yap ev
adtois dAAo mpaypatevovtar mAiv Omws TOV KpLT?V
Tov TWa ToLnowow. epi S€ THY evTExve”
mioTtewy ovdev Sevkv¥ovaw* TodTO 8 eoTw, bev av
Tis yevoito evOvpnpatiKds.

10 Ava yap rotro tis adrijs ovons p<Oddov rept Ta
Snunyopica Kal Sikavikd, Kal KadAiovos Kal moAu-
TiKWTEpas THs SnunyopiKis mpayparelas ovens 7)

¢ Systematic logical proofs (enthymeme, example), includ-
ing testimony as to character and appeals to the emotions
(2. 3), which the rhetorician has to invent (eipeiv, inventio)
for use in particular cases. They are contrasted with “ in-

artificial” proofs, which have nothing to do with the rules of
the art, but are already in existence, and only need to be

6

RHETORIC, I. 1. 7-10

judgements are delivered on the spur of the moment,
so that it is difficult for the judges properly to decide
questions of justice or expediency. But what is
most important of all is that the judgement of the
legislator does not apply to a particular case, but is
universal and applies to the future, whereas the
member of the public assembly and the dicast have
to decide present and definite issues, and in their
case love, hate, or personal interest is often involved,
so that they are no longer capable of discerning the ,
truth adequately, their judgement being obscured
by their own pleasure or pain.

All other cases, as we have just said, should be
left to the authority of the judge as seldom as
possible, except where it is a question of a thing
having happened or not, of its going to happen or
not, of being or not being so; this must be left to
the discretion of the judges, for it is impossible for
the legislator to foresee such questions. If this is
so, it is obvious that all those who definitely lay
down, for instance, what should be the contents of
the exordium or the narrative, or of the other parts
of the discourse, are bringing under the rules of art
what is outside the subject ; for the only thing to
which their attention is devoted is how to put the
judge into a certain frame of mind. They give no
account of the artificial proofs,* which make a man
a master of rhetorical argument.

Hence, although the method of deliberative and
forensic Rhetoric is the same, and although the
pursuit of the former is nobler and more worthy of
a statesman than that of the latter, which is limited

made use of. The former are dealt with in chs. iv.-xiv., the
latter in ch. xv. of this book.

7

1355a

11

ARISTOTLE

THS Tepl Ta ouvalddypara, Tept pev exelyns oddev
A€yovor, mept de rob SiucdLlecbas mdvres TeUp@vT aL
Texvodoyeiv, OTL HTTOv é€oT. mpo Epyov Ta eEw Tod
Tpayparos Aéyew év Tots Snunyopucots Kal Hyrrov
€oTt KaKkodpyov 1 Onunyopta duxodAoyias, ore Kow6-
TEpoV. evra00a, pev yap 6 KpiTis Trept oixelov
Kpivet, Wot ovdev GAAo Set Av amodeiEau re
oUTws exes ws dnow 6 avpBovredwv: ev dé Tots
duxaviKois ovx tkavov TobTo, d.AAd. T™po Epyov cory
dvadaBetv TOV ducpoariy: Tmepl aMorpiwy yap iY
Kplows, wore mos TO avTa@v oKoTOUpevot Kal 7pos
xdpw aKkpowpevor diddac. Tois apudiofnrotow,
aad’ od Kpivovow. 810 Kal moAAaxod, womep Kal
mporepov eimov, 6 vopos kwdvev Aéeyew e€w Tob
mpdyparos® €xel 8° avdrot of Kpital TobTo THpovow
ixavas.

"Exel 5é€ davepoy éotw dtu 7) bev evTexvos
pe0od0s epi Tas micTers eoriv, 7» Se mioTis amd-
deikis tis (TOTE yap mioTEVopwev ddvoTa Grav azmo-
SedetyOar JrorAdBwpev), Cot. 8° adders PyTopiK?
evOdunpa, Kal €oTt TOOTO ws eimetvy amADs Kupiay-
Tarov dav miorewv, TO O° evOduqpa ovMoy.opos
Tis, mept de ovMoyopob opotws dmavros THS
Suaenrucns €or ideiv, H avris odns 7) pepous
twés, ShAov 8 dre 6 padiota Todro Suvdpevos

@ xowérepov: or, “ more intelligible to the ordinary man.”

» The case as a rule being a matter of personal indifference,
the judges are likely to be led away by the arguments which
seem most plausible.

© Exact scientific proof (dwrédeés), which probable proof
(iors) only to a certain extent resembles.

4 Dialectic here apparently includes logic generally, the

8

RHETORIC, I. 1. 10-11

to transactions between private citizens, they say
nothing about the former, but without exception
endeavour to bring forensic speaking under the rules
of art. The reason of this is that in public speaking
it is less worth while to talk of what is outside the
subject, and that deliberative oratory lends itself to
trickery less than forensic, because it is of more
general interest. For in the assembly the judges
decide upon their own affairs, so that the only thing
necessary is to prove the truth of the statement of
one who recommends a measure, but in the law
courts this is not sufficient ; there it is useful to win
over the hearers, for the decision concerns other
interests than those of the judges, who, having only
themselves to consider and listening merely for their
own pleasure, surrender to the pleaders but do not
give a real decision. That is why, as I have said
before, in many places the law prohibits speaking
outside the subject in the law courts, whereas in the
assembly the judges themselves take adequate pre-
cautions against this.

It is obvious, therefore, that a system arranged
according to the rules of art is only concerned with
proofs ; that proof is a sort of demonstration,’ since
we are most strongly convinced when we suppose
anything to have been demonstrated ; that rhetorical
demonstration is an enthymeme, which, generally
speaking, is the strongest of rhetorical proofs ; and
lastly, that the enthymeme is a kind of syllogism.
Now, as it is the function of Dialectic as a whole, or
of one of its parts,? to consider every kind of syllogism
in a similar manner, it is clear that he who is most

“part”? being either the Analytica Priora, which deals
with the syllogism, or the Sophistici Elenchi, on Fallacies.

9

12

ARISTOTLE

Oewpeiv, ek tivwy Kal mds yiverar ovddoyiopios,
odros Kal évOupnwatikds av ein padtora, mpoo-
AaBdyv wept roid 7” eori 7a evOvuphpara Kal Tivas
éxer Suadopas mpds tods AoyiKods avdAdAoyiopovs-
TO Te yap aAnbes Kal TO Suowov TH adnbe? Tis
adris €oTt Suvdews idetv, dua S€ Kat of avOpwror
mpos TO GAnfes medvKacw tkav@s Kal Ta mA€elw
Tuyxdvovot Ths dAnBeias: 510 mpos Ta evdoea oTo-
XaoTiuKas €xew Tob dpwolws exovtos Kal mpos TI
adnGevdy €otw.

“Ori pev oby ra &€w Tob mpdyparos ot dAAou
texvoroyodar, Kat did7t waAAov arrovevevKaot mpds
TO dixodoyeiv, pavepdv: xpjoos 8 eotiv 4 pnTo-
puxn dua te TO ddoer elvar Kpeirrw tadnOH Kal
Ta Sika Tov evavriwv, wore edy pi) KaTa TO
TMpoojKov at Kpices ylyvwrras, avayKn dv adtav
nTTac0a.' todro 8 eorw dévov émitysnoews. ert
d€ mpos eviovs 008’ ei riv axpiBeorarny Exounev
eTLOTHUNY, padtov am’ éKeivns metoar éyovras*
didackadrias ydp éorw 6 Kata Tiv émoTHny Adyos,
todro de advvarov, aA’ avayKn Sia TOV Kowdv
mrovetaba Tas miores Kal Tods Adyous, Womep Kal
ev Tots TomKois eA€yomuev Tepl THs mpos TOds TrOA-
Aodvs evrevEews. Err S€ ravavria Set Sivacbar
meiNew, Kabdmep Kal ev rots avAAoyiopots, ody
omws audorepa mpatrwpev (od yap det ta havAa

* &doga, “resting on opinion’; defined in the Topics
(i. 1) as “things generally admitted by all, or by most
men, or by the wise, and by all or most of these, or by the
most notable and esteemed.”’

» didre either =5rr, “* that” ; or, (it is clear) “‘ why.”

* Almost equivalent to demonstration or strictly logical
proof.
10

RHETORIC, I. 1. 11-12

capable of examining the matter and forms of a
syllogism will be in the highest degree a master of
rhetorical argument, if to this he adds a knowledge
of the subjects with which enthymemes deal and the
differences between them and logical syllogisms.
For, in fact, the true and that which resembles it
come under the purview of the same faculty, and at
the same time men have a sufficient natural capacity
for the truth and indeed in most cases attain to it ;
wherefore one who divines well in regard to the
truth will also be able to divine well in regard to
probabilities.?

It is clear, then, that all other rhetoricians bring
under the rules of art what is outside the subject,
and ® have rather inclined to the forensic branch of
oratory. Nevertheless, Rhetoric is useful, because
the true and the just are naturally superior to their
opposites, so that, if decisions are improperly made,
they must owe their defeat to their own advocates ;
which is reprehensible. Further, in dealing with

certain persons, even if we possessed the most |

accurate scientific knowledge, we should not find it
easy to persuade them by the employment of such
knowledge. For scientific discourse is concerned
with instruction,” but in the case of such persons
instruction is impossible ; our proofs and arguments
must rest on generally accepted principles, as we
said in the Topics, when speaking of converse with
the multitude. Further, the orator should be able
to prove opposites, as in logical arguments; not
that we should do both (for one ought not to persuade
people to do what is wrong), but that the real state

#i.2. The Topics is a treatise in eight books on Dialectic
and drawing conclusions from probabilities.

11

_,

ARISTOTLE

meiBew) aN’ iva pajre AavOdvy TOs EXEL, Kat oT7ws
dAAov XpwpLevov Tots Adyous py) Sixaiws adrot Avew
EXCoILEV. Tav pev obtv dAAwy texv@v ovdepyia 7a.
vavria ovMoyilerar, 7 7 be Sader runt kal PyTopuKn
povar tobro mrowbow Opotws yap elow duporepar
TOV evavTiwv. Ta pevToL BroKeimeva TMpaywara
ody Opolws exer, GAX’ dei TaAN OA Kal Ta BeATiW TH
ducer evovAdoytoTorepa Kal miBavwrepa ws amA@s
ciety. Tpos be ToUTOLS GTOTIOV, et TO THATL
pev a.ioxpov pn dvvacbau Bon Bet EAUT@, Aoyep 8°
1855 b ouK aloxpov" 6 0 pd.AAov WOudv € €oTw dvOpasrou Tijs Tob

13 odparos xpelas. ei 8 ore peydAa Brdipevev ay 6
Xpwpeevos adixos Th To.avTyn Suvder TOV Aoyow,
TovTO ye Kouvov €oTt KaTa madvre TOV dyabéav
mijy a apeThs, Kal waAvoTa KaTa TOV Xpnopwrdren,
olov taxvos byveias movrov orparnytas* ToUTOLS
yap dv Tus WheAjoete TA WEeyLoTa xpa@pevos Sikalws
Kal Braifevev aBiKws.

14. “Ore pev obv ovK corw ovTE EvOS TWos yevous
dpcopropuevov y) pyTopucn, adda. xabdrrep U) Sua
AcKrucn, Kal OTL XPnTYWLOS, pavepov, | kal are ov
TO Tretoat epyov avris, aAAa Td ety 7a dmdpxo ovTa
mBava mept €KaaToV, xabdzep Kal ev Tats as
TEXV OMS maGQS ovde yap latpiKis TO bya TroLpoat,
d.AAd. pexpe od evOeXeT aL, pexpe TOUTOV mpoayayety:
éort yap Kal tovds ddvvarous peraaBetv dyretas
Opens Oepameboou Kalas. mpos Sé TovToLs OTL TIS
avris TO Te muBavov Kal 70 hawdpevov ideiv mBavov,
Womrep Kat em Tis Suahexrucijs ovMoytopov TE Kal
dhawopevov avddAoyiopev. 6 yap codioTiKos ovK

* The early sophistical definition was “the art of per-

suasion.”’
12

RHETORIC, I. 1. 12-14

of the case may not escape us, and that we ourselves
may be able to counteract false arguments, if another
makes an unfair use of them. Rhetoric and Dialectic
alone of all the arts prove opposites ; for both are
equally concerned with them. However, it is not
the same with the subject matter, but, generally
speaking, that which is true and better is naturally
always easier to prove and more likely to persuade.
Besides, it would be absurd if it were considered
disgraceful not to be able to defend oneself with the
help of the body, but not disgraceful as far as speech
is concerned, whose use is more characteristic of man
than that of the body. If it is argued that one
who makes an unfair use of such faculty of speech
may do a great deal of harm, this objection applies
equally to all good things except virtue, and above
all to those things which are most useful, such as
strength, health, wealth, generalship ; for as these,
rightly used, may be of the greatest benefit, so,

wrongly used, they may do an equal amount of harm. ~ 5

It is thus evident that Rhetoric does not deal with
any one definite class of subjects, but, like Dialectic,
[is of general application]; also, that it is useful ;
and further, that its function is not so much to
persuade, as to find out in each case the existing
means of persuasion.* The same holds good in re-
‘spect to all the other arts. For instance, it is not
the function of medicine to restore a patient to
health, but only to promote this end as far as possible ;
for even those whose recovery is impossible may be
properly treated. Itis further evident that it belongs
to Rhetoric to discover the real and apparent means
of persuasion, just as it belongs to Dialectic to dis-

cover the real and apparent syllogism. For what \

13

Fal
“Pry,

ARISTOTLE

ev TH Suvdper aA’ év TH mpoapécer* any evraiba
pev corau 6 6 pev Kara THY ETLOTHLNY O de Kara Ty
mpoaipeow pyrwp, eet de oopiorns pev Kara THY
mpoaipeow, SuarexruKos dé od Kara TH mpoaipeow
aAAa Kara Ty Svvapiuy.

Mlept dé abrijs 770 Ths we0ddov TretpoopeOa Aéyew,
TOs TE Kat eK Tivwv Sunoopeba Toyxdvew Tov
TPOKELLEVY mad obv olov ef trapxhs opiod-
jevow adrny tis eort, Aéywprev Td, Aourd..

2. "Korw o7) p pnTopixy Svvaus Tept EKaoTov Tod
bewphoa TO evdexonevov mBavor. TobTo yap
ovdemids € érépas €oTl Téxvns epyov" Tav yap dAAwv
éxdorn mept TO oerh UToKetevov € €or" dBacKaducr
Kal TELoTLKH, Olov larpiKy Trept DyLewov Kal vooepov
Kat yewperpio. Tept Ta oupBeBnxora mab Tots
peyebeor Kat dprOpunrucn tepl dpub.ov, dpotws de
Kal ai Aourai TOV TEXVOV | Kal emLaTn Lav" H Se
pyntopiKy mrept Tod Sobevros wes eizetv Soxe? SUvacbau

ewpeiv TO miBavdv. S10 Kal dapev adriy ov epi
TL yevos idtov adwpiopevov Exew TO TEXVLKOV.

Tdv dé riorewv ai nev arexvol eiow at 8° evrexvor.
direxva dé Adyw doa pn Ov hu@v memdoprorat aa
Tpoumippxev, olov pdprupes Bacavor ovyypagal | kat
doa. ToLavra, evrexva dé Goa did. Tis, peBddov Kat bv?
pa karacxevacdjvar Suvarov. wore Set TOUTWY
Tots pev xpnoacbar Ta Se edpeiv.

* The essence of sophistry consists in the moral purpose,
the deliberate use of fallacious arguments. In Dialectic,
the dialectician has the power or faculty of making use of
them when he pleases; when he does so deliberately, he is
called a sophist. In Rhetoric, this distinction does not exist;
he who uses sound arguments as well as he who uses false
ones, are both known as rhetoricians.

14

RHETORIC, I. 1. 14—n1. 2

makes the sophist is not the faculty but the moral
purpose. But there is a difference: in Rhetoric, one
who acts in accordance with sound argument, and

‘one who acts in accordance with moral purpose, are

both called rhetoricians ; but in Dialectic it is the
moral purpose that makes the sophist, the dialec-
tician being one whose arguments rest, not on moral
purpose but on the faculty.¢

Let us now endeavour to treat of the method
itself, to see how and by what means we shall be
able to attain our objects. And so let us as it were
start again, and having defined Rhetoric anew, pass
on to the remainder of the subject. — Rr

2. Rhetoric then may be defined as the faculty of
discovering the possible means of persuasion in

reference to any subject whatever. This is the
function of no other of the arts, each of which is

able to instruct and persuade in its own special
subject ; thus, medicine deals with health and sick-
ness, geometry with the properties of magnitudes,
arithmetic with number, and similarly with all the
other arts and sciences. But Rhetoric, so to say,
appears to be able to discover the means of per-
suasion in reference to any given subject. That is
why we say that as an art its rules are not applied
to any particular definite class of things. =

As for proofs, some are artificial, others inartificial.
By the latter I understand all those which have not
been furnished by ourselves but were already in ex-
istence, such as witnesses, tortures, contracts, and
the like ; by the former, all that can be constructed
by system and by our own efforts. Thus we have
only to make use of the latter, whereas we must
invent the former.

15

>
:

|
'

|

|
'

\

74

3
1356 a

4

oO

6

7

ARISTOTLE

~ A A ~ / , / ‘
Tév 5€ 51a Tod Adyou mopilouevwv ticrewv Tpia
to > / . ¢ A 4, > > ~ 40. 5 Aé:
elon eoTiv: at ev yap eiow ev T@ HOE TOO A€yovTos,
¢ , oie ~ \ > A a , ¢ Ars
ai d€ €v T@ Tov aKkpoarny diabeivai mws, at de ev

>, A ~ Ao A ~ 4 nn / 0
att® TH Adyw, Sia Tob Secxvdvae 7) PaiveoBar
SevKvUVaL.

Ava ev obv Tob HOous, Stav otrw AexOH 6 Adyos
ote a&imuotov moujoar Tov A€yovTa’ Tois yap
emuetKéot muoTevouev puaGArov Kal Oarrov, epi

/ A c ~ > e \ \ > A Ve
mavTwv ev amrds, ev ols de TO axpuBes uy eoTw
aAAa TO apdido€eiv, Kal mavreADs. Set Se Kal
Totro ovpPaivew dia Tov Adyov, aAAa pon dia TO

/ / > \ /, >?
mpodedoédaobar mov twa elvat tov A€yovTa: od
yap Womep evior THv TexvoAocyotvTwy TiWdacw ev
Th Téxvn Kal THY emeikerav TOD A€yovTos ws ovdEev
ovpBadrdAopevnv mpos TO miBavdv, adAdAd ayedov ws
eimeiv Kupwwrdarny exer miotw To HOos. dua de
TOV aKkpoaTt@y, oray eis 7a00s bao Tob Adyou mpo-
axyOdow: od yap dpuolws arrodidojev Tas Kpicets Av-
movpevor Kal xaipovres 7 pirobvTes Kal picodyTes*
mpos 0 Kal ovov treipGcbai dayev mpayparevecbat

~ ~ A
Tovs viv texvoAoyobvras. (epi prev odv TovTwy
SnrAwOnoerar Kal? ExacTov, Stay mept Tov malady
Aéywpev') Sia 5€ Tdv Adywv mioredovow, 6rav
> \ nn /, / > ~ \@¢
aAnbes 7) pawdpevov SeiEwpev ex THv tepl Exacta,
mibavarv.

> \ > ¢ vi p>) \ 4, bE \ 4

Emel 8° ai miores dua TovTwv eiai, pavepov drt

/ > \ Xr a “~ AX / 0 PS) /
ravras €oti AaBeiv rod ovAAoyicacbar Svvapevov
Kal Too Oewpfhoa mepl ta 4On Kal Tas aperas Kal
16

RHETORIC, I. 1. 3-7

Now the proofs furnished by the speech are of three —

kinds. The first depends upon the moral character
of the speaker, the second upon putting the hearer
into a certain frame of mind, the third upon the

speech itself, in so far as it proves or seems to prove. .

The orator persuades by moral character when his
speech is delivered in such a manner as to render
him worthy of confidence ; for we feel confidence in
a greater degree and more readily in persons of
worth in regard to everything in general, but where
there is no certainty and there is room for doubt,
our confidence is absolute. But this confidence must
be due to the speech itself, not to any preconceived
idea of the speaker’s character; for it is not the
case, as some writers of rhetorical treatises lay down
in their “‘ Art,” that the worth of -the-orator“in- no

way contributes to his powers of persuasion ; on the
contrary, moral character, so to say, constitutes the

most effective means of proof. The orator persuades
by means of his hearers, when they are roused to

emotion by his speech; for the judgements we

deliver are not the same when we are influenced by
joy or sorrow, love or hate; and it is to this alone
that, as we have said, the present-day writers of
treatises endeavour to devote their attention. (We
will discuss these matters in detail when we come to
speak of the emotions.) Lastly, persuasion is pro-
duced by the speech itself, when we establish the
true or apparently true from the means of persuasion
applicable to each individual subject.

~ Now, since proofs are effected by these means, it
is evident that, to be able to grasp them, a man
must be capable of logical reasoning, of studying
characters and the virtues, and thirdly the emotions

Cc FD.

8

1356 b

ARISTOTLE

tpitov Tod mept Ta man, TL TE ExacTov eoTt TaV
TaQav Kal motev TL, Kal ék Tivw eyyiverat Kal TAS.
wore ovpBaiver tiv pytopixny otov mapadves Te
THS Suadenructis elvan Kal THs mept Ta NOH mpay-
paretas, qv Sixady é €or Tpooayopevew mohuruKny.
810 Kat drrodverat b b10 TO OXHMA TO THs moAurucis
PNTOpLKN Kat ot GVTLTOLOULEVOL Tavrns Ta prev Ou
dmaievatay Ta, Oe Ou " dAdaLovetav Ta. dé Kal du’ dAAas
aitias avOpwrikds’ €oT. yap wopiov TL THS duaAeK-
TUCAS Kal opotwpa, KabdtEp Kal apyojevot etropev
mept obdevos yap Wpioprevov ovdEeTEpa. avray €oriv
EmLOTHUN, TOS EXEL, ara Suvdpers TWwées TOO
mopiaa Adyous. epi mev odv THs SuVdpews avTar,
Kal m@s €xovor mpos adAAjAas, €ipyntat axedov
ixavds.

Tav dé Sua rod devxvdvat 7 paivecda Seucvivar,
xabdrrep Kal ev Tots Svaexrucots TO pev eTAywYT
€or TO be ovMoyiop.os TO be pawopevos ovMoyt-
apes, Kal evradla dpotis éxyer’ €or. yap TO jev
Tmapaderypa eTraywyn, TO 5’ evOdunpa avddoyiopos,
[ro dé dawdpevov evOdpnya pouvopevos ovMoyt-
opos]. Kadd 8 evOdunua peev PuTOpucoy ova-
Aoytopsr, mapdderyj.a dé éemayarynv PyTOpLKHY.
mavres d€ tas mores movodvrar Sia TOU Seucvovar
7 mapadelywara Aéyovtes 7 evOuunuara, Kal Tapa.
Tatra oveev mus: WoT elmep Kal dAws avadyKn 7

1 Inserted by Spengel from Dionysius of Halicarnassus
(first letter to Ammaeus, Vi.).

@ Rhetoric, as dealing with human actions, characters,
virtues, and emotions, is closely connected with Politics,
which includes Ethics. The two latter treat of the same
subject from a different point of view. Both deal with
happiness and virtue, but the object of Politics is, by com-

18

RHETORIC, I. 1. 7-8

—the nature and character of each, its origin, and
the manner in which it is produced. Thus it appears
that Rhetoric is as itwere an offshoot of Dialectic
and of the science of Ethics, which may be reasonably
called Politics.* That is why Rhetoric assumes ® the
character of Politics, and those who claim to possess
it, partly from ignorance, partly from boastfulness,
and partly from other human weaknesses, do the
same. For, as we said at the outset, Rhetoric is a
sort of division or likeness of Dialectic, sincé neither
of them is a science that deals with the nature of
any definite subject, but they are merely faculties
of furnishing arguments. We have now said nearly
enough about the faculties of these arts and their
mutual relations.

But for purposes of demonstration, real or apparent,
just as Dialectic possesses two modes of argument,
induction and the syllogism, real or apparent, the
same is the case in Rhetoric; for the example is
induction, and the enthymeme a syllogism, and the
apparent enthymeme an apparent syllogism. Ac-
cordingly I call an enthymeme a rhetorical syllogism,
and an example rhetorical induction. Now all
orators produce belief by employing as proofs either
examples or enthymemes and nothing else ; so that
if, generally speaking, it is necessary to prove any

parison of the different forms of States to find the one in
which man will be most virtuous. Lastly, Rhetoric, as an
important factor in the training and education of the individual
citizen and of the members of the State as a whole, may be
described as an offshoot of Politics, with which the sophistical
rhetoricians identified it. For the relation of Rhetoric to
Dialectic see Glossary.
» Or, “slips into the garb of” (Jebb). Probably a stage
metaphor.
19

ARISTOTLE

ovMoy.ilopevov 7) emdyovra Seuxvivar orvoby (SiAov
& iyiv rotro ex Tdv avadutiKdv), avayKatov
éxdtepov avr@v éxatépw tovtwv To adro elvar.
97is 8 ori diadopa wapadetypatos Kal evOup7y-
patos, pavepov ex Ta TomuKav: ekel yap mepl
ovAXdoyiopod Kal éemaywyis <ipntat mporepov, OTL
TO fev TO emt ToAADY Kal cpoiwv Seikvucbar STL
oUTws €xer eked prev enaywyn eoTrw evratla de
Tapdderypa, TO Se TWa@V SvTwv ETEpov TL Oia TAVTa.
ovpPaivew mapa tatra TH Tabra elvar, 7 KaQdAov 7)
ws emi TO TOAU, exe ev avddAoyiopos evTadla de
evOUunwa KaArcirar.
10 Wavepov 8 ori Kal éxdrepov exer ayabov Td eldos
THs pyTopucijs kabdrep yap Kal ev Tots peBoduxors
”
elpntat, Kal ev ToUToLs Gpmoiws exer’ elol yap at jLev
TapaderypaTrwoers pyTopeiar at dé evOupnpariKat,
Kal pytopes dpolws ot pev tmrapaderyparwders ot Se
evOvpnparixol. mBavot pev odv ody Frrov ot
Adyou ot Sia THV Tapaderyparwv, YopuBodyrar Se
11 paAAov ot evOvpnpatixol. tiv 8 airiay abit@v, Kat
ms ékaTtépw xpynotéov, epodev voTepov~ viv de
mept adt@v TovTwv pwadAov S.opicwuev Kabapds.
°Emet yap 70 milavov twit mBavev eat, Kal TO

@ Anal. Priora, ii. 23; Anal. Posteriora, i. 1.

» That is, enthymeme and example must be the same as
syllogism and induction.

¢ From the definitions of syllogism (i. 1) and induction
G: 12). No particular passage, however, explains the

ifference here mentioned.

4 The employment of syllogism and induction, 7d «dos
Tis pntopixfs being taken as simply=% pyropixy. Another
rendering is: ‘‘ that each kind of Rhetoric (that which de-
20

RHETORIC, I. 1. 8-11

fact whatever either by syllogism or by induction—
and that this is so is clear from the, Analytics “—each
of the two former must be identical with each of the
two latter. The difference between example and
enthymeme is evident from the Topics,° where, in
discussing syllogism and induction, it has previously
been said that the proof from a number of particular
eases that such is the rule, is called in Dialectic
induction, in Rhetoric example ; but when, certain
things being posited, something different results by
reason of them, alongside of them, from their being
true, either universally or in most cases, such a
conclusion in Dialectic is called a syllogism, in
Rhetoric an enthymeme.

It is evident that Rhetoric enjoys both these aie
vantages “—for what has been said in the Methodica °
holds good also in this case—for rhetorical speeches
are sometimes characterized by examples and some-
times by enthymemes, and orators themselves may
be similarly distinguished by their fondness for one
or the other. Now arguments.that. depend on ex-
amples are not less calculated to persuade, but those
which depend upon enthymemes meet with greater

approval. Their origin and the way in which each ~

should “be used will be discussed later’; for the
moment let us define more clearly these proofs
themselves.

Now, that which is persuasive is persuasive in

pends upon example or upon enthymeme) enjoys some
special advantage.”

* A lost treatise, mentioned by Diogenes Laértius in his
Life of Aristotle, xxiv., and by Dionysius of Halicarnassus
in the first letter to Aimmaeus, vi. It is supposed to have
dealt with some branch of Logic.

f ii. 20-24,

21

ARISTOTLE

\ 30N ¢e / > c. A ‘ A A
pev ed0ds brdpxer Se’ adro mBavov Kal moTov TO
8¢ tO Seixvvcba Soxeiv dia Tovortrwv, oddepia SE
réyvn oxoret tO Kal? Exaorov, olov % tarpucy Tt
Lwxpdrer 76 byewov eotw 7) KadAlg, adda ri TO
roupde 7) Tois Tovotade (rodTo pev yap EvTexvov, TO
Sé xa” Exacrov dretpov Kal odk emuornTdov), odde
¢ ¢ \ A > bd A /
4 pyropucy TO Kal? Exacrov évdoov Jewprycer,
olov Lwx«parer 7 ‘Immia, aAAd To Towtode, Kal-
/ ‘ ¢ / \ \ > / ,
dmep kat 7 SuadexTiKy. Kat yap éxeivy avMoyi-
> > & ” / \ ” ‘ a
Cera odk €€ dv ervyxev (paivetar yap arta Kal Tots
~ > > > U A > ~ /
iss7a Tapadnpodaw), GAN exeivn pev ex Tav Adyouv
Scopevav, 7 Sé pytopiKr) ex Tav dn BovdcdeoBar
eiwldrwv.
” \ af ow 9) Ose , , ‘
12 "Kort S€ 70 epyov adrijs wept Te TovovTwv Tepi
dv BovArevdpeba Kai Téxvas ur) Exomev, Kal ev Tots
towvTois akpoatais ot ov Svvavra. dua moAA@v
avvopay ovdé Aoyilecfar méppwHev. Bovdevopeba
Sé mept radv dawopdvwy évdéxecIar aydorépws
” \ \ n > / ” *” / nn“
éyew* wept yap TOv aduvdtwr ahAws 7 yevéobar 7)
” ~ > ‘ 4 ¢ ©
ZccoOan 7) exew ovdels BovAcderar odrws trodap-
13 Bdvwv: oddev yap mAgov. evdéxerar dé avdAoyi-
leobar Kal ovvdyew Ta pev ex avdAdcdAoytopevwr
/ A | Paes 2 > AA / \ / A
mpotepov, Ta 8 && dovdAdoyiorwy pev Seopevww de
~ A \ \ qi ” > 7 A
avdoyiopod Sia 7d pr) elvar evdofa. avayKn dé
roUTwv TO pev py) €lvae ederraxoAovOnrov Sua TO

@ Or, ‘‘ by persons who are so ”’ (Jebb).

> Certain propositions, which seem paradoxical and im-
probable to a popular audience, must be proved before it is
able to understand them.

22

RHETORIC, I. m. 11-13

reference to some one, and is persuasive and con-
vineing either at once and in and by itself, or because
it appears to be proved by propositions that are
convincing “; further, no art has the particular in
view, medicine for instance what is good for Socrates
or Callias, but what is good for this or that class of
persons (for this is a matter that comes within the
province of an art, whereas the particular is infinite

and cannot be the subject of a true science) ;
_ similarly, therefore, Rhetoric will not consider what
| seems probable in each individual case, for instance
| to Socrates or Hippias, but that which seems probable

to this or that class of persons. It is the same with
Dialectic, which does not draw conclusions from any
random premises—for even madmen have some
fancies—but it takes its material from subjects which
demand reasoned discussion, as Rhetoric does from

_ those which are common subjects of deliberation.

The function of Rhetoric, then, is to deal with

things about which we deliberate, but for which we

have no systematic rules; and in the presence of
such hearers as are unable to take a general view of
many stages, or to follow a lengthy chain of argu-
ment. But we only deliberate about things which
seem to admit of issuing in two ways; as for those
things which cannot in the past, present, or future
be otherwise, no one deliberates about them, if he
supposes that they are such; for nothing would be
gained by it. Now, it is possible to draw conclusions
and inferences partly from what has been previously
demonstrated syllogistically, partly from what has
not, which however needs demonstration, because it
is not probable.’ The first of these methods is
necessarily difficult to follow owing to its length, for

23

ARISTOTLE

pijKos (6 yap Kpirns taoxevrar elvar amAobs), Ta
€ pn mbava dia TO pu €€ dpodroyouvpevwy etvat
pnd evddEwv: dor’ avayxatov ro te evOdunwa
elvat Kal TO Trapdderypa wept TOV evdexomevwn Ws
Ta moAAd exew Kal ddAws, TO pev Tapddevypa
eraywynv To 8 evOdunua ovdrdoyopov, Kal e€&
oAtywv Te Kal moAAdKis é€AatTovwv 7 e& BV 6
mp@tos avdAdoyropes* eav yap } TL TOUTWY yya@pt-
pov, od0e Set Aéyew: adbrds yap Tobro mpooTiOnow
6 akpoarys. otov dt Awpieds orehavirny ayadva
veviknkev, tkavov eimeiy Ore "OAdumia veviknKev:
To 8 6tt oredavirns ta ’OAdpumia, 0bd€ Set mpoo-
Getvau yryvdoKovar yap mavTes.
14. “Emmet & eoriv dAtya péev trav dvayKaiwv e& dv ot
pytopucol ovdAAoyiopol etou (Ta yap T7OAAG Epi av
at Kpicers Kal at oxédbers, evdeyerar Kal adAws
éxew* tept dv pev yap mparrovor, BovAevovrat
Kal oxorrobo., Ta Sé€ mpartépeva mavTa TovovTov
yévous €oti, Kal oddev dis Eos eimetv €€ avayKns
ToUTwv), TA & ws emi TO TOAD ovpPBatvovta Kal
EvoexXopueva eK ToLoUTwY avayKn érépwv avAdoyi-
leoba, ta 8 dvayxata e€ avayxaiwy (dpAov 8
npiv Kal TobTo ek Tay avaduTiK@v), Pavepov Ort
e€ dv 7a evOuujpatra AEyerar, Ta pev avayKata
€oTat, Ta Se mAcloTa ws emi TO TOA. A€yeraL
yap evOvunpara e€ eikédtwv Kal onueiwv, wore

* mp@ros: the primary, typical syllogism of the first figure.

» Son of Diagoras of Rhodes, and like his father celebrated
for his victories in the Greek athletic contests. He played
a considerable part in political and naval affairs in support
of the Spartans (412-407 s.c.), whom he afterwards offended,
and by whom he is said to have been put to death.

¢ Anal. Priora, i. 8, 13-14.

24

RHETORIC, I. 11. 13-14

the judge is supposed to be a simple person; the
second will obtain little credence, because it does
not depend upon what is either admitted or probable.
The necessary result then is that the enthymeme
and the example are concerned with things which
may, generally speaking, be other than they are,
the example being a kind of induction and the
enthymeme a kind of syllogism, and deduced from
few premises, often from fewer than the regular ¢
syllogism ; for if any one of these is well known,
there is no need to mention it, for the hearer can
add it himself. For instance, to prove that Dorieus °
was the victor in a contest at which the prize was
a crown, it is enough to say that he won a victory
at the Olympic games ; there is no need to add that
the prize at the Olympic games is a crown, for every-
body knows it.

But since few of the propositions of the rhetorical
syllogism are necessary, for most of the things which
we judge and examine can be other than they are,
human actions, which are the subject of our delibera-
tion and examination, being all of such a character
and, generally speaking, none of them necessary ;
since, further, facts which only generally happen or
are merely possible can only be demonstrated by
other facts of the same kind, and necessary facts by
necessary propositions (and that this is so is clear
from the Analytics °), it is evident that the materials
from which enthymemes are derived will be some-
times necessary, but for the most part only generally
true; and these materials being probabilities and
signs, it follows that these two elements must corre-

25

ARISTOTLE

dvdyKn TOUTCOV exdrepov éxarepe TavTo eivat.
15 To fev yap eikds eorw os emt TO TOAD ywopevor,
ov dmdds dé, Kabdzep opilovrat TweEs, aGAAG 70
rept TO. evdexopeva Mus € exew, oUTwWS EXOv mpos
1857 b exeivo mpos ) elds, ws TO xaborov mpos TO Kara
16 pos’ Tav dé onpeteov TO fev oUTWS exet as TOV
Kal’ exaorov Tt mpos TO Kabdrou, TO be ws av
Kabddov Tt mpos TO kare, pépos. Toure dé 70
bev dvayKaiov TEKUNPLOV, TO O€ pa dvayKatov
17 dvevpov €oTt Kara Th diadopdy. avayKaia pev
obv Aéyn ef av yiverat ovMoytopes, 510 kat
TEKUT}plov TO Towdrov Tév onpetonv éoriv érav
yap pn evddéxecOan olwvrau dicat TO Aexbev, TOTE
épew olovrat TeKUmpLoV ws Sedevypévov Kat meme
paopevov: 70 yap TéeKwap Kal Tépas TavToV €oTL
KaTa TI dpxatay yAarrav.
is “Kort 5é€ t&v onueiwy 7d pev ws TO Kal? Exa-
OTOv mpos TO Kabdrov de, olov et tis elrrevev
onpetoy elvar 6 ore ot aodol Sixavot, LwKparns yap
cogos Hv Kab Sticavos. TOTO bev ov onpetov
eoT., AvTov (be, Kav adn bes 7 TO eipnuevovs aavA-
Adyrorov ydp. To 8é, olov et TUS elrrevev onpetov
ore voaei, TUpeTTel yap, a TETOKEV ore yara é eXel,
dvayKatov. orep T@v onpelov TEKENpLOV [Lovo
€oriv: povov yap, av dAn Ges }» dAvréy €orw. TO
be ws TO xabddov Tpos TO Kara. Lépos éxov, olov
el Tis elmelev, OTL TUpeTTEL, OnpElov elvaL, TMUKVOV
yap avamvel. Avrov bé€ Kal TodTo, Kav aAnbes 7:

* That is, probabilities and signs correspond to general
and necessary propositions. This is not strictly correct ;
only the TeK MA} pia. correspond to the necessary pro ositions,
the other signs and the probabilities to the general or con-
tingent propositions.

26

RHETORIC, I. 1m. 14-18

spond to these two kinds of propositions, each to
each. For that which is probable is that which
generally happens, not however unreservedly, as
some define it, but that which is concerned with
things that may be other than they are, being so
related to that in regard to which it is probable as
the universal to the particular. As to signs, some
are related as the particular to the universal, others
as the universal to the particular. Necessary signs
are called tekméria; those which are not necessary
have no distinguishing name. I call those necessary
signs from which a logical syllogism can be con-
structed, wherefore such a sign is called tekmérion ;
for when people think that their arguments are
irrefutable, they think that they are bringing forward
a tekmérion, something as it were proved and con-
cluded ; for in the old language tekmar and peras
have the same meaning (limit, conclusion).

Among signs, some are related as the particular
to the universal; for instance, if one were to say
that all wise men are just, because Socrates was both
wise and just. Now this is a sign, but even though
the particular statement is true, it can be refuted,
because it cannot be reduced to syllogistic form.
But if one were to say that it is a sign that a man is
ill, because he has a fever, or that a woman has had |
a child because she has milk, this is a necessary
sign. This alone among signs is a tekmérion; for
only in this case, if the fact is true, is the argument
irrefutable. Other signs are related as the universal
to the particular, for instance, if one were to say
that it is a sign that this man has a fever, because
he breathes hard ; but even if the fact be true, this
argument also can be refuted, for it is possible for

27

19

1358 a
20

ARISTOTLE

EvoexeTaL yap Kal pq) TUperTovTa mvevoTiay. TL
pev ovbv elkds €orTt Kal Ti onuetov Kal TeKpHpLoV,
Kat Tt diadepovow, eipyrar prev Kat vov' waAdov é
pavep@s Kat tept tovtwy, Kal dia Ti’ airiay Ta
ev aavaAdd L € 1 d€ ovdArer é :
fev aovdAddyiora e€ote Ta Se ovAdeAoyiopeva, ev
Tots avaduruxots Subpioras wept adrav. !
Hapdderypa 5€ ére pev eorw emaywy) Kat Tept
mola €maywyn, elpytat. eat. d€ ovTE ds pépos
A Ld 4 f)> ¢ Ld \ la #0)? ¢ a
mpos OAov ov ais CAov mpos pré€pos UO’ cis SAov
mpos OAov, add’ as épos Tpos pEpos, GpoLoV Tpds
Opo.ov, OTav audw pev 7) UTd TO adToO yevos, yrw-
pysw@repov de Odrepov 7 Oarépov, mapadevypa
€oTw. otlov dt. émiBovdredet tupavvids Avoviatos
airav thy pudakiy: Kat yap llevoiorparos mpdrepov
emBovrevwy yrev pvdraxnv Kat AaBay erupav-
\ /, > 4 a if
vevoe, Kal Oeayevyns ev Meydpots: Kal dAAow Scous
ioaot, Tapdderypa mavres ylyvovrat Tob Acovuciou,
dv ovK toaoi mw «i Sia TodTO aire. mdvra Be
~ ¢€ \ \ b \ / ov c > la
TatTa vo TO avTo Kabddov, drt 6 émBovAedwv
Tupavvids pvdakiy aire’.
> e \ > Xr / c 5 ~ a /
RE dv pev obv A€yovras ai Soxodcar elvas mioreus
amodekTiKal, eipyTar. Tov de evOvpnudrwr peyi-
A /
orn Siadhopa Kat uddvora AeAnOvia cyedov wavras
coTly WTEp Kal Tept THY SiaAeKTUKIY weOodov TV
ovAdoyiop@v: Ta pev yap adrdv éotl Kata Tip
PyTopiKiy WorTep Kal Kata THY SiaAeKTiKiY weVodSov
~ ~ >
Tov ovddoyopav, Ta dé Kar’ dAdas téxvas Kal
duvdpeis, Tas pev ovoas tas 8 ovmw Kar-
/ \ \ / / \ cod
evAnupevas' 10 Kat AavOdvovai re, Kal padAdov
anNTOMEVvOL KaTa TpoTov peTaBaivovaw e€ adbrar.

@ Anal. Priora, ii. 27.
28

RHETORIC, I. 1. 18-20

a man to breathe hard without having a fever. We
have now explained the meaning of probable, sign,
and necessary sign, and the difference between them ;
in the Analytics * we have defined them more clearly
and stated why some of them can be converted into
logical syllogisms, while others cannot.

We have said that example is a kind of induction
and with what kind of material it deals by way of
induction. It is neither the relation of part to whole,
nor of whole to part, nor of one whole to another
whole, but of part to part, of like to like, when both
come under the same genus, but one of them is better
known than the other. For example, to prove that
Dionysius is aiming at a tyranny, because he asks for
a bodyguard, one might say that Pisistratus before
him and Theagenes of Megara did the same, and
when they obtained what they asked for made them-
selves tyrants. All the other tyrants known may
serve as an example of Dionysius, whose reason,
however, for asking for a bodyguard we do not yet
know. All these examples are contained under the
same universal proposition, that one who is aiming
at a tyranny asks for a bodyguard.

We have now stated the materials of proofs which
are thought to be demonstrative. But a very great
difference between enthymemes has escaped the
notice of nearly every one, although it also exists in
the dialectical method of syllogisms. For some of
them belong to Rhetoric, some syllogisms only to
Dialectic, and others to other arts and faculties, some
already existing and others not yet established.
Hence it is that this escapes the notice of the
speakers, and the more they specialize in a subject,
the more they transgress the limits of Rhetoric and

29

21

22

ARISTOTLE

paAdrov 5é cadhées Eorar 7d Aeydopevov Sid sAEvovev
pnbev.

Aéyw yap Siadextixovs Te Kal pyropukods avA-
Aoytopods elvat mepit Av rods tomovs Adyomuev-
otro. 8 eciolv of Kowh mepl Sixaiwy Kat duoiav
Kal epi moAuTiK@V Kal meplt toAAd@v SiadepovTwr
elder, olov 6 Too paAAov Kal trrov Témos: ovdeV
yap paAdov €orat ex TovtTov ovAdoyicacba 7
evOUpnpa ecimeiv tept Sucaiwy 7 pvoiav 7 mept
dTovoty' Kaito. Tatra cider diadeper. dia dé
doa €k THY Tept ExacTov eldos Kal yévos mpoTd-
cewy eotw, olov rept dvoixdv eiot mpordces ef
dv ovte evOdunwa ovre avAdoyiopds éore mepl TOV
HOuKaV, Kal wept rovTwv aAAa e& dv odk« Eoras
TEpi THV pvoikav* dpotws 5é Todr’ Exer emt mavT@v.
Kakelva bev od moinoer mept oddev yévos Eudpova*
mept oddev yap vroKeipevov eoTw: Tabra dé, Gow
tis av BéAtiov exAdynrar tas mpotdoes, Ajoet
moujoas GAAnv emoriyny ths diaAeKTiKAs Kal
pytopikhs: av yap evrvyn dpyats, odKéTe SiadeK-
TUK?) OBE PHTopLK?) GAA’ exeivyn EaTaL Ts exer TAS
apxds. €oT. de Ta TAciora Tav evOvunuatayv ex
TovTwy Tav «lddv Acyopeva THY KaTa pepos Kal
idiwv, ex S¢€ tav Kowdv éAdrrw. Kaldmep obdv
Kal év tots TomiKots, Kal evtat0a dSvaiperéov Trav
evOupnpatwv td Te €ldn Kal tods Tomous e& dv

* The common topics do not deal with particular subject
matter, as the specific topics do. In making use of the latter,
the *better’’ (that is, in regard to a special science) the
propositions chosen by aman, the more he will without
knowing it quit the domain of Rhetoric and Dialectic, and
become a professor of that special science whose first principles
he has hit upon.

30

RHETORIC, I. 11. 20-22

Dialectic. But this will be clearer if stated. at
greater length. bis
I mean by dialectical and rhetorical syllogisms
those which are concerned with what we call.“ topies,”’
which may be applied alike to Law, Physics, Politics,
and many other sciences that differ in kind, such as
the topic of the more or less, which will furnish
syllogisms and enthymemes equally well for Law,
Physics, or any other science whatever, although
these subjects differ in kind. Specific topics on the
other hand are derived from propositions which are
peculiar to each species or genus of things; there
are, for example, propositions about Physics which
can furnish neither enthymemes nor syllogisms about
Ethics, and there are propositions concerned with
Ethics which will be useless for furnishing conclusions
about Physics ; and the same holds good in all cases.
The first kind of topics will not make a man practically
wise about any particular class of things, because
~ they do not deal-with any particular subject matter ;
but as to the specific topics, the happier a man is in
his choice of propositions, the more he will uncon-
sciously produce a science quite different from
Dialectic and Rhetoric. For if once he hits upon
first principles, it will no longer be Dialectic or
Rhetoric, but that science whose principles he has
arrived at.* Most enthymemes are constructed from
these specific topics, which are called particular and
special, fewer from those that are common or uni-
versal. As then we have done in the Topics,’ so
here we must distinguish the specific and universal
topics, from which enthymemes may be constructed.

> Sophisticit Elenchi (Fallacies), 9. This treatise is really
the ninth and concluding art of the Topics. is

ARISTOTLE

Anmréov. A€yw 8 cidn pev Tas Kal? Exacrov yévos
iSlas mpotdceis, Témous dé Tovs Kowods Spmolws
TavTWY. mpoTEpov odv EiTwLEV TEpL TOV ELO@V:
mp@rov d¢ AdBwpev Ta yevn THs pyTopiKis, Saws
SieAdpevot doa eri, wept TovTwy ywpis ap-
Bdvapev 7a orowxeta Kal Tas TpoTacets.

3. “Eort d€ Tis pytopurfs «idy tpia Tov apiOnov-
TogovTo. yap Kal ot aKpoatat tav Aoyav tr-
dpxovow ovrTes. avyKeiTar pev yap eK Tpiav 6
Adyos, Ex Te TOO A€yovTos Kal epi od A€éyer Kal

1358 b ™pos Ov, KaL TO TéAOS mpds TodTOV é€aTL, Aéyw dé
2 Tov akpoaTHy. avdykn d€ Tov axpoariv 7 Oewpov
clva. 7) KpiTHVv, KpiTnY O€ 7) TOV yeyevrnuevew 7 TOV
peAddvt@v. €ore 5° 6 pev mept TOV pedAovTwr
Kpivav olov exxAnovaorys, 6 Sé mepl TOV yeyevn-
pévenv olov 6 Sixaorys, 6 5€ wept THs Suvdpews 6
3 Jewpos* dor’ &€ avayKns av ein tpia yevn tev
Aoywv Tdv pntopucdv, ovpBovdevtikdv, ducaviKdv,
CrTLOELKTLKOV.

LupBovdAjs d€ To ev mpotpom? Td dé amrotpom7:
del yap Kal ot idia avpBovdcvovtes Kal of Kowf Sy-
Enyopobvtes TovTwy Odrepov movwodow. Sikyns de
TO pev KaTnyopia TO 8 amodoyia: TovTwy yap
OmoTepovoby moveiy avayKn Tovs duduoBynrodvras.
EMLOELKTLKOD SE TO Lev Erratvos TO Oe Yoyos.

4 Xpdvor dé Exdorov rovtwv eiol TH wev cvupBov-
AevovTt 6 wéAAwv (epi yap TOY eoopéevwv cvpBov-

“ Propositions (or premises), the name given to the two first
statements in a syllogism from which the conclusion is drawn:
All men are mortal (major premise); Socrates is a man
(minor premise) ; therefore Socrates is mortal.

» All three kinds of hearers are regarded as judges (the

32

RHETORIC, I. nm. 22—1n. 4

By specific topics I mean the propositions peculiar
to each class of things, by universal those common
to all alike. Let us then first speak of the specific
topics, but before doing so let us ascertain the
different kinds of Rhetoric, so that, having deter-
mined their number, we may separately ascertain
their elements and propositions.*

8. The kinds of Rhetoric are three in number,
corresponding to the three kinds of hearers. For
every speech is composed of three parts : the speaker,
the subject of which he treats, and the person to
whom it is addressed, I mean the hearer, to whom
the end or object of the speech refers. Now the
hearer must necessarily be either a mere spectator
or a judge, and a judge either of things past or of
things to come.2 For instance, a member of the
general assembly is a judge of things to come ; the
dicast, of things past; the mere spectator, of the
ability of the speaker. Therefore there are neces-
sarily three kinds of rhetorical speeches, deliberative,
forensic, and epideictic.

The deliberative kind is either hortatory or dis-
suasive ; for both those who give advice in private
and those who speak in the assembly invariably
either exhort or dissuade. The forensic kind is either
accusatory or defensive ; for litigants must neces-
sarily either accuse or defend. The epideictic kind
has for its subject praise or blame.

Further, to each of these a special time is appro-
priate: to the deliberative the future,’ for the

mere spectator as a “ critic ’’), although strictly «p:77s should
be limited to the law courts.

¢ In i. 6. 1 and 8. 7 the present is also mentioned as a
time appropriate to deliberative Rhetoric.

D 33

ARISTOTLE

7 a” / n“ > , ~ \
Aevet 7) mpotpérwv 7 amoTpémwv), TO Se dixa-
Couevw 6 yevopevos (Epi yap Ta&v meTmpayyevwy
2 4 ¢ \ A ¢ \ > a ~ >
det 6 pev KaTnyopel 6 Se amodoyeira), TO 8
ETLOELKTLK® KUPLWTATOS eV 6 TAapwv" KaTa yap
Ta UTdpyovTa emawovow 7 Yeyovar mavTES, TpoG-
xp@vrar dé modAdKis Kal Ta yevoweva avapipvyo-
Kovtes Kal Ta pwéAAovTa mpoeikdlovTes.
/ \ ¢ / / ° / > A
5 Tédos 5€ ExdoTos TovTwY ETEpoV E€OTL, Kal
Tpiow over Tpia, TH pev ovp,BovdAevovTt TO ovp-
, \ / ¢ A \ /, ¢
dépov kai BraBepov' 6 pev yap mpotpémwv ws
/ , ¢ \ > t4 ¢ “~
BéArvov ovpBovAcver, 6 Se aroTtpémwy ws xetpov
> / \ > ” \ ~
amotpémer, Ta 8 aAXa pds TobTO ovpmapadAap-
ld n“ / a ane ~ | a“ \ a > / cal
Bavew, 7 Sixavov 7) dducov, 7) Kadov 7 aioxpov: Tots
A , \ , \ \ ” \ >
dé Suxalouevors TO Sikatov Kal TO addiKov, Ta 8
” N Ere / \ ~ a
GAXa Kal odror ovputrapaAap,Bdvovot mpos TabTa: Tots
+ ee J ~ \ /, \ \ ‘ \ > /,
8 émawovdar Kat yéyovar To KaAcv Kal TO aicxpov,
‘ > ” A kd \ ~ > /
Ta 8 dAda Kat odto. mpos Tadra emavadhépovow.
A > \ > / ¢€ / /, )
6 onpetov 5° Stu TO eipnuevov Exdarows TéAos* meEpl
A A ~ ” > # > ”“ > /
pev yap Tav ddAwv eviote odk av audioByrioaer,
¢ / ¢ > / “”“ c > ”
olov 6 dicaldopevos ws od yéyover 7 ws odK EBAa-
cd > > a ) , > Bd) e ,
yev: OTe 8 abduxet, ode mor’ av dpodoynoetev-
yO\ \ a oO” 8é ¢ , \ yo Se
ovdev ‘yap av eder dixns. dpoiws dé Kal of cup-
\ \ ”
Bovdrevovres Ta prev GAXa modAdKis mpolevrat, os
Sé dovpdopa ovpBovrevovew 7 am adedinwv
> 4 > * e A / f e. 8 >
amoTpémovew ovK av opodoyjoaey’ ws ovK
34

RHETORIC, I. ur. 4-6

speaker, whether he exhorts or dissuades, always
advises about things to come; to the forensic the
past, for it is always in reference to things done that
one party accuses and the other defends; to the
epideictic most appropriately the present, for it is
the existing condition of things that all those who
praise or blame have in view... It_is not uncommon,
however, for epideictic speakers to avail themselves
of other times, of the past by way of recalling it, or
of the future by way of anticipating it.

Each of the three kinds has a different special end,
and as there are three kinds of Rhetoric, so there
are three special ends. The end of the deliberative
speaker is the expedient or harmful; for he who
exhorts recommends a course of action as better,
and he who dissuades advises against it as worse ;
all other considerations, such as justice and injustice,
honour and disgrace, are included as accessory in
reference to this. The end of the forensic speaker
is the just or the unjust; in this case also all other
considerations are included as accessory. The end

of those who praise or blame is the honourable and
disgraceful ; and they also refer all other considera-
tions to these. A sign that what I have stated is
the end which each has in view is the fact that
sometimes the speakers will not dispute about the
other points. For example, a man on trial does not
always deny that an act has been committed or
damage inflicted by him, but he will never admit
that the act is unjust; for otherwise a trial would
be unnecessary. Similarly, the deliberative orator,
although he often sacrifices everything else, will
never admit that he is recommending what is inex-
pedient or is dissuading from what is useful; but

35

ARISTOTLE

+ \ > / 8 ~ \
dducov tovs daoruyeirovas KaradovdAodcba Kal
\ 8 \ iS lo vA / is) A /
Tods pindev adiKobvras, oAAdKis oddev dpovTi-
13502 Covow. dpoiws S€ Kal of emawodvtes Kal ot
geyovtes 08 cKkoTobow ei ovpdépovta empagey 7
BraBepd, GAG Kal ev emaivw moAddKis riWéacw
Lid 5A / ~ 7 A Xr Xr ~ ” ,
67. dAvywphoas TOD att@ AvovreAobytos Expaké 71
/ e na AX / > “~ o > / ~
KaAddv, otov ’AxiAAda errawodow or. €BorPnoe TH
a \ cal
éraipw LlarpoxAw «ids Ste det adrov amobaveiv,
Pon rm , , e¢ \ a , ,
cov Civ. tovrw Sé 6 pev Towdtros Odvaros KaA-
Avov, To Sé Civ cupdPépov.

7 Davepov Se éx Tov cipnuévwv Ste avdyKn Tepl
TovTwv exew mpOTov Tas TpoTdcets* TA yap TEK-
pnpia Kal Ta €lKdTa Kal Ta ONMEela mpoTacels Etat
pynropucat: dAws pev yap ovdAdoytopos eK mpo-
tdcewv éott, TO 8 evOdunua ovddoyiopds €ort

8 ovvesTnKws eK TOV eipnuevwv mpoTrdoewv. erel
Sé ore mpayxOfvar oldv Te odTe mpaxOjcecIar Ta
iO off GAA a) \ 8 / 35 \ \ \ ; a”
advvara aGAAa Ta Svvard, oddé Ta 7) yevoueva 7
pi) eodpeva ody oldv Te Ta pev mempaxOar Ta de
mpaxOjcccbar, dvayratov Kat T@ ovpBovdcvovre
Kat T@ Suxalopevw Kal TH emBekTuc@ Exew Tpo-
Tdoels Tept Svvatod Kal dduvdrov, Kal et yéyovev 7)

9 pj, Kal ei €oTrar 7 pH. Ere 6° eel amavres Kat

® The omission of o’« before &éicov has been suggested.
The sense would then be: ‘‘ As to the injustice of enslaving
. . » he is quite indifferent.’’ ‘There is no doubt a reference
to the cruel treatment by Athens of the inhabitants of the
island of Melos (416 3.c.) for its loyalty to the Spartans
during the weg eee war (Thuc. vy. 84-116). The
Athenian envoys declined to discuss the question of right or
wrong, which they said was only possible between equal

owers, and asserted that expediency was the only thing that
had to be considered. The question of justice or injustice
3

6

RHETORIC, I. mr. 6-9

often he is quite indifferent about showing that the
enslavement of neighbouring peoples, even if they
have done no harm, is not an act of injustice.*
Similarly, those who praise or blame do not con-
sider whether a man has done what is expedient or
harmful, but frequently make it a matter for praise
that, disregarding his own interest, he performed
some deed of honour. For example, they praise
Achilles because he went to the aid of his comrade
Patroclus,’ knowing that he was fated to die, although
he might have lived. To him such a death was more
honourable, although life was more expedient.

From what has been said it is evident that the
orator must first have in readiness the propositions
on these three subjects.° Now, necessary signs,
probabilities, and signs are the propositions of the
rhetorician ; for the syllogism universally % consists
of propositions, and the enthymeme is a syllogism
composed of the propositions above mentioned.
Again, since what is impossible can neither have been
done nor will be done, but only what is possible, and
since what has not taken place nor will take place
ean neither have been done nor will be done, it is
necessary for each of the three kinds of orators to
have in readiness propositions dealing with the
possible and the impossible, and as to whether any-
thing has taken place or will take place, or not.
Further, since all, whether they praise or blame,

(in the Melian case entirely disregarded), even when taken
into account, was merely accessory and intended to serve as
a specious justification for the policy of might.

» To protect his body and avenge his death (Jliad, xviii.).

¢ The expedient, the just, the honourable, and their con-
traries.

# ws: or, reading é)os, “ the syllogism as a whole.”

37

ARISTOTLE

enawodvres Kal iéyovtes Kal mporpémovres kal
amoTpemovTes Kat Karnyopobyres Kal dohoyod-
evo. od puovov Ta cipnucva Seucvivat sreip@yra
GAA Kal dtu péya 7 piKpov TO dyaboy 7 TO KaKoV
TO KaAov. 7) TO aiaxpov 7) TO Sixauov 7) TO adixov,
7 Kal” adra A€eyovres 7 mpds dna avrimapaBan-
Aovres, SiAov dru Séou dy Kal rept peyebous Kal
puKpoTntos Kal Tod peiLovos Kau tod eAdrroves
mpoTaces exew, Kat KaldAov Kat mept éxdoTou,
olov ti petlov ayalov 7 eAarrov uD adiknua u]
dixaiwpa: dwoiws bé Kal mept TOV aMov. Tept
dv pev obv €€ avayrns det AaBetv Tas mpordoets,
eipyTau: eva O€ Tadra Siaiperdov (dia mept ekaarOU
TOUTWY, Olov TrEpt wv aupuBovaAr Kal mepl wv ot emt-
deuxTuKol Adyou, Tpitov Se Trept dv ai Sikae, i,
4. [Ipa@rov pev ody Anmréov zepi nota dyaba u)
Kaka 6 ovpBovrActwy ovpBovAcver, erred?) od ‘rept
dmavra aan doa evdéxerar Kai yevéoOar Kat pu7}.
2 doa de &€ avdyKns 7) eorlv 7 €orat 7 advvatov elvat
7 yeveoOar, mepi S€ tovTwv ovi core ovpBovdy.
odde 81) wept TOV evdexouevwv dmdvrav* cor yap
Kat dvoeu via Kal amo TUYNS yevopeva. dyad Toy
evdexopevwy Kal ylyvecba Kal pi, mept dv ovdev
m™po €pyou TO ovpBovdevew~ adda SijAov ort mept
oowv e€oti TO BovAevecba. Tosatoa 5 corly doa
mépukev avayecbar eis Hyds, Kal dy 9 Gpxy THs
yevecews ed’ Hiv €or: BEXpH yap Tovrov axorob-
1859b ev, Ews av evpwuev et Huiv Svvara 7 advvaTa
mpagéar.
38

w

RHETORIC, I. 111. 9—1v. 3

exhort or dissuade, accuse or defend, not only en-
deavour to prove what we have stated, but also that
the same things, whether good or bad, honourable
or disgraceful, just or unjust, are great or small,
either in themselves or when compared with each
other, it is clear that it will be necessary for the
orator to be ready with propositions dealing with
greatness and smallness and the greater and the less,
both universally and in particular; for instance,
which is the greater or less good, or act of injustice
or justice; and similarly with regard to all other
subjects. We have now stated the topics concern-
ing which the orator must provide himself with
propositions ; after this, we must distinguish between
each of them individually, that is, what the three
kinds of Rhetoric, deliberative, epideictic, and
forensic, are concerned with.

~ We must first ascertain about what kind of good — i,

or bad things the deliberative orator advises, since
he cannot do so about everything, but only about
things which may possibly happen or not. Every-
thing which of necessity either is or will be, or which
cannot possibly be or come to pass, is outside the
scope of deliberation. Indeed, even in the case of
things that are possible advice is not universally
appropriate ; for they include certain advantages,
natural and accidental, about which it is not worth
while to offer advice. But it is clear that advice is
limited to those subjects about which we take
counsel ; and such are all those which can naturally
be referred to ourselves and the first cause of whose
origination is in our own power ; for our examination
is limited to finding out whether such things are
possible or impossible for us to perform.

39

ARISTOTLE.

4 Kaé’ éxaorov pev odv axpiBds SvapiOujcacbat
Kat diadraBeiv eis ein rept dv €idOaor ypnuarilew,
ert 8° daov evddxerar epi adr@v Siopicar Kara THY
adnbevav, od Set Kata TOV TapovTa Kaipov Cnretv
dia TO punjre THs pyropuchs elvar Téxvns GAN epu-
ppoveorépas Kat waAdAov aAnOwijs, 7oAAG 8é mAclw
deddcbar Kal viv abr rdv oiketwv Oewpnudrwr:

5omep yap Kal mpdtepov eipnKdtes Tuyydvomer,
aAnbes eorw, dt 7) pytopuch) ovyKerrar pev eK TE

THs avadutiuchs emvoripns Kal Ths mept Ta On.

modutiKijs, ouola 8 earl Ta pev TH SuadeKTiKA Ta

6 d€ rots coduotikois Adyous. Sow 8° av Tis H THY
Svarexrixny 7} Tadrynv jt) Kabdaep av Svvdpers GAd
emuoTipas meparar KaracKkevdlew, Ajoerar tiv
pvow atbrdv adavicas T@ peraBatvew emuoxeva-
Cw eis emoriuas broKeywevav TWOV Tpaynarwr,

7daAAa ju) pdvov Adywv. spas 8 doa mpd Epyov

fev eore diedetv, ert 8° darodeimer oxepw TH modriKA

ETLOTH UN, ElmwpLEV Kal VOV.

xedov ydp, mept dv BovAevovrar mavres Kal

TEpt & ayopevovow of cup,Bovdrcvortes, TA méeyLora

Tuyxave. wévre Tov apiucv dvra: Tatra 8 éori

TEpt Te mépwr, Kal mroAduov Kal eipnyyns, ere dé

mept pvdakis THs xwpas, Kal TOV eicayouevwy

kai eLayouevav, kal wept vouobecias.

“Qore epi pev mopwv tov péddovra avpPov-
Aevoew déou dv Tas mpoaddous Tis moAews €idévat
tives Kal mdécaL, Stws etre Tis Trapadeimerar mpoo-
TeOH Kal et tis eAdrrwv adb&yOA, err 8€ ras Sa-

8

« The analytical science is Dialectic, incorrectly regarded —

as a branch of Analytics, which properly implies scientific
demonstration:

40

RHETORIC, I. tv. 4-8

However, there is no need at present to endeavour
to enumerate with scrupulous exactness or to classify
those subjects which men are wont to discuss, or to
define them as far as possible with strict accuracy,
since this is not the function of the rhetorical art
but of one that is more intelligent and exact, and
further, more than its legitimate subjects of inquiry
have already been assigned to it. For what we have
said before is true*: that Rhetoric is composed of
analytical science and of that branch of political
science which is concerned with Ethics, and that it
resembles partly Dialectic and partly sophistical
arguments. But in proportion as anyone endeavours
to make of Dialectic or Rhetoric, not what they are,
faculties, but sciences, to that extent he will, without
knowing it, destroy their real nature, in thus altering
their character, by crossing over into the domain of
sciences,’ whose subjects are certain definite things,
not merely words. Nevertheless, even at present
we may mention such matters as it is worth while
to analyse, while still leaving much for political
science to investigate.

Now, we may say that the most important subjects
about which all men deliberate and deliberative
orators harangue, are five in number, to wit: ways
and means, war and peace, the defence of the
country, imports and exports, legislation.

Accordingly, the orator who is going to give advice
on ways and means should be acquainted with the
nature and extent of the State resources, so that if
any is omitted it may be added, and if any is in-

° Taking els émicrjpas with peraBalvew. If taken with
émitxevdtwv, the sense will be: ‘ by changing his ground

(ueraBaivey being used absolutely) while altering their char-
acters from faculties to sciences.”

41

9

1360a

10

ARISTOTLE

/ ~ / ¢ /
mavas Tis méAews amdoas, dmws el Tis TEpiepyos
> 07 \ wv / > / / >
adaipeOf Kal «i tis peilwv eAdrrwv yéevnrar od
\ , ‘ \ 4
yap povov mpos Ta bmdpxovTa mpoorilevres mAov-
4 la > \ \ > ~ ~
owTepor yivovTat, adda Kal apaipobytes THv Sa-
/ ~ > ~
Tavnuarwv. tadra 8 od pdvov ek THs meplt TA
rh) > / > 5 /, ~ GAN’ > a
lola, Eprreipias evdexeTar avvopar, avayKatov
kal TOV Tapa Tots aAAois edpnuevwv toropiKoy Elvat
A
TMpos TIV TEpt TOUTwWY GvuBovAny.
A A , \ > / A / 29 7
Ilepi d€ moAguov Kai cipyvyns thy Svvapw €idevar
Ths TOAcws, Ordon TE DrdpxYer On Kal moony ev-
déxerar UrdpEat, Kal mola Tis 7) Te UdpYoved eoTt
\ 7 ? , / ” \ /
Kal qTLs evdexeTat mpooyevecbar, Ett S€ mroAcmous
Tivas Kat m&s memoAdunkev. od pdovov dé THs
> iy / > \ \ ~ © / ~ >
oixeltas mdéAews adAa Kal TOV Oudpwv tabra avay-
a 07 \ \ a“ bt A a Lid
Kalov eidévar, Kal mpos ovs emidokov TroAcwelv, OWS
mpos ev TOvs KpEeiTToUsS eipyVvEednTaL, mpos Sé TOS
HTTOVUs eT” avTois 7 TO ToAcuEiv. Kal Tas Suvdpets,
/ Ld “A > , ” A \ 6
TOTEPOV OMoLaL 7 avdpwora EoTt yap Kal Tavry
mAcoventely 4 €Aarrotc8a. davayKaiov de Kal
mpos Tadra ju7) ovov Tovs olKelous ToA€mous TeDEw-
La > \ \ \ ~ TAA ~ > ’
pnkevat adda Kai tos Tav dAAwy, m@s amoBai-
vovow* amo yap T&v Opoiwy Ta Gpowa yiyverBau
méepuKev.
~ a A /,
"Ext S€ mept dvdakis ths xopas pn AavOdvew
an A > ~
m&s puddrrerat, aAAd Kal To wAHOos €idévar ris
x a UE yt Ces ‘ \ , A r
dvdakis Kal 70 eldos Kal Tods Témous THY dvdak-
42

RHETORIC, I. rv. 8-10

sufficient, it may be increased. Further, he should
know all the expenses of the State, that if any is
superfluous, it may be removed, or, if too great, may
be curtailed. For men become wealthier, not only
by adding to what they already possess, but also by
cutting down expenses. Of these things it is not
only possible to acquire a general view from in-
dividual experience, but in view of advising concern-
ing them it is further necessary to be well informed
about what has been discovered among others.

In regard to war and peace, the orator should be
acquainted with the power of the State, how great
it is already and how great it may possibly become ;
of what kind it is already and what additions may
possibly be made to it; further, what wars it has
waged and its conduct of them. These things he
should be acquainted with, not only as far as his
own State is concerned, but also in reference to
neighbouring States, and particularly those with
whom there is a likelihood of war, so that towards
the stronger a pacific attitude may be maintained,
and in regard to the weaker, the decision as to
making war on them may be left to his own State.
Again, he should know whether their forces are like
or unlike his own, for herein also advantage or dis-
advantage may lie. With reference to these matters
he must also have examined the results, not only of
the wars carried on by his own State, but also of
those carried on by others; for similar results
naturally arise from similar causes.

Again, in regard to the defence of the country, he
should not be ignorant how it is carried on; he
should know both the strength of the guard, its
character, and the positions of the guard-houses

43

ARISTOTLE

/ ~ > > ta A ” »” ~
Tnpiwv (Todro 8° addvvarov pn Eumeipov ovra THs
4 ed ” > 2r / c rv ‘A ~ A
xwpas), w’ eit’ ekdtrwv % pvdraxh mpooreOR Kat
wv / > ~ \ af > ,
el Tis mepliepyos adaipeOA Kal tods émuTndeious
TomTous THP@ot waAdov.

11 “Er 5€ wept tpodijs, don Samdvn tkavi rH mode
Kal mola 7 avTod Te yuyvomern Kal cicayeryysos,
Kal tivwr 7 eEaywyhs déovrar Kal Tivwy eicaywyns,
iva mpos TovTovs Kal ovvOAKar Kal ovpPodAat yi-
yvwvrar: mpos So yap SiadvAdrrew avayKatov ay-
eyKAjTtous Tovs moAitas, mpos Te TOUS KpElTTOUS Kal
mpos Tovs eis TaDTA xpnoipous.

~ > a

12 Kis & doddAcvay dravra pev tatra dvayKatov
Svvacbar Oewpeiv, odk eAdyiorov dé mepl vopo-
Geoias ématew: ev yap Tots vopuois eorly 4 owrnpia
Tis 7OAews, WoT avayKaiov <idévar mé0a T° €oTi
ToATEt@y €t6n, Kal Tota ovpdéeper ExdoTy, Kal B76

7 , / ‘ > / ~ ,
tivwv Pbeipecbar mépuKe Kal oikelwy THs moArEelas

A > , /, A A if A ’ , ,
kal evavTiwv. dAéyw dé TO bro oixeiwy PbeipecBar,
ort ew THs BeAtiorns Twodureias ai GAAaL macat Kal
avieuevar Kal emurewdopevar POeipovrat, olov Snuo-
Kparia od povov avienevyn aobeveorépa yiveras Wore

/ 7 > > / > A ‘\ > A
tédos 7€eu eis GAvyapxiav, aAAd Kal emvrewouery
ofddpa, worep Kal 4 ypuTdorns Kal oysdrns od

, > / ” | A tA > \ A /
[ovov aviemeva. EpxeTat eis TO u€aov, GAAA Kal odd-

o

dpa ypuTa ywopeva 7) ayuda ovrw Svariferar woTe

* ro’rouvs : those who will receive exports and send im-
ports.

44

RHETORIC, I. rv. 10-12

(which is impossible for one who is unacquainted
with the country), so that if any guard is insufficient
it may be increased, or if any is superfluous it may
be disbanded, and greater attention devoted to
suitable positions.

Again, in regard to food, he should know what
amount of expenditure is sufficient to support the
State; what kind of food is produced at home or
can be imported ; and what exports and imports are
necessary, in order that contracts and agreements
may be made with those * who can furnish them ;
for it is necessary to keep the citizens free from
reproach in their relations with two classes of people
—those who are stronger and those who are useful
for commercial purposes.

With a view to the safety of the State, it is
necessary that the orator should be able to judge of
all these questions, but an understanding of legisla-
tion is of special importance, for it is on the laws
that the safety of the State is based. Wherefore
he must know how many forms of government there
are; what is expedient for each; and the natural
causes of its downfall, whether they are peculiar to
the particular form of government or opposed to it.
By being ruined by causes peculiar to itself, I mean
that, with the exception of the perfect form of
government, all the rest are ruined by being relaxed
or strained to excess. Thus democracy, not only
when relaxed, but also when strained to excess,
becomes weaker and will end in an oligarchy ;
similarly, not only does an aquiline or snub nose
reach the mean, when one of these defects is relaxed,
but when it becomes aquiline or snub to excess, it
is altered to such an extent that even the likeness

45

ARISTOTLE

13 nde puxripa Soxeiy elvarc. yprhoysov 5¢ mpos tas
vosobecias TO 7) dvov eratew tis moduTela oup-
péper eK TOV TrapeAnAvOdrwv Dewpobver, GAAG Kal
Tas Tapa Tots aAAous €idévat, at motat Tots molots
apporrovaw. ware SiAov Stu mpos ev THY vomo-
feciay at THs ys mepiodo. xpjoysor (evred0ev yap
AaBeiv €or. Tods THv eOvGv vowous), mpos d€ Tas
moditiKas ovpBovdrds ai T&v mept tas mpaées
ypapovrey toropiau: dmavra. d€ Tatra moATiKASs
dAN od pyTopuchs epyov coriv.

1360b [lept dv pev oov exe det TOV peMovra ovpBov-
Acvew, TA peytora Tooabra eorw: e€ dv Se Set Kal
mept TovTwy Kal mept Tav dAAwy mpoTpémew 7
amotpéemew, Aéywev madw.

5. Lyedov dé Kal dia ExdoTw Kal Kowh maar
oKomds Tis €oTiv, 0d} oToxalopmevor Kal alpodyrat
Kal devyovow: Kal Tobr éeotiv ev Kehadaiw e€izeiv

27 7 €vdayovia Kal Ta pdpia adTis. wore mapa-
delypatos xdpw AdBwyev ti €orw ws adds eizeiv
% €ddaiovia, Kal ex Tivwy Ta popia TavTHS* TeEpl
yap tavrns Kal Tay eis TavTnY oUVTEWOoVTWY Kal
Tov evavtiwy Tav’Tn al te mpotporal Kal ai azo-
TpoTal mécal eiow: Ta ev yap mapacKkevdalovra
TavTHV 7) THY popiwy TL, H petlov avr’ eAdrTovos
mowodvra, Set mparrew, Ta dé POcipovra 7 eu-
modilovra 7) Ta evayTia moLobvTa pu) mparrew.

3 “Eorw 57 eddaovia edrpagia per aperis, 7
adrdapKkera Cos, 7) 6 Bios 6 per’ aodadeias 7dt0TOs,

« This rendering, although convenient, hardly represents

46

RHETORIC, I. rv. 13—v. 3

of a nose is lost. Moreover, with reference to acts
of legislation, it is useful not only to understand
what form of government is expedient by judging
in the light of the past, but also to become acquainted
with those in existence in other nations, and to
learn what kinds of government are suitable to what
kinds of people. It is clear, therefore, that for
legislation books of travel are useful, since they help
us to understand the laws of other nations, and for
political debates historical works.* All these things,
however, belong to Politics and not to Rhetoric.

Such, then, are the most important questions upon
which the would-be deliberative orator must be well
informed. Now let us again state the sources whence
we must derive our arguments for exhortation or
discussion on these and other questions.

5. Men, individually and in common, nearly all
have some aim, in the attainment of which they
choose or avoid certain things. This aim, briefly
stated, is happiness and its component parts. There-
fore, for the sake of illustration, let us ascertain
what happiness, generally speaking, is, and what its
parts consist in; for all who exhort or dissuade dis-
cuss happiness and the things which conduce or are
detrimental to it. For one should do the things
which procure happiness or one of its parts, or in-
erease instead of diminishing it, and avoid doing
those things which destroy or hinder it or bring
about what is contrary to it.

Let us then define happiness as well-being com-
bined with virtue, or independence of life, or the
life that is most agreeable combined with security, or

the Greek, which, literally translated, is “‘ the investigations
of those who write about human actions”? (ef. icropiKxds, § 8).

47

ARISTOTLE
7 evOnvia KTnudTrwv Kal owparoy pera. Suvdpews
pudaxrucfs Te Kal TpaKTuKis TovUTwy* axeddv ‘yap
TOUTE ev 7 mew THY eddatpoviay SoRoyotow

4 elvan G dmavres. el 67) € corw a eddayrovia, ToLovrov,
avaykn adris «lvat pépy edbyéveray, Tohududiav,
xXpnoroprriay, hodrov, edrexviay, ToureKviay,
edynpiay, ere TAS TOO OLaTOS dperds, oloy & dylevav,
KdMos, ¢ loxwv, peyeBos, Svvapw a dy wovvorucny, ddgav,
TUYULHV, eUruxiav, ¢ apeTHy: , ovTw yep, av avrapKés-
Taros «tn, él dmrdpxou avr@ Ta T eV are Kal Th
exTOs ayaba: ov yap €orw aAAa Tapa, rabra,
eo 8 & atte pev TH mepl puynv Kat To, ev
oapare, eu Sé evyevera Kal pido. Kat Xenpara
Kat TyLyn. ett Se Tpoonre ty oldpeba. duvdpets
drdpxew Kal TUxynV’ ovTwW yap dv aopaddoraros
6 Bios ein. AdBwpmev roivvy cpoiws Kal Tod’Twy
ExaoTov Tl €oTwv.

5 Edyévera ev obv eorw Over ev Kat mdodeu TO
gbrdxGovas 7 dpxaious elvat, Kal tyepdvas Tovs
mposrous emupavets, Kal moAAods émupavets yeyo-
vevau ef adr av emt Tots bnrovpevors: iia dé ev-
yeveva. q at * av8pav 7] 7 dro yuvaik@v, Ket yunovorns
am * dyspoir, . Kal Borep emt TOAEws Tous TE mpusrous
} yvepipous 7) em apeThH 1 tAovTwW 7} ay Tw TOV
TULCOMEVOOY , Kat moAAods émupaveis. ek Tod yevous
Kat dvdpas Kat yuvaikas Kal véous Kal mpeo-
Burépovs.

® This is the usual rendering, although it is hard] satis-
factory. Jebb translates “‘ a flourishing state .. . of body.’

> Or, ** bring about,” ** effect them.”

° i.e. of mind and body ; or durdmecs may mean ** positions

of authority and influence.”
4 This was a favourite boast of the Athenians.

48

RHETORIC, I. v. 3-5

abundance of possessions and slaves,* combined with
power to protect and make use of them”; for nearly
all men admit that one or more of these things con-
stitutes happiness. If, then, such is the nature of
happiness, its component parts must necessarily be :
noble birth, numerous friends, good friends, wealth,
good children, numerous children, a good old age ;
further, bodily excellences, such as health, beauty,
strength, stature, fitness for athletic contests, a good
reputation, honour, good luck, virtue. For a man
would be entirely independent, provided he pos-
sessed all internal and external goods ; for there are
no others. Internal goods are those of mind and
body; external goods are noble birth, friends,
wealth, honour. To these we think should be added
certain capacities ° and good luck; for on these
conditions life will be perfectly secure. Let us now
in the same way define each of these in detail.

Noble birth, in the case of a nation or State,
means that its members or inhabitants are sprung
from the soil,4 or of long standing; that its first
members were famous as leaders, and that many of
their descendants have been famous for qualities that
are highly esteemed. In the case of private in- y
dividuals, noble birth is derived from either the
father’s or the mother’s side, and on both sides there
must be legitimacy ; and, as in the case of a State,
it means that its founders were distinguished for
virtue, or wealth, or any other of the things that
men honour, and that a number of famous persons,
both men and women, young and old, belong to the”
family. ‘

E 49

ARISTOTLE

6 Evdrexvia dé Kal modvtexvia otk ddnAa* €or Se
1351a T@ Kow® pev, vedTys av 7} ToAAY Kal ayaly, ayaby
dé Kat’ aperiv odparos, olov wéyebos KadAos ioxdv
Sivapw aywriorikyy: ypvyfs Se cwdpootvy Kat
avépla véov aperai. idia d¢ edrexvia Kal modv-
Tekvia TO TA lola TéeKVA TOAAA Kal ToLadra Elva,
A , \ + ~ A > ‘ /
Kat OijAea Kat dppeva: OnrevHv Sé€ apery cdpwaros
\ LAA ‘ 4 0 ~ be ta ‘
puev KaAAOS Kai péyeBos, puyfs 5€ cwdpoot’vyn Kat
direpyia dvev avedevbepias. opoiws b€ Kal idta
Kal Kowh Kal Kat avdpas Kal Kata yuvatkas Se?
Tely ExaoTov trdpyew TMV ToLovTWY* GaoLs Yd,
p
Ta Kata yuvatkas data womep Aaxedaipoviors,
axedov KaTa TO Hutov odK edvdayLovodow.
7 [ldovrov dé pépn voplopatos mARbos, yijs,
Ywpiwy KThows, err dé eitAwy KTHow Kat Bookny-
dtwv Kal dvdpamddwv mAjnber Kal peyeber Kal
/ /, ~ A / ‘ > ~
KdAAer Stadepdvtwr, Tatra b€ mdvrTa Kal achadf
Kal éAevbepia Kal ypjoyna. e€ote S€ xprHoywa pev
padov ra Kdprrysa, eAevOepia S5é€ Ta mpds azrd-
Aavow: Kdprysa 5é A¢yw ad’ Hv ai mpdcodot, azro-
Aavorixd dé ad’ dv undev mapa THv xphow ylyverar,
oe \ » ” Pak , \ $5 a2 ~
6 Tt Kat d&wv. dpos S€¢ dopadeias pev TO evtadba
Kal otTw KeKTnaba Wor ed’ adT@ elvar THY xphow
atbrav: Tod Sé olketa elvar drav ef’ abr@ H amad-
Aorpidoa % un, Aéyw Sé dmaddotpiwow Seow Kat
@ dvehevdepia: literally, qualities unbecoming to a free
man or woman, ungentlemanly, unladylike ; hence, oe

servile, sordid.

» A similar charge against the Spartan women is made in
the Politics (ii. 9. 5): “ Further, the looseness (dveors) of the |
Spartan women is injurious both to the purpose of the con-—
stitution and the well-being of the State . . . their life is one
of absolute luxury and intemperance ’’ (compare Euripides,
Andromache, 595-6 ‘even if she wished it, a Spartan girl

50

RHETORIC, I. v. 6-7

The blessing of good children and numerous chil
dren needs little explanation.. For the common-
wealth it consists in a large number of good young
men, good in bodily excellences, such as stature,
beauty, strength, fitness for athletic contests ;_ the
moral excellences of a young man are self-control
and courage. For the individual it consists in a
number of good children of his own, both male and
female, and such as we have described. Female~
bodily excellences are beauty and stature, their
moral excellences self-control and industrious habits,
free from servility.* The object of both the in-
dividual and of the community should be to secure the
existence of each of these qualities in both men and
women; for all those States in which the character
of women is unsatisfactory, as in Lacedaemon,’ may
be considered only half-happy.

Wealth consists in abundance of money, ownership
of land and properties, and further of movables,
cattle, and slaves, remarkable for number, size, and
beauty, if they are all secure, liberal, and useful.
Property that is productive is more useful, but that
which has enjoyment for its object is more liberal.
By productive I mean that which is a source of
income, by enjoyable that which offers no advantage
beyond the use of it —at least, none worth men-
tioning. Security may be defined as possession of
property in such places and on such conditions that
the use of it is in our own hands; and ownership as
the right of alienation or not,’ by which I mean giving
could not be chaste’’). The opinion of Xenophon and
Plutarch is much more favourable.

¢ 7) wi: in the ms. readings these words follow roi
oixeta eivor: “ ownership or non-ownership.” The altera-
tion is Spengel’s. '

51

ios)

1361 b

10

ARISTOTLE

lol ov \ ‘ a 2 \ > a ~
mpaow. 6Aws Sé€ 76 mAovTeiv eorly ev TO xpHobar
a “\ a“ a ¢
padrov 7) ev TO KexrhoOa Kal yap 7 evepyeud
€oTt TOV ToLwovTwv Kal 7 xpos TAODTOS. .
> / > MAD | \ A ¢ A / a c
Edvdoéia 8 éoti ro bd mavtTwy orovdaiov bo-
/, a“ 7 ge 4 ” 4 27
AapBdvecOar, 7) Tovodrov Ti Exyew ob madvTes epievTat
” e AA «> An ¢ /
H ot ToAAol 7) of Gyaoi 7 ot Ppdvipor. :
Tun 8 ori pev onpetov edvepyetixfs Sd€&ns,
TyWULavrat O€ SiKaiws pev Kal pwadAvoTa ot evepyeTn-
KOTES, od piv GAAa TYLaTaL Kal 6 Suvdpevos evepye-
reiv: evepyecia dé 7) els owrnpiav Kal doa aitia TOD
YA ” > Xr ~ ” ” ~ GAA > 06
elvat, 7) eis TAObTOV, 7} «is TL TOV aAAwY ayalar,
e \ ¢ BY ¢ ~ n“ Lid a“ > 50. “ /
Gv pa padia 7 Krhow 7 CAws 7 evTatla y more:
ToAAot yap dia puKpa SoxodvTa TYyLHs TYyxavovow,
GAN of root Kal of KaLtpol atrior. prépn Se TYyLTs
Ovoiar, pvipar ev pérpois Kal dvev méetpwv, yepa,
\
Tewevn, mpoedpiar, taddor, elkdves, tpopat dn-
pooova, ta BapBapixd, olov mpooKxyyjcers Kat
~ A
éxoTdoets, S@pa Ta Tap ExdoTols Tiwia. Kal ‘yap
TO S@pov corr Ktjpatos ddais Kal TiYts onpetov,
/
S16 Kal of dirdoxpyyator Kal of Piddtiysor épievrar
a / \ A
avtav: audorépois yap exer dy S€ovrar: Kal yap
A A]
KTHUGa eoTw, 00 edievtar of diAoxpymaror, Kat
Tysny Exel, od of piAddTysor.
. 4 A M4 A
Luwparos sé aper? vyieva, arn Se ovTwWs wore
a ‘ \
avdaous elvar xpwpevous Tots c@pacw* TodAot yap
I ‘
byvatvovow womep “Hpddiucos Aeyerar, ods ovdeis

@ évépyera : realization in action or fact.

> Of Selymbria, physician and teacher of hygienic gym-
nastics (¢. 420 B.c.). He is said to have made his patients
walk from Athens to Megara and back, about 70 miles.
He was satirized by Plato and by his old pupil Hippo-

52

RHETORIC, I. v. 7-10

the property away or selling it. In a word, being
wealthy consists rather in use than in possession ;
for the actualization® and use of such things is wealth.

A good reputation consists in being considered a
man of worth by all, or in possessing something of
such a nature that all or most men, or the good, or
the men of practical wisdom desire it.

Honour is a token of a reputation for doing good ;
and those who have already done good are justly
and above all honoured, not but that he who is
capable of doing good is also honoured. Doing good
relates either to personal security and all the causes
of existence ; or to wealth; or to any other good
things which are not easy to acquire, either in any
conditions, or at such a place, or at such a time ;
for many obtain honour for things that appear
trifling, but this depends upon place and time. The
components of honour are sacrifices, memorials in
verse and prose, privileges, grants of land, front
seats, public burial, State maintenance, and among
the barbarians, prostration and giving place, and all
gifts which are highly prized in each country. For
a gift is at once a giving of a possession and a token
of honour; wherefore gifts are desired by the am-
bitious and by those who are fond of money, since
they are an acquisition for the latter and an honour
for the former ; so that they furnish both with what
they want.

Bodily excellence is health, and of such a kind
that when exercising the body we are free from sick-
ness ; for many are healthy in the way Herodicus ®
is said to have been,’ whom no one would consider
crates as one who killed those for whom he prescribed —
(cf. ii. 23. 29).

53

ARISTOTLE

* > / ~ ¢ / \ \ 4, >
dv evdaipovioce THS Byrelas Sua TO TavTWY am-
éxec0ar radv avOpwrivwr 7 TOV mAcloTwr.

> t

11 KadAdos 8€ é€repov Kal? Exdorny HAckiay éoriv.

véou prev odv KdAAos TO Tpds TOUS TOVOUS KPHaYLOV
~ /
éxew TO oHya Tovs Te mpds Spopov Kal mpos Biav,
Poy, cd id ~ \ > 5A p>) \ ¢ 7 Or
nOvv ovra ideiy mpos amdAavow, 810 of mévrabAor
7 if \ / \ A / ¢ ,
KdAAoroL, Ste mpos Biav Kal mpos TaxXos aa Tedd-
\ ‘
Kaow* axpalovros S€ mpos pev movous Tods moAe-
7 egr \ > a \ /,
puxovs, nddv dé elvar Soxeiv pera poBepdryros:
/
yepovtos Sé mpos pev mdvouvs Tovs davayKatous
ec /, ” \ \ \ \ ” a ‘ ~
ixavov, aAvmov Se 81a. 7d pundev exew Dv TO yhpas
AwBara.

12 *loxds 8 eori ev Sdvapis rod Kweiv Erepov ws
BovAera, avdryren dé Kively erepov H €AkovTa 7
WOobvra 7) aipovra 7} mélovra 7) cvvOdAiBovra, wore

a ,
6 toxupos 7) mow 7) ToUTwWY Ticlv eoTw laxupos.
a \

13 Meyé@ous dé dperr) 70 brepéxew Kara uhKos Kal

~ ~ , /
Babos Kal mAdros t&v ToMAGv tocotTw jeifovt
£ cal \ \
date pn Bpadvrépas moveiv tas Kwihoes Sua THY
drrepBoArjy.
, >

14 “Aywrotiuxy S€ odpatos dpeT? avyKerrar eK

‘ \ © A

peyelouvs Kal ioxvos Kal tdxous: Kal yap 6 Taxds
/ e

ioxupds eoTw: 6 yap Suvdevos Ta oKeAn purreiv

“A / © \

Tws Kal Kweivy taxyd Kal moppw Spopukds, 6 Se

s ~

OAiBew Kat karéyew madaotikds, 6 5¢ dow TH

* Five contests: jumping, running, discus-throwing,
javelin-throwing, wrestling.

> Or simply, “ freedom from pain ”’ (§ 15).
54

RHETORIC, I. v. 10-14

happy in the matter of health, because they are
obliged to abstain from all or nearly all human
enjoyments.

Beauty varies with each age. In a young man,
it consists in possessing a body capable of enduring “~
all efforts, either of the racecourse or of bodily
strength, while he himself is pleasant to look upon
and a sheer delight. This is why the athletes in the
pentathlum@ are most beautiful, because they are”
naturally adapted for bodily exertion and for swift-
ness of foot. In a man who has reached his prime,
beauty consists in being naturally adapted for the
toils of war, in being pleasant to look upon and at
the same time awe-inspiring. In an old man, beauty
consists in being naturally adapted to contend with
unavoidable labours and in not causing annoyance ?
to others, thanks to the absence of the disagreeable v
accompaniments of old age.

Strength consists in the power of moving another
as one wills, for which purpose it is necessary to
pull or push, to lift, to squeeze or crush, so that the
strong man is strong by virtue of being able to do
all or some of these things.

Excellence of stature consists in being superior to
most men in height, depth, and breadth, but in such
proportion as not to render the movements of the
body slower as the result of excess.

Bodily excellence in athletics consists in size,
strength, and swiftness of foot ; for to be swift is to
be strong. For one who is able to throw his legs
about in a certain way, to move them rapidly and with
long strides, makes a good runner; one who can
hug and grapple, a good wrestler; one who can
thrust away by a blow of the fist, a good boxer ;

55

ARISTOTLE

mAnyh muKTiuKds, 6 8 audotépos tovrois may-
KPATLAOTUKOS, 6 be Tact mevrabhos.

15 Edynpia | 8 eort Bpadurs Yipes per” dAvmias®
ovre yap et Taxd ynpaorer, evynpws, ovr’ ef pdyts
jev Avanpas be. éore be Kat eK Tav Tob owparos
dper@v Kal TUXNS* |) avocos yap Dv pense t ioxupos
ovK eorau amabns odd ddumos Kal moAuxpoveos
dvev TUXNS Svapretvevev av. €ote d€ Tis Kal xwpls
ioxvos kal byvetas aAAn Svvajus jeaxpoBiornTos*
moNot yap avev TOV TOU owparos dperav paKpo-
Brot elow: aAX’ oddev 7 axpyBoroyia xpnoywos 1
mept ToUTWY «ls Th viv.

16 LloAvdidia S€ Kat xpyotopuria ovK adn ra TOO
pirov Wpiop.evov, ore early 6 ToLovTos piros 6 doris
G& olerau dyad, elva €xeivyr, Tpaxrucds €oTw
avta@v bu’ exeivov. @ 8 modot TowwoToL, ToAv-
diros, @ de Kal emeucets avdpes, xpnoropidros..

17. Edrvyia 8° cori, av uh a) ayabar aitia, rabra

1362a yiyveoBat Kal bmdpxew 7 mavra 7), Ta mhetora 7) q Ta.
peylora. atria 8° eoriv u} TUX eviwy pev oy Kal
at réxvat, moAA@y dé Kai areXveov, olov oowy n
pros (evdexerau de Kal Tapa pvow eivat): bytetas
pev yap téxvn atria, KdAdovs dé Kal peyebous

* A combination of wrestling and boxing.

» The results of art and the results due to nature are often
assisted (or hindered) by the interference of the irregular
operations of fortune or chance. Health may be the result
of fortune, as well as of art (a sick man may be cured by a
drug taken by chance, one not prescribed by the physician) ;
beauty and strength, of fortune as well as nature. It is
parenthetically remarked that fortune may also produce
unnatural monstrosities. The removal of the brackets and
the substitution of a comma for the colon after ¢icis have

56

RHETORIC, I. v. 14-17

one who excels in boxing and wrestling is fit for the
pancratium,’ he who excels in all for the pentathlum.

A happy old age is one that comes slowly with
freedom from pain; for neither one who rapidly
grows old nor one who grows old insensibly but with
pain enjoys a happy old age. This also depends
upon bodily excellences and good fortune ; for unless
a man is free from illness and is strong, he will never
be free from suffering, nor will he live long and
painlessly without good fortune. Apart from health
and strength, however, there is a power of vitality
in certain cases; for many live long who are not
endowed with bodily excellences. But a minute
examination of such questions is needless for the
present purpose.

The meaning of numerous and worthy friends is
easy to understand from the definition of a friend.
A friend is one who exerts himself to do for the sake
of another what he thinks is advantageous to him.
A man to whom many persons are so disposed, has
many friends ; if they are virtuous, he has worthy
friends.

Good fortune consists in the acquisition or posses-
sion of either all, or the most, or the most important
of those goods of which fortune is the cause. Now
fortune is the cause of some things with which the
arts also are concerned, and also of many which have
nothing to do with art, for instance, such as are due
to nature (though it is possible that the results of
fortune may be contrary to nature); for art is a
cause of health, but nature of beauty and stature.?

been suggested. The meaning would then be: ‘“ for instance,

such as are due to nature, but possibly may be also contrary
to nature.”

57

ARISTOTLE

, a \ \ A ~ > ~ bd \
dvois. dAws Sé Ta ToLadra Tov ayaldy eoriv
> \ 4 24? e > \ © 06 ” Se i
amo TUyns, ep ols eativ 6 Pbovos. Eat Se Ka

A \ , > a. > 7 s 2 e
Tov mapa Adgyov ayalay airia tvyn, olov ei ot
GAAou aisxpot adeAdpoi, 6 5é Kadds, 7 of GAAoL pr)

\ / e > e “” > a Vi
eldov tov Onoavpdv, 6 8 edpev, 7 et TOD mAnoiov
” \ , 4 \ 7, ” > \ / 4
ervxe TO Bédos, TovTou Sé fu}, 7 Et 2) HAVE prdvos
del hoitdv, of Sé dak éeAOovres SiehOdpyoav:
mavra yap Ta Tovatra evTvynpata SoKel elvar.

a , ‘ \
18 [epi d€ dperis, éretmep oikewdtatos 6 mepl Tovs
A
émalvous TOmos, OTav meplt émaivov mrowwpela Tov
Adyov, Tore Siopioréov.
A ,
6. “Ov pev odv Set oroydleobar mporpemovTa ws
A
eoopevwyv 7) dvmapxdvTwy, Kal @v amoTpEeTorTa,
\
davepov' Ta yap evavTia TovTwy éaTiv. eel de
~ y
mpoKetar TH avpPovdAcvovtTt aKkomes TO Guupepor,
/ \ > \ ~ , > A \ ~
BovAevovrat 5€ od wept Tod TéAovs GAAa TeEpl TV

\ \ / “~ Fee \ A , b
mpos TO TéAos, Tadra 8° €oTl TA GUUPEepovTa Kara

\ / \ \ / > / /, ”
Tas mpages, TO 5€ avpdepov ayabdv, Anmréov av
ein orotxeia rept ayabod Kat ovpdéepovtos adds.

” \ > \ “a ”“ > \ ¢ ~ ”

2 “Eorw 8) dyafov 6 dv adbro éavrod e&vexa F

e , \ be Mea SAA c , 6 \ 6
aiperov, Kal od evexa aAXo atpovpeba, Kal ob
>y7 vA ”“ / A ” v an” ~
edierar Tarra 7 mdvTa Ta alobnow Exovra 7) voor,
a“ > 4 ~ ,\ @ ¢ “~ “ if /, > 5 ,
7 et AdBou vobv. Kat Goa 6 voids av ExdoTw amodoin,

~ > / eo
Kal doa 6 Trepl ExacTov vods amodidwow ExdoTw,
robTé eotw éxdoTrw ayabov, Kal ob mapdvTos €0
‘
SudKerrau Kal adrdpKws Exel, Kal TO aUTapKEs, Kal

58

RHETORIC, I. v. 17—v1. 2

Speaking generally, the goods which come from
fortune are such as excite envy. Fortune is
also a cause of those goods which are beyond ,
calculation ; for instance, a man’s brothers are all
ugly, while he is handsome ; they did not see the-
treasure, while he found it; the arrow hit one who
stood by and not the man aimed at; or, one who
frequented a certain place was the only one who did

not go there on a certain occasion, while those who
went there then for the first time met their death.
All such instances appear to be examples of good
fortune.

The definition of virtue, with which the topic of
praise is most closely connected, must be left until
we come to treat of the latter.

6. It is evident, then, what things, likely to happen
or already existing, the orator should aim at, when
exhorting, and what when dissuading ; for they are
opposites. But since the aim before the deliberative
orator is that which is expedient, and men deliberate,
not about the end, but about the means to the end,
which are the things which are expedient in regard
to our actions; and since, further, the expedient is
good, we must first grasp the elementary notions of

good and expedient in general.
Let us assume good to be whatever is desirable
for its own sake, or for the sake of which we choose
: something else ; that which is the aim of all things,
or of all things that possess sensation or reason; or
would be, if they could acquire the latter. Whatever
reason might assign to each and whatever reason
: does assign to each in individual cases, that is good
for each; and that whose presence makes a man

fit and also independent; and independence in

59

ARISTOTLE

A A n” ‘ ~ ; 4 \
TO TonTiKov 4 pvdaKTiKoY TOV TovwovTwY, Kal @
> a ~ ~
aKxoAovbe? ta Tovatra, Kal Ta KWAUTLKA TOV evay-
tiwy Kai Ta Pbaprikd.

> A ~ A

3 “Akodovbet 5 dixds* 7) yap aa 7 Vorepov, olov
TO pev pavOdvew 7d emiotacba torepov, TH Se
/ ~ ~
byvaivew TO Civ dua. Kal Ta TomTiKa TpLYDs,
,
Ta pev Ws TO byaivew byreias, Ta SE Ws ovTia
4 / \ \ ¢ \ / 7 c Burt \
dyvetas, Ta Se Ws TO yupvdlecOar, STL Ws emi TO
4 7oAD Trovet dyiecav. TovTwy Sé Kemevwy avayKy

/, / ~ 3. ~ > \ Ss \ \
tas Te Anes THY ayaldv ayabds eivat Kal Tas
Tov Kak@v amoBoAds: akodovbe? yap Ta prev TO

\ ” \ A ov ~ de \ 29 A > 06
pn €xew TO KaKov dua, TO Sé TO exyew TO ayabov

5 voTepoy. Kal 7) avr eAdtTovos ayalod peilovos
Afus Kat dvti peilovos Kaxod eAdrrovos: @ yap
1362b Umrepexer TO petlov Tod eAdtToOVvos, TOUTW yiveTat
~ \ ~ ~ > > / ‘ A > \ A
6 Tob pev Ajyus Tod S dzroBoAy. Kal Tas apeTas dé
tg
avayKn ayadov civa Kata yap TavTas «dD Te did-
a > ~ \
KEWTaL ot Exovres, Kal mrounruKcat TOV dyalav elot
Kal mpaxrorcat. rept exdorns d¢, Kal Tis Kal rota,
7 Xwpls pytéov. Kal THY ndovny ayabov elvar mavTa
yap epierar TA Cha adris TH PUoe. wore Kal TA
¢ / \ A \ > / > \ s \ A ‘
noea Kal TA KAaAd avayKn ayaba, elvat Ta pe yap
nPovijs mounruKa, T&v dé KaAdv TA ev HdEa TA. be
avra Kal’ éavra aiperd €oTw.
> /
8 ‘Qs b€ Kal’ & eimetv, avayKn ayaba evar rade.
a
evdaipovias Kal yap Kal? atbro alperov Kal avr-
7 4

9 apKeEs, Kat evexa adtod moAAd aipovueba. dixato-
ouvn, dvdpia, owppoovvn, peyadopuxia, peyaho-
mpemeva Kal ai ddAat af rorabrar E€eis* aperal yap

60

RHETORIC, I. vi. 2-9

general; and that which produces or preserves such
things, or on which such things follow, or all that is
likely to prevent or destroy their opposites.

Now things follow in two ways—simultaneously or
subsequently ; for instance, knowledge is subsequent
to learning, but life is simultaneous with health.
Things which produce act in three ways ; thus, healthi-
ness produces health ; and so does food ; and exercise
asarule. This being laid down, it necessarily follows
that the acquisition of good things and the loss of
evil things are both good; for it follows simultan-
eously on the latter that we are rid of that which is
bad, and subsequently on the former that we obtain
possession of that which is good. The same applies
to the acquisition of a greater in place of a less good,
and a less in place of a greater evil ; for in proportion
as the greater exceeds the less, there is an acquisi-
tion of the one and a loss of the other. The virtues
also must be a good thing; for those who possess
them are in a sound condition, and they are also
productive of good things and practical. However,
we must speak separately concerning each—what it
is, and of what kind. Pleasure also must be a good ;
for all living creatures naturally desire it. Hence it
follows that both agreeable and beautiful things must
be good; for the former produce pleasure, while
among beautiful things some are pleasant and others
are desirable in themselves.

To enumerate them one by one, the following
things must necessarily be good. Happiness, since
it is desirable in itself and self-sufficient, and to
obtain it we choose a number of things. Justice,
courage, self-control, magnanimity, magnificence, and
all other similar states of mind, for they are virtues

61

ARISTOTLE

10 puyfs. Kal bdyieva Kal KddAdos Kal Ta ToLwadTa:
‘ \ a“
aperal yap owparos Kat mountikal 7oAA@v, ofov 1
bylea Kal WOovis Kai tod Civ, 80 Kal apiorov
Soke’ elvar, ote S00 THY Tots moAAois TyYMwTaTwr
11 airy €orw, Hdovis Kat Tob Cav. mAodros: aper?
4 / \ A ~ / \
12 yap KTHGEWS Kal TonTUKOVY ToAA@v. didos Kal
rb k. \ A (le @' 25 ¢ \ c / \
piria: Kat yap Kal’ adrov aiperos 6 didos Kat
A ~ / / \ \ ¢ 4 ‘
13 mountiKos ToAAdv. Tysn, dd€a* Kal yap 7d€éa Kal
TounTiKa TOAA@V, Kal aKkoAovbe? adbrots ws emt Td
\ ‘ ¢ / pm e ~ / ~
14 roAd TO brdpyew ed’ off Tysdvrar. Svvapus TOO
déyew, Tod mparrew: TOUNTUKO. yap TaVTAaA TH
15 Towadra dyabey. ETL evgvia, evi, <vpdbeva,
ayxivo.a, maya TO. Tovabra: moutuKad yap abras
ayabdav ai Suvdpers ciciv. dpotws dé Kal ai ém-
oThmat mica Kal ai téxvar Kal To Civ: «i yap
A * Ld > / > e. \% c /
16 undev aAAo eEmorto ayabdv, Kal’ atiro aiperov
\ aA
€oTw. Kal TO dikatov: cvudepov ydp TL Kowf €oTwW.
17. Tadra pev ody oxeddv Ta Opodroyotpeva ayaba
iséorw: ev dé Tots apdioPyrycipors ex Tavd_e oF
ovAdoyiopol. @ TO evavtiov Kakdv, Todr ayabov.
‘ * A > , an > a , >
19 Kai ob TO evayriov Tots exPpois ovdpeper olov €t
/ cal a
To SetdAods elvar pdAvora ovpdéeper Tots €xOpois,
~ ¢ > t , Me a | a
dfjAov ott avdpia padvora wWphéeAwov Tots troAirats.
ay, “A e.2 \ 4, ”“ wy Fee. /
20 kal GAws 6 of é€xOpot BovAovrar 7 ef’ & yxaipovor,
> / 4 > / / ‘ > ”
rovvavtiov TtovtTw whéAyov daiverat: 810 € €t-
pynra

« The excellence of anything is proportionate to its success
in the performance of its proper function. ‘The function of
acquisition is to get something valuable, such as money, and
its “‘excellence"” may be judged by the amount of wealth
obtained.

62

RHETORIC, I. vr. 10-20

of the soul. Health, beauty, and the like, for they
are virtues of the body and produce many advan-
tages ; for instance, health is productive of pleasure
and of life, wherefore it is thought to be best of all,
because it is the cause of two things which the
majority of men prize most highly. Wealth, since
it is the excellence of acquisition * and productive of
many things. A friend and friendship, since a friend
is desirable in himself and produces many advan-
tages. Honour and good repute, since they are
agreeable and produce many advantages, and are
generally accompanied by the possession of those
things for which men are honoured. Eloquence and
capacity for action; for all such faculties are pro-
ductive of many advantages. Further, natural clever-
ness, good memory, readiness to learn, quick-witted-
ness, and all similar qualities ; for these faculties are
productive of advantages. The same applies to all
the sciences, arts, and even life, for even though no
other good should result from it, it is desirable in
itself. Lastly, justice, since it is expedient in general
for the common weal.

These are nearly all the things generally recognized
as good; in the case of doubtful goods, the argu-
ments in their favour are drawn from the following.
That is good the opposite of which is evil, or the
opposite of which is advantageous to our enemies ;
for instance, if it is specially advantageous to our
enemies that we should be cowards, it is clear that
courage is specially advantageous to the citizens.
And, speaking generally, the opposite of what our
enemies desire or of that in which they rejoice,
appears to be advantageous ; wherefore it was well
said :

63

ARISTOTLE

$2 4 / /
H Kev ynOjoa IIpiapos.
” lo
€oTt 8 ovK ae TOOTO, GAN’ ws emi TO TOAD: OddevV
\ 4, ad a
yap kwdver eviore radTo acupdhépew Tots evavTiots:
¢ /
dev éyerar ws TA KAKA Cvvdyer TOds avOpwroUs,
Ld a
13632 OTav 7 Tad’TO BAaBepov audoiv.
K \o@ 4, ? ¢€ Xr / ~ > ff] / “a 8° a“
21 Kat 0 ux é€orw trepBodry, trodto ayabov, 6 8 av
22 7) wetlov 7 Set, Kaxov. Kal od evexa TOoAAG mremdvn-
Tar 7) dedamdvyta pawdpevov yap ayabov Sn,
\ ~
kal ws Ttédos Td Tovodroy srodapBavera, Kal
ty Ar a's \ be £). > 0 / 54 a>
tédos moAAdv: 7d dé rédos ayabov. dOev rabr
elpyrat,

Kad dé Kev edywAnv Hpiduw [kal Tpwat Atzrovev
’Apyeinv “EAevny|
Kat

> / / / / /
ataxpov Tot Snpov Te revew [Kevedv re vecoBar|,

a, , / » ie BZ \ 4, \ € ,
Kat 7) TapoyLta O€, TO emt Ovpais THY BOpiay.
\ e + bh 65 \ \ /
23 Kat od moddoi edievrar, Kal TO mepysdynrov
a >
pawouevov' od yap mdvres edlevrat, Todr ayalov
G2 ¢ \ A 7 / / \ \
24 HV, ot de troAAOL Worep TavTes paivovTar. Kal TO
a \
errauveTov" ovdels yap TO pn) ayabov emawel. Kal
~ / ”

6 ot €xPpol érawodow: woTep yap mavres HOH

@ Iliad, i. 255. ‘The words are those of Nestor to Achilles
and Agamemnon, in which he points out how their enemies
would rejoice if they heard all the story of their quarrel.

» Reading 6. The ordinary reading of is taken to mean
**that which does not permit of excess,” that which is mid-
way between two extremes, the mean. Another suggested
rendering is, ** that of which one cannot have too much.”

¢ Lliad, ii. 160. Addressed by Hera to Athene, begging
her to prevent the Greeks departing from Troy and leaying
Helen behind.

64

RHETORIC, I. vi. 20-24

Of a truth Priam would exult.¢

This is not always the case, but only as a general
rule, for there is nothing to prevent one and the
same thing being sometimes advantageous to two
opposite parties; hence it is said that misfortune
brings men together, when a common danger
threatens them.

That which is not in excess ® is good, whereas that
which is greater than it should be, is bad. And that
which has cost much labour and expense, for it at
once is seen to be an apparent good, and such a
thing is regarded as an end, and an end of many
efforts ; now, an end is a good. Wherefore it was
said :

And they would [leave Argive Helen for Priam and the
Trojans] to boast of,°

and,
It is disgraceful to tarry long,?

and the proverb, “[to break] the pitcher at the
door.’’¢

And that which many aim at and which is seen to
be competed for by many; for that which all aim
at was recognized as a good, and the majority may
almost stand for “ all.’’ And that which is the object
of praise, for no one praises that which is not good.
And that which is praised by enemies ; for if even

@ Iliad, ii. 298. Spoken by Odysseus. While sym-
pathizing with the desire of the army to leave, he points out
that it would be “ disgraceful after waiting so long” to
return unsuccessful, and exhorts them to hold out.

¢ Proverbial for “lost labour.” Cf. French “faire nau-
Frage au port,” and the English ‘there’s many a slip ’twixt
cup and lip.”

F 65

ARISTOTLE

dporoyobaw, ef Kal of KaK@s memovOdres: dua yap
\ \ ¢ a“ EY 7 \ ~ a
70 havepov opodroyotev dv, womep Kal padAo. ods
ob €xOpot emawotow. 816 AcAoWophobar béAaBov
Kopiv@or bd Xiuwvidov mrovjoavtos
Kopwios 8° od péuderar to “IAvov.

. "S ~ / ”“ ~ > ~ > ~ n
25 Kal 6 TOV dpovipwr tis 7) TOV ayalav avdpav 7

~ / e > ry / "AG. ~
yuvak@v mpoeKpwev, olov *Odvacéa nva Kat
€ / \ \ * AX / 5 ¢ 0. \ \
EAévnv @noevs Kat e€avdpov at Beal Kal
"Axirréa “O
xiArda “Opnpos.
26 Kai dAws Ta mpoaipera: mpoarpodvrat dé mpar-
Tew Th TE eipnweva Kal Ta Tots exOpois Kaka Kal
27 7a Tots pido ayaba Kai ra Svvard. tadra de
Suy@s ori, Ta Te 'yevopeva av Kal Ta padiws yuyvd-
csv \@ vA + 4 “~ 3 2\/ £
poeva. pddia dé doa. 7 dvev Adans 7) ev CAityw xpovw*
TO yap xaAemov dpileras 7 A¥mrn 7 TAHVEL xpovov.
> Poe Be ' e tA 7 7 A \
Kat eav Ws BovAovra: BovrAovrar Sé 7H pyndev KaKov
”“ ér wy. D 6 a“. ~ 5” ” 3A n” r
} €Aarrov Tob dyabod: robro 8 éorar, eay 7) Aav-
28 Odvy % TYyswpia 7) puKpa 7. Kal Ta tia, Kal a
/ \ \ / \ \ 4 lol
pndels, Kal Ta TepiTTa* TYyLn yap ovTw paAdov.
Kal Ta apporrovra avrots: Tovatra dé Ta Te mpoo-
nKovTa Kata yevos Kal Sdvayw, Kal dv édetrew

-

@ Meaning that they cannot have done their duty against
their enemies, who would then have blamed them. Another
suggested reading is ods ol dito Wéyouor Kai ods of €xOpol wh
Péyouot (“those whom their friends blame and whom their
enemies do not blame’’).

» In the Jliad Glaucus, a Corinthian, is described as an
ally of the Trojans. Simonides meant to praise, but the
Corinthians were suspicious and thought his words were
meant satirically, in accordance with the view just expressed
by Aristotle. ‘The Simonides referred to is Simonides of
Ceos (Frag. 50, P.L.G. iii., where the line is differently
given). Aristotle is evidently quoting from memory, as he
often does, although not always accurately.

66

RHETORIC, [. vi. 24-28

those who are injured by it acknowledge its goodness,
this amounts to a universal recognition of it ; for it
is because of its goodness being evident that they
acknowledge it, just as those whom their enemies
praise are worthless.* Wherefore the Corinthians
imagined themselves insulted by Simonides, when
he wrote,

Ilium does not blame the Corinthians.?

And that which one of the practically wise or good,
man or woman, has chosen before others, as Athene
chose Odysseus, Theseus Helen, the goddesses
Alexander (Paris), and Homer Achilles.

And, generally speaking, all that is deliberately
chosen is good. Now, men deliberately choose to do
the things just mentioned, and those which are
harmful to their enemies, and advantageous to their
friends, and things which are possible. The last are
of two kinds: things which might happen,’ and
things which easily happen ; by the latter are meant
things that happen without labour or in a short time,
for difficulty is defined by labour or length of time.
And anything that happens as men wish is good ;
and what they wish is either what is not evil at all
or is less an evil than a good, which will be the case
for instance, whenever the penalty attached to it is
unnoticed or light. And things that are peculiar to
them, or which no one else possesses,? or which are
out of the common; for thus the honour is greater.
And things which are appropriate to them; such
are all things befitting them in respect of birth and
power. And things which they think they lack,
_ © yevoueva dv: Spengel omits dv: i.e. “things which have
happened.” ;

** Or which no one else has done” (Jebb).

67

ARISTOTLE

OlovTal, Kav uKpa 7° OvdEeY yap HTTOV mpoatpodvTaL
29 radra mparrew. Kal Ta edKarépyaota SuvaTa
A ¢€ ev > / / “a 4, a” ¢
yap ws pdd.a edxatepyaora dé, ad mavTEes 7 Ob
+ pe ed “a won 7 \
moAAol 7) of Gpovor 7) of HrTovs KaTwpIwoay. Kat
“a ~ a / ” “a > v4 a“
& xapiobvrat Trois didows, 7 & amexOjoovrTar Tots
€yOpots. Kal doa ovs Oavydlovor mpoaipobvrat
mparrew. Kal mpos & edduets eiol Kat Epzrerpor:
~ ‘
pdov yap Katopbwocw olovrat. Kat & pmdels
~ > A A a \ @& > ~
fatAos* érrawera yap paAdov. Kat dv émbvpodv-
/ > \ , eo, > \ \
Tes Tuyydvovow* od yap povov 70d aAAd Kal
sa \ “a
30 BéAriov daiverar. Kal pddvora €xacTot mpos a
1363b TOLODTOL, Olov ot diAddviKoL Et viKn EoTaL, Ot Pidd-
Tysor et TYLA, OF PiAoypHuarot et xpHuaTa, Kal ot
+ ¢ 4 \ A be > “a \ a
GAAot woattws. mept pev ovv ayalod Kal Tod
aupdépovtos ek TovTw@v Anmréov Tas TioTEts.
7. "Ezei dé moAAdkis dpuodoyobvres Gudw oup-
lon ~ > ~ a
dépew tept Tob padAov aydioByrotow, epeEfs av
ein Aextéov mept TOO peiLovos adyafod Kai Tod
a , ” A ¢ /, \
2 warAov auudépovtos. Eatw bx brepéxov pev To-
“~ \
codrov Kat ért, vmepexopevov Se TO evuTdpxor.
a LA cal ‘
Kal perlov pev del Kal mA€elov mpos EAarrov, peya
S€ Kai puxpov Kal troAd Kati dAlyov mpos TO Tay
~ , TB / \ ‘\ 4 ‘
ToAAGv péyeOos, Kat drrepéxov ev TO pwéeya, TO SE
? ~ / ‘ \ \ 3\/ ¢ A
€deimov puKpdv, Kat moAd Kat odAiyov woatrws.
> ‘ s > \ / / > ‘ ¢ ~ @&
3 eet odv ayabdov A€yowev Td TE adTO abrod Evexa

68

RHETORIC, I. v1. 28—vir. 3

however unimportant ; for none the less they de-
liberately choose to acquire them. And things which
are easy of accomplishment, for being easy they are
possible ; such things are those in which all, or most
men, or those who are equals or inferiors have been
successful. And things whereby they will gratify
friends or incur the hatred of enemies. And all
things that those whom they admire deliberately
choose to do. And those things in regard to which
they are clever naturally or by experience ; for they
hope to be more easily successful in them. And
things which no worthless man would approve, for
that makes them the more commendable. And
things which they happen to desire, for such things
seem not only agreeable, but also better. Lastly,
and above all, each man thinks those things
good which are the object of his special desire, as
victory of the man who desires: victory, honour of
the ambitious man, money of the avaricious, and so
in other instances. These then are the materials
from which we must draw our arguments in reference
to good and the expedient.

7. But since men often agree that both of two
things are useful, but dispute which is the more so,
we must next speak of the greater good and the
more expedient. Let one thing, then, be said to
exceed another, when it is as great and something
more—and to be exceeded when it is contained in
the other. “‘ Greater” and ‘“‘ more”’ always imply
a relation with less ; “ great ” and “ small,” “ much ”
and “ little’ with the general size of things; the
“ great ” is that which exceeds, and that which falls
short of it is “small ’’; and similarly “ much ”’ and
“little.” Since, besides, we call good that which is

69

4

ou

ARISTOTLE

Kat p27) dMov aiperov, Kal 08 mavT’ epierar, Kal 6
voov av Kal Ppovnow AaPovra. Edovro, Kal TO moun-
TUCOV Kat TO priaxricor, 7 @ emerat TH Towbra,
TO om ob évexa TO TEAS €oTt, Tédos &° corly ob
evexa Ta GAXa, avra de dyabov TO mpos abrov
Tatra memovlds, avayKn Ta Te TAciw TOO évos Kal
Tov edarTovwy, ovvapilwoupevou Too ev0s i Trav
eAarroveny, petlov ayabov civau dmepexer yap, TO
de evuTrdpxov UrrepeXeTau.

Kai ¢ eav TO pe yeorov 708 jueylorov dmepexn, Kat
ava abrav Kal boa aura abrav, Kal 70 pe yeorov
Too peylorou: olov «if 6 péyvoTos dvnp yevauKrds
THS peylorns peilo, Kal OrAws ot dvSpes TOV
yuvauKay peilous: Kab a ot i dvdpes Orws TOV yuvan-
Ka pcilous, Kal avip 6 pe yloros THS peylorns
yuvaurds pete: dvdAoyov yap Exovow at brep-
oxal TOV yevdv Kal TOV peyiorwy ev adrois. Kal
orav TOE pev T@de EmNTOL, €xeivo be TOUTW [L7}"
emer au d€ 7 To Ga. 7 TO edelins 7 7 TH Suvdpet-
evuTapxes yap 1 Xphors 7 Too Erro/LevOU €v TH
Oarépov. emeTau be dpa pev TO byraivew TO ony,
rovrw Sé& éxeivo ot, varepov Se TH pavOdvew To
emiotaclar, Suvaper S¢ TH lepoovrciv ro amo-
oTEpeiv' 0 yap tepoavAjoas Kav amooTEepHaeiev. Kal

* The one, the smaller number, and the greater number
must be of the same species. ‘Thus, 5 pounds is a greater
good than 2 pounds ; but 5 farthings is not a greater good
than 2 pounds, since the smaller number is not reckoned in
with the greater (Buckley).

’ If B (life) follows on, is the. consequent of A (healiin
but A is not the consequent of B, then A is a greater g
than B.

70

RHETORIC, I. vu. 3-5

desirable for its own sake and not for anything else,
and that which all things aim at and which they _
would choose if they possessed reason and practical ‘
wisdom ; and that which is productive or protective
of good, or on which such things follow ; and since that
_ for the sake of which anything is done is the end,
and the end is that for the sake of which everything
else is done, and that is good for each man which
relatively to him presents all these conditions, it
necessarily follows that a larger number of good
things is a greater good than one or a smaller
number, if the one or the smaller number is reckoned
as one of them;? for it exceeds them and that
which is contained is exceeded.

And if that which is greatest in one class surpass
that which is greatest in another class, the first class
will surpass the second; and whenever one class
surpasses another, the greatest of that class will
surpass the greatest of the other. For instance, if
the biggest man is greater than the biggest woman,
men in general will be bigger than women; and if
men in general are bigger than women, the biggest
man will be bigger than the biggest woman ; for the
superiority of classes and of the greatest things con-
_ tained in them are proportionate. And when this
follows on that, but not that on this [then “that ”
is the greater good] ;° for the enjoyment of that
which follows is contained in that of the other.
Now, things follow simultaneously, or successively,
or potentially ; thus, life follows simultaneously on
health, but not health on life; knowledge follows
subsequently on learning [but not learning on
knowledge]; and simple theft potentially on sacri-
lege, for one who commits sacrilege will also steal.

71

ARISTOTLE

\ ¢ / ~ > ~ , / > yd
67a vmepéxovTa TOD adTod peilow peilw: avayKn
7 yap vmepéxew Kal Tob pellovos. Kal ta peilovos

ayabob mountixa peilw: tobTro yap Hv TO peiCovos
TounTiK@ elvar. Kal o0 TO TroLnTLKOV petlov, wa-
a ¢
avTws* el yap TO byvewov atpetrobtepov Tod 7d€os
A a > , A € ¢€ 4 ~ 3 ~~ ,
kat petlov ayabdv, Kat 4 vyieva THs HOovAs peilwr.
A A ¢ 4 > e \ ~ A > ¢ £
8 Kat TO atperwrepov Kal” adto Tod pH Kal? aidro,
_ 1264a olov ioxds byrewod: 7d ev yap oby adTob eveKa,

A A ¢ a o s A > , nn A A
970 d€ adTod, Smep Hv TO ayabov. Kav 7 TO bev

, \ A A / \ A \ my” a A

TéAos, TO Sé ut) TEAS: TO prev yap aGAAov Eveka, TO
d€ adrod, olov TO yupvdlecOa tod eb Eyew TO
~ A A e / / an
10 c@pa. Kat TO Hrrov mpocdedpuevov Oarépov 7
ETépwv' adrapKéaTepov ydp: irrov dé mpoadetrar
\ > / a“ e , / ‘\ a
ll to eAarrévewv 1 paovav Tpoadeopevov. KQL OTaV
/ \ »” ~ \ PKA A ‘ > A
TOOE pev avev TODSE [1) 7) 7) 7) SvvVaTov 7 yeveoOar,
Odrepov d€ dvev todtov: adbrapKéarepov dé TO [17
aA >
dedpevov, WoTe paivera peilov ayabor.
A >
12 Kav 7 apx7, To dé x) Gpyyn. Kav 7 aitiov, To 8
\ > ~
ovK airvov, 51a. TO adbrd: avev yap airiov Kal apyiis
> 4 > a“ / \ a > ~ ‘\
advvarov elvar y yevéobat. Kal dvotv apyaiv rod
~ aA a >
amo Ths petlovos petlov, Kal dvotv airiow To amo
“~ , gf ~ A > 4 A ~
Tob peilovos airiov petlov. Kai avarradw 87) dvotv
apxaiv 7 Tob jrel(Covos apy pelCwv Kal dvoiv airiow

* Eight is greater than 2 by 6, which itself is greater than 2.

72

RHETORIC, I. vu. 6-12

And things which exceed the same thing by a greater
amount [than something else] are greater, for they
must also exceed the greater.* And things which
produce a greater good are greater; for this we
agreed was the meaning of productive of greater.
And similarly, that which is produced by a greater
cause ; for if that which produces health is more
desirable than that which produces pleasure and a
greater good, then health is a greater good than
pleasure. And that which is more desirable in itself
is superior to that which is not ; for example, strength
is a greater good than the wholesome, which is not
desirable for its own sake, while strength is; and
this we agreed was the meaning of a good. And
the end is a greater good than the means ; for the
latter is desirable for the sake of something else, the
former for its own sake; for instance, exercise is
only a means for the acquirement of a good con-
stitution. And that which has less need of one or
several other things in addition is a greater good,
for it is more independent (and “ having less need”’
means needing fewer or easier additions). And when
one thing does not exist or cannot be brought into
existence without the aid of another, but that other
can, then that which needs no aid is more indepen-
dent, and accordingly is seen to be a greater good.
And if one thing is a first principle, and another
not ; if one thing is a cause and another not, for the
Same reason; for without cause or first principle
nothing can exist or come into existence. And if
there are two first principles or two causes, that
which results from the greater is greater; and
onversely, when there ‘are two first principles or
wo causes, that which is the first cause or principle

73

ARISTOTLE

13 TO ToD preiLovos airiov petlov. SHAov obv ex Tov
eipnuevwy ot. adotépws petlov €orw Kal yap et
apxn, To dé pt) apy, Sd€er peilov eivar, Kal ef py
apxy, TO dé apyy, TO yap TéAos peilov Kal odK
apyyn, womep 6 ANewdduas Karnyopav épn KadAc-
otpatov tov BovAetoavtra tod mpdéavros madAov
adikety’ o8 yap av mpaxOfqvar yun BovAevoapevov*
maAw 6€ Kal XaBpiov, tov mpagavta tod BovAcv-
cavros: od yap av yevéobar, ei por) Hv 0 mpagwv-
TovTou yap eveka éemBovrevew, Omws Tpagwow.

14 Kat 70 oravwirepov tod adbovov, olov xpuads
avdypou axpnoTorepos wy peilov yap 1 KTHaw dvd
TO yaderwrépay elvar. GAdov Sé tpomov TO a=
d0ovov rod araviov, dtt % xpiows dmepexer TO
yap moAAdKis Tob GAvydKus drrepexer’ GDev A€yera

” \ Md
apiotov prev vowp.

1p Kat dAws 7d xaderdrepov Tob pdovos: oravid-
/ ~ ~
tepov yap. dAdov S€ tpdmov To pdov TOD yaAeTTW-

« A thing may be of greater importance in two ways: (a)
that which is a first principle is superior to that which is not;
(6) that which is not a first principle, but an end, is superior
to that which is a first principle; for the end is superior to
the means. In the illustration that follows: (a) the first
principle (suggesting the plot) is said to be of more import-
ance (worse) than the end or result (carrying out the plot);
(6) on the other hand, this end is said to be worse than the
first principle, since the end is superior to the means. Thus
the question of the amount of guilt can be argued both
ways. )

+ Oxepeny a frontier-town of Boeotia and Attica, had been
occupied by the Thebans (366 s.c.). Callistratus suggested
an arrangement which was agreed to and carried out by
Chabrias—that the town pw, remain in Theban possessiog
for the time being. Negotiations proved unsuccessful and

74

RHETORIC, I. vir. 13-15

of the greater is greater. It is clear then, from what
has been said, that a thing may be greater in two
ways ; for if it is a first principle but another is not,
it will appear to be greater, and if it is not a
first principle [but an end], while another is; for
the end is greater and not a first principle.* Thus,
Leodamas, when accusing Callistratus,° declared that
the man who had given the advice was more guilty
than the one who carried it out; for if he had not
suggested it, it could not have been carried out.
And conversely, when accusing Chabrias, he declared
that the man who had carried out the advice was
more guilty than the one who had given it; for it
could not have been carried out, had there not been
some one to do so, and the reason why people devised
plots was that others might carry them out.

And that which is scarcer is a greater good than
that which is abundant, as gold than iron, although
it is less useful, but the possession of it is more
valuable, since it is more difficult of acquisition.
From another point of view, that which is abundant
is to be preferred to that which is scarce, because the
use of it is greater, for ‘“ often” exceeds “‘ seldom ”;
whence the saying :

Water is best.°

And, speaking generally, that which is more difficult
is preferable to that which is easier of attainment,
for it is scarcer ; but from another point of view that
which is easier is preferable to that which is more

the Thebans refused to leave, whereupon Chabrias and
Callistratus were brought to trial. Leodamas was an
Athenian orator, pupil of Isocrates, and pro-Theban in his
political views.

¢ Pindar, Olympia, i. 1.

75

ARISTOTLE

16 Tépov exer yap ws BovAdcucba. Kal @ Td evavtiov
a \ A
petlov, Kal ob 4 aorépnaos peil@v. Kal ape? [2
~ \ \
apeThs Kal Kakia pu) KaKias peilwv: Ta pev yap
/ a”
17 TEAn, Ta 5 od TEAn. Kal dv Ta Epya Kadriw 7
> , , > 7 1 @ ¢ , \ c
atoxiw, peila avrd. Kal @v at Kakiat Kal at
> ¢ A
apeTat jeilous, Kal Ta epya pellw, emeimep ws TA
\
aitia Kat ai apyal, Kal Ta amoBaivovta, Kal ws Ta
> t \ \ ” \ € > , Wo
18 amoBaivovra, Kal Ta alta Kal at adpyat. Kal ov
ere?’ \ c / a“ / e v° SS ~
n dtrepox7) atperwrépa 7) KaAXNiwy, olov To aKpiBOs
c aA ¢ / om a \ A ”
opav atperwtepov Tod dodpaivecbar: Kat yap oyus
1364b Oodpyoews* Kal TO direraipov eivar Tod piAoxpy-
lol /
prarov padXrov KdAdov, doe Kal direraipia dido-
xpypatias. Kal avrTuceywevws Se tev PedTiOvwr
at wmepBoAat BeAriovs Kat Kadduvdvwv KaddXious.
19 kat dv at emOvpiar KadAlouvs 7 BeAriovs: ai yap
/ > / / 2 \ ~ /
peilovs opeEes perldvwv cioiv. Kal TOv KadAo-
A hs) \ / ee / / |
vwov d€ 7 Kal BeATiovwy at émBupias BeAtiovs Kat
/ \ ‘ > /
KaAXious Sia TO ado.
20 Kai dv at emuoriwar Kaddiovs 7 orrovdadrepat,
Kal Ta Tpdypara KadAiw Kal omovdadrepa ws
A ” £29 / \ \ in bg r /, de \
yap exer 7 emioTHun, Kal TO aAnBes: KeAcveL Se TO
A a \
abThs exdoTn. Kal Tt@v omovdaotépwv de Kal
/ e.\9 ~ > / \ ~ \
Kadddvewv at emorhuar avaAdoyov dia Tadra. Kat
“a / ” “” / ¢ / ”“ / n”“
6 Kpivevay av 7) Kexpixaow ot dpdvipor 7} mavTes 7)
¢ AA \ ”“ e Xr / ” © / > 06
ot moAAot 7 of wAciovs 7) of Kpdtioro. ayabov 7

2

_

* e.g. it is worse to be blind than deaf; therefore sight is
better than hearing (Schrader).

76

RHETORIC, J. vi. 16-21

difficult ; for its nature is as we wish. And that,
the contrary or the deprivation of which is greater,
is the greater good.? And virtue is greater than
non-virtue, and vice than non-vice ; for virtues and
vices are ends, the others not. And those things
whose works are nobler or more disgraceful are them-
selves greater; and the works of those things, the
vices and virtues of which are greater, will also be
greater, since between causes and first principles
compared with results there is the same relation as
between results compared with causes and first prin-
ciples. Things, superiority in which is more desirable
or nobler, are to be preferred ; for instance, sharp-
ness of sight is preferable to keenness of smell; for
sight is better than smell. And loving one’s friends
more than money is nobler, whence it follows that
love of friends is nobler than love of money. And,
on the other hand, the better and nobler things are,
the better and nobler will be their superiority ; and
similarly, those things, the desire for which is nobler
and better, are themselves nobler and better, for
greater longings are directed towards greater objects.
For the same reason, the better and nobler the
object, the better and nobler are the desires.

And when the sciences are nobler and more
dignified, the nobler and more dignified are their
subjects ; for as is the science, so is the truth which
is its object, and each science prescribes that which
properly belongs to it; and, by analogy, the nobler
and more dignified the objects of a science, the nobler
and more dignified is the science itself, for the same
reasons. And that which men of practical wisdom,
either all, or more, or the best of them, would judge,
or have judged, to be a greater good, must necessarily

77

ARISTOTLE

~ > / o ” "n 6¢ A n” ‘ A A
peetlov, avayKn odTws exew, 7) aMADs 7H Kata TI
dpovnow Expwav. €ot. d€ TodTo Kowov Kal KaTa
Tov dAAwy: Kal yap TL Kal TooOV Kal TrOLOV OUTwS
” c a“ ¢ > / \ ¢ / ” > >
EXEL Ws av 7) emioTHun Kal 7 dpovnats eimor. GAA
én ayalav cipjkapev’ wpiotar yap ayaboy <ivar,
“a , A 7 / iA > a“ hid
6 AaBovta Ta mpdypwata dpdovynow €Aowr dv Exa-
orov’ OfjAov odv Ort Kat retlov, 6 wGdAov 7 Ppdvnois

‘4 \ \ an / ¢ / n“ ¢ ~ n”~

22 A€yet. Kal TO Tots PeATioow brapxov, 7 amAds 7
/ bw > / > vA \ a @ > nw ¢
% BeAtiovs, ofov avdpia ioxvos. Kat 6 €or’ av o
BeAtiwv, 7) atABs 7) 4 BeAtiov, ofov To adiuKetoBar
an a > ~ lol A ¢ 7, na
pGAdov 7 adiKeiv’ tobTo yap 6 SiKatdTepos av
e \ \ hd lanl e , \ \
23 €EAowTro. Kal TO Hdvov TOO FArtov Adeos: THY yap
€ \ / 4 \ > a ~

nooviy mavTa SimKel, Kal adTOD Evexa TOD HdeaOaL
a. t7 ¢ \ uA ‘ > ‘ ‘ ‘
dpéyovrat, wprorar de TovTois TO ayalov Kal To

/ Lid A / > / A A
TéAos. 7otov d€ TO TE aAvTOTEpOV Kal TO ToAU-

24 Xpovwrepov HOV. Kal TO KdAMOV TOD Hrrov KaAod-

\ 4 Ao b] ” A HOU a“ A > € ‘

TO yap KaAdv eoTw FTO TO 400 7 TO Kal’ adro

€ / ‘ a > \ ¢ ~ ”“ , : /
25 alpeTov. Kal dowv adroit adrois 7 ido Bov-
” ~ ~ / > /
Aovrat airior etvac paAdAov, radra peilw ayald,
oe \ a / 4 ‘ A ,
26 Oowv Sé FKiora, peilw KaKd. Kal Ta ToAvXpo-
yuwtepa TOV oAvyoxpoviwrépwv Kal Ta BeBasdrepa

~ / e / \ c ~ ~
tov pn BeBarorépwv: dmepéxer yap 7) xphow Tov

A ~ / ~ de ~ » , : ov A ,
pev TO xpdvm Ta&v Se TH BovAjcer: drav yap Bov-

¢ / ~ € ~ ,
Awvrar, brdpxer waAdov 7 Tob BeBaiov,
\ ¢ ”“ > ~ / ‘ ~ © /
27 Kat ws av ex Tov OVOTOLYWY KAL TWY OLOLWV

78

RHETORIC, I. vir. 21-27

be such, either absolutely or in so far as they have
judged as men of practical wisdom. The same may
be said in regard to everything else ; for the nature,
quantity, and quality of things are such as would be
defined by science and practical wisdom. But our
statement only applies to goods; for we defined
that as good which everything, if possessed of prac-
tical wisdom, would choose ; hence it is evident that
that is a greater good to which practical wisdom
assigns the superiority. So also are those things
which better men possess, either absolutely, or in so
far as they are better ; for instance courage is better
than strength. And what the better man would
choose, either absolutely or in so far as he is better ;
thus, it is better to suffer wrong than to commit it,
for that is what the juster man would choose. And
that which is more agreeable rather than that which
is less so; for all things pursue pleasure and desire
it for its own sake; and it is by these conditions
that the good and the end have been defined. And
that is more agreeable which is less subject to pain
and is agreeable for a longer time. And that which
is nobler than that which is less noble ; for the noble
is that which is either agreeable or desirable in itself.
And all things which we have a greater desire to be
‘instrumental in procuring for ourselves or for our
friends are greater goods, and those as to which our
desire is least are greater evils. And things that
last longer are preferable to those that are of shorter
duration, and those that are safer to those that are
less so; for time increases the use of the first and
the wish that of the second ; for whenever we wish,
we can make greater use of things that are safe.
_ And things in all cases follow the relations between

79

ARISTOTLE

TTWOEWV, Kal TaAN’ aKoAdovbet: ofov ei TO dvdpetos
KdAAov Kal aiperwTepov Tob owdpdvers, Kat dv8pia,
swdpoovvns atperw@répa Kat To dvdpetov elvat TOO
28 owdpoveiv. Kal a) mares aipodvrar ToD py O
mavres. Kat 6 ot TrAeiovs 7 {6 |* ot i eAdrrous: ayabov
13652 yap %v oo mavres edievTat, Wore Kad pcilov ob
padov. Kal é ot aupioByrobvres 7] Y) of exOpot 7 7 ot
Kpivovres 7) ovs obrot Kpivovow- TO pev yap ws av
et mavres paicy € eo, To S€ of Kbpvoe Kal ot i elddres.
29 Ka ore pev ob mavTEs [eTexXovar jucilov: ariyuia
yap TO Hy) perexew ore be ob pndets 7 H 0d dXLyou-
30 omrayucdTEpov yap. Kal TO eTaweT are pa.” Kadri
yap. Kal dv at tysat petlous, aoatrws: 7 yap
TUL) @omep. afia Tis eoTiv. Kal dv at Cypiar
31 peilous. Kal Ta TOV Opodoyoupeveny Fj n pawopevey
peydhav peilw. Kai dSiarpodpeva dé els TO. Hépy
Ta avTa peilw paiveras: mAcvovenv yap drrepexew
paiverat. Ofev Kal 6 montis dynow meioa Tov
Med€aypov avacrivar
doca Kak avOpwro.o. méAe. THY dotv addy:
Aaoi pev POwvPovor, 7dAw Sé Te TOp apaldver,
téxva d€ tT GAAoL dyovow.
Kat ro ovvrifévar Kai émorkodopeiv, worep

1 Inserted by Spengel.

« «Things of which the prices are greater, price being a
sort of worth *” (Jebb).

> Or, “* superiority over a greater number of things.”

¢ After wetoa all the mss. except A° (Paris) have Aéyoucar.
If this is retained, it must refer to Meleager’ s wife Cleopatra,
who “ persuaded him. . . by quoting.”” As the text stands,
the literal rendering is: “the poet says that ie recital of
the three verses) persuaded.” The passage is from Jliad, ix.
592-594 (slightly different). # See Glossary.

80

RHETORIC, I. vu. 27-31

co-ordinates and similar inflexions ; for instance, if
“courageously ”’ is nobler than and preferable to
“temperately,’ then “courage’”’ is preferable to
“temperance,” and it is better to be “ courageous ”’
than “‘ temperate.” And that which is chosen by all
is better than that which is not ; and that which the
majority choose than that which the minority choose ;
for, as we have said, the good is that which all desire,
and consequently a good is greater, the more it is
desired. The same applies to goods which are re-
cognized as greater by opponents or enemies, by
judges, or by those whom they select; for in the
one case it would be, so to say, the verdict of all
mankind, in the other that of those who are acknow-
ledged authorities and experts. And sometimes a
good is greater in which all:participate, for it is a
disgrace not to participate in it; sometimes when
none or only a few participate in it, for it is scarcer.
And things which are more praiseworthy, since they
are nobler. And in the same way things which
are more highly honoured,’ for honour is a sort of
measure of worth; and conversely those things are
greater evils, the punishment for which is greater.
And those things which are greater than what is
acknowledged, or appears, to be great, are greater.
And the same whole when divided into parts appears
eater, for there appears to be superiority in a
eater number of things.2’ Whence the poet says
that Meleager was persuaded to rise up and fight by
e recital of ¢

All the ills that befall those whose city is taken; the

ople perish, and fire utterly destroys the city, and strangers
rry off the children.

Combination and building up,4 as employed by
G 81

32

33

34

35

ARISTOTLE

"Emixappos, dud TE TO avTO TH Suarpecer (4 yap

ovvleots trepoxny Seikvvct modAiv) Kat ore apx?
paiverat peydAcov Kat alriov. eérel be TO xare-
mobTEpov Kal omravicyTepov peilov, Kab ot Katpot
Kal at TpAucton Kal ob rorrot Kat ot Xpovor Kal at
Suvdpers Tovovat peyda, ef yap mapa SUvapy Kat
Tap: TAuctay Kal Tapa Tovs OpoLoUs, Kat el obras
7 evradéa a 700’, efee péyeBos Kal KaAdayv kab
ayabéy eal, Suucadtov, ah tran etoile ene

TO erly papy.a. TO oAvptioviKn:

mpoabe wev aud’ cspovow exwv Tpaxetav doway
ixOis e& “Apyous eis Téyeav ehepov.

Kal 6 Iducparns adrov everwpiale A€yeov ef dy
bripée tadra. Kal To avropues Tob CTTUKTHTOU"
yarerdrepov yap. dev kat 6 mouths dnow

adrodidaktos 8 ett.

Kal TO peydaAov peyeorov Epos: ofov IepixAis tov’
émuTapiov Aéyev, THY vedTnTa eK Tijs mrOdews v=
mpijobae o Gomep TO €ap ek TOO eveavTod el i e€aupeein.

Kal 70, év xpeia preilove xpnoysa, olov Ta ev yypa
Kat vooois. Kal Svoiv 70 eyyUrepov tod téAous.
Kal TO avT@ Tod amA@s. Kal To Svvarov Tov

@ Epicharmus (c. 550-460 B.c.), writer of comedies and
Pythagorean philosopher, was born at Megara in Sicily
(according to others, in the island of Cos). His comedies,
written in the Doric dialect, and without a chorus, were
either mythological or comedies of manners, as extant titles
show. Plato speaks of him as “‘ the prince of comedy” and
Horace states definitely that he was imitated by Plautus.

» Simonides, Frag. 163 (P.L.G. iii.).

¢ Or, the yoke to which the basket, like our mille-pails
long ago, was attached,

82

RHETORIC, I. vit. 31-35

Epicharmus,? produce the same effect as division, and
for the same reason ; for combination is an exhibition
of great superiority and appears to be the origin and
cause of great things. And since that which is
harder to obtain and scarcer is greater, it follows
that special occasions, ages, places, times, and powers,
produce great effects; for if a man does things
beyond his powers, beyond his age, and beyond what
his equals could do, if they are done in such a manner,
in such a place, and at such a time, they will possess
importance in actions that are noble, good, or just,
or the opposite. Hence the epigram® on the
Olympian victor :

Formerly, with a rough basket * on my shoulders, I used
to carry fish from Argos to Tegea.

And Iphicrates lauded himself, saying, “ Look what
I started from!” And that which is natural is a
greater good than that which is acquired, because it
is harder. Whence the poet says :

Self-taught am I.¢

And that which is the greatest part of that which is
great is more to be desired; as Pericles said in his
Funeral Oration, that the removal of the youth from
the city was like the year being robbed of its spring.’
And those things which are available in greater need,
as in old age and illness, are greater goods. And
of two things that which is nearer the end proposed
is preferable. And that which is useful for the in-
dividual is preferable to that which is useful ab-

4 Odyssey, xxii. 347. The words are those of the minstrel
_ Phemius, who was forced to sing to the suitors of Penelope.
_ * Not in the oration in Thucydides (ii. 35).

83

ARISTOTLE
iO / . \ A A 2 \ > ” \ ‘ >
advvarov' TO phev yap adT@, To 8 ov. Kal Ta ev
téAet Tod Biov: réAn yap wGAdov +a mpos TH TéA€t.
‘ ~
36 Kat ra mpos aAjbevavy r&v mpos SdEav. dpos Se
1365b TOO mpos Sd€av, 6 AavOdvew pwéAAwv odK av €AoLTO.
A \ \ oy / ~ > a , a“
S10 Kail TO «bd mdoyew rod €b Torey Sdéevev av
¢€ A > A A A a“ 7 Meal
aipeTwrepov elvar: TO ev yap Kav AavOavyn aipy-
oeTar, movetv 8 ed AavOdvwr od Soxet av éAécbar.
37 Kal Goa elvar pwaAdov 7 Soxetv BovAovrat: mpos
a 7
aAjevav yap padov. 86 Kai tiv Sixavoodynv
\ A s ¢ a ”“ = ec 7 é
dact puxpov elvar, drt Soxeiv 7) elvar aipera@repov
\ \ ¢ / A \ A ‘ A tA
38 70 dé dyvaivew ov. Kal TO mpds TOAAG XpHoyLe-
e ‘ \ A ~ s | + od 4 4
Tepov, olov To mpos TO Cav Kal «bd Chv Kal rip
HOoviy Kal TO mparrew Td KaAd. 8d Kat 6 mAobros
\ € ¢ / / a . 7 A ”
Kal 7 vylera péytoTra Soxe? elvar dmavTa yap exer
~ \ \ iA / 4 4 ?? 58 ek
39 Tabra. Kat TO advmdrepov Kal Td pel? HdovAs
e \ 3 A
mAciw yap évds, Wore ddpyer Kal 7) HSov7) ayalov
a ~ ~ /
Kal 7 dAvmia. Kal dvoiv 6 7@ abt@ mpoorile-
a a \ ,
40 eevov jetlov To OAov moet. Kat Ga pr AavOdver
\ /
mapovrTa 7) [a] AavOdver: mpos adAnbevav yap Teiver

Tatra. 610 To tAovreiv davein av peilov ayabov

® Or, reading xal adr\Gs: ‘ that which is useful both to
the individual and absolutely is a greater good ” (than that
which is only useful in one way), but this necessitates a
considerable ellipse.

84

RHETORIC, I. vit. 35-40

- solutely ;* that which is possible to that which is

impossible ; for it is the possible that is useful to us,
not the impossible. And those things which are at
the end of life; for things near the end are more

like ends.

And real things are preferable to those that have
reference to public opinion, the latter being defined
as those which a man would not choose if they were
likely to remain unnoticed by others. It would seem
then that it is better to receive than to confer a
benefit ; for one would choose the former even if it
should pass unnoticed, whereas one would not choose
to confer a benefit, if it were likely to remain un-
known. Those things also are to be preferred, which
men would rather possess in reality than in appear-
ance, because they are nearer the truth ; wherefore
it is commonly said that justice is a thing of little
importance, because people prefer to appear just
than to be just ; and this is not the case, for instance,
in regard to health. The same may be said of things
that serve several ends; for instance, those that
assist us to live, to live well, to enjoy life, and to do
noble actions ; wherefore health and wealth seem to
be the greatest goods, for they include all these
advantages. And that which is more free from pain
and accompanied by pleasure is a greater good ; for
there is more than one good, since pleasure and free-
dom from pain combined are both goods. And of
two goods the greater is that which, added to one
and the same, makes the whole greater. And those
things, the presence of which does not escape notice,
are preferable to those which pass unnoticed, because
they appear more real ; whence being wealthy would
appear to be a greater good than the appearance of

85

ARISTOTLE

41 Tod Soxeiv. Kal TO dyamnrov, kal Tots Lev povov
Tots d¢ per? GAAwv. 816 Kal ovK ton Cnpia, a av Tis
Tov érepopladyrov Tu¢dwon Kal tov dv éxovra:
deyarrnT ov yap apipytar.

8. “Ex Tivo pev ov dei Tas miorets pépew € ev
TO TpOTperrety Kal dmorpérely, oxedov etpyrae.
peyrorov dé Kal KUpUararov GmdvTwY mpos 70
dvvacbat mretDew Kal Kkahas ovpBovrevew, Tas
moduretas dmdoas AaBeiv Kat ra Exdorns €On Kal

2 VOpujLo. Kat ovpdepovta Suedeiv. mre(Govrat yap
dmavres TO ouppepovre, ouppeper dé 70 o@Llov THY
moAureiav. ere € Kupia pev eoTrw 1 708 Kupiov
amopavars,” Ta be KUpLa Sunpytar Kare Tas moNe-
Telas* doar yap at moAvreiar, Tooadra Kal Ta KUpLd
€oTwv.

3 Eiot de moNuretan TETTApES, _Snwoxparia Bduy-
apxia apiorokparia povapyia: wore TO jLev KUpLOV
Kal TO Kpivov TodTwy Ti eoTLW del wopiov, 7 GAoV

4 ToUrwyv. éorr 5é€ Snuwokparia péev modirela ev
KAnpw Siavéwovrar tas apyds, dAvyapxia Se ev
of amo TyULnUaTwY, apioToKpaTia bé ev 7 ot KaTa
maelav. mawdelav dé Aéyw THY bd TOD vomov
KeyLevny” ot ‘yap KEE HernKOTES €v Tois vopipous
€v Th aploToKpatia dpxovow. avayKn de TovToUS

1 The ordinary ms. reading is drbpaces, but this word
appears most commonly to mean ‘ negation’ * (from darégnme)

in Aristotle, as opposed to “affirmation” (from xardpnut).
dmopavois is from aridaivw.

* It is difficult to see the connexion here. Munro’s sug-
gestion, 7@ doxeiv for rod doxetv, adopted by Roemer, would
mean “ by the show of it,” that i is, by its attracting notice,

» Or, “is not punished equally.”

¢ The pronouncements of the supreme authority are them-

86

|

RHETORIC, I. vu. 41—vint. 4

it.¢ And that which is held most dear, sometimes
alone, sometimes accompanied by other things, is a
greater good. Wherefore he who puts out the eye
of a one-eyed man and he who puts out one eye of
another who has two, does not do equal injury; for
in the former case, a man has been deprived of that
which he held most dear.

8. These are nearly all the topics from which
arguments may be drawn in persuading and dis-
suading ; but the most important and effective of
all the means of persuasion and good counsel is to
know all the forms of government and to distinguish
the manners and customs, institutions, and interests
of each; for all men are guided by considerations
of expediency, and that which preserves the State
is expedient. Further, the declaration of the
authority is authoritative,’ and the different kinds of
authority are distinguished according to forms of
government ; in fact, there are as many authorities
as there are forms of government.

Now, there are four kinds of government, de-
mocracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, monarchy, so that the
supreme and deciding authority is always a part or
the whole of these. Democracy is a form of govern-
ment in which the offices are distributed by the
people among themselves by lot; in an oligarchy,
by those who possess a certain property-qualifica-
tion; in an aristocracy, by those who possess an
educational qualification, meaning an education that
is laid down by the law. In fact, in an aristocracy,
power and office are in the hands of those who have
remained faithful to what the law prescribes, and

selves authoritative as laying down laws and regulations for
the citizens.
87

ARISTOTLE

paivecbar a dplorous” dev Kal TobvopLa <idnge TobTo.

1366 a povapxia 8 éorl Kara Tobvopa ev els dmdy Tov
KUpLOS €or" TOUTE S¢ 7 jeev Kata Taéw Twa.
Baoureia, 7) 8° adpuotos Tupavvis.

5 To 67) tédos exdorns moAuretas od bet AavOdvew*
atpodvrat yap Ta mpos TO TéAos. aT. Se Sypo-
Kpatias per TéAos ercvbepia., dluyapxtas de mobros,
apiotoKpatias S€ Ta mpds mawWetay kal Td. vouypa,
Tupavvidos d€ puvdAaky. Oijov ovv ore Td, pos TO
Tédos exdorns €0y Kal YOULL Kal oupdéepovra.
diaupeTeov, elmep atpobvrat mpos Tobro emrava.-

6 dépovres. emret € od pdvov ai mioreis ‘yivovTat bu
dmodeuxriKob Adyov dAAd. Kal du HOuKod (ro yap
Touov Twa. paivesbau TOV Aéyoura TLaTEvO}LEV, TOvTO
8? éoriv dy dyabos daivnrar 7) evvous 7 appa),
dou & dy TO 787, Tov TodTe@v ExdorTns € exe jas:
TO ev yap exdorns 700s mbavwirarov avayKn
mpos exdoryy civa. Tabra. de AnpOnoerat bua
TOV abrav: Ta pev yap 40n davepa Kara TH
mpoaipeow, 1) dé mpoalpecis avadéeperar mpos TO
TéXos.

7 ‘Qy pev ody Set dpéyecbat mpotpémovras ws €ao-
peevwv 7) OvTwv, Kal ex tivwy Set Tas mepl TOU
ovpdepovtos tioters AapPdvew, ere S€ mepi Ta
mept tas moAutelas NO@v Kal vopipwv Sia Tivwy TE
Kal 7@s edropjcouev, ef Gaov Hv TH TapovTe
KaLp@ ovppetpov, eipntat SunxpiBwrar yap év Tots
moXutiKois mepl ToUTwr.

4 The *end”’ of monarchy is wanting here.
> iii. 7-18, iv.
88

RHETORIC, I. vin. 4-7

who must of necessity appear best, whence this form
of government has taken its name. In a monarchy,
as its name indicates, one man alone is supreme over
all; if it is subject to certain regulations, it is called
a kingdom ; if it is unlimited, a tyranny.

Nor should the end of each form of government
be neglected, for men choose the things which have
reference to the end. Now, the end of democracy
is liberty, of oligarchy wealth, of aristocracy things
relating to education and what the law prescribes,
.. . 5 of tyranny self-protection. It is clear then
that we must distinguish the manners and customs,
institutions, and interests of each form of govern-
ment, since it is in reference to this that men make
their choice. But as proofs are established not only
by demonstrative, but also by ethical argument—
since we have confidence in an orator who exhibits
certain qualities, such as goodness, goodwill, or both
—it follows that we ought to be acquainted with the
characters of each form of government; for, in
reference to each, the character most likely to per-
_ suade must be that which is characteristic of it. These

characters will be understood by the same means ; for
characters reveal themselves in accordance with moral
purpose, and moral purpose has reference to the end.

We have now stated what things, whether future
or present, should be the aim of those who recom-
mend a certain course ; from what topics they should
_ derive their proofs of expediency ; further, the ways
and means of being well equipped for dealing with
the characters and institutions of each form of govern-
ment, so far as was within the scope of the present

oceasion ; for the subject has been discussed in detail
in the Polttics.°

89

ARISTOTLE

9. Mera dé taira Adywyev mepl aperis Kal
Kaktas Kal Karoo Kal aicypod: obo. yap oKomrol
TO erawobdvru Kal ipéyoure" oupPioerau yap Gua.
mept Tovtwy Aéyovras Kaetva. dn Aoby e€ & cy Tovot
TWES drrodnpOnoopeba. Kara TO 700s, qmEep jv
Sevtépa miotis: ék TaV adTOv yap neds Te Kal
dAXov déidmucrov Suvnodpeba trovety mpos apeTHy.

2émel Sé cupPaiver Kal ywpis omovdfs Kal pera
omovoyns éemawwely moAAdKis od provoy avOpwov
Bedv adda Kai aboya Kal trdv ddAAwy Caav To.
TUXOV, TOV avTOV TpOTOV Kal mEepl TOUTWY AnmTéoV
Tas mMpoTdces, Wore Soov mapadelyparos ydapw
elmwpeev Kal Tepl TOUTWY.

3 KaAoy peev ody eoriy, 6 dy du” adro olperov év
emawveT ov 2; 7) 6 av ayabov 6 dv 700 H, OTe dyabov.
el 6€ Toro €oTl TO Kady, dvdyen TH dpernv

4 KaNov elva’ ayabov yap Ov emrawerov €or. aperi
oi ort peev Sdvapiis, ws SoKel, TopLoTiKy) ayabav

1366 b Kal pvraKktiky, Kal Svvapis evepyeTuct) ToMav
5 kal peyddwv, Kal. mavTwv tept mavTa. peepyn Se
dpetis diuxavoodvn, avdpia, owppoovy7, peyado-
MpeTrELa, peyadowuxia, édevbepiorns, Tpaorns, ppo-

6 vyats, codia. avayKn be peyloras elvae dperas
Tas Tots dows Xpyopordras, clrrep eoTiv 2) ape
Svvapus evepyeTiKy. Sud TobTo Tovs Sucatovs Kat
dvSpetous pddvora, TYyLGow® pev yap ev moh€épep
7 O€ Kal ev elpiv7 XpRoYWLOS Mors. elra 1 €Aev-
Depuorns” mpolevrar yap Kal otk avraywrilovrat
mept TOV xXpnudrov, dy pddora epievrat dMou.

Téort 8€ SiKavoodvn prev aper? 8 hv ra adrav

4 Or, ‘a faculty of doing many and great benefits to all
men in all cases’ (Jebb).

90

RHETORIC, I. 1x. 1-7

9. We will next speak of virtue and vice, of the

noble and the disgraceful, since they constitute the
im of one who praises and of one who blames ; for,

when speaking of these, we shall incidentally bring
to light the means of making us appear of such and
such a character, which, as we have said, is a second
method of proof; for it is by the same means that
we shall be able to inspire confidence in ourselves or
others in regard to virtue. But since it happens
that men, seriously or not, often praise not only a
man or a god but even inanimate things or any
ordinary animal, we ought in the same way to make
ourselves familiar with the propositions relating to
these subjects. Let us, then, discuss these matters
also, so far as may serve for illustration.

The noble, then, is that which, being desirable in
itself, is at the same time worthy of praise, or which,
being good, is pleasant because it is good. If this
is the noble, then virtue must of necéssity be noble,
for, being good, it is worthy of praise. Virtue, it
would seem, is a faculty of providing and preserving
good things, a faculty productive of many and great
benefits, in fact, of all things in all cases.* The
components of virtue are justice, courage, self-control,
magnificence, magnanimity, liberality, gentleness,
practical and speculative wisdom. The greatest
virtues are necessarily those which are most useful
to others, if virtue is the faculty of conferring benefits.
For this reason justice and courage are the most
esteemed, the latter being useful to others in war,
the former in peace as well. Next is liberality, for
the liberal spend freely and do not dispute the
possession of wealth, which is the chief object of
other men’s desire. Justice is a virtue which assigns

91

ARISTOTLE

EKAOTOL EXovor, Kat as. 6 vopos, adixia dé dv’ iy

8 Ta dANSrpue., ovx ws 6 v0jL0s. avdpia dé bu’ Hv
mparriKot eto Tov Kaddv ~ epyoov ev tots cwdwvols,
Kal Ws oO vopos Kedevet, Kat darnpeTuKol TO vopep

9 devAia be TodvavTioy owdpoovyn Sé€ dperr du av
mpos Tas Povas Tas TOO GwWuaTos OUTWS Exovow
ws 6 vopos Kerever: axodacia Sé Tovvavtiov.

10 eAevOepidtyns Sé rept xpypara «bd TOUNTUKT, av-

11 eAevbepia dé TovvayTiov. peyahowuxia 5€ aper)
peyddwv TOUNTLK?) evdepyerndrwn, puxpoyuxia de

12 rotvvavriov. peyadomperera d€ aper? ev Samav7}-
pace peyebous TrounruKn’ puxpouxia de Kal pLuKpo-

13 mpeTreva Tavavtia. ppdovnots 8 eotiv dper) Siavotas,
Kal” nv ed BovdeveoBar dvvavrat trept ayabav Kal
Kak@v TOV elpnpevany eis evdarpoviay.

14 Ilepi pev odv dperis Kai Kaxias Kabddov Kal
mreph TOV Hopi elpyra KaTa Tov eveoT@Ta KaL-
pov ixavds, mept_ de TOV dMuv ov Xaremov ideiv-
pavepov yap ort avdyien Ta TE TrOUNTURG, Tis dperiis
ctv KaAd (™pos dperiy yap) Kat Ta dim dperiis
yuopeva, Tovadra de rd Te onucia THs dperijs Kat

15 7a epya. emel dé Ta onpeta Kat Ta Towabra, a
€oTw ayabod ¢ épya i) aan KaAd, avayKn oga TE
avdpias é epyo. n onpreton avdptas 7) 7) dvdpetous mempa~
KTOL KAAG <lvat, Kal TO Sixava kat Ta. Suxains ¢ épya
(md0q dé ov" ev dry yap ravrn TOV apeTa@v odK
ael TO Sixaiws Kadov, arr’ emt Too Cnprodobar
alsxpov TO Sixaiws uadAov 7) 76 adikws), Kal KaTa

* Or, taking els evdauoviay with BovdeverOar, “* come to a
wise decision conducive to their happiness.”

92

RHETORIC, I. 1x. 7-15

to each man his due in conformity with the law ;
injustice claims what belongs to others, in opposition
to the law. Courage makes men perform noble acts
in the midst of dangers according to the dictates of
the law and in submission to it; the contrary is
cowardice. Self-control is a virtue which disposes
men in regard to the pleasures of the body as the
law prescribes; the contrary is_ licentiousness.
Liberality does good in many matters ; the contrary
is avarice. Magnanimity is a virtue productive of
great benefits; the contrary is little-mindedness.
Magnificence is a virtue which produces greatness in
matters of expenditure ; the contraries are little-
mindedness and meanness. Practical wisdom is a
virtue of reason, which enables men to come to a
wise decision in regard to good and evil things, which
have been mentioned as connected with happiness.*

Concerning virtue and vice in general and their
separate parts, enough has been said for the moment.
To discern the rest ® presents no difficulty ; for it is
evident that whatever produces virtue, as it tends to
it, must be noble, and so also must be what comes
from virtue; for such are its signs and works. But
since the signs of virtue and such things as are the
works and sufferings of a good man are noble, it neces-
sarily follows that all the works and signs of courage
and all courageous acts are also noble. The same
may be said of just things and of just actions; (but not
of what one suffers justly ; for in this alone amongst
the virtues that which is justly done is not always
noble, and a just punishment is more disgraceful
than an unjust punishment). The same applies

> i.e. the causes and results of virtue (Cope); or, the noble
and the disgraceful (Jebb).

93

ARISTOTLE

16 Tas dMas 5€ aperas doatrurs. Kal ep daous Td
dOAa Tyr, Kana. Kal ep daots TYLH paMov 1)
Xpypara. Kal doa pe) adtod Eveka. mparret Ts

17 rv atperav. Ka Ta amtAads dyaba, doa Umep
Tijs marpibos TUS emoince, Tmapiddv - TO avdTod. Kal
Ta TH pvoe ayald: Kal & pn adt@ ayaa: adrod

\ a \ ~
sera yap Evea Ta TOLaOTa.

ig Kai o doa TeOvedre evdexeTau dmdpxew paMov 7 7
favre: TO yap adrod éveka pGArov exer 7a Cavre.

19 Kal doa epya Tav dAAwy Evexa: Frrov yap avTod.
Kal doa. edmpayiat mepi aAAovs, aAAa pu) Trepl
airév. Kat epi Todvs €0 ToujoavtTas: Sikaoy yap.

20 Kal Ta evepyeTipara: od yap eis abrov. Kal Ta.
evavria D ep ois atoxvvovrau- Ta yap alaxpa ai-
oxvvovTat Kal i Aéyovres Kal mrovobvres Kal peMovres
womep Kal Lande memoinkev, elmovros Tod

’AXkaiov

BdAw te Feri, adAd we Kwdver
aidws,

ai 8° elyes eobAdv tpepov 7) Kaddv
Kal pn te Feurhvy yA@oo eKvKa Kakov,
aidws Kev odki o elyev Oupar’,

> | Peet; \ ~ /

GAN’ éAeyes mrept TO SiKaiw.

21 Kai zept dv aywridor pr poBovpevou: epi yap

Tov mpos dd€av depdvtwy ayaldv robro madoxou-
220w. Kal at TOv dvce. omovdaioTépwr aperal KaA-
23 Aiovs Kal Ta Eépya, olov avdpos 7 yuvaiKds. Kal

”

ai amoAavorikal dAAots adXAov 7} adrots: 810 7d

@ Frag. 55 (P.L.G. iii.). > Frag. 28 (P.L.G. iii.).
4

RHETORIC, I. 1x. 16-23

equally to the other virtues. Those things of which
the reward is honour are noble ; also those which are
done for honour rather than money. Also, those
desirable things which a man does not do for his
own sake ; things which are absolutely good, which
a man has done for the sake of his country, while
neglecting his own interests; things which are
naturally good; and not such as are good for the
individual, since such things are inspired by selfish
motives.

And those things are noble which it is possible for
a man to possess after death rather than during his
lifetime, for the latter involve more selfishness ; all
acts done for the sake of others, for they are more
disinterested ; the successes gained, not for oneself,
but for others; and for one’s benefactors, for that
is justice ; in a word, all acts of kindness, for they
are disinterested. And the contrary of those things
of which we are ashamed; for we are ashamed of
what is disgraceful, in words, acts, or intention ; as,
for instance, when Alcaeus said :

I would fain say something, but shame holds me back,*

Sappho rejoined :

Hadst thou desired what was good or noble, and had not
thy tongue stirred up some evil to utter it, shame would not
have filled thine eyes, but thou would’st have spoken of what
is right.”

Those things also are noble for which men anxiously
strive, but without fear; for men are thus affected
about goods which lead to good repute. Virtues and
actions are nobler, when they proceed from those
who are naturally worthier, for instance, from a man
rather than from a woman. It is the same with
those which are the cause of enjoyment to others

95

ARISTOTLE

/ \ e
24 Oixatov Kal 7 Sixaootyn Kaddv. Kat 7d rods ex-
\ a ~
Opovds TyswpetcOar wadAAov Kal pr) KaTradAdrrecBar.
/, \ >
TO TE yap avrarodiddvar Sixavov, To Sé Sixatov
, > ~
25 KaAdv, Kal avdpelov 76 yu) Hrtao0a. Kal vien Kal
‘ A a c , ‘ ” ” \
TYyULN TOV KaAdVY aiperd TE yap dKapra évrTa, Kal
¢ > ~ a
dTepoxyv aperis Sndot. Kal Ta pvynpovevtd, Kal
\ ~ a ~
7a aAAov waAAov, Kal d u7) COvre €rerar. Kal ols
\ > lal \ \ 4, ‘ A /
Tyun aKodovbe?. Kal Ta mepurtd. Kal Ta povw
¢€ 4, , > , 4, ‘
26 umapxovTa KaAXiw: eduvypovevTdotepa yap. Kat
KTHpaTa dKapma* edkevbepidbrepa yap. Kal Td Tap’
Biy \ oom” Ul \ ¢ : al? ~
exdotos dé tdva Kadd. Kal doa onpetd eorr TOV
> ¢ / > / e > /
Tap ekaoTos émawoupevwr, olov ev Aakedaipove
~ / > , A a > , >
Kopav Kaddv: édevbepov yap onuetov: od ydp éart
27 ~ e Lo 35 A Cal ” 0 / \
Kopa@vTa padvoy ovdev mrovetv Epyov OntiKov. Kat
A 7 > / / / > ,
TO pndepiav épydlecbar Bavavoov réxvnv: édevbé-
\ A A \ 4 ~
pou yap TO p17) mpos aAAov Chv.
/ A \ \ "A A € 4 ¢
28 Anmréov dé Kai Ta avveyyus Tots bmdpyovow ws
> \ » \ \ ” ‘ A / t
TavTa OVTA Kal pos Errawvov Kal mpos yoyov, olov
~ ‘ /
Tov evAaBH yuypov Kal émiBovdov Kai Tov jABov
a \¢ >
29 xpHoTOV Kal Tov avdAynrov mpaov. Kal Exacrov 5
> ~ 7, BAN \ ‘ /n:
€x TOV TapaKkoAovbowvTwrv del Kata TO BéATLOTOV,
~ ‘ \
olov Tov dpyidov Kal Tov pavuxov amAobv Kal Tov
~ \ A >
1367 b ab0dSn weyadromperh Kal ceuvov. Kal Tods ev Tats
e a ¢ > a > cal a” te \
trepBodais ws ev rats dperais ovras, olov tov

96

RHETORIC, I. 1x. 24-29

rather than to ourselves; this is why justice and
that which is just are noble. To take vengeance on
one’s enemies is nobler than to come to terms with
them ; for to retaliate is just, and that which is just
is noble ; and further, a courageous man ought not
to allow himself to be beaten. Victory and honour
also are noble; for both are desirable even when
they are fruitless, and are manifestations of superior
virtue. And things worthy of remembrance, which
are the more honourable the longer their memory
lasts; those which follow us after death; those
which are accompanied by honour ; and those which
are out of the common. Those which are only
possessed by a single individual, because they are
more worthy of remembrance. And _ possessions
which bring no profit; for they are more gentle-
manly. Customs that are peculiar to individual
peoples and all the tokens of what is esteemed
among them are noble ; for instance, in Lacedaemon
it is noble to wear one’s hair long, for it is the mark
of a gentleman, the performance of any servile task
being difficult for one whose hair is long. And not
carrying on any vulgar profession is noble, for a
gentleman does not live in dependence on others.
We must also assume, for the purpose of praise or
blame, that qualities which closely resemble the real
qualities are identical with them ; for instance, that
the cautious man is cold and designing, the simple-
ton good-natured, and the emotionless gentle. And
in each case we must adopt a term from qualities
closely connected, always in the more favourable
sense ; for instance, the choleric and passionate man
may be spoken of as frank and open, the arrogant
as magnificent and dignified; those in excess as

H 97

30

31

ARISTOTLE

A > cal \ ‘ v > , /
Opacdty avdpeiov Kal Tov dowrov eAevbepiov: bd€er
Te yap Tois moAAois, Kal dua tapadoyotiKov ek
Ths aitias’ ef yap od py avayKn KwduvevTiKds,

~ ~ n“ / hd / ‘ >
TOAAG paAdov av ddkevev Grrov Kaddv, Kat €t Tpo-

a ~ “a /

ETLKOS TOs TUXODGL, Kal Tots didous: depBodrr yap
dpeTns TO mdvTas ed Trovety. oKorreiy be Kal Tap’
ois 6 €mawos: WoTep yap 6 LwKpdarys EAeyev, od

\ > / > > , > ~ a \
xarerov ’AOnvaious ev ’AOnvaiors émauweiv. Set de

/
TO Tap éxdoTos Tiywov A€yew ws brdpyet, olov
> , n , n” , Ve \
ev LkvOas 7) Adkwow 7 dirocddors. Kat ddAws dé
TO Tipwov ayew «eis TO KaAdv, erreimep SoKet yerTvLav.
Kat Ooa Kata TO TpoonKov, olov «i a&va TOV Tpo-
yovwy Kal T&v mpotmnpypmevwv: eddaysoviKoy yap
Kal Kadov TO mpocemiKTao0ar TH. Kal ei Tapa
\ ~ ee Sm \ / \ A /
TO mpoonKov dé emt To BéATLov Kai TO KaAXLOV, ofov
ei evTvy@v pev petpios atvxdv dé peyadoyuyos,
7 peilwv yeyvowevos BeAtiwv Kai KaradAaKkTuKa-
a ~ >

Tepos. Todvrov dé 7d Tob “Idicpdarous, e€ oiwv
els ola, Kal TO TOD GAUpTLOViKoV

/ A > > ” ” a
mpoobe ev aud wuorow €xwv Tpaxetav,

lo ,
Kal TO TOD Vyswvidov

* Those whose qualities are extreme may be described as
possessing the virtues of which these are the excess.

> Plato, Menexenus, 235 v.

¢ Thus, the Scythians may be assumed to be brave and
great hunters; the Spartans hardy, courageous, and brief
in speech ; the Athenians fond of literature—and they should
be praised accordingly.

4 That is, 7d riuwov looks as if it were really caddy, and
should be spoken of as if it were so.

¢ Cp. 7. 32 above.

’ Frag. 111 (P.L.G. iii.).

98

RHETORIC, I. rx. 29-31

possessing the corresponding virtue,* the fool-
hardy as courageous, the recklessly extravagant as
liberal. For most people will think so, and at the
same time a fallacious argument may be drawn from
the motive ; for if a man risks his life when there is
no necessity, much more will he be thought likely
to do so when it is honourable; and if he is lavish
to all comers, the more so will he be to his friends ;
for the height of virtue is to do good to all. We
ought also to consider in whose presence we praise,
for, as Socrates said, it is not difficult to praise
Athenians among Athenians.?’ We ought also to
speak of what is esteemed among the particular
audience, Scythians, Lacedaemonians, or philoso-
phers,® as actually existing there. And, generally
speaking, that which is esteemed should be classed
as noble, since there seems to be a close resemblance
between the two.? Again, all such actions as are in
accord with what is fitting are noble; if, for instance,
they are worthy of a man’s ancestors or of his own
previous achievements; for to obtain additional
honour is noble and conduces to happiness. Also,
if the tendency of what is done is better and
nobler, and goes beyond what is to be expected ;
for instance, if a man is moderate in good
fortune and stout-hearted in adversity, or if, when
he becomes greater, he is better and more for-
giving. Such was the phrase of Iphicrates, “ Look
what I started from!” ? and of the Olympian
victor :

Formerly, with a rough basket on my shoulders, I used
to carry fish from Argos to Tegea.’

and of Simonides :

99

ARISTOTLE

a / A > ~ > s 4,
1] TATpOS TE Kat aVdpos adeAP@v 7 oda TUpavwn.
\ > ~ / <
32 *Emet 8 ex rOv mpd&ewv 6 Erawos, idiov é Tod
7
arrovdaiov TO KaTa Tpoaipeow, mreiparéov Seuxvivar
MpaTToVvTa KATA mpoaipeow. xprHopwov Sێ Td 7oA-
\

Adnis daiveoOa. mempaydra. 80 Kal Ta oup-
TTWOPATA Kal TA GTO TéxNS Ws ev Tpoatpécer
An éoy" av yap ToAAG Kai dpova mpopepnra, on-
pLetov dperijs elvar dd€eu Kal mpoaipécews.

33 "Eoru 3’ éxrawos Adyos eudavilwy péyebos aperis.
de? ody Tas mpd&eis emierkvbvar Ws ToLadraL. TO
& eyka@puov TOV Epywv eotiv, ta Se KvKAwW Ets

,

mloTw, olov evyévera Kal madela* eikos yap e€
ayabay ayabod’s Kat Tov ovTw TpahéevTa Tovwwdrov
> \ Atos , , \ >
civar. O10 Kal eyKwpidlouev mpdéavras. ta 8

a a > A a
epya onpeta THs e€ews eoTu, éemel erawoipev av
Kal p17) TempayoTa, ei muoTEevoywev elvat ToLOdTOV.

\ a
34 aKaptopos Sé Kal evdayovicpos abrots ev Tadrd,
, > > > 4 > > oe c > / ‘
tovtos 8 ov Tatra, add’ domep 7 eddaysovia THY
\ ~

apeTrVv, Kal 6 evdaLpmovLapos TeEpLexer TADTA.
” \ \ > ¢ ‘ © /

35 “Eyes d€ Kowov eldos 6 Errawos Kal at cupBovAat:
a yap ev T@ ovpBovrcvew tr7d0o1w av, radra

~ , ‘

36 petatebevta TH AE eyKwpia ylyverat. enet

an ‘ a
1368a OUV Exonev a Sel TpaTTEWw Kal Totdy Twa elvat,
Sel tabra ws brobyjKas éyovtas TH AdEe pera-
/ \ / e ov >? a / A
Teva Kat otpédew, olov dtu od Set péeya dpovetv
24 a \ , > Me > S > “re! ’ ‘
emt tots dua TUxnV aAAa Tois bu’ adrov. ovTw jLEV

@ Archedice, daughter of Hippias, tyrant of Athens, and
wife of Aeantides, son of Hippocles, tyrant of Lampsacus.

100

RHETORIC, I. rx. 31-36

Daughter, wife, and sister of tyrants.*

Since praise is founded on actions, and acting accord-
ing to moral purpose is characteristic of the worthy
man, we must endeavour to show that a man is acting
in that manner, and it is useful that it should appear
that he has done so on several occasions. For this
reason also onemust assume thataccidents and strokes
of good fortune are due to moral purpose ; for if a
number of similar examples can be adduced, they will
be thought to be signs of virtue and moral purpose.

Now praise is language that sets forth greatness
of virtue ; hence it is necessary to show that a man’s
actions are virtuous. But encomium deals with
achievements—all attendant circumstances, such as
noble birth and education, merely conduce to per-
suasion ; for it is probable that virtuous parents will
have virtuous offspring and that a man will turn out
as he has been brought up. Hence we pronounce
an encomium upon those who have achieved some-
thing. Achievements, in fact, are signs of moral
habit ; for we should praise even a man who had not
achieved anything, if we felt confident that he was
likely todoso. Blessing and felicitation are identical
with each other, but are not the same as praise and
encomium, which, as virtue is contained in happiness,
are contained in felicitation.

Praise and counsels have a common aspect ; for
what you might suggest in counselling becomes
encomium by a change in the phrase. Accordingly,
when we know what we ought to do and the qualities
we ought to possess, we ought to make a change in
the phrase and turn it, employing this knowledge
as a suggestion. For instance, the statement that
“one ought not to pride oneself on goods which are

101

ARISTOTLE

<7 >
otv Acxbev droOnKnvy Stvarar, wdl 8 Eémawov
ce / ~ > a 8 \ / ¢ / aAAG
péya dpovdy ov rots dua TUynv brdpyovow adAa
a a LA
tots 8’ abrév.”” wore Grav éeraweiv BovdAn, dpa Tt
an“ ¢€ / \ «@ ¢€ / Ld es. >
av dro0o., Kai orav vroblécba, dpa Ti av emat-
37 / ¢ de mr /, ” > / > > ,
véoevas. 1 d€ AdEis Cora avrikeern e€ avayKns,
étav TO bev KwWADOV TO dé x7) KWABOV ebay =
/ \ A ~ > a a >
38 Xpyoréov dé kal tdv av&yriucdv troAdois, otov et
/ Bal ~ a” > s\/ ” \ “a ,
povos 1 mp@ros 7) peT Aliywv 7 Kat [6] padvora
memoinkev. amavTa yap Tatra KaAd. Kal Ta eK
TOV Xpovwv Kal TOV Kalpav: Tadra dé mapa TO
mpoojkov. Kal ef moAAdKis TO adto KaTwplwKev:
/ / ‘ > > \ tA > \ > a ba)
péya yap, Kal odk amo tUyns aAAa du’ adrov ay
dd€evev. Kal ef Ta TMpoTpéemovTa Kal TYyUL@vTa dd
rodrov etpnta. Kal Kareokevdobn. Kal eis ov
mpO@tov éykapwov errounOn, otov eis ‘ImmdAoxov, Kat
‘Appuddiov Kat "Apioroyeirova TO ev ayopa ora-
Ofvar. dpoiws S€ Kal emi rv evavTiwv. Kav
> ¢ \ > lol ‘ + > /
Kal’ abrov edrophs, mpos aAAovs avrimapaBaAAew:
Omep “looxparns emote Sia tH aovvyFevay Tod
a A 7
Suxodroyeiv. Set 5€ mpos evddEous ovyxpivew: ad&n-
39 TLKOV ‘yap Kal KaAdv, ei orrovdaiwv BedTiwv. miner
S edAdyws 1) av&nos cis Tods emaivous: ev dmep-

@ In the first sentence, the statement is imperative, there
is a prohibition; in the second, it is a simple affirmative,
implying praise. In the one case there is forbidding, in the
other not-forbidding, which are opposites.

» Nothing more is known of him.

¢ Who slew Hipparchus, tyrant of Athens.

4 Reading dovvjeay. He had no legal practice, which
would have shown the irrelevancy of comparisons in a
law court, whereas in epideictic speeches they are useful.
cwnbeav gives exactly the opposite sense, and must refer
to his having written speeches for others to deliver in the
courts.

102

RHETORIC, I. rx. 36-39

due to fortune, but on those which are due to oneself
alone,”’ when expressed in this way, has the force of a
suggestion ; but expressed thus, “ he was proud, not
of goods which were due to fortune, but of those
which were due to himself alone,” it becomes praise.
Accordingly, if you desire to praise, look what you
would suggest ; if you desire to suggest, look what
you would praise. The form of the expression will
necessarily be opposite, when the prohibitive has
been changed into the non-prohibitive.*

We must also employ many of the means of
amplification ; for instance, if a man has done any-
thing alone, or first, or with a few, or has been chiefly
responsible for it ; all these circumstances render an
action noble. Similarly, topics derived from times
and seasons, that is to say, if our expectation is
surpassed. Also, if a man has often been successful
in the same thing; for this is of importance and
would appear to be due to the man himself, and not
to be the result of chance. And if it is for his sake
that distinctions which are an encouragement or
honour have been invented and established ; and if
he was the first on whom an encomium was pro-
nounced, as Hippolochus,’ or to whom a statue was
set up in the market-place, as to Harmodius and
Aristogiton. And similarly in opposite cases. If
he does not furnish you with enough material in
himself, you must compare him with others, as
Isocrates used to do, because of his inexperience ¢ of
forensic speaking. And you must compare him with
illustrious personages, for it affords ground for
amplification and is noble, if he can be proved better
than men of worth. Amplification is with good
reason ranked as one of the forms of praise, since it

103

ARISTOTLE

~ /, > ¢ > ¢ xX ~ AO 8 ‘ ba)
oxh yap eorw, 7» 8° dbrepoyn THv KaA@Y. 610 Kav
pi) 7pos Tods evddEous, GAA pds Tods aAAous Set
A a ,
mapapdaAXew, émeirep 4 bmepoxn SoKel pnvdew
40 apeTyv. Orlws 5é€ TaV Kowdv €id@v dmact Tots
Adyous 7 pwev avEnows emitndevoTaTy Tots emiderKTL-
Kois' Tas yap mpd€ers dpodoyoupevas AapBdavovow,
o \ 7 lal \ / A ‘
wate Aourov péyebos mepileivar Kal KaAXos: Ta SE
A a ‘ ~
Tapadelypara tots oupBovAeuTiKois* eK yap TaV
/
mpoyeyovoTwy Ta péAAovTa KaTapavTEevopevoL Kpi-
val a /
vopev' Ta 8 evOupypara Tots duKaviKots* aitiay yap
\ > / / / A \ \ \
Kat amddew pddvoTra dSéxeTar TO yeyovos Sia TO
41 aoadés. ek Tivwy pev odv ot Errawwor Kal ot yoyou
Aéyovrat axedov mavTes, Kal mpos mrota det BAErov-
Tas emaweiv Kal péyew, Kal ex Tivwy Ta eyKa@pLa
ylyverau Kal Ta dveldn, Tabr’ eoriv: exonevwy yap
ToUTwY Ta evavtia TOUTOLs Pavepa’ 6 yap woyos eK
TOV evavTiwv éoTiv.
1368b 10. Ilepit 5€ Katnyopias Kat amodoyias, éK
TOGwY Kal Trolwy qroLveiobar Set TOds avAAoytopovs,
> / a” ” / aA \ cal / a
2 éxouevoy av ein Aéyew. Set 57) AaPetv Tpia, ev
A ,
pev Tivwy Kal TocwY EveKxa aoLKodat, SevTEpov Se
TAs avdTol Svakeipevor, tpitov d5é€ Tods motous Kal
3 ms Exovtas. Siopicdpevor odv TO dduKeiv Aéywpev
tea
é€7js.
” \ A > cal A / ¢ /, \
Eorw 57) To déucetv to BAdrrew EexovTa Tapa
A / / ya \ ¢ \ wv c \ /
TOV vopov. vopuos 5 eoTiv 6 ev tOLos 6 de KoWds.
/ Lv \ >a , 4
Aéyw 5é iSvov pev Kal? dv yeypappevov troAurevovrat,

104

RHETORIC, I. 1x. 39—x. 3

consists in superiority, and superiority is one of the
things that are noble. That is why, if you cannot
compare him with illustrious personages, you must
compare him with ordinary persons, since superiority
is thought to indicate virtue. Speaking generally,
of the topics common to all rhetorical arguments,
amplification is most suitable for epideictic speakers,
whose subject is actions which are not disputed, so
that all that remains to be done is to attribute
beauty and importance to them. Examples are
most suitable for deliberative speakers, for it is by
examination of the past that we divine and judge
the future. Enthymemes are most suitable for
forensic speakers, because the past, by reason of its
obscurity, above all lends itself to the investigation
of causes and to demonstrative proof. Such are
nearly all the materials of praise or blame, the things
which those who praise or blame should keep in
view, and the sources of encomia and invective ; for
when these are known their contraries are obvious,
since blame is derived from the contrary things.

10. We have next to speak of the number and
quality of the propositions of which those syllogisms
are constructed which have for their object accusa-
tion and defence. Three things have to be con-
sidered ; first, the nature and the number of the
motives which lead men to act unjustly ; secondly,
what is the state of mind of those who so act; third-
ly, the character and dispositions of those who are ex-
posed to injustice. We will discuss these questions
in order, after we have first defined acting unjustly.

Let injustice, then, be defined as voluntarily caus-
ing injury contrary to the law. Now, the law is
particular or general. By particular, I mean the

105

or

o

ARISTOTLE

KoUWov de 6oa aypada Tra,pa. maow opodroyetobac
doKel. éKOvTES be mrovodow doa elddres Kal Ba
avayKalouevot. doa prev ody ExovTes, od mavTa
Tpoatpovpevol, doa de Tpoarpovjievor, eiddTes
dmavrTa* ovdeis yap 6 mpoatpetrar dyvoet. bv a
be mpoarpobvra Brdarrew Kal patra mrovety Tapa
TOV vomov, KaKla earl Kal akpacia* €av yap TWES
exwou poxOnpiay 7) play 7), mAelovs, Tepl de TobTo
6 poxAnpot tvyxavovow ovres, Kal dducot elow,
olov 0 pev dvehevbepos mept Xpypwara, 6 8° akoAa-
oTos mrepl Tas TOO ) oeparos 7oovds, 6 6 be padaKos
mepl Ta _ pabupa, 6 dé Sevdds mept Tods Kwddvous
(rovs yap ovyxwduvevovras eyKaradymdvovat dud
TOV poBov), 6 dé diAdrysos Sia TYLHY, 68 dE vOupos
du? dpynv, é dé didrdvixos dia. vikny, 6 dé TUuKpOS Sua
TyLwplav, 6 om dpoov dud TO amatadoba rept TO
dikavov Kal dducov, 6 S dvaiaxvvTos bu dhvywptav
ddés. opolws de Kat TOv ddAwv eExacros meEpl
exaoTov TOV DrroKeyevenv.

“AMA, mept fev TOUT dijAov, 7a. pev ex Tay
Tept Tas apeTas elpnuevwv, TA 8° EK av mepl TO
man pnPnoopever: Aourrov oF etrrety Tivos eveca
Kal ma@s EXovTES dducobor, Kal Tivas. _mp@tov peev
ouv SvehaueBa TivwV OpEyopevot Kal Tota. pev-
yovtes eyyepotow adiucciv: SHAov yap ws TH pev

* xpoalpeois (premeditation, deliberate or moral choice)
is always voluntary, but all voluntary action is not pre-
meditated ; we sometimes act on the spur of the moment.
Choice is a voluntary act, the result of deliberate counsel,
including the use of reason and knowledge. In the Hthies
(iii. 3. 19) Aristotle defines rpoalpects as ** a deliberate appeti-

106

RHETORIC, I. x. 3-6

written law in accordance with which a state is
administered ; by general, the unwritten regulations
which appear to be universally recognized. Men act
voluntarily when they know what they do, and do
not act under compulsion. What is done voluntarily
is not always done with premeditation ; but what
is done with premeditation is always known to the
agent, for no one is ignorant of what he does with a
purpose. The motives which lead men to do injury
and commit wrong actions are depravity and incon-
tinence. For if men have one or more vices, it is in
that which makes him vicious that he shows himself
unjust ; for example, the illiberal in regard to money,
the licentious in regard to bodily pleasures, the
effeminate in regard to what makes for ease,’ the
coward in regard to dangers, for fright makes him:
desert his comrades in peril; the ambitious in his
desire for honour, the irascible owing to anger, one
who is eager to conquer in his desire for victory, the
rancorous in his desire for vengeance; the foolish
man from having mistaken ideas of right and wrong,
the shameless from his contempt for the opinion of
others. Similarly, each of the rest of mankind is
unjust in regard to his special weakness.

This will be perfectly clear, partly from what has
already been said about the virtues, and partly from
what will be said about the emotions. It remains
to state the motives and character of those who do
wrong and of those who suffer from it. First, then,
let us decide what those who set about doing wrong
long for or avoid; for it is evident that the accuser
tion of (longing for, dpeés) things in our power,” as to which
we should necessarily be well-informed.

> Or, “in the matter of ease,” taking ra pdduya as=
paduula.

107

ARISTOTLE

KaTynyopobvTt mo0a Kal mota TovTwy brdpyer TO
avTiikw oKxemtéov, T@ 8° amroAoyoupevy Tota Kal
mooa ToUTwY ovx UrdpxeL. mMavTEs 51) mpaTTOVOL
mavra Ta ev ov Ov adTods Ta Sé dv adTovs. TH
fev odv pt) du” adrovs Ta ev Sia TUYHY mpaTTOVOL
\ > > > / a > > > / A \ /
Ta 5° &€ avaykns, Tav 8 e€ avayKns Ta pev Bia
Ta d€ doe. Wore mavTa doa pr bi avbTovs
£ \ \ > \ / 2 A 2 \ \
MpaTTovat, TA pev amo TUyns TA OE Poe Ta Se
/ Lud \ > ¢ ua \ es > \ ” A
Bia. doa dé & atrovs, Kat Sv avroi ait, Ta
\ > ” \ \ > + ‘ \ \ A

1369a pev Ou €Oos Ta dé du? dpeEw, Kal Ta pev Sia Aoye-
\ ” \ A > > / ” > e \
soTucny ope€w Ta dé du’ addyiorov: Eore 8 H pev
BovrAnats ayabob dpekis (oddels yap BovAerau add"
7 oray oinOA eivac dyabov), dAoyou om opefers 0 opy7)
Kab emBupia, wore mdvra 6 600 mparrovow avayKn
mparrew Ov aitias émrd, dua TUynV, dia Pvow, dia

/ >” \ / \ / ». ‘2 /
Biav, du’ €Bos, dia Aoyroporv, dia Ovpdv, dv’ emBvplav.
\ \ “~ > ¢ , nn 4 ”
9 To 8€ mpocdiaipetoba Kal’ yAkias 7 E€ets 7
GAN drra Ta mpaTTopeva TeEpiepyov' ei yap oup-
BéBnke rots véows dpyirous evar 7 émibupnriKots,
ob Sud TV vEeoTnTo. mparTovet Ta ToLAvTa. dd.
bv opyiy Kat éemOupiav. ovd€ dua mAodrov wal
meviav, adAAa ovpBéBnKe Tots pev méevynor dua Ty
évderav emiOupety ypnudrwvr, tots dé mAovotois
dua thy e€ovoiay éemOupety Tov pr avayKaiwy

ys) ~ LAAG / \ e > PS) \ Xr ~
noovayv. adAa mpd€ovor Kat odrot od dia mAodrov
‘ / > A \ \ > / ¢ / \
Kal meviay adda Sia trHv emiOvpiav. dpoiws Se
\ ¢ / \ ee / \ ¢ » ¢ /
Kat of dikavoe Kal oi dduKot, Kal ot dAXot of Aeyo-

~1

“ In the cases of the young, the poor, and the rich, their
youth ete. are only ‘** accidents,’ accidental not real causes.
Aristotle defines 75 cvpSeB8nx6s (Metaphysica, iv. 30) as * that
which is inherent in something, and may be predicated of it
as true, but neither necessarily, nor in most cases; for
instance, if a man, when digging a hole for a plant, finds a

108

RHETORIC, I. x. 6-9

must examine the number and nature of the motives
which are to be found in his opponent; the de-
fendant, which of them are not to be found in him.
Now, all human actions are either the result of man’s
efforts or not. Of the latter some are due to chance,
others to necessity. Of those due to necessity, some
are to be attributed to compulsion, others to nature,
so that the things which men do not do of themselves
are all the result of chance, nature, or compulsion.
As for those which they do of themselves and of which | |
they are the cause, some are the result of habit,
others of longing, and of the latter some are due to
rational, others to irrational longing. Now wish is a
[rational] longing for good, for no one wishes for any-
thing unless he thinks it is good ; irrational longings
are anger and desire. Thus all the actions of men
must necessarily be referred to seven causes: chance,
nature, compulsion, habit, reason, anger, and desire.

But it is superfluous to establish further distinc-
tions of men’s acts based upon age, moral habits,
or anything else. For if the young happen to be?
irascible, or passionately desire anything, it is not
because of their youth that they act accordingly, but
because of anger and desire. Nor is it because of
wealth or poverty; but the poor happen to desire
wealth because of their lack of it, and the rich desire
unnecessary pleasures because they are able to procure
them. Yet in their case too it will not be wealth or
poverty, but desire, that will be the mainspring of
their action. Similarly, the just and the unjust, and
all the others who are said to act in accordance with

treasure.” The colour of a man’s eyes is an “ inseparable”
accident, the fact that a man is a lawyer is a “separable”
accident.

109

ARISTOTLE

\ \ ov / A ~ f
fevot Kara Tas e€ers mparrew, dud TadTa mpa€ovow*
” \ \
7 yap Sia Aoyropov 7) dia maBos GAN ot pev Sv
10 \ £0. / ¢ Se § \ > ,
10 70n Kat 7a0n xpynord, ot dé Sia ravavTia. ovp-
Baiver pwevto. Tats ev Tovadtais e€eou TA Tovadra
> a a \ a A 4 79% A
akodovdeiv, tats 5€ Tovalode Ta Todde: EvOdS yap
” ~ \ 7 \ \ r /,
lows TH ev awddpove dia TO oeidpova eivar So€au
Te Kal emOvuiat ypnoTal emaKoAovbobot mepi TeV
~ / ~
nd€wr, TH 8 axodAdotrw ai evartiat wept tav
ll airdv Tovtwv. 16 Tas pev Tovatras Svaipécers
€atéov, oxemtéov d€ mrota oto elwhev Emecbau:
‘ ”“ / n” / a
el prev yap AevKos 7 péAas 7) peyas 7) pLKpos,
ovoev TéeTaKTaL TMV ToLovTwy aKodAovbeiv, et Se
/ ” uA a“ OL a“ 19 ts) 8 vA
véos 7) mpeaPrys 7 Sikatos 7 dducos, 7dn Siadéper.
Kat dAws doa Tdv avpPawdvTwv Toe diadepew
Ta 70n ta&v avOpdimwv, olov mdAouteiv Soxav
a \ a ~
éavT@ 7) méveobar dioices TL, Kal edTUyEiv H aTUXElV.
A ~ ~ \ ~
Tatra pev odv vorepov epoduev, viv dé wept Tav
AourGv eimwpev mp@Tov.
12 "Kore 8’ amo tvyns pev TA TOLADTA yryvopeva,
\ @& /
dowv 7 TE aitia, adpiaTos Kal [7 EVEKG TOU yiyveTat
\ \
Kal pyre ael pyre Ws emt TO TOAD parE TETAy-
a ~ a ~ 4 \
peevws: OfAov 8 ex Tod dpiopod THs TUxNS TEpl
> oF a
13 rovTwv. doe. 5é, dowv 7 7 atria ev avrois Kat
&) \ \ A 4,
1369b TETAYMEVN* 7) yap GEL 7 WS ETL TO TOAD WoadTws
a >
amoBaiver. Ta yap mapa dvow ovddev Set axpiBo-
a , \ ‘4 \ nv + ER
Noyeio0ar, méTEpa Kara pvow Twa 7 adAnv airiay
e / ~
ylyverar: Sd€eve 8 dv Kat 7 TUN aitia elvar TOV
- sas | / a” A
14 rovotTwv. Pia dé, 60a map’ emOvpiav 7 Tods Aoye-

@ ji. 12-18.
110

RHETORIC, I. x. 9-14

their moral habits, will act from the same causes,
either from reason or emotion, but some from good
characters and emotions, and others from the oppo-
site. Not but that it does happen that such and
such moral habits are followed by such and such
consequences ; for it may be that from the outset
the fact of being temperate produces in the temperate
man good opinions and desires in the matter of
pleasant things, in the intemperate man the contrary.
Therefore we must leave these distinctions on one
side, but we must examine what are the usual con-
sequences of certain conditions. For, if a man is fair
or dark, tall or short, there is no rule that any such,
consequences should follow, but if he is young or old,
just or unjust, it does make a difference. In a word,
it will be necessary to take account of all the cireum-
stances that make men’s characters different ; for
instance, if a man fancies himself rich or poor,
fortunate or unfortunate, it will make a difference.
We will, however, discuss this later*; let us now
speak of what remains to be said here.

Things which are the result of chance are all those
of which the cause is indefinite, those which happen
without any end in view, and that neither always,
nor generally, nor regularly. The definition of
chance will make this clear. Things which are the
result of nature are all those of which the cause: is
in themselves and regular; for they turn out always,

or generally, in the same way. As for those which

happen contrary to nature there is no need to in-
vestigate minutely whether their occurrence is due

“to a certain force of nature or some other cause (it

would seem, however, that such cases also are due
to chance). Those things are the result of com-

11]

15
16

17

18

ARISTOTLE

apovs yiyvera bv abr@v tOv mpatrovtwy. ee
dé, doa dia TO ToAAdKis TETTOLnKEVaL TroLodCW.
dia Aoyropov S€ Ta SoKxodvTa oupdhéepew ex TaV
cipnuevwv ayaladv 7 ws réAos 7) ws mpos TO
tédos, dtav did TO oupdepew mpatrnTar: eva
\ ‘ €33 /, , / > >
yap Kat ot axdAacTo. ovpdepovra mpatrovew, GAA
ov dia TO ovpdepew adda dv” 7dovyv. Sia Ovpov
d€ Kal dpynv Ta TYynwpyTiKd. Siadéper 5é Tyswpia
Kat KdAacis: 7 ev yap KdAaois Tod mdoxyovTos
evexad eoTw, 7 d€ TYyLwpia Tod moLvotvTos, wa
> ~ / \ s > \ ¢ > /, ~
arromAnpwOf. Ti pev ody é€otw 7 opyn, ShAov
€oTa. ev Tots trept mabdy, du’ emOupuiay dé mpar-
¢ / eQs ” \ \ \ 4
Teta. doa paiverar Hdéa. eat. d€ Kal TO atynbes
\ \ > \ > a ¢ / \ \ ‘ ~
Kal TO eOvorov ev Tots Hd€ow* TOAAA yap Kal TOV
/ \ ¢ / hid > a ¢ / ~
dvoer pn Hdéwv, dtav eOicbdow, 7déws Trovodow.
ov / > cal 7 > ¢ \ /,
Qore ovAdaBovr. ecizeiv, daa d attods mpar-
A > > \ a” > \ n~ / > ‘
Tovow, amavtT eat 7 ayaa 7 dawopeva ayaba
Re / “” / aS) / > \ 3° Ld > ¢€ /
H ndea 7) Pawopeva Hdea. émet 8° daa bv adrovs,
éxdvtes mpdtrovow, ody éxovtTes S€ doa jury BV
abtovs, mavT av ein, doa éxdvTes mpaTTovew, 7
> \ ”“ / > \ ” ¢ / n” /
ayaba 7 dawdpeva ayaba 7 Hdea 7 Paivopueva
nd€a* TIOnL yap Kal Tv TOV KaKOv 7 Pawopevev
~ “> \ “ > \ / > / /
Kakav 7) amraAAayny 7) avti weilovos eAdrrovos meTa~
a a / ~
Anw ev Tots ayabois (aipera yap Tws), kal Thy TOV
~ “”“ / ” > A ” /,
Aurnpav 7 dawopevwv 7 araddayjv 7 petaAnpw

a iN , 2 , ? a. ¢g7 € 4
avTt perCovev eAatrovwv €V TOLS o€ow WOQAUTWS.

4 ii. 2.
112

RHETORIC, I. x. 14-18

pulsion which are done by the agents themselves in
opposition to their desire or calculation. Things are
the result of habit, when they are done because they
have often been done. Things are the result of
calculation which are done because, of the goods
already mentioned, they appear to be expedient
either as an end or means to an end, provided they
are done by reason of their being expedient; for
even the intemperate do certain things that are ex-
pedient, for the sake, not of expediency, but of
pleasure. Passion and anger are the causes of acts
of revenge. But there is a difference between re-
venge and punishment ; the latter is inflicted in the
interest of the sufferer, the former in the interest of
him who inflicts it, that he may obtain satisfaction.
We will define anger when we come to speak of the
emotions.“ Desire is the cause of things being done
that are apparently pleasant. The things which are
familiar and to which we have become accustomed
are among pleasant things ; for men do with pleasure
many things which are not naturally pleasant, when
they have become accustomed to them.

In short, all things that men do of themselves
either are, or seem, good or pleasant; and since
men do voluntarily what they do of themselves, and
involuntarily what they do not, it follows that all
that men do voluntarily will be either that which is
or seems good, or that which is or seems pleasant.

For I reckon among good things the removal of that

which is evil or seems evil, or the exchange of a
greater evil for a less, because these two things are
in a way desirable ; in like manner, I reckon among
pleasant things the removal of that which is or
appears painful, and the exchange of a greater pain

I 113

ARISTOTLE

Anmréov dpa Ta ovpdepovra Kal Ta dea, TOCA
19 Kal qota. rept poev obv Too ouppepovros ev Tots
ovpBovdrcuricois el elpnTau mporepov, mept dé Tob 1)8€0s
etrrmpev vov. Set de vopitew t ixavovs elvarrovs 6 Opous,
€av Wot TEepl EKAOTOV pajre doadets penre dxpiBeis.
ll. ‘YzoxeioOw 8° myty elvan THY Hdoviy Kino
Twa THs puxiis kat katdotacw aOpoav Kal aioOnrny
ets THY dmdpxovoay piow, Avanv 5é Tobvavtiov,
2 <i oe eorly 7)50v7) TO TovobTov, SfAov Ste Kal 700
1370a €oTL TO TOUNTUKOV Ths elpnuevns diabeoews, TO be
pbaprikov 7 7) THs evayrias KaTaoTacEws | TounTuKcov
3 Aumnpdv. dvdyen obv 780 elvat 76 Te €is TO Kara,
dvow iévar ws em TO Todd, Kal pddvora. éray
ameAngdora 7 THY €auTa@v diow Ta KaT avdriy
yeyvopeva, Kal Ta €0n: Kal yap TO etOuopevov
WoTrep TepvKos: 709 ylyverau’ Opovov ydp Tt TO
€Bos TH pvoer eyyvs yap Kal 70 moAAdKis TO Gel,
€oTt O° u] peev pvars Too del, To 5é €Oos Tob moNAd-
4 Kis. Kal TO pe) Biavov- Tapa. pvow yap % Pia.
510 TO avayKaioy Avinpov, Kat opbds elpynrat
Tay yap avayKaiov mpdyp” aviapov édv.
Tas 8 émysedeias Kal Tas omovdds Kal Tas ovV-
Tovias Avrnpas’ dvayKata yap Kal Biava Tabra.,
eav By eOrobdow: ovtw dé Td bos mrovet 198. Ta
om evayTio. nea" 810 at pabupian kal at drovia
Kal at déAevor Kal ai radial Kal ai avarravcers
Kal 6 Umvos T&v 7déwv: oddev yap mpos avayKyY

« Cf. i. 6 above.

» The true nature of the “normal state’’ was lost during
the period of disturbance and unsettlement.

¢ From Evenus of Paros (Frag. 8, P.L.G. ii.): see Introd.

@ Or, *rest”’ (bodily).

114

RHETORIC, I. x. 18—x1. 4

for a less. We must therefore make ourselves
acquainted with the number and quality of expedient
and pleasant things. We have already spoken of the
expedient when discussing deliberative rhetoric ; 4
let us now speak of the pleasant. And we must
regard our definitions as sufficient in each case,
provided they are neither obscure nor too precise.

11. Let it be assumed by us that pleasure is a
certain movement of the soul, a sudden and per-
ceptible settling down into its natural state, and
pain the opposite. If such is the nature of pleasure,
it is evident that that which produces the disposition
we have just mentioned is pleasant, and that that
which destroys it or produces the contrary settling
down is painful. Necessarily, therefore, it must be
generally pleasant to enter into a normal state
(especially when what is done in accordance with that
state has come into its own again); and the same
with habits. For that which has become habitual be-
comes as it were natural ; in fact, habit is something
like nature, for the distance between “ often ’”’ and
“ always” is not great, and nature belongs to the
idea of “ always,” habit to that of “ often.” That
which is not compulsory is also pleasant, for com-
pulsion is contrary to nature. That is why what is
necessary is painful, and it was rightly said,

For every act of necessity is disagreeable.¢

Application, study, and intense effort are also painful,
for these involve necessity and compulsion, if they
have not become habitual ; for then habit makes them
pleasant. Things contrary to these are pleasant ;
wherefore states of ease, idleness, carelessness, amuse-
ment, recreation,’ andsleep are among pleasantthings,
because none of these is in any way compulsory.

115

ARISTOTLE

, ‘ a ¢ > / 7. A a ¢ , €
5TOUTWY. Kal od dv 7 emOupia evi, dmav Ov: 7
yap emOuvpia tod 7d€0s éeoriv dpetts.
~ \ > ~ ¢ \ ad 7 > c A
Tadv dé émbuyidv ai pev adAoyoi eiow ai be
\ Ao dé de GAG / a A >
peta Adyov. Aéyw dé dAdyous pév, daas jun) ek
Tov vroAapBavew tu éemiOvpotow: eiat Se rovadrau
doar elvat A&yovtar doer, Womep at Sua Tov
/ ~
awpatos tmrdapxovoa, olov 7 tpodys, duba Kat
a \ > a“
meiva, Kat Kal’ exaotov tpodhs eidos eémBupia,
\
Kal at mepl TA yevoTa Kal TEpl TA Gdpodiava Kal
/
dAws Ta amTd, Kal mepl oop Kal aKony Kal
\ ~ Le
ow. peta Adyou dé doa ex TOG mevoOAvar em-
Gupotew: troAXa, yap Kat Sedoacbar Kal Krncacbae
emtOvpotow axovoartes Kat mevabevtes.
6 ’Enet 8 eori 76 HdeoOa ev TO aicbdvecbai twos
4 ¢ \ / > \ ” / > /
mafovs, 7 dé pavracia early aicbnois tis aobevys,
Kav' TH preuvnpevw Kat to eAmilovte axoAovbot
” / * , “ > , > \
av davracia tis ob péeuvyrar 7 éAmiler. ef Se
1 Keeping Bekker’s xavy=«xal é&. Roemer reads xéel=xal
dei, Spengel dei ev.

« There is no consideration or ‘‘ definite theory” (Jebb,
Welldon) of the results that may follow. The desires arise
without anything of the kind; they simply come.

» The passage ézel 5° éori . . . alo@nors has been punctuated
in two ways. (1) With a full stop at é\mlgec (Roemer, Jebb).
The conclusion then drawn is that memory and hope are
accompanied by imagination of what is remembered or
hoped. To this it is objected that what Aristotle really
wants to prove is that memory and hope are a cause of
pleasure. (2) With a comma at édmlfec (Cope, Victorius).
The steps in the argument will then be: if pleasure is the
sensation of a certain emotion; if imagination is a weakened
(faded) sensation ; if one who remembers or hopes is attended
by an imagination of what he remembers or hopes; then,
this being so, pleasure will attend one who remembers or

116

RHETORIC, I. x1. 5-6

Everything of which we have in us the desire is
pleasant, for desire is a longing for the pleasant.

_ Now, of desires some are irrational, others rational.
I eall irrational all those that are not the result of
any assumption.* Such are all those which are called
natural; for instance,those which come into existence
through the body—such as the desire of food, thirst,
hunger, the desire of such and such food in particular ;
the desires connected with taste, sexual pleasures, in
a word, with touch, smell, hearing, and sight. I call
those desires rational which are due to our being con-
vinced ; for there are many things which we desire
to see or acquire when we have heard them spoken
of and are convinced that they are pleasant.

And if pleasure consists in the sensation of a certain
emotion, and imagination is a weakened sensation,
then both the man who remembers and the man who
hopes will be attended by an imagination of what he
remembers or hopes.’ This being so, it is evident

hopes, since there is sensation, and pleasure is sensation and
a kind of movement (§ 1).

pavracia, the faculty of forming mental images (variously
translated ‘* imagination,” “ mental impression,” ‘* fantasy ’’)
is defined by Aristotle (De Anima, iii. 3. 11) as a kind of
movement, which cannot arise apart from sensation, and the
movement produced must resemble the sensation which
produced it. But gavracia is more than this; it is not
merely a faculty of sense, but occupies a place midway
between sense and intellect; while imagination has need of
the senses, the intellect has need of imagination.

If ¢avracla is referred to an earlier perception of which
the sense image is a copy, this is memory. Imagination
carries the sense images (¢avrdcpuara) to the seat of memory.
They are then transformed into memory (of something past)
or hope (of something future) and are handed on to the
intellect. (See Cope here, and R. D. Hicks in his edition of
the De Anima.)

117

ARISTOTLE

~ a “ \ ¢ \ ¢ / \
tobro, SfAov ote Kal Hdoval dpa Hepynpevous Kal
7 eArriLovow, emretmep Kal aicOnoats. Bor dvdyKn
mavra TA OEA 7 EV TO aicbavecBar eivau Tapovra
nev TO peuvjoba vyeyevnpeva nH ev TO eArrilew
uéMovra: aic@dvovrar perv yap Ta mapdvta, peé-
1370b pynvTar dé TA yeyevneva, €Amilovar de Ta peA-
8Xovta. Ta pev ody pvnovevTa dea €oTiv, ov
pudvov oa ev TH TapdvTt, OTE Taphy, Hdea Hv,
> > ” A ? ¢ / “ * x A \ \
GAN eva Kal ody d€a, av 7 VaoTepov Kaddov Kat
ayalov TO peta TobTO* bev Kal TobT’ elpynra,
GAN 7dd Tor cwhévta pepvqobar movwr,
Kal
\ / a / res
peTa yap Te Kal GAyeot TépmeTat avinp
/ hid AAG 10 ‘ Aa 27
pLvHevos, Os Tis TOAAG 7aOy Kat ToAAG edpyn.

6 > ” Ld ¢€ \ ‘ A A ” /
9 tovTov 8° aitiov Oru HOV Kal TO pr EXEW KaKOV.

\ > > > / id / a“ > / “3 ~
Ta 0 ev €Amidi, oa TapdvTa 7 eddpaivew 7 wdedreiv

/ / \ ” 4 >? cal Lid
dpaiverar peydAa, kai avev Avayns wdedeiv. ddws
5’ 60a Tmapovra. eddpaiver, Kal eArilovras Kal
Lev nrevous os emi TO Tonw. 510 Kat TO opyt-

es0ar dU, womep Kai “Ounpos éroinae rept Tod
Avpod

Os Te TOAD yAvKiwy péAcTos KaTaAEerBomevoto*

30 ‘ 4 > / ~ > ,
ovleis ‘yap opyilerau TO adware pawopevap
TyLwplas Tuxely, ovde Tots mod dmep avrovs TH
Suvdper ovK opyilovrar 7 Hrrov.
10 Kat év tats wAelorais émOupiais axoAovbe? tis
7d0v"" 7) yap pweuvnuevor Ws Ervxov 7 eAmilovres
* Euripides, Andromeda (Frag. 133, T.G.F.).

» Odyssey, xv. 400, 401, but misquoted in the second line,
which runs: és 71s 6) wdda woddd wdOy Kal wor’ éradnO7Z.

118

RHETORIC, I. x1. 6-10

that there is pleasure both for those who remember
and for those who hope, since there is sensation.
Therefore all pleasant things must either be present
in sensation, or past in recollection, or future in
hope ; for one senses the present, recollects the past,
and hopes for the future. Therefore our recollections
are pleasant, not only when they recall things which
when present were agreeable, but also some things
which were not, if their consequence subsequently
proves honourable or good ; whence the saying :

Truly it is pleasant to remember toil after one has escaped it,*

and,

When a man has suffered much and accomplished much,
he afterwards takes pleasure even in his sorrows when he
recalls them.”
The reason of this is that even to be free from evil
is pleasant. Things which we hope for are pleasant,
when their presence seems likely to afford us great
pleasure or advantage, without the accompaniment
of pain. In a word, all things that afford pleasure
by their presence as a rule also afford pleasure when
we hope for or remember them. Wherefore even
resentment is pleasant, as Homer said of anger that
it is
Far sweeter than dripping honey ; °

for no one feels resentment against those whom
vengeance clearly cannot overtake, or those who are
far more powerful than he is ; against such, men feel
either no resentment or at any rate less.

Most of our desires are accompanied by a feeling
of pleasure, for the recollection of a past or the hope

¢ Iliad, xviii. 108.
119

ARISTOTLE

ws tevEovra xalpovol Twa Hdovyv, olov ot 7 ev
Tois mupeTois exopevor Tals Sixbous Kal pepvnwEvot
ws emov Kat eAmilovres metobar xaipovow, Kat

ll oi ep@vres Kal diadeydpevor Kal ypddovtes, Kat
TmowobvTés TL GEL TEPL TOD Epwpevov yaipovow* ev
diac. yap tots Towovrois pepvnuevor otov aicbd-
veo0at olovrat Tod epwyevov. Kal apyy dS Tod
Epwros avTn ylyveTar maow, dTay jut) Movov Tap-
ovTos xaipwow aAda Kat armdvTos peuvnpevot

12 ép@ow. 510 Kal drav Avinpos yernTrat TO 7) Tap-
civar, Kat ev Tots méveor Kal Opyvos eyyiverai
Tis dov7* 7 ev yap AUay ent TO pH badpxew,
ndovn 8 &v TO peuviolar Kal opdv mws exeivov,
Kal & emparre, Kal olos Hv. 810 Kal Tobr’ eikdTws
elpnra,

“a 4 a A a eyo > /,
Os Paro, Toior de maow bh’ iwepov Wpoe yoouo.

13. Kai 70 tynwpetobar Sv: 0} yap To pur) TUyXavew
utnpov, TO Tvyxdvew Ov: of 8 dpyrlopevor
Aurobvrar avuTepBAjTws jut) Tyswpovpevor, €Ari-

\ / \ \ a ¢ / >

14 Covres 5€ xalpovow. Kal TO viKav HOU, od pdvor
tots pirovicas adda récw: pavtacia yap dbrepoxijs
ylyverat, ob} mavTes Exovow emiBupiay 7) hpewa 7

A > \ \ \ ~ ¢ 4 > 4, \ \

15 PGAXov. erei 5é TO viKay dV, avdyKyn Kal Tas
is7la TaLolas HOelas elvat Tas paynTiKas Kal Tas é€pt-
orikds (modAdKis yap ev TavTais ylyverat TO VLKGY)

* Or “ doing something that has to do with the beloved.’
» Iliad, xxiii. 108, on the occasion of the mourning fot
120

RHETORIC, I, x1. 10-15

of a future pleasure creates a certain pleasurable en-
joyment; thus, those suffering from fever and
tormented by thirst enjoy the remembrance of
having drunk and the hope that they will drink again.
The lovesick always take pleasure in talking, writing,
or composing verses @ about the beloved ; for it seems
to them that in all this recollection makes the object
of their affection perceptible. Love always begins
in this manner, when men are happy not only in the
presence of the beloved, but also in his absence when
they recall him to mind. This is why, even when
his absence is painful, there is a certain amount of
pleasure even in mourning and lamentation ; for the
pain is due to his absence, but there is pleasure in
remembering and, as it were, seeing him and recalling
his actions and personality. Wherefore it was rightly
said by the poet :

Thus he spake, and excited in all a desire of weeping.”

And revenge is pleasant ; for if it is painful to be
unsuccessful, it is pleasant to succeed. Now, those
who are resentful are pained beyond measure when
they fail to secure revenge, while the hope of it
delights them. Victory is pleasant, not only to those
who love to conquer, but to all; for there is pro-
duced an idea of superiority, which all with more or
less eagerness desire. And since victory is pleasant,
competitive and disputatious ° amusements must be
so too, for victories are often gained in them ; among

Patroclus ; Odyssey, iv. 183, referring to the mourning for
the absence of Odysseus.

¢ Controversiae or school rhetorical exercises, as well as
arguing in the law courts; unless épicrikds means simply
** in which there is rivalry.”

121

ARISTOTLE

\ 5 , \ / \ J. ‘
Kat aotpayadices Kal opaipicers Kal KuBelas Kat
TeTTElas. Kal TeEpl Tas eomovdacpevas Sé matdias
Opotws: al pev yap Hdetar yiyvovra, av Tis H

/ € > 9DN e a e / \
ouv7iOns, at 8 edOds deta, olov Kuvyyia Kat
Taoa Onpevtixy: dmov yap dpiAda, evradla Kat
vikn €otiv. 810 Kal W ducavixt) Kal 7 epiotuKn

16 7Oeta Tots €lOvopévors Kat Svvapevois. Kal TYLA)

\ > , ~ eQv \ \ /

Kat evdogia Tav Hdiotwy bia TO yiyvecbar dav-
Taciav éExKdoTw OTL ToLodros olos 6 omovdatos, Kal
nw bud “ “A ” > va ~
peGAAov Grav Pbow ods olerar dAnOevew. Tovodror
S° of eyyds waGAdov THv méppw, Kat of ovv7bers Kat
ot toXtrat TOY aTwOev, Kai ot OvTes TAV weAAdVTWwY,

\ ¢ / > 4 \ \ x\/

Kal ot dpovysor adpdvwv, Kai modAoi ddAtywyr:
~ \ > \ > 4, \ > / ~
padrXrov yap eikos aAnfevew rods eipnuevous TaY
evavTiwv' eel Ov Tis Todd Katadppovel, Worrep
Travdiwv 7 Onpiwy, oddev péAer THS ToUTwWY TYyLAS

N ~ / 7 A ~ / / > > ”

7 THs Sd€ns adris ye ths 8dEns xapur, aAn’ eimep,
3 dAdo Tt.

17. Kai o piros Tov mew TO TE yap pirety 700
(oddeis yap didrowos pr) xaipwv oww) Kal Td
dircicbar dv: davracia yap Kal evrad™a rod
tmrdpyew avT@ ayalov civar, ob} mdvtes emibu-

~ ¢ > / 4 de Xr a > ~ 6 /
podow ot aicbavdpevor: TO Se pirciobar ayaraobat
> > \ > ¢ / \ A 4 4 AY

1g corw adrov dv adrov. Kat TO Davpdlecbar Hdd
dv avto TO TysGo8a. Kai TO KoAaKevecbar Kal
6 KoAag dv- pauwopevos yap Javpaoris Kal
19 pawodpevos pidos 6 Kodak eoriv. Kal ro radbra
7

@ For the meaning of giAla, pidetv ef. ii. 4.
122

RHETORIC, I. x1. 15-19

these we may include games with knuckle-bones,
ball-games, dicing, and draughts. It is the same
with serious sports ; for some become pleasant when
one is familiar with them, while others are so from
the outset, such as the chase and every description
of outdoor sport; for rivalry implies victory. It
follows from this that practice in the law courts and
disputation are pleasant to those who are familiar
with them and well qualified. Honour and good
repute are among the most pleasant things, because
“every one imagines that he possesses the qualities of
a worthy man, and still more when those whom he
believes to be trustworthy say that he does. Such
are neighbours rather than those who live at a dis-
tance ; intimate friends and fellow-citizens rather
than those who are unknown ; contemporaries rather
than those who come later ; the sensible rather than
the senseless ; the many rather than the few ; for
such persons are more likely to be trustworthy than
their opposites. As for those for whom men feel
great contempt, such as children and animals, they
pay no heed to their respect or esteem, or, if they
do, it is not for the sake of their esteem, but for
some other reason.

A friend also is among pleasant things, for it is
pleasant to love “—for no one loves wine unless he
finds pleasure in it—just as it is pleasant to be loved ;
for in this case also a man has an impression that he
is really endowed with good qualities, a thing desired
by all who perceive it; and to be loved is to be
cherished for one’s own sake. And it is pleasant to
be admired, because of the mere honour. Flattery
and the flatterer are pleasant, the latter being a
sham admirer and friend. It is pleasant to do the

123

ARISTOTLE

mparrew moAAdKis 7dv* TO yap ovvnbes 780 iV.
20 kal TO peraBadew 700: eis piow yap yiyverat
peraBadrew: TO yap avro det brrepBoAnv rove?
rhs Kabeordons cEews: dOev eipnrat
\ / 4,
petaBoAy mavrwy yAuK.
A ~ \ \ \ / ¢ /, > / \ »~
51a TOOTO Kal TA dia xpdvov Hdéa €oTi, Kal dvOpwrot
Kat mpdypata> petaBody yap ex Tod mapovros
21 €orlv, dua d€ Kal omdvov TO dia ypovov. Kal TO
/ ‘ \ / ¢ A e 9. & \ b
pavOdvew Kat 70 Oavudlew 75d ws emi To modv-
év pev yop TO Oavpdalew To emBupreiv pabeiv
€oTiv, WoTEe TO Oovpacrov emOupnrov, ev dé T@
22 pavOdvew els To Kara vow Kabioracbar. Kat
TO €0 TroLely Kal TO ED TaGXYeW TOV Hdewv* TO pEV
yap «0 mdoxew Tuyxdvew eoTw dv éemOupodat,
TO O€ €U mrovety Exew Kal brepexew, Hv audorepwv
.y7 \ \ A 3 A rd ‘ > /
is7lb edievtar. dia Se TO Od Elva TO edmoLNTLKOY,
Kat TO éemavopboby 750 Tots avOpdmois eotl Tovs
/ \ A \ > land > Cal > \ A ‘
23 mAnoiov, Kal TO Ta eAXiTrA emutedciv. mel SE TO
pavOavew TE 700 Kat TO Bavpatew, Kat Ta Toudde
avaykKn 75€a elvat olov 76 TE juyrovpevor, aomep
ypapucn, Kal dvb pavromoua Kal TounTucy, Kat
my 6 av <b jeep evov th Kay h py 80 avo
TO [ey Evo" od yap emt rovTw xaiper, aAAa
ovAdoytopos eoTw Ort ToOTo exeivo, WOoTE wav-
24 Odvew Tr ovpBaiver. Kat at mepimérevat Kal TO
mapa puKpov owlecbar ex Tav Kwdvvwv: mavTa
25 yap Oavuaora tatra. Kal émel TO Kata pvow
1 Roemer reads 76 re piunrixkdv, The meaning is much
the same, only pinotjmevor is passive.

* Euripides, Orestes, 234.
* True knowledge or philosophy, which is the result of
learning, is the highest condition of the intellect, its normal

124

RHETORIC, I. xr. 19-25

same things often; for that which is familiar is, as
we said, pleasant. Change also is pleasant, since
change is in the order of nature; for perpetual
‘sameness creates an excess of the normal condition ;

whence it was said :
: Change in all things is sweet.*

‘This is why what we only see at intervals, whether
‘men or things, is pleasant; for there is a change
‘from the present, and at the same time it is rare.
‘And learning and admiring are as a rule pleasant ;
‘for admiring implies the desire to learn, so that what
‘causes admiration is to be desired, and learning
‘implies a return to the normal.’ It is pleasant to
bestow and to receive benefits; the latter is the
attainment of what we desire, the former the posses-
sion of more than sufficient means,° both of them
things that men desire. Since it is pleasant to do
good, it must also be pleasant for men to set their
neighbours on their feet, and to supply their de-
ficiencies. And since learning and admiring are
pleasant, all things connected with them must also
be pleasant ; for instance, a work of imitation, such
as painting, sculpture, poetry, and all that is well
imitated, even if the object of imitation is not
pleasant ; for it is not this that causes pleasure or
the reverse, but the inference that the imitation and
the object imitated are identical, so that the result
is that we learn something. The same may be said
of sudden changes and narrow escapes from danger ;
for all these things excite wonder. And since that

_or settled state. Consequently, a return to this is pleasure,
which is defined (§ 1) as a settling down of the soul into its
natural state after a period of disturbance.

_ © Or, “ larger means than the person benefited.”

125

26

2

~l

28

ARISTOTLE

OU, Ta ovyyevh Sé Kata dvow adAjAos eoTW,
TdVTA TA OVyyYEVvH Kal Gora Nd€a Ws emt TO OAV,
olov avOpwros avOpwimw Kat immos tmmm Kal
véos véew. Oev Kal at mapousion eipnvTaL, ws

HAE Aka Tépzrec,

\
KQL

ws alel Tov dmotov,
Kal
eyva dé Op Opa,
\
Kal

+ ER \ \ ,
aet KoAowWs Tapa KoAoLoV,

\ Ld v ~
Kat doa dAXa Tovatra.
> \ A A Ld \ \ A ¢ A ¢ a“
Ezet 5€ TO Gpovov Kal TO avyyeves NOV EavTa
dmav, pddwora 8 adros mpos éavTdv EKaoTos
Tobto mémovlev, avaykn mavras diAavrous ecivat
paddrov 7) Artov: wavTa yap Ta ToLadra bmdpyer
mpos avTov pddvota. eet dé didavTo. mavtes,
Kal TA avTa@V avayKn dea civar Taw, olov Epya
\ , \ \ ; ¢ ods \ \
Kat Adyous. 810 Kal dirokddakes ws emi Td Todd
/ \ / \ /
direpacrai Kat diddtysor Kai diAdteKvot:
atT@v yap epya, TO. TEKVG. Kal Ta Muri) emu
Tedeiv 780" abtav yap epyov. 797 ylyverau. Kal
émel TO dpyew 7OvoTov, Kal TO go ov Soxety elvau
Ov" apxiKov yap To dpovetv, éott 8 % codia
lanl a > / ” > \ /
ToAAav Kal Oavpacrdv éemoriyn. Ere emet hidd-
TYLOL WS ETL TO TOA, GVayKY Kal TO EmiTyLaV TOIS
/ ¢ \ - \ A > e / a
méAas dd elvat. Kal To ev & BéArioTos Boxe?
civat abros atrob, evradOa diarpiBew, worep Kal

Edpuridns dyoi

® Odyssey, xvii. 218 ws alel rdv dpmotoy dyer Beds ws Tov
omotor.

126

RHETORIC, I. xr. 25-28

which is in accordance with nature is pleasant, and
things which are akin are akin in accordance with
nature, all things akin and like are for the most part
pleasant to each other, as man to man, horse to
horse, youth to youth. This is the origin of the
proverbs :

The old have charms for the old, the young for the young, ¥

Like to like,*

Beast knows beast,

Birds of a feather flock together,’

and all similar sayings.

And since things which are akin and like are
always pleasant to one another, and every man in
the highest degree feels this in regard to himself, it
must needs be that all men are more or less selfish; ~~
for it is in himself above all that such conditions °
are to be found. Since, then, all men are selfish, it
follows that all find pleasure in what is their own, ~
such as their works and words. That is why men as
a rule are fond of those who flatter and love them, _
of honour, and of children; for the last are their ~
own work. It is also pleasant to supply what is
wanting,’ for then it becomes our work. And since
it is most pleasant to command, it is also pleasant to
be regarded as wise ;° for practical wisdom is com-
manding, and philosophy consists in the knowledge
of many things that excite wonder. Further, since
men are generally ambitious, it follows that it is also
agreeable to find fault with our neighbours. And if
a man thinks he excels in anything, he likes to devote
his time to it; as Euripides says :

» Literally, “ever jackdaw to jackdaw.”

¢ Of likeness and kinship. 2 999.
* Both practically and speculatively or philosophically.

127

29

1372a

ARISTOTLE

Kant ToT eémelyeTat,
/ ¢ / ¢ / nA /
vepov ExdoTns TuEpas metorov H€pos,
Ww adros abdtod tuyydver BéATiotos wr.
e , de ge 2 5 Ue Py ‘ a AOE ‘ =
dpoiws dé Kal eet 4 madia Tov yéwv Kat Taca
aveots, Kat 6 yéAws Tov dev, dvdyren kal 70.
a ¢ tA
yeroia Hdéa elvar, Kat avOparovs Kat Adyous Kat
” 7 A \ / \ > a \
epya Suasprorat be mept yeroiey xwpis ev rots rept
TonTiKhs. Tept pev ody yOdewv eipyobw Tadra,

\ A ee ~ > / 7 /,
ra dé Auanpa ex TAY evavtiwy TovToas havepa.

bo

ow

> ~ ~

12, “Qv pev odv &vexa adiKodor, Tadr ori:

~ ~ ‘
mas 8 éxovres Kal tivas, Aéywuev viv. avrot
pev ody OTav olwvrat Suvarov elvat TO mpaypa

~ a / “ ca
mpaxOjvar Kat éavtois Suvardv, «ite av Aabeiv
/ ” A / 4 lon / ”
mpakavres, 1) pn Aabdvres pr) Sodvar Sixnv, 7
~ / ~
Sodvar pev GAN edAdttrw tiv Cnpiay elvar Tob
Képdous éavTois 7 @v KHdovTar. Toia pev odv
Suvara daiverar Kat mota advvara ev Tois voTEpov
pnOjcerar (Kowa yap Tatra mdvTwv Tav Adywr),

> \ > ww \ / > 4
avrot 8 otovtrar Suvarol elvar poddvora alnprot

a na \
dduceiv of eizety Suvdpevor Kal of mpaxTuKol Kal

Me ~ > 4 ” / >
of Eurreipor TOAADY aywvwv, Kav TodAdpiAcL wow,
Kav mAovowl. Kal pddioTa pev, av avrol wow
év trois elpnuevors, olovrar dvvacar, ei Se su,

a“ A / /
Kav vrdpywow adbrois Tovodror Pidou 7 UanpéTat
} Kowwvot Sua yap tabdra Svvavrar Kal mparrew

‘ / \ \ ~ U » er SS /
Kat AavOdvew Kat pr) Sodvar Sixnv. Kat eav didow
ou Tots adicoupevois 7) Tois KpiTais* of ev yap

, > 4 / A ‘ > A \
diror advAakroi te mpds TO adiKeicfar Kal mpoo-
* Antiope (Frag. 183, 7.G.F.).

»’ Only the definition appears in the existing text:
“The ridiculous is an error, painless and non-destructive
ugliness (5).”’

128

RHETORIC, I. xr. 28—x11. 4

And allotting the best part of each day to that in which
he happens to surpass himself, he presses eagerly towards it.”

Similarly, since amusement, every kind of relaxation,
and laughter are pleasant, ridiculous things—men,
words, or deeds—must also be pleasant. The ridi-
culous has been discussed separately in the Poetics.°
Let this suffice for things that are pleasant ; those
that are painful will be obvious from the contraries
of these.

12. Such are the motives of injustice; let us now
state the frame of mind of those who commit it, and
who are the sufferers from it. Men do wrong when
they think that it can be done and that it can be
done by them; when they think that their action
will either be undiscovered, or if discovered will
remain unpunished; or if it is punished, that the
punishment will be less than the profit to themselves
or to those for whom they care. As for the kind of
things which seem possible or impossible, we will
discuss them later,’ for these topics are common to
all kinds of rhetoric. Now men who commit wrong
think they are most likely to be able to do so with
impunity, if they are eloquent, business-like, ex-
perienced in judicial trials, if they have many friends,
and if they are wealthy. They think there is the
greatest chance of their being able to do so, if they
themselves belong to the above classes; if not, if
they have friends, servants, or accomplices who do ;
for thanks to these qualities they are able to commit
wrong and to escape discovery and punishment.
Similarly, if they are friends of those who are being
wronged, or of the judges; for friends are not on
their guard against being wronged and, besides, they

¢ ii. 19.
K 129

ARISTOTLE

a \
KataAAarrovra. mpiv eémeEeADciv, of Se Kpirat
/ e a“ / > \ n“ Lid > ~
xapilovrar ois av pido. dot, Kat 7) dAws adiaow
7) puxpots Cnu.rotow.
a /
5 AaOnrixoi 8 eiolv of 7° evavtiot Tots éyKAn-
pacw, olov dobevis mept aikias Kal 6 mévys Kal
6 alaypos mepi poryeias. Kal Ta Aiav ev pavep@
Kat ev of0aduois: advAaxra yap dua TO pndeva
6 av oleoPar. Kai Ta THALKADTA Kal Ta ToLadTa ola
>. e > 4 \ \ ~ / \
pnd av ets advdakta yap Kal Tadra* mavTes yap
Ta elw0dra worep appworiuata dvddrrovrat Kat
LO , “A de ) / > £ Pe) \
TALK LATA, O SE pndets TH HppwoTHKEY, OVdElS
7 evAaBetrar. Kai ols pundeis exOpos 7 moAXoi- of
\ \ w la \ \ A /
pev yap otovra Ajoew bia TO pH pvdAdrrecbar,
¢ \ / \ \ \ a“ ” > ond
of dé AavOdvovor ba TO pur) SoKety av emryeuphoat
/ \ \ \ > / ” a
pvdattopevois, Kat Sia TO amodoyiay exew ste
8 ovK av evexeipnoav. Kal ols tbmapxer Kpviis 7
TpoTos 7 Tomos 7 SidBeois eVmopos. Kal daots
A ~ > \ / / a” > \ /
p17) AaBotow e€ori Siwars Sixyns 7 avaBod) xpdvov
” ‘ ~ \ e \ / ,
SiapPopat Kpit@v. Kat ols, €av yévnrar Cypia,
> \ / a > / ”* > \ / ”“
€oTl Siwos Tis exticews 7 avaBody xpovios, 7)
9 5 > > / de e& Ld > A , \ t \
uv dmopiay pndev e€er 6 Te atoA€on. Kal ols Ta
\ / A / 5 Pe / ¢ \ 4
pev Képdn havepa 7 peyddAa 7) eyyds, at dé Cnutac
1372b puKpal 7) adaveis } mOppw. Kal dv wn eort TYyLwpla
” lon > / et ty _.€ / A- se
10 ton TH WdhedAcia, ofov SoKe? 7 TUpavvis. Kal daows

4 Two different persons. If the second é be omitted, the
reference is to one.
® Or, a “ resourceful mind.”

130

RHETORIC, I. x1. 4-10

prefer reconciliation to taking proceedings; and
judges favour those whom they are fond of, and
either let them off altogether or inflict a small penalty.

Those are likely to remain undetected whose
qualities are out of keeping with the charges, for
instance, if a man wanting in physical strength were
accused of assault and battery, or a poor and an
ugly man“ of adultery. Also, if the acts are done
quite openly and in sight of all; for they are not
guarded against, because no one would think them
possible. Also, if they are so great and of such a
nature that no one would even be likely to attempt
them, for these also are not guarded against ; for all
guard against ordinary ailments and wrongs, but no
one takes precautions against those ailments from
which no one has ever yet suffered. And those who
have either no enemy at all or many; the former
hope to escape notice because they are not watched,
the latter do escape because they would not be
thought likely to attack those who are on their guard
and because they can defend themselves by the plea
that they would never have attempted it. And
those who have ways or places of concealment for
stolen property, or abundant opportunities of dispos-
ing of it.’ And those who, even if they do not remain
undetected, can get the trial set aside or put off, or
corrupt the judges. And those who, if a fine be
imposed, can get payment in full set aside or put off
for a long time, or those who, owing to poverty, have
nothing to lose. And in cases where the profit is
certain, large, or immediate, while the punishment
is small, uncertain, or remote. And where there can
be no punishment equal to the advantages, as seems
to be the case in a tyranny. And when the unjust

131

ARISTOTLE

To. peev aducnpara Ajpupara, ai be Cnpiac oveld
povov. Kal ols Tobvavtiov TO pev adiKHwaTa €is
emrawvov Twa, olov ei ovveBn OpL0. Tyseopnoacbac
brrép Tar pos 1 EnTpos, aomep Laveovt, ai de
Cypiar eis xpnpara n pvyiv 7 Towdrov tu Sv
dyuporepa yap a8ixobor Kal dudorépws exovres,
aay ovx ot avrot adn’ of evavTiot tots "Ocow.

11 Kat of ToAAG.Kis 7) AcdnBores nH py elnpumpeevor.
Kal ot moAAdKis amoteTuxnKoTes’ elol yap Twes
Kal év Tots TowovTos, Womep ev Tois ToAEmLKOIS,

12 ofor avapdyeobar. Kat ols dv mapayphua 7 TO
¢ 7 \ \ \ MA Bal \ / ¢ \
HOU, TO Se Avmypov vVoTEpov, 7) TO KEpdos, H SE
Cnpia vorepov: of yap aKxpatets Tovwodro., oT. 3°

13 dcpacia mept mavra Cowv Opéyovrau. Kal ols av
Tobvayriov TO [Lev Avmnpov 7707 | uy Cnpia, To be
750 Kal wpeAipov voTepa Kal Xpovuirepa ot yap
eyKparets Kal ppovy,wrepot TA ToLabdra SidKovow.

\ e an > / wan 4, / lol an“ >

14 Kal ofs av evdexnrar dia TUynv Sd€ar mpaEar 7 de
> 4 ” \ / a” > ” ‘ @ ©
dvayKny 7) Sua pvow 7 bu eos, Kat ddws dap -

15 tev adda pA) aducciv. Kat ols & av 7 Tob emeticoos
tuxetv. Kal door av evdeets Wow. dix om etal
evoeeis* ) yap Ws avayKaiov, Womep ot TéevNTES, 7
¢ € ~ 7 ¢ , ‘ ¢ /

16 Ws UmepBoAfs, Womep oi Avot. Kal of afddpa
evdoxy.obdvtes Kal ot opddpa ado€obyres, of pev
ws od do0€ovres, of 5’ ws oddev waGAAov dd€ovres.

17. Adrot pev oty otrtws €ExovTes emtxeipodow,
adukovot d5€ Tovs ToLOVTOUS Kal Ta TOLADTA, TOUS

@ Who Zeno was, and what the story, is unknown.

» Some do wrong for the sake of gain, others for the sake
of praise ; but the former sacrifice honour for self-interest,
the latter self-interest for honour.

© * More distant ” (Jebb). .

132

RHETORIC, I. xm. 10-17

acts are real gains and the only punishment is dis-
grace ; and when, on the contrary, the unjust acts
tend to our credit, for instance, if one avenges father
or mother, as was the case with Zeno,“ while the
punishment only involves loss of money, exile, or
something of the kind. For men do wrong from
both these motives and in both these conditions of
mind; but the persons are not the same, and their
characters are exactly opposite.? And those who
have often been undetected or have escaped punish-
ment; and those who have often been unsuccessful ;
for in such cases, as in actual warfare, there are
always men ready to return to the fight. And all
who hope for pleasure and profit at once, while the
pain and the loss come later; such are the intem-
perate, intemperance being concerned with all things
that men long for. And when, on the contrary, the
pain or the loss is immediate, while the pleasure and
the profit are later and more lasting’; for temperate
and wiser men pursue such aims. And those who
may possibly be thought to have acted by chance or
from necessity, from some natural impulse or from
habit, in a word, to have committed an error rather
than a crime. © And those who hope to obtain in-
dulgence ; and all those who are in need, which is
of two kinds ; for men either need what is necessary,
as the poor, or what is superfluous, as the wealthy.
And those who are highly esteemed or held in great
contempt ; the former will not be suspected, the
latter no more than they are already.

In such a frame of mind men attempt to do wrong,
and the objects of their wrongdoing are men and
circumstances of the following kind. Those who

4 With a comma or colon after 74 ro.adra ; without these
render: ‘‘ those who possess such things as they . . .”
133

ARISTOTLE

” * > \ > A a” > > cal an >
ExovTas wv avToi evdecis 7) eis TavayKata 7 eis
18 Uirepoxnv 7) ets amdoAavow, Kal Tods moppw Kal
a ~ a ~ >
Tovs eyyts: TOV pev yap 7) Anis Taxela, Tov 8
7 Tyswpia Bpadeia, oiov of avddvtes Tods Kapyn-
/ \ A \ > a \ A
19 doviouvs. Kat Tovs jut) evAaBeis nde dudaktiKods
> \ 4 cv ‘ , a
aAAd muorevTiKo’s' pddiov yap mavtas Aabeiv.
\ \ ¢ 7 > lol \ \ > ~
Kat Tovs pabdpous: émyseAobs yap TO éeme&eAbety.
Kal Tovs atoxvvTnAov’s: od yap paxyntikol mept
/ ‘ \ ¢ ‘ ~ > / \
20 Képdovs. Kal tods bo moAAdv adicnfevtas Kal
pn eme€eAOovras ws ovTas KaTa THY TapoyLtay
/ ~ / ‘ a a \
21 rovtous Mvodv Xeiav. Kal ots pnderwmore Kal
“A / > / \ > Z ¢ \
ovs troAAdKis' apdorepot yap advAakror, of pev
¢€ > / ec > e > ” ” \ A
22 ws obdémoTe, of 8’ Ws ovK av ETL. Kal Tovs dia-
/ a > / ¢ ~ \ a
BeBAnpevovs 7 dduaBdAovs: of rovodrou yap ovTE
mpoatpodvrat, poBovpmevor tovs KpiTtds, ovTe duU-
’
vavrat mreiew: wv of prcovpevor Kal dbovovpevol
/
23 elow. Kal mpos ods Exovor mpddacw 7) mpoyovwr
is73a 7) adtav H pilwv 7 TomodvTwy KaKkds 7 peA-
Anoavtwv 7} adrods 7 mpoydvous } dy KydovTat-
woTep yap 1 Tapoyia, mpoddoews Setrar po-
¢ / \ \ > \ ‘ \ /

24 vov 7) movnpia. Kat rods éxOpods Kai tods didrovs*
\ \ \ cs \ > «Qo 7 ‘ \
Tovs pev yap pdd.v, tos 8 dv. Kal Tods
> / ‘ 4 \ \ > ~ Bd) ~ na
adirous. Kai Tovs pt) Sewods eimeiy H mpagat’ 7
yap ovK éeyxeipotow eérmekvevar, 7) KatadAarrovrat,
2577) ovdev TEepaivovow. Kat ols pr AvowreAd dia-

* Who were too far off to retaliate.
®’ A proverb meaning “an easy prey.” The Mysians
were regarded as cowardly and unwarlike.

134

RHETORIC, I. x1. 17-25

possess what they themselves lack, things either
necessary, or superfluous, or enjoyable ; both those
who are far off and those who are near, for in the
one case the gain is speedy, in the other reprisals
are slow, as if, for instance, Greeks were to plunder
Carthaginians. And those who never take pre-
cautions and are never on their guard, but are
confiding ; for all these are easily taken unawares.
And those who are indolent ; for it requires a man
who takes pains to prosecute. And those who are
bashful; for they are not likely to fight about
money. And those who have often been wronged
but have not prosecuted, being, as the proverb says,
“ Mysian booty.’’® And those who have never, or
those who have often, suffered wrong ; for both are
off their guard, the one because they have never yet
been attacked, the others because they do not expect
to be attacked again. And those who have been
slandered, or are easy to slander; for such men
neither care to go to law, for fear of the judges,
nor, if they do, can they convince them; to this
class belong those who are exposed to hatred or
envy. And those against whom the wrongdoer can
pretend that either their ancestors, or themselves,
or their friends, have either committed, or intended
to commit, wrong either against himself, or his
ancestors, or those for whom he has great regard ;
for, as the proverb says, “ evil-doing only needs an
excuse.’ And both enemies and friends; for it is
easy to injure the latter, and pleasant to injure the
former. And those who are friendless. And those
who are unskilled in speech or action; for either
they make no attempt to prosecute, or come to terms,
or accomplish nothing. And those to whom it is no

135

ARISTOTLE

tpiPew emitnpodow 7 dSikny 7 Exrow, olov of E€vor
kat adroupyol* emi pixp@ te yap SvadvovTat Kal
26 padlws KaTamavorvTat. Kal Tovs moAAa dLKnKO-
Tas, 7) ToLAoTa, ola dducodvran eyyvs yap Tu SoKet
TOO Hm aduKeiy clvat, orav Tl TOLOUTOV dduun Oy
TUs olov «ibe. Kat adbros dducety déeyw 5° olov
97 €t Tis Tov eiwOdra bBpilew aikicaito. Kal Tovs
memounKetas Kak@s 7) BovdAnfevtas 7 Bovdo-
pevous 7) TounjgovTas’ exe yap Kal TO HO Kal TO
28 Kader, Kal eyyus TOU He) dduKety paiverar. Kat
ols Xaprodvrac 7 pirous 7H Davpalopevors 7 q cpw-
pevous y Kuptous 7 OAws mpos ods Cdow avrot:
99 Kal mpos ovs eoTW emveiKelas TUxXElv. Kal ols av
eyKekAnKotTes Wot Kal mpodiakeywpynKores, olov
KaAdummos emroteu Ta mept Aiwva> Kai yap Ta
30 Tovabra eyyds Tod 111) dducety paiverau. Kal ods
tm’ dAdwv pédAovtas, av pay abrol, ws ovKéTt
evdexopevov Povdetoacbat, domep Aێyerar Aiveai-
Snpos TéAwve mépuipar Kortdfia avdparodicapevy,
31 OTe éfOacev, ws Kal adros péAAwy. Kal ods adu-
Kynoavres SuvyicovTar todd Sixava mpattew, ws

* aixla (assault) was a less serious offence than iSpis
(wanton outrage).

» ols, i. e. supplying dédicouuévors, “ by whose being
wronged.” ods has been suggested, i.e. supplying déiKxodvres,

wronging whom.”

¢ In our relations with whom, almost=from whom.
Another interpretation is: ‘*In reference to whom there is a
chance . . . consideration from others, meaning the judges”
(Welldon).

4 Callippus was a friend of Dion, who freed Syracuse
from Dionysius the Younger. He afterwards accused Dion
and contrived his murder. His excuse was that Dion knew
what he intended to do, and would be likely to strike first,
if he did not anticipate him.

136

RHETORIC, I. xir. 25-31

advantage to waste time waiting for the verdict or
damages, such as strangers or husbandmen ; for they
are ready to compromise on easy terms and to drop
proceedings. And those who have committed
numerous wrongs, or such as those from which they
themselves are suffering ; for it seems almost an act
of justice that a man should suffer a wrong such as
he had been accustomed to make others suffer ; if,
for instance, one were to assault a man who was in
the habit of outraging others.* And those who have:
already injured us, or intended, or intend, or are
about to do so; for in such a case vengeance is both
pleasant and honourable, and seems to be almost an
act of justice. And those whom we wrong ® in order
to ingratiate ourselves with our friends, or persons
whom we admire or love, or our masters, in a word,
those by whom our life is ruled. And those in
reference to whom there is a chance of obtaining
merciful consideration.© And those against whom
we have a complaint, or with whom we have had a
‘previous difference, as Callippus acted in the matter
of Dion; for in such cases it seems almost an act of
justice. And those who are going to be attacked by
others, if we do not attack first, since it is no longer
possible to deliberate ; thus, Aenesidemus is said to
have sent the prize in the game of cottabus to Gelon,’
who, having reduced a town to slavery, had antici-
pated him by doing what he had intended to do him-
self. And those to whom, after having injured them,
we shall be enabled to do many acts of justice, in the
¢ Aenesidemus, tyrant of Leontini, being anticipated by
Gelon, tyrant of Syracuse, in the enslavement of a neigh-
bouring state, sent him the cottabus prize, as a compliment
for having ‘‘ played the game” so skilfully. The cottabus
was originally a Sicilian game.
: 137

32

33

ARISTOTLE

padiws lacdpevor, dorep éfyn “Idowv 6 Oerradds
8 a > A A Ld "A \ / Ma
civ aduxeiv Evia, Orws Svvntat Kal Sixara modAd
Trovelv.
Kai & mdvres 7) modAol dduxeiy cidPaow: ovy-
/ \ ” / 0 \ \ c Lo
youns yap otovra. revEeoOar. Kal ta pddva
uA ~ > 4 \ > Nb t
Kpviat- rovatra 8° doa raxyd dvadioxerat, olov
\ > 7 “a \ b) / / nn” /
Ta €OWdyLA, TA EvpeTdBANTA oXHMacW 1) xXpw-

1 / va ~ > / 7
34 waow 7 Kpaceow. 7 & TOAAaxod adavica evmopov*

35

1373 b

tovatra dé ra edBdoraxtra Kal ev puKpots TozroLs
/ Lid ‘
adaviloueva. Kal ols advddopa Kal dpova moAAG
en Ae ~ ~ e
mpoimHpxe TH adikobvTr. Kal doa aioyvvovTat ot
> 4 / ~ >? la 4
aducnbévres A€yew, olov yuvark@v oixeiwy bBpeus
”“ > > \ ka > ca \ bud a
9 «ls atrods 7 «is vies. Kal doa dtAodiKety
/ a“ . / ~ A / \ A
ddfevev av 6 emewv: Toratra S€ Ta TE iKpa Kab
e > ~
ep’ ois ovyyvapn. ws pev obv exovres adiKodat,
a ~ > /
Kat Tota Kal molous Kal dia Ti, oxeddov Tabr’ eoriv.
> , ,
13. Ta 8 aducjpara mavra Kal Ta Sikavmpara
> / n ~ ov
dicAwpev, apEdwevor mp@tov evredbev. wprorat
\ ey \ \ » , , Ae,
67 Ta Stkata Kal Ta adiKa mpds TE vopous [dvo],
\ \ ” > ~ / \ / ‘ \
Kal TMpos ovs eat, SixOs. A€yw S€ vdpov Tov pev
ww \ A / ” A A ¢ 4 e
ldtov Tov de Kowdy, ldvov ev TOV EKdaToLS wpt-
apévov pds adrovs, Kal Tobrov Tov pev aypadov
Tov d€ Yeypappevov, Kowov S€ Tov Kara dvow.
€oTt yap, 6 pavrevovral ti mavres, dae Kowov
/
dikavov Kal ddiKov, Kav pndeuia Kowwvia mpds
* Bracketed by Spengel, but retained by Roemer.

* Tyrant of Pherae.
138

RHETORIC, I. x1. 31—xr1r. 2

idea that it will be easy to repair the wrong ; as Jason
the Thessalian® said one should sometimes commit
injustice, in order to be able also to do justice often.

Men are ready to commit wrongs which all or
many are in the habit of committing, for they hope
to be pardoned for their offences. They steal objects
that are easy to conceal; such are things that are
quickly consumed, as eatables; things which can
easily be changed in form or colour or composition ;
things for which there are many convenient hiding-
places, such as those that are easy to carry or stow
away in a corner; those of which a thief already
possesses a considerable number exactly similar or
hard to distinguish. Or they commit wrongs which
the victims are ashamed to disclose, such as outrages “
upon the women of their family, upon themselves,
or upon their children. And all those wrongs in
regard to which appeal to the law would create the
appearance of litigiousness ; such are wrongs which
are unimportant or venial. ‘These are nearly all the
dispositions which induce men to commit wrong, the
nature and motive of the wrongs, and the kind of
persons who are the victims of wrong.

13. Let us now classify just and unjust actions
generally, starting from what follows. Justice and
injustice have been defined in reference to laws and
persons in two ways. Now there are two kinds of
laws, particular and general. By particular laws I
mean those established by each people in reference
to themselves, which again are divided into written
and unwritten ; by general laws I mean those based
upon nature. In fact, there is a general idea of just
and unjust in accordance with nature, as all men in
a manner divine, even if there is neither communica-

139

wo

or

ARISTOTLE

>

aAAjAovs 7 nde cvvOyKn, ofov Kat % Lodoxdgous

2A / / 4, a ‘ >
vruyovn daiverar éyovoa, Ste Sixaovy ameipy-

/ / \ / e /, a“ ~
pevov Barbar rov LloAvvetxn, ws dvce dv rodro
dikasov"

> / lod > / > > yA,

ov yap TL viv ye Kaxbés, add’ dei more
~ ~ > A > a /

Ci Tobdro, Koddeis oldev e& drov davy.

\ e > ~ , \ ~ \ /
kat ws “EyredoxAts Aéyer wept tod pur) Krelvew
TO euipuxov ToOTO yap od Tot ev Sixasov Tict 8°
od dixaov,

> A \ A / / 4, > > / .

aAXra TO wev TavTwY voupov Sud 7’ edpypedovTos

1/ ? / / / > > / me ~
ailépos nvexéws Térarat did tT amdérov ad yijs.
kat ws ev T@ Meoonviak@ Aéyer *AAKiddyas.

\ “A \ 7 co 7 n” A
mpos ovs de Swhiprotar, Sixy@s Sudpiorary 7 yap
m™pos TO KOWOoV 7) Tmpos Eva TOY KowWwvovVTWY, &
Sel mpdrrew Kal pr) mparrew.

Avo Kat TadiuKjpara Kat Ta Suxarmdpata diy@s
€oTw adiceity Kal SuKatompayeivy? yap mpos eva
Kal Wplop.evov 7) Tmpos TO KoWwdy" 6 yap jporyed@v
kal TUT adiKel TWA TOV wpropévwy, 6 Se p71)

a“ >
OTpaTevdjevos TO KOWOV. amavTwy 61) TOY adiKn-
pdtrwv Sinpnuevwr, Kal Tav pev OvyTwv mpos TO
‘ ~ \ \ a \ \ »” >
Kowov T&v d€ mpos aAAov Kai mpos GAdovs, ava-
AaPovres ti €ort TO adixetoOar, Aéeywpev Ta Aouad.
»” \ \ > Cal ‘ e \ c / \ a”
€ott 67) TO adiketafat TO bd EKdvTOs Ta adiKa
a ” ¢ 4
TaaXEW* TO yap adiKely WpLoTaL mpoTEpoY EKOUGLOV

® Antigone, 456.
> Of Elis, pupil of Gorgias. The oration is not extant, but

140

RHETORIC, I. xm. 2-5

tion nor agreement. between them. This is what
Antigone in Sophocles * evidently means, when she
declares that it is just, though forbidden, to bury
Polynices, as being naturally just :

For neither to-day nor yesterday, but from all eternity,
these statutes live and no man knoweth whence they came.

And as Empedocles says in regard to not killing that
which has life, for this is not right for some and
wrong for others,

But a universal precept, which extends without a break
throughout the wide-ruling sky and the boundless earth.

Alcidamas ® also speaks of this precept in his Messe-
niacus. . . . And in relation to persons, there is a
twofold division of law ; for what one ought to do or
ought not to do is concerned with the community
generally, or one of its members.

Therefore there are two kinds of just and unjust
acts, since they can be committed against a definite
individual or against the community ; he who com-
mits adultery or an assault is guilty of wrong against
a definite individual, he who refuses to serve in the
army of wrong against the State. All kinds of
wrong acts having been thus distinguished, some of
which affect the State, others one or several in-
dividuals, let us repeat the definition of being
wronged,’ and then go on to the rest. Being
wronged is to suffer injustice at the hands of one
who voluntarily inflicts it, for it has been established

the scholiast supplies his words: é\evOdpous adiKxe mdvras
Geds* ovdéva Sodd\ov H Piors wemroinxev (** God has left all
men free; Nature has made none a slave’). The Messen-
ians had revolted from Sparta.

#1. 10. .S,

141

ARISTOTLE

6 civar. eet 8 avadyKn Tov adicovpevov BAdmrecbat
Kat axovoiws BAdmrecbar, ai ev BAdBar e« Tov
/ / > A A > \ \ A
mpoTepov favepai eiow: ta yap ayaba Kat Ta
\ /, > e's yh / \ SE: ta
Kaka Sujpynta Kal?’ aira mpdoTepov, Kat Ta éxovowa,
7 > ‘ Ld 2 7 ov > > , / 4A
ToT. €oTw Goa elddTes. WoT avayKn TdvTa TO.
> / ”“ \ \ A ” \ \ oo”
eyKAnpata 7) mpos TO KoWOY 7) TpPOS TO LoLov elvat,
A. iene ~ HS Es / A 7
Kal 7 ayvoobyTos 7 AkovTos, 7) EkOvTOS Kal ElddTOS,
\ / \ \ / \ \ A /
Kal TOUTWY TA Ev TpoEAoMEvou Ta Sé Sid mAbs.
\ \ > ~ ¢ / > cal \ A
8 mept pev odv Ovpod pyOyjcerar ev Tots wept ta
a ~ A ~ ”
m7d0n, mota S€ mpoaipotvrat Kat ms €yxovres,
ElpyTar mporepov.
9 °Ezei 8° dpuodoyobvres moAddKis mempaxevar 34)
\ mi - # ) ¢ ~ a” \ “A \ 5 EM
1374a TO Emr’ypapyia. ody OpoAoyodow 7 mepl 6 TO ezi-
“ > / ‘
ypaypa, olov AaBeiy ev GAr’ od KAeyar, Kal 7a-
\ /
Tafa mporepov GAN’ ody bBpioa, Kat ovyyevécbar
~ ¢ ~
arr’ od porxedoar, 7 KAear adr’ ody tepoovAjaa
~ / A > >
(od yap Oeob ti), 7 emepydoacbar pev add’ od
~ ’ > >
Snudotav, 7) SietAdxOar ev Tots moAepious add’ od
~ ~ \ \ vd
mpododvar, dua tadra déou av Kal mepi rovTwr
, / / , 4 / , Ld
diwpicbar, Ti KAomH, Ti UBpis, Ti jovyeia, SmwWS
af ¢ 4 7 \ ¢ / r 4 0
édv te brdpyew edv te pr) Urdpyew BovAdpmeba
”

10 devxvivar, Exwpev eudhavilew To Sikaov. €or dé
/ \ ~ A ~ 10 > \ DA
mdvTa TA TOLADTA TEpl TOD AdiKov eivar Kal dadAov

~ ,
7) pe) AduKov 7 apdroByrnots* ev yap TH mpoaipecer
¢i6. % 4, 10.3. e ii. 2. @ i, 11, 12.
142

RHETORIC, I. xu. 6-10

that injustice is a voluntary act. And since the man
who suffers injustice necessarily sustains injury and
that against his will, it is evident from what has been
said in what the injuries consist; for things good
and bad have already been distinguished in them-
selves,” and it has been said that voluntary acts are
all such as are committed with knowledge of the
ease.” Hence it necessarily follows that all accusa-
tions concern the State or the individual, the accused
having acted either ignorantly and against his will,
or voluntarily and with knowledge, and in the latter
‘case with malice aforethought or from passion. We
will speak of anger when we come to treat of the
passions,° and we have already stated? in what
circumstances and with what dispositions men act
with deliberate purpose.

But since a man, while admitting the fact, often
denies the description of the charge or the point on
which it turns—for instance, admits that he took
something, but did not steal it; that he was the
first to strike, but committed no outrage ; that he
had relations, but did not commit adultery, with a
woman; or that he stole something but was not
guilty of sacrilege, since the object in question was
not consecrated ; or that he trespassed, but not on
public land; or that he held converse with the
enemy, but was not guilty of treason—for this reason
it will be necessary that a definition should be given
of theft, outrage, or adultery, in order that, if we
desire to prove that an offence has or has not been
committed, we may be able to put the case in a true
light. In all such instances the question at issue is
to know whether the supposed offender is a wrong-
doer and a worthless person, or not; for vice and

143

ARISTOTLE

¢ / \ A > a A \ ~ ~
n poxOnpia Kat To adiKetv, Ta Se Tovadra TeV
OVOLaTWY Tpoconmaiver THY Tmpoalpeow, olov UBpis
Kat KAomy: od yap ei emdrake, mavtws vBpicer,
aAN” el €vexd Tov, olov Tob drydoo exeivov 7
avTos jodjvac. ovde TdvTOs, el AdOpa eAaBev,
exhepev, GAN ei emt PAdBy Kal operepioud é éavTod.
opotes be Kal mepi Tov dAAwy exer, Worep Kal
mrepl TOUTW.

11 “Enei Se Tov duKaiwy Kal TOv adikwy Hv dvo
<td (ra pev yap. VEY poppeva ra oe dypaga) » mepl
Gv pev ot vopou dyopevovow clpn Tar, Tay s dypd-

12 dwy dvo early «idn: tabra 8° éori ra pev Kal?
c A > ~ ‘ / 27? > / \
drrepBoAny dperijs Kal Kaxias, ed ois oveldn Kal
emawvou Kal dryio kal TyLat al Swpeat, ofov
TO xdpw exew TO Tmoujoavre ed Kal avrevmoteiv
Tov ed TouoavTa Kal BonOyrucov elvat Tots pirous
Kal oo dAdo TOLADTA, TA be Too ‘tov vOWov Kal

13 YEYPApLLEevov eMetmpa. TO yap | eTTLELKES doKet

tcavov elvan, €or. d€ emierKés TO mapa TOV ve-
ypappevov vopov dikatov. ovpPBaiver dé TodTO TA
pev aKovTwy Ta O€ ExovTwy THV vopoleTar,
> , \ 7 / ¢ / > bi \
akovTwy prev Orav AdOn, éexdvTwy 8 Grav pH
, / > > > a ‘ /
Svvwrrar Siopica, GAN’ avayKatov pev 7 KaldAov
> ~ \ > /, > > : J A / ‘ 7
cimeiv, un) 4 S€, GAN’ ws emt TO OAV. Kal 60a

* Roemer reads, after Dittmeyer, ei érl Bd By [rovrou ag’
ob €\aBe] kal. . . from the old Latin translation.

> Laws are special and general, the former being written
or unwritten. The unwritten law, again, is of two kinds:
(1) general; (2) supplementary to the special written law.
This general law (not the same as the general law “ based
upon nature” § 2) refers to acts which go beyond the le :
standard of virtuous or vicious acts and are characterized

144

RHETORIC, I. xm. 10-13

wrongdoing consist in the moral purpose, and such
terms as outrage and theft further indicate purpose ;
for if a man has struck, it does not in all cases follow
that he has committed an outrage, but only if he
has struck with a certain object, for instance, to
bring disrepute upon the other or to please himself.
Again, if a man has taken something by stealth, it
is by no means certain that he has committed theft,
but only if he has taken it to injure another % or to
get something for himself. It is the same in all
other cases as in these.

We have said that there are two kinds of just and
unjust actions (for some are written, but others are
unwritten), and have spoken of those concerning
which the laws are explicit; of those that are un-
written there are two kinds. One kind arises from
an excess of virtue or vice, which is followed by
praise or blame, honour or dishonour, and rewards ;
for instance, to be grateful to a benefactor, to render
good for good, to help one’s friends, and the like ;?
the other kind contains what is omitted in the special
written law. For that which is equitable seems to
be just, and equity is justice that goes beyond the
written law. These omissions are sometimes in-
voluntary, sometimes voluntary, on the part of the
legislators ; involuntary when it may have escaped
their notice, voluntary when, being unable to define
for all cases, they are obliged to make a universal
statement, which is not applicable to all, but only
to most, cases; and whenever it is difficult to give
a remarkable degree («a0’ jrepPod7jv) of virtue or the opposite.
For these laws do not prescribe any special reward or punish-
ment, but acts are praised or blamed, honoured or dis-

honoured, rewarded or punished, in accordance with the
general feeling of mankind.

L 145

ARISTOTLE

\ e7 / > > / e ‘ ~
poy) paddvov Siopioar de \areipiav, olov 70 Tpaoat
ovdnpw mArikw Kal mote rut droAetmou yap av

146 alwyv SvapOmobvra. av ov adiéproTov, d€n

1374 b
15

16

17

18

19

de vopoberjoar, dvdynen amas elzretv, Gore Kav
Saxrvdvov EXwv ema pyrat TH Xeipa o) arden,
KaTa pev Tov YEYPapeLevov vojov evoxos €ore Kal
duce’, KATO. dé To Ceri ovK GOLKEl, Kal TO
ETTLELKES Tobro cori.

Ke 5 éorl TO elpn|cevov 70 ETLEeLKes, pavepov
motd ore TA EmleLKH Kal ovK emUeuh, Kal 7rotoL
ovK émueuceis dvOpwrou: ep ofs Te yap det ovy-
yvopnv exe, eTTLELK TH} rabra, Kad TO TA GpapTy-
para Kat TO. aduchara. Hq) TOD ioov agvoby, pnde
Ta aruxnpara éort oe druxnpara, pev 6 ooa Tapd.-
Aoya Kal p41) aaro _HoxOnpias, dpapTnyara, dé doa
pr mrapdhoya Kal p17) dr0 mrovnptas, dducnpara

€ doa pone mapddoya amo Tovnpias si eoriv:
Ta yap ov emBupiiay amo movnpias. Kal TO Tots
dvOperrrivous ovyywooKew eTTLEUKES. Kal TO pe)
mpos TOV vOpov anna Tpos TOV vopoberny oKoTretv,
Kal p1) ™pos TOV Aédyov ada, T™pos TIHV Sudvovay
Too vopoberov, Kab ay) Tpos wi mpagw aAAd. mpos
TH mpoaipeow, Kab [7) mpos TO [Lepos dAAd. mpos
TO ddov, pede motos Ts viv, aAAa motos Tis Hv
del ] Ws €mt TO TOAD. Kal TO puvnpovedew paMov
av émabev dyabey | H KaKav, kal ayabay av
émrafe paAdov 7) emoinaey. Kal TO dvexeobax
dducovpevor. Kal TO paNov Adyw €Odvew pee
veobar 7) epyw. Kal TO ets diauray padMov 7 a7 ets
dixnv BovrAcobar i€var: 6 yap SvaiTnTis TO emetkes

* ** Tnexperience ’’ (Jebb).

146

RHETORIC, I. xi. 13-19

a definition owing to the infinite number of cases,*
as, for instance, the size and kind of an iron instru-
ment used in wounding ; for life would not be long
enough to reckon all the possibilities. If then no
exact definition is possible, but legislation is neces-
sary, one must have recourse to general terms; so
that, if a man wearing a ring lifts up his hand to
strike or actually strikes, according to the written
law he is guilty of wrongdoing, but in reality he is
not ; and this is a case for equity.

If then our definition of equity is correct, it is
easy to see what things and persons are equitable
or not. Actions which should be leniently treated
are cases for equity ; errors, wrong acts, and mis-
fortunes, must not be thought deserving of the same
penalty. Misfortunes are all such things as are
unexpected and not vicious; errors are not unex-
pected, but are not vicious ; wrong acts are such as
might be expected and vicious, for acts committed
through desire arise from vice. And it is equitable
to pardon human weaknesses, and to look, not to
the law but to the legislator ; not to the letter of
the law but to the intention of the legislator ; not
to the action itself, but to the moral purpose ; not to
the part, but to the whole; not to what a man is
now, but to what he has been, always or generally ;
to remember good rather than ill treatment, and
benefits received rather than those conferred; to
bear injury with patience ; to be willing to appeal
to the judgement of reason rather than to violence ;°
to prefer arbitration to the law court, for the arbi-
trator keeps equity in view, whereas the dicast looks

>“ To be willing that a judicial sentence should be
nominal rather than real ”’ (Jebb).
147

ARISTOTLE

Cc. mm ¢ A A \ /, ‘ , Lid
Opa, 0 dé SiKxaoris Tov vouov: Kai rovrov evexa
dcaurntHs €dpéOn, Grws TO emueikes ioydn. mepl
Lev ody Tv emetkOv Siwpic0w tov Tpdaov Tobrov.
> a
14, "Adixnua dé petlov, dow av amd peilovos
> > , \ \ \ > / / a
7 aducias’ 610 Kal Ta eAdyioTra péyora, olov 6
MeAavwizrov KadXiotpatos Karnydpet, ort map-
edoyicato tpia HuwwBédAva tepd. tods vaotrotovs:
emt Stkatoovvys dé Tovvaytiov. €oT. S€ TadTa ek
~ / a
Tov evuTrapxew TH Suvdper: 6 yap Tplia TysvnBeua.
‘epa KAépas Kav dtiotv adiucjnoeev. ote prev 51)
4 \ a Ce > > ~ 4 ,
ovrw TO peilov, ote 8 ex tod BAdBous Kpiverac.
2Kal ob un eoTw ton Tyswpia, dAAa waoa eAdtTwr.
Kat od pH €oTw tao: xaAderov yap Kat advvarov.
Kal ob px €or Sixyny aBeiv tov mabdvra* aviarov
3 yap: 7 yap dikn Kal Kddaows tao. Kat et 6
A \ > \ ? \ ¢ A / > /
mabav Kat adiucnbets adbros abrov peydAws éKd-
Aacev’ Ett yap peilov. 6 Trowjoas Sdikatos KoAa-
~ e ~ e \ > la
aOivat, olov LodoxAs strep Edxripovos ovv-
nyopdv, emel améopagev éavrov dBpiobets, od
1375a Tysnoew edn eAdtToves 7) 0} 6 Tabay éavT@
~ >
4 €Tinoev. Kal 6 pdvos 7) mpOtos 7} per’ odAltywv
/
meToinkev. Kal TO ToAAdKis TO adTO apapTdavew
a ~ v4
péya. Kat du’ 6 av CyrnOH Kal cdpeOH Ta KwAvovTa
~ “~ > ba)
Kat Cnurobvra, ofov ev "Apyer Cnurodrar de? dv av

2 i.7. 13. Callistratus and Melanopus were rival orators.
Nothing is known of this particular charge.

» The magistrates who superintended the building and
repairing operations.

¢ Understanding iac@a. Or ‘to punish adequately,”
supplying 08 wi ton rimwpla. .

4 An orator, not the tragic poet.

¢ “ Or has been seldom paralleled ”’ (Cope, but ep. i. 9. 38).

148

RHETORIC, I. xin. 19—xrv. 4

only to the law, and the reason why arbitrators were
appointed was that equity might prevail. Let this
manner of defining equity suffice.

14. Wrong acts are greater in proportion to the
injustice from which they spring. For this reason |

the most trifling are sometimes the greatest, as in the
charge brought by Callistratus * against Melanopus
that he had fraudulently kept back three consecrated

half-obols from the temple-builders ®; whereas, in )

the case of just actions, it is quite the contrary. The
reason is that the greater potentially inheres in the
less ; for he who has stolen three consecrated half-
obols will commit any wrong whatever. Wrong acts
are judged greater sometimes in this way, sometimes
by the extent of the injury done. A wrong act is
greater when there is no adequate punishment for
it, but all are insufficient ; when there is no remedy,
because it is difficult if not impossible to repair it ; °
and when the person injured cannot obtain legal
satisfaction, since it is irremediable ; for justice and
punishment are kinds of remedies. And if the
sufferer, having been wronged, has inflicted some
terrible injury upon himself, the guilty person de-
serves greater punishment; wherefore Sophocles,@
when pleading on behalf of Euctemon, who had
committed suicide after the outrage he had suffered,
declared that he would not assess the punishment at

less than the victim had assessed it for himself. A’
wrong act is also greater when it is unprecedented, —

or the first of its kind, or when committed with the

aid of few accomplices’; and when it has been fre- _)

quently committed ; or when because of it new pro-
hibitions and penalties have been sought and found:
thus, at Argos the citizen owing to whom a new

149

—"

ARISTOTLE

'é 0A \ Ps) > “A \ 8 / > 5
vomwos TEAH Kat du’ ots TO Seopwripiov @kodo-
A Cal
5 uno. Kat TO OnpiwwddoTepov adiknua petlov.
\ “a > , ~ ‘ a ¢ > 4
Kal 0 eK mpovoias paAAov. Kai 6 of aKovovTes
lot a “ 9 ~ \ A \ c /,
poBobvrat waddAov 7) eAcodow. Kal Ta wev pyTopiKa
> ~ a A > / / a“ ¢€
€oTt Tovadra, OTe moAAa avipynKke Sikara 7 dTEp-
/ e Ld A, / > ,
BéBnxev, ofov dpxovs de€vas miorers emvyapias*
~ \ > / ¢ /, \ be ~
6 moAAY yap aducnpdarwr trepoxyy. Kal TO evtadla
«& / ¢ > ~ ov ~ «
od KoAdlovra of dd.ixodvres, Step ToLvotow ot
yevdopaptupobytes’ Tot yap ovK av aoiKnoELEV,
” be a“ , \ 2.92 > ,
el ye Kal ev TH SuxaorTnpiw; Kai ed ols aicytvy
pdAwora. Kal ei totrov bd’ od eb mémovber
, \ > a 4 ~ a \@ >
mAciw yap adiKel, OTL TE KAK@S ToLel Kal OTL OVK
= 1a N . » , > , \
70. Kal 6 mapa Ta aypada Sixava* apeivovos yap
A > > / / s A \ Ls
py Sv avayKny Sikatov elvat. Ta ev odv yeypap-
péva e& avayKyns, Ta 8 aypada ov. aAdov de
/ > \ \ / ¢ ‘ \ A
TpoTrov, ei Tapa Ta ‘yeypaypeva’ 6 yap Ta PpoPepa
> ~ \ \ >? / \ A A > /,
aduk@v Kat ta emily. Kal Ta por) emlypwa
> , v \ \ /- LO , /
ddukynoeevy av. epi ev odv adiKHmaTos pLeilovos
\ > 4 ”
Kat €AdtTovos eipnTar.
15. Ilepi 5€ trav aréyvwv Kadovpévwv micrewv
> / , > ~ > / > a wy A
exopevov €oTe TOV cipnwevwy emdpapetv: Ova yap
¢

Ro ~ ~ > \ \ / ‘ > ,
2 adrat TOv Suxavixdv. elot de wevte Tov apiOpov,

@ And therefore the violation of them is more discreditable.
>» When he thinks of the punishment they may entail.

150

RHETORIC, I. xiv. 4—xv. 2

law has been passed, is punished, as well as those on
whose account a new prison had to be built. The
crime is greater, the more brutal it is; or when it has
been for a long time premeditated ; when the recital
of it inspires terror rather than pity. Rhetorical tricks
of the following kind may be used :—the statement
that the accused person has swept away or violated
several principles of justice, for example, oaths,
pledges of friendship, plighted word, the sanctity of
marriage ; for this amounts to heaping crime upon
crime. Wrong acts are greater when committed
in the very place where wrongdoers themselves are
sentenced, as is done by false witnesses ; for where
would a man not commit wrong, if he does so in a
court of justice? They are also greater when accom-
panied by the greatest disgrace; when committed
against one who has been the guilty person’s bene-
factor, for in that case, the wrongdoer is guilty of
wrong twice over, in that he not only does wrong, but,
does not return good for good. So too, again, when
a man offends against the unwritten laws of right,
for there is greater merit in doing right without being
compelled“; now the written laws involve compulsion,
the unwritten do not. Looked at in another way,
wrongdoing is greater, if it violates the written laws ;
for a man who commits wrongs that alarm him ? and
involve punishment, will be ready to commit wrong
for which he will not be punished. Let this suffice
for the treatment of the greater or less degree of
wrongdoing.

15. Following on what we have just spoken of, we
have now briefly to run over what are called the
inartificial proofs, for these properly belong to forensic
oratory. These proofs are five in number: laws,

151

ARISTOTLE

3 voor paprupes ovvOAKar Bacavor dpKos. mp@Tov
fev odv Tepl vouwy eimwpev, TAs YpnoTéov Kal
TMpoTpéeTovTA Kal GTroTpeTOVTA Kal KaTYYyOpObVTAa

4 Kat amoAoyovpevov. davepov yap OT, eay prev
evavTios Ho VEY Papipevos TO mpdypart, TH KOWD
vou Xpnareov Kal Tots émrueuceow ws “Bucato~

5 Tépots. Kal OTe TO yvopy TH apiory Toor cori,

670 pr) tavTeAds yphoba Tois yeypappevois. Kal
OTL TO pev emerKes Gel prever Kal OvdETOTE peETAa-
Barrer, 088’ 6 Kowds (kara piow yap €orw), ot
de YEYPAppEVvoL moAAdKis: dbev elpyrat Ta ev TH
LopoxAcouvs “Avruyovy: amoAoyetrat yap Oru eBaipe
mapa Tov Tod Kpéovros vopov, aAX’ od mapa Tov

aypadov*
1875 b od ydp Tt viv ye KaxBes, GAN dei more .. .
a > > > 4A > ” > ‘ > /
Tabr’ otv eyw ovK eucdAov avdpos ovdevdes.

x’ \ / / > > / \ /
TKat Ore TO Sixadv éeorw adnbés Ti Kal ovpdépov,
GAN’ od 76 SoKody: wor’ od vdmos 6 yeypappevos”
od yap movet TO Epyov TO Tod vowov' Kal Ort

Ld
@omrep apyvpoyvwopwv 6 KpiTIis eoTw, Omws
/ \ / , \ \ > /, ‘
takpivn TO KiBdnAov Sikatov Kal TO aAnOés. Kal
bid / > A A a > / ” a
Ort BeAriovos avdpos TO Tots aypagou: Tots
9 YEYpapupLevors xpjola Kat eupevery. Kad et mov
evayTtos vow evdoxyodvTL 7) Kal avros abr@:
olov eviore o pev KeAcver KUpia elvar arr av

oo
o77]

* Although the use of inartificial proofs is almost entirely
confined to forensic oratory, they may be used in deliberative
oratory.

» The first line is quoted i. 13. 2. The second differs
somewhat from Sophocles (Antigone, 458), where the passage
runs, TovTwy éyw ovK Eueddov, dvdpds ovdevds | Ppdynua Seloac’, év
Geoicr Thy Sixnv | Sdoew (I was not likely, through fear of the

152

RHETORIC, I. xv. 3-9

witnesses, contracts, torture, oaths. Let us first then
speak of the laws, and state what use should be made
of them when exhorting or dissuading,* accusing or
defending. For it is evident that, if the written law
is counter to our case, we must have recourse to
the general law and equity, as more in accordance
with justice; and we must argue that, when the dicast
takes an oath to decide to the best of his judgement,
he means that he will not abide rigorously by the
written laws ; that equity is ever constant and never
changes, even as the general law, which is based on
nature, whereas the written laws often vary (this
is why Antigone in Sophocles justifies herself for
having buried Polynices contrary to the law of
Creon, but not contrary to the unwritten law :

For this law is not of now or yesterday, but is eternal . . .
this I was ‘not likely [to infringe through fear of the pride]
of any man);?
and further, that justice is real and expedient, but
not that which only appears just; nor the written
law either, because it does not do the work of the
law’; that the judge is like an assayer of silver,
whose duty is to distinguish spurious from genuine
justice ; that it is the part of a better man to make
use of and abide by the unwritten rather than the
written law.? Again, it is necessary to see whether
the law is contradictory to another approved law or
to itself; for instance, one law enacts that all con-

pride of any man, to incur the penalty for violating these
statutes at the bar of heaven’’).

¢ Which is the administration of real justice, not that
which appears to the legislator to be such and is embodied
in legal enactments.
4 Cp, 14. 7 above.

153

ARISTOTLE

~ ¢ > > 7 A / \
owdvra, 6 8 amayopever pp) ovvTiecbar mapa
\ , \ > > / 7 / ‘
10 Tov vopuov. Kat ef apdiBodros, wWoTe oTpedew Kal
can 27? ¢ / A > \ an“ \ , >
opav ed’ dmotépay Thy aywyiv 7 TO dSixaov ep-
11 appoce: 7) TO ovpdépov, eira TovTw yphafar. Kal
el Ta prev Tpaypata ed’ ols ér€On 6 vomos pnKeTL
pever, 0 Oe vOLLos, qretpareov TooTO Sndobv kal
12 pdxecba Tavrn mpos TOV VOHOV. eav be 6 Ys5
Ypappevos 7 mpos TO mpayya, 76 TE youn Th
apiory Aekréov 6 OTL ov Tob mapa Tov vojov evexa
Sucd lew eoriv, ard’ iva, €av dyvonan Th A€yet 6
lod v7 x) ~
VOMos, [7) ETLopKH. Kal OTL od TO aTADs ayalov
¢ Cal is) / iAAG A ¢ nn \ i Bde
aipetrar oddeis, GAAd ro abr@. Kal drv ovdev
Svageper 7 n pa Ketobat 7) Y py) xpiobar. Kal OTu ev
Tats das TéXvaUs od AvoireAc? mapacogilecbat
Tov iatpov: od yap tocodto BAdmTer 1 dpapria
Tob tarpod OGov TO ilecbar ameeiy TH apxovTt.
Kal ort TO Tov vo pov codwrepov lyreiy elvat,
Toor’ €oTiv é ev Tots emrawwovpevors vopous amayo-
peveTar. Kal Trepl ev TOY vouwrv ovTw Siwpicbw.
13 [lept 5é€ papripwv, pdptupés eiou dirroi, of
\ \ ¢ \ / \ 4, c \
prev traAaol ot dé mpdadaror, Kal TovTwy ot pev
peréxovtes Tod Kwdtvov ot 8 éxrds. A€yw Se
aA \ \ / MS \ Lud HAA
maAavovs pev Tovs Te TolnTas Kal dowv aAdwv
yrepipoov etal Kpigeus pavepat, olov "AOnvaior
“Opjpw pedprupe EXpHoavTo mept Ladapivos Kal
Tevédior evayyos llepudvipw +r Kopwiiw mpos

@ Alas 3 éx Dadapivos dyev Svoxaldexa vijas, | orjce 6’ dywr ty’
"AOnvalwy toravro pddaryyes, Iliad, ii. 557-8. The Lacedae-
monians, acting as arbitrators between Athens and Megara,
who were fighting for the possession of Salamis, decided in
favour of Athens on the strength of the two lines in the /liad,
which were taken to show that Salamis belonged to Athens.

154

RHETORIC, I. xv. 9-13

tracts should be binding, while another forbids
making contracts contrary to the law. If the mean-
ing of the law is equivocal, we must turn it about,
and see in which way it is to be interpreted so as to
suit the application of justice or expediency, and
have recourse to that. If the conditions which led
to the enactment of the law are now obsolete, while
the law itself remains, one must endeavour to make
this clear and to combat the law by this argument.
But if the written law favours our case, we must say
that the oath of the dicast “‘ to decide to the best of
his judgement ”’ does not justify him in deciding
contrary to the law, but is only intended to relieve
him from the charge of perjury, if he is ignorant of
the meaning of the law; that no one chooses that
which is good absolutely, but that which is good for
himself; that there is no difference between not
using the laws and their not being enacted ; that in
the other arts there is no advantage in trying to be
wiser than the physician, for an error on his part
does not do so much harm as the habit of disobeying
the authority ; that to seek to be wiser than the
laws is just what is forbidden in the most approved
laws. Thus much for the laws.

Witnesses are of two kinds, ancient and recent; of
the latter some share the risk of the trial, others are
outside it. By ancient I mean the poets and men
of repute whose judgements are known to all; for
instance, the Athenians, in the matter of Salamis,
appealed to Homer ® as a witness, and recently the
inhabitants of Tenedos to Periander of Corinth ?

It was reported that the second line was the invention of

Solon.
> Tt is not known to what this refers.

155

ARISTOTLE

Luyevets. kal Kreopdv xara Kpiriov rots LéAw-
vos €deyelous éxpioato, A€ywv dre maAat doeAyrjs
7 oixia* od yap av mote émroinae LoAwv

wn g
elmreiv prot Kpuria uppotpiye matpos axovew.

an ~ 4,
14 mrept ev odv TOY yevowevwv of Tovwodror wapTupes,
1376a rept de THv eoopevwv Kal of xpnopodrdyot, ofov

15

16

OcuroToKAfs, ote vavpaxyynréov, Td EvAwov Tetxos
id ”

A€yov. €tt Kal ai mapomiar, womep e€ipynTat,
\ a
paprup.a €oriv: ofov et tis oupBovdAedver pi) Tovet-

a /,
aba pidrov yépovta, TovTw papTupel 7) Tapoynia,

4 > Ss 5 ,
pymor €b Epdew yépovra.
Kat TO Tovs viods avaipeiv By Kal TOds TaTEpas,
v4 “A / / a /
vamos Os TaTépa KTElvas Taidas KaTaAeizet.
/ > id 7 , ,

IIpécharor 8 door yrdpysol tt Kexpixacw*
Xpyjoyor yap at tovtwy Kpiceis Trois mept Tov
> ~ > ~ e a > a
avT@v apudioBynrotow: oiov EvBovAos év ois
ducacrypiow éexpyjoato Kata Xdpnros 6 IAdrwv
ele mpos “ApxiBiov, ote éemidédwxev ev TH moAE
TO Opmodoyeiv Tovnpods «iva. Kal ot peTéxovTes
~ tA an / , ¢c A >
Tob Kwdvvov, dv dd€wor pevdecbar. of pev odv
ToLoOvTOL THY ToLwovTwWY jdvov papTUpEes Elaw, Et

« (Frag. 22, P.L.G. ii, where the line runs, elréuevac
Kpiria favOdrpxe marpds dxovew). The Critias attacked by
Cleophon is the well-known oligarch and grandson of the
first. Cleophon argued from the phrase ** bid him listen to
his father” that his ancestor was a disobedient son and a
degenerate. In reality, Solon had a high opinion of the
family, and probably meant to praise the father.

® Herodotus, vii. 141.

¢ They have not been mentioned before. Spengel would
therefore omit elpnra, and remove the commas: “ proverbs
are, as it were, evidence.”

156

RHETORIC, I. xv. 13-16

against the Sigeans. Cleophon also made use of the
elegiacs of Solon against Critias, to prove that his
family had long been notorious for licentiousness,
otherwise Solon would never have written :

Bid me the fair-haired Critias listen to his father.¢

One should appeal to such witnesses for the past,
but also to interpreters of oracles for the future ;
thus, for instance, Themistocles interpreted the
wooden wall to mean that they must fight at sea.
Further, proverbs, as stated,° are evidence; for
instance, if one man advises another not to make a
friend of an old man, he can appeal to the proverb,

Never do good to an old man.

And if he advises another to kill the children, after
having killed the fathers, he can say,

Foolish is he who, having killed the father, suffers the
children to live.@

By recent witnesses I mean all well-known persons
who have given a decision on any point, for their
decisions are useful to those who are arguing about
‘similar cases. Thus, for instance, Eubulus,¢ when
attacking Chares in the law courts, made use of what
Plato said against Archibius, namely, “ that the open
confession of wickedness had increased in the city.”
And those who share the risk of the trial, if they
are thought to be perjurers. Such witnesses only
serve to establish whether an act has taken place or

4 From the Cypria of Stasinus, of the ** epic cycle.”

* Opponent of Demosthenes. Chares was an Athenian
commander, both naval and military. Nothing is known
of Archibius. Plato is probably the comic poet.

157

ARISTOTLE

/ nn /, > ”“ / \ \ ~ Cal >
yéyovev } uy, el CoTw 7 pH, TEept Se TOU Totov ov
, e > , ~ » > ,
pedptupes, olov ei Sikavov 7 aduKov, et aupdepov
“”“ > 7 ¢ > + \ \ /
177 daovudopov' ot 8 admwilev Kat epi TovTwy
/ /, > ¢ , > /
mioTOTATOL. TmLoTOTAaTOL & ot maAaot- adiahOopor
~ /
yap. moTwdpata dé mept papTupidv papTupas
ev pr) €xovte, OT ek Tav cikdTwv Set Kpivew Kal
ToT €oTl TO yuwmpn TH aploTrn, Kal dre odK EoTW
eararhioa Ta «ikoTa emi dpyupiw, Kal OTe ody
dAiokerar Ta elKOTA yevdowapTupL@v. ExovTt de
>
mpos pi) €xovTa, OTL ody UrdduKa TA €lKdTa, Kal
Ld > \ n“ ” ~ > > ~ /
Ott ovoev av der paptupidy, ei ex T&v Adywv
¢ \ +2 ~ > \ \ e / ec
18 txavov tv Oewphoa. «iol d€ at paprupiar at
pev mept adrod ai d€ wept tod apdioPyrodvtos,
Kal at pev mepl Tod mpdypatos at de mept Tod
* Ld \ id > / > > ~
nOovs, wore pavepov Ort oddéToT EBTW aTophoat
paptupias xpnoipns: «¢ pt) yap Kara ToD mpdy-
~ ~ >
patos 7) avt@ opodroyounerys TO apdroBy-—
~ Ps / > \ A ~ » ” > ~ >
toovrT. evavtias, aAAa tepi Tod nOovs H adrov eis
emueikevav 1) TOO audicByrobdvros «is havAdryra.
19 ra, 8 ddAa epi pdaptupos 7 didov 7 ExOpod 7
uA ”“ > ~ ”“ > ~ ” ,
pera€v, 7) edvdoKodvros 7 adokobyros 7 pmeTakv,
a U ~ ~
Kat doar aAAa Tovatrar diadhopat, ex TOV adbr@v
\
Tomwy Aextéov €€ olwvrep Kal ta evOupynpara
déyomev.
\ \ ~ ~ 4 a / ~
20 Tlepi d€ rHv ovvOnKav tocavry Tob Adyou xpAj-
/ > Ld »” ”“ a \ A
1376 b ols €oTw aov avfew 7 Kalaipeiv 7] mLoTAs ToLEty

@ Or, ** witnesses wholly unconnected with the case.”
158

RHETORIC, I. xv. 16-20

not, whether it is or is not the case; but if it is a
question of the quality of the act, for instance,
whether it is just or unjust, expedient or inexpedient,
they are not competent witnesses; but witnesses
from a distance “ are very trustworthy even in regard
to this. But ancient witnesses are the most trust-
worthy of all, for they cannot be corrupted. In
regard to the confirmation of evidence, when a man
has no witnesses, he can say that the decision should
be given in accordance with probabilities, and that
this is the meaning of the oath “ according to the
best of one’s judgement ” ; that probabilities cannot
be bribed to deceive, and that they cannot be con-
victed of bearing false witness. But if a man has
witnesses and his adversary has none, he can say that
probabilities incur no responsibility, and that there
would have been no need of evidence, if an investiga-
tion according, to the arguments were sufficient.
Evidence partly concerns ourselves, partly our ad-
versary, as to the fact itself or moral character ; so
that it is evident that one never need lack useful
evidence. For, if we have no evidence as to the fact
itself, neither in confirmation of our own case nor
against our opponent, it will always be possible to
obtain some evidence as to character that will
establish either our own respectability or the worth-
lessness of our opponent. As for all the other
questions relative to a witness, whether he is a friend,
an enemy, or neutral, of good or bad or middling
reputation, and for all other differences of this kind,
we must have recourse to the same topics as those
from which we derive our enthymemes.

As for contracts, argument may be used to the
extent of magnifying or minimizing their importance,

159

21

22

23

24

25

ARISTOTLE

Bi a ue 2\ \ 92 A Coe \ au
} amlorous, eav pev abt@ brapywor, moTas K
, ~ ~ , :
kuplas, emt d€ tod apdioByrodvtos todvavtiov.
/
mpos pev odv TO TOTS 7) amiaToUs KaTacKevalew
~ la
ovoev duaddéper Tis mepl Tovs papTupas mpay-
parelas* Omoior yap dv Twes Wow ot emvyeypap-
A ,
pevor 7) pvddrrovres, TovToLs at ovvOijKar TOTAL
ciow. oporoyouvperns 8 elvac THs avvOyKns,
\ /
oikelas prev ovons av&nréov: 7 yap avvOnKn vomos
€otw idios Kal KaTd pépos, Kal at ev ovvOjKat
od mrotodot Tov vopov KUpiov, of Sé vopmor Tas KaTa
/
Tov vopov ovOyKas. Kal dAws adros 6 vomos
a >
owOnKn Tis eoTlv, WoTe Gots amore 7 avatpel
a * /
auvOnKnv, Tods vopmous avaipet. €Tt S€ mparTe-
Tat TA TOAAG TOV cuvaddrAaypaTwr Kal Ta ExovoLa
>
Kata ovvOrjKas, WoTe akipwv yryhopevav avat-
petra 1% mpos aAAjAovs xpeia ta&v avOpmrwv.
\ s \ @ c / > Lond > a ”
Kat TaAAa dé Goa apyorrer, emumodfs idely €oTw.
” > > / 4g \ A ~ > 7
av 8 évaytia 4 Kal pera TOV apdiaByTovvTwr,
a /
Tp@Tov Lev, Grrep adv Tis mods VOmov EevayTiov Ma-
yécaito, Ta00’ dpyorrer: aromov yap €t Tots jev
, ”“ \ > ~ / s > > > /
vopots, av pn opO@s Keiwevor. Bow aAXr eEapdp-
¢ / > / ~ /

Twow of TWéwevor, odk olducba Sev meiPeoPa,
lal \ / > a tae ~ /
rais 5€ ovvO7jKais dvaykatov. «0 dr rob SiKatov

” ~ /
eotl BpaBevris 6 Sikaoris* ovKovv ToOTO OkETTEOY,
> > ¢ / \ A \ , > ”
GAN ws SixadTepov. Kal TO ev Sixavov OvVK EOTL

/ ” > > / v9 > 4, \
peraotpéat ovr andry ov avdykyn (mepuKos
a ‘ >
yap é€otw), ovvOjKar Sé ylyvovrar Kat e€arary-
\ U4
Oévrwv Kal davayxacbevtwy. mpos Se TovTos
160

RHETORIC, I. xv. 20-25

of proving that they do or do not deserve credit.
If we have them on our side, we must try to prove
them worthy of credit and authoritative ; but if they
are on the side of our opponent, we must do the
opposite. In view of rendering them worthy or
unworthy of credit, the method of procedure is
exactly the same as in the case of witnesses; for
contracts are trustworthy according to the character
of their signatories or depositaries. When the exist-
ence of the contract is admitted, if it is in our favour,
we must strengthen it by asserting that the contract
is a law, special and partial; and it is not the con-
tracts that make the law authoritative, but it is the
laws that give force to legal contracts. And in a
general sense the law itself is a kind of contract, so
that whoever disobeys or subverts a contract, sub-
verts the laws. Further, most ordinary and _ all
voluntary transactions are carried out according to
contract ; so that if you destroy the authority of
contracts, the mutual intercourse of men is destroyed.
All other arguments suitable to the occasion are easy
to see. But if the contract is against us and in
favour of our opponents, in the first place those
arguments are suitable which we should oppose to
the law if it were against us ; that it would be strange
if, while we consider ourselves entitled to refuse to
obey ill-made laws, whose authors have erred, we
should be obliged to consider ourselves always bound
by contracts. Or, that the judge is the dispenser of
justice ; so that it is not the contents of the contract
that he has to consider, but what is juster. Further,
that one cannot alter justice either by fraud or
compulsion, for it is based upon nature, whereas
contracts may be entered into under both conditions.

M 161

26

1377 a

ARISTOTLE

oKkorreiv ei evaytia eoTi Twi 7) TOV yeypappevev
vow 7 T&v Kowdv, Kal TOV yeypaypevwv 7

a > / “ a > / ” a eae
Tots oikelois 7% Tots dAAoTplois, Emevta €f aAAats
ovvOjKats baTépats 7) mpoTépais’ 7) yap at Vorepat

‘2 > > /
KUptat, aKupot 8 ai mpdrepat, 7) at mporepat oplai,
ai 8 vorepar jratyKacw, OmoTépws av % xpH-

4 lon ~
oysov. ere dé TO cupdéepov Opay, el wy evavTiobrat
Tots Kpitats, Kal doa GAXa Tovabra: Kal yap TadTa
edlewpnta opoiws.

ec \ / / , > »” \

Ai d5€ Baoavor paprupiac twés elow, Exew de
dokoto. TO moTdv, STL avayKn Tis TMpdoceoTW.
ovKouv xaderrov ovd€ epi ToUTWwY Eimeivy TA EvdE~

/ a
xopeva, €€ dv édv te trdpywow oiketar avew
€oTw, OTe ddnfeis povar tov poaptupid@v eiolv
avdrau edv te brevavtTiac Mou Kal peta TOD apyde-

~ , EA > ~ / >
oByrotvros, Suadvor av tis tadAnbH Aéywv Kal
oe ~ / ~ / 2O\ \
dAov tot yévous trav Bacdvwv: oddey yap Hrrov
> / A 87 Ve n LA 6A ‘
avaykalopuevoe Ta pevdh Adyovow 7} TadnOR, Kai
duakapTepotvres pu) Adyew TadAnOA, Kal padiws
a a 34
Katapevdopevo, ws mavadpuevor. OGrrov. Set 6
éxew emavapepew emi roatra yeyevnpeva Trapa-
val / *;
delypata & ioacw of Kpivovres. Set dé A€yew ws
>? } aa | > a ¢ /, \ A \
otk eiolv adnfeis at Bdoavor- moddol pev yap
a a *
maxvppoves, Kat Av0ddSeppor Kal rats puyxais ovres
~ a e
duvarol yevvaiws éyKaprepoto. trais avdyKais, ot

A r A \ HA a A lol A > 4, is cal

d¢ devAol Kal edAaBeis mpo Tot Tas avayKas Wety
~ ~ A >
avt@v Karalappotow, wore ovdev eoTL TLOTOV EV
Baodvous.*

1 This passage [det 5° éxew . ... Bacdvors], which is found
in the best (Paris. A*) ms., is now generally rejected, mainly
as being linguistically un-Aristotelian.

162

RHETORIC, I. xv. 25-26

In addition to this, we must examine whether the
contract is contrary to any written law of our own
or foreign countries, or to any general law, or to
other previous or subsequent contracts. For either
the latter are valid and the former not, or the former
are right and the latter fraudulent ; we may put it
in whichever way it seems fit. We must also con-
sider the question of expediency—whether the con-
tract is in any way opposed to the interest of the
judges. There are a number of other arguments of
the same kind, which are equally easy to discern.

Torture is a kind of evidence, which appears
trustworthy, because a sort of compulsion is attached
to it. Nor is it difficult to see what may be said
concerning it, and by what arguments, if it is in our
favour, we can exaggerate its importance by assert-
ing that it is the only true kind of evidence ; but if
it is against us and in favour of our opponent, we
can destroy its value by telling the truth about all
kinds of torture generally ; for those under com-
pulsion are as likely to give false evidence as true,
some being ready to endure everything rather than
tell the truth, while others are equally ready to make
false charges against others, in the hope of being
sooner released from torture. It is also necessary
to be able to quote actual examples of the kind with
which the judges are acquainted. It may also be
said that evidence given under torture is not true ;
for many thick-witted and thick-skinned persons, and
those who are stout-hearted heroically hold out under
sufferings, while the cowardly and cautious, before
they see the sufferings before them, are bold enough ;
wherefore evidence from torture may be considered
utterly untrustworthy.

163

ARISTOTLE

27 Ilepit 8 dpxwv tetpayds eorr Suedeiv: 7 yap
didwor Kat AapPdver, 7 oddérepov, 7 TO pev TO

> * \ / ” / \ > /

8’ ov, Kal tovTwv 7 didwor pev od} AapBaver Se,

”“ / \ / > * ” ” \

7 AapBaver pev Sidwor 8 ov. Etc GAAws Tapa
Tatra, <€¢ duwpoora: odtos 7 ba adbtod H Um
28 exeivov. od didwot pev ovdv, OTL padiws émop-—
Kovow, Kal dudT. 6 prev ofocas ovK amodiowot,
Tovs O€ p17) GudcavTos oleTar KaTaduKdoeW. Kal
Ws obTos 6 Kivduvos KpeitTwY O év Tois SiuKaoTais*

A ~ >
29 Tots prev yap morever TH SB ov. od AapPaver 9’,
OTL avTl xypnudtwy GpKos. Kal OTL et hv PaddAos,
KATWELOCATO av? KpEeiTToV yap Eevekad Tov dadAov
elvar 7) pndevds’ Gudcas pev ody eer, 7) Opocas
> + Ad A > > \ ” ” 3 > > 22
5’ ov. ovrtw dé du’ dperny av ein, GAN od dv
emuopkiav TO pn. Kal TO TOO Zevodavovs appor-—
Tel, OTL ovK lon mpdKAnois avTn doeBet mpos
> ~ > > ¢< / \ > > A > ~ / ~
evoeBH, GAN’ dpuoia Kal et loyupos acer maragau
30 mAnytvar mpoxaddoaito. ei Sé AapPdver, dre
~ \

mioTevet adTa, exeiv~w 5° ov. Kal TO TOD Hevo-
‘
ddvovs petaotpebavra dharéov ottws taov elvat
nn c \ > \ ~ ¢ > > \ > ‘s / .
av 6 pev aoeBis 618, 6 8 evtoeBhs ouvdy: Sewov

4 In Attic legal procedure, the challenge (apé«Anots) to take —
an oath on the question at issue was one method of deciding it. —
One party offered the other something to swear by (é/6wou—
8pxov), this being the real meaning of épxos, and the other
party either accepted (AauBdver, déxerar) it or refused it.
Both parties, of their own accord, might propose to take —
the oath.

> There are three reasons for not tendering the oath: (1)
men are always ready to perjure themselves, if they are—
likely to benefit by doing so; (2) if your adversary takes the |
oath, he will decline to pay, trusting that he will be acquitted,
whereas, if he is not on his oath, he will probably be con-—
demned ; (3) there is less risk in leaving the decision to the”
dicasts, who can be trusted. |

164

g
i
:
j
j
)
”

RHETORIC, I. xv. 27-30

As to oaths 4 four divisions may be made ; for either
we tender an oath and accept it, or we do neither,
or one without the other, and in the last case we
either tender but do not accept, or accept but do
not tender. Besides this, one may consider whether
the oath has already been taken by us or by the
other party. If you do not tender the oath to the
adversary, it is because men readily perjure them-
selves, and because, after he has taken the oath, he
will refuse to repay the money, while, if he does
not take the oath, you think that the dicasts will
condemn him; and also because the risk incurred
in leaving the decision to the dicasts is preferable,
for you have confidence in them, but not in your
adversary.” If you refuse to take the oath yourself,
you may argue that the oath is only taken with a
view to money ; that, if you had been a scoundrel, you
would have taken it at once, for it is better to be a
scoundrel for something than for nothing; that, if
you take it, you will win your case, if not, you will
probably lose it ; consequently, your refusal to take
it is due to moral excellence, not to fear of committing
perjury. And the apophthegm of Xenophanes ° is
apposite—that “it is unfair for an impious man to
challenge a pious one,” for it is the same as a strong
man challenging a weak one to hit or be hit. If you
accept the oath, you may say that you have con-
fidence in yourself, but not in your opponent, and,
reversing the apophthegm of Xenophanes, that the
only fair way is that the impious man should tender
the oath and the pious man take it; and that it

¢ Born at Colophon in Asia Minor, he migrated to Elea
in Italy, where he founded the Eleatic school of philosophy.

165

ARISTOTLE

\ \ , a
Te TO pn Oédew adrov, dep dv exeivovs a&.ot

31 oudoavras Sixdlew. ed 52 SiSwow, Gre evoeBes
TO Dédew trois Oeois émitpémew, Kal Ste oddSev Set

avrov dAkwy xpitdv Setoba: abt@ yap SiSwor

/ \
32 Kpivew. Kal Ore dtomov TO pa) Oédrew spuvdvar
\ e ” > a > 4
mept wv addovs abot ouvivar.
> \ A 5 ~ ~ \
Eei d€ Kal exacrov SHAov m&s Aekréov, Kal
/ ~ ~
ouvdvalouevov mas Aexréov SfAov: ofov et adbrés
\ ,
pev Oéder Aap Bdvew Si8dvar S€ pr}, Kal ei Sidwor
\ 4
pev AapBdvew dé pr) Oddrer, Kai ei AapBdvew Kal
77 b 5 5 / 0 aN ” § 7 Z > \ ~ > ta
1377 b Ovdovar HéAex etre undérepov: ek yap TOV eipnwevwy
> / Pal > "s
avaykn ovyKetabar, wote Kal Tods Adyous avayKy
ovyKeicbar ex TOV cipnucvav. édv dé Hh yeyern-
/ “~ /
Bévos bm’ adrob Kal évavtios, drt od émvopKia*
Exovovov yap TO aduxeiv, TO 8 emiopKety aduKedy
2 , \ \ , AP , > , > ~ s
33 €or, Ta Oe Bia Kal amdtyn axovova. evTadOa ovv
~ ~ 7
OvwvakTéov Kal TO emopKely, OTL EoTL TO TH Svavoia,
> > > ~ / 2A \ ~ > / 3
aA’ od rH orduart. dv 5€ TH avTwWikw 7 opw-
a ¥
foopevos, OTe TavTa avaipel 6 pi) emevww ols
apocev ia yap Tobro Kal Tots vopois ypa@vrat
> / \ cc e n~ A > ~ > 7,
OmocavTes. Kal “dyads pev dkwodow éeppeverv
4 / b \ > ? ? / ”
ois Gudcarres Sixdlere, adtoi 8 odK eupevovow.
\ A >
Kal doa av dAXda avéwv tis elmevev. mept ev odv
Tov atéxvwv mictewv cipjolw Tooadra.

« The defence in such cases is: (1) that the previous oath
was taken as the result of fraud or compulsion; (2) that you
did not mean what you said.

166

RHETORIC, I. xv. 30-33

would be monstrous to refuse to take the oath
yourself, while demanding that the judges should
take it before giving their verdict. But if you tender
the oath, you may say that it is an act of piety to
be willing to leave the matter to the gods; that
your opponent has no need to look for other judges,
for you allow him to make the decision himself ; and
that it would be ridiculous that he should be un-
willing to take an oath in cases where he demands
that the dicasts should take one.

Now, since we have shown how we must deal with
each case individually, it is clear how we must deal
with them when taken two and two; for instance,
if we wish to take the oath but not to tender it, to
tender it but not to take it, to accept and tender it,
or to do neither the one nor the other. For such
cases, and similarly the arguments, must be a com-
bination of those already mentioned. And if we
have already taken an oath which contradicts the
present one, we may argue that it is not perjury ;
for whereas wrongdoing is voluntary, and perjury is
wrongdoing, what is done in error or under com-
pulsion is involuntary. Here we must draw the
conclusion that perjury consists in the intention, not
in what is said.* But if the opponent has taken such
an oath, we may say that one who does not abide
by what he has sworn subverts everything, for this
is the reason why the dicasts take an oath before
applying the laws ; and [we may make this appeal] :
“They demand that you abide by your oath as judges,
while they themselves do not abide by theirs.”
Further, we should employ all means of amplification.
Let this suffice for the inartificial proofs.

167

> , a

1. °Ex tivwy pev odv Set Kal mpotpémew Kai
amroTpémew Kal eraweiv Kal péyew Kal KaTyyopelV
Kal atroAoyetoba, Kal ota: dd€at Kal mpordcets
XpHoyLor mpos Tas TOUT mlorets, Tar éoriv:
mept yap TOUTWY Kal ek TOUT@ 7a evOuunpara,
as rept EKQOTOV etrrety dla TO yevos Tov Aoywr.

2 érrel & evexa Kpiseds coTw y) pytopuxy (Kat yap
Tas oupBovhas Kpivovat kal y diky Kptous eortv),
avayKn p71) povov mpos Tov Adyov dpav, Omws
> A ” \ 7 > A \ c \
dmodeuKTLiKOs €oTar Kal muoTds, aAAA Kal avdrov

3 mouv Twa Kal TOV KpiTIV KaTacKevalew: odd
yap Siadeper mpos miotw, pdAoTra prev ev Tais
ovpBovrats, «ira Kal ev tais Sikais, TO mowy Twa
daivecbar Tov A€yovra Kal TO mpos avTovs b7roAapm-
Bavew é€xew ws adrov, mpos d€ TovTos eav Kal

4avTol diaKkeievol mws TUyydvwow. TO pev odV
mov twa daivecar tov réyovra ypnowebrepov

« This is Cope’s interpretation. Jebb renders: “If we
take each branch of Rhetoric by itself.” The classes are of
course the deliberative, forensic, and epideictic.

» The instructions given for enthymematic or logical proof
should suffice; but since the function of Rhetoric is to find
the available means of persuasion and its end is a judgement ;
and since an appeal to the speaker’s own character and to
the passions of those who are to give the judgement is bound

to carry great we ight, the speaker must be provided with
rules for ethical and ‘* pathetic ” (emotional) proofs. In i, 5

168

BOOK II

1. Such then are the materials which we must
employ in exhorting and dissuading, praising and
blaming, accusing and defending, and such are the
opinions and propositions that are useful to produce
conviction in these circumstances ; for they are the
subject and source of enthymemes, which are speci-
ally suitable to each class (so to say) of speeches.*
But since the object of Rhetoric is judgement—for
judgements are pronounced in deliberative rhetoric
and judicial proceedings are a judgement—it is not
only necessary to consider how to make the speech
itself demonstrative and convincing, but also that
the speaker should show himself to be of a certain
character and should know how to put the judge
into a certain frame of mind. For it makes a great
difference with regard to producing conviction—
especially in demonstrative, and, next to this, in
forensic oratory—that the speaker should show him-
self to be possessed of certain qualities and that his
hearers should think that he is disposed in a certain
way towards them; and further, that they themselves
should be disposed in a certain way towards him.?
Indeliberative oratory, it is more useful that the orator
Aristotle mentions appeals to the emotions with disapproval,
but this does not apply to all such appeals, but only to those

which are likely to bias the judges unfairly (¢.g. stirring up
envy, hatred, a desire for revenge).

169

ARISTOTLE

> \ , > A \ a /
els tas ovpBovdAds éorw, To dé Svaxetobai ws
Tov akpoaTiy eis Tas Sikas od yap TavTa paiverar
firodor kai puicodow, odd’ dpyilopevois Kal mpaws
1 a
exovow, aA” 7 TO Tapdmay EeTepa 7) KaTAa TO
is7sa weyeOos Eerepa: TH pev yap gidodyTt, mepl od
movetrar THY Kplow, 7% OvK adLKEiy 7) pLKpa SoKEt
aduketvy, TH Se pucotvtTs Tobvavriov’ Kal T@ pev
> ~ \ > F + A \ > /
emOvupobvr. Kat edéAmids ovtTt, €av 7) TO €Gomevov
¢ rd A ” A > \ ” t
900, Kal €oecOa Kai ayaldv eceoPar daiverat,
~ a /
tT 8 amabe? cai Svoxepaivovte tobvavtiov.
5 Tod pév obv adrods eivat muorods tods Aéyovras
~ 2 .&
Tpia €oTl Ta aiTia: Tocatra ydp eore du a m-
4 ” ~ > / ” A lol
orevouev eEw tav armodeiEewv. eoT. b€ TadTa
dpovynois Kai apet? Kal edvora’ Srayeddovrar yap
Tept wv A€yovow 7) avpBovredovow H dia mavTa
6 Tatra 7) Sia TovTwy TL 7) yap Su’ adpoodynv ovK —
> ~ / ”“ / > ~ ‘
oph&s do€dovow, 7) dogdlovres opfas dua pox-—
~ /
Onpiav od ra Soxodvta Aéyovow, H Ppoviyswor pev
a , > /
Kal emveuceis elalv GAA’ ovk« e€bdvou* Sudtrep evde-
XeTau py Ta. BéArvora ovpBovrcvtew yeyvaoKovras. ;
Kal mapa Taira oddev. avayKy dpa Tov dmavra ;
Soxobyta tatr éxew elvar tots akpowpevois
7 moTov. Oley pev toivev dpdovipor Kal o7rovdator
daveiev av, ek Tv Tepl Tas apeTas Sinpnuevwv
Anrréov: ék ta&v abir&v yap Kav Erepdv tis Kav
€avTov KaTacKevdoee ToLodrov’ mepl 8 evdvoias
\ , > a \ \ / /
Kal didias év Tots rept Ta 7dOn AeKTEov.

_—————

4 Opposed to evéAmdi. Others render “ ina bad humour.”

> émieckis and crovidatos both = dyadds. In a restricted
sense émrieckys is “* respectable,” cmrovéaios “* serious.”

¢ i, 9.

170

RHETORIC, II. 1. 4-7

should appear to be of a certain character, in forensic,
that the hearer should be disposed in a certain way ;
for opinions vary, according as men love or hate, are
wrathful or mild, and things appear either altogether
different, or different in degree ; for when a man is
favourably disposed towards one on whom he is passing
judgement, he either thinks that the accused has com-
mitted no wrong at all or that his offence is trifling ;
but if he hates him, the reverse is the case. Andifa
man desires anything and has good hopes of getting
it, if what is to come is pleasant, he thinks that it is
sure to come to pass and will be good; but if a man
is unemotional or not hopeful? it is quite the reverse.

For the orator to produce conviction three qualities
are necessary ; for, independently of demonstrations,
the things which induce belief are three in number.
These qualities are good sense, virtue, and goodwill ;
for speakers are wrong both in what they say and
in the advice they give, because they lack either all _
three or one of them. For either through want of
sense they form incorrect opinions, or, if their
opinions are correct, through viciousness they do not
say what they think, or, if they are sensible and
good,° they lack goodwill ; wherefore it may happen
that they do not give the best advice, although they
know what it is. These qualities are all that are
necessary, so that the speaker who appears to possess
all three will necessarily convince his hearers. The
means whereby he may appear sensible and good ®
must be inferred from the classification of the
virtues;° for to make himself appear such he
would employ the same means as he would in the
case of others. We must now speak of goodwill
and friendship in our discussion of the emotions.

171

8

1378 b

ARISTOTLE

“Kort dé Ta, man, dv 60a _peraBaMovres dva-
p€povor _Tpos Tas Kploets, ols Exerar Avan Kal
moovn, otov opyn) éXeos hoBos Kai doa adAa Tovabra.,
Kal TO Tovrous evavtia. Set de Suaipetv TO. mepl
éxaoTov eis Tpia: A€yw 8° olov mrepl épyis, 7s
TE Ovaretpevou opyihou clot, Kal Tlow etasBaow
opyileoban, Kal é7rl motous: el yap TO pev ev 7 70,
dvo EXouev ToUTwD, dmavra dé p47), addvarov av
ein THY Opynv epurovety* Opotws d€ Kal emt Tov
aAAwv. Bomep otv Kal emt TOV TpoEtpnpLevenv
dteyparbaprev Tas mMporacess, ovTwW Kal emi TOUTUV
TOLHOW LEV KAL OueAwpev TOV <tpnLevov Tpomov.

2. "Earw 81) dpyi) dpekis peta Avans TyLeplas
Pawvopevns dud povomerny dAvywpiay TeV «is
avrov n TOV adrod, Too dAvywpety HI) TpooHKoVTOS.
et 61) TOOT’ éory 7 opy7}, dvdyeen Tov opyuldouevov
opyileobar a det TOv Kal? Exaorov TWt, olov KAéwvi
adn’ ovdK avO pare, Kal OTL abrov 7 Tav avrod
Tl qemolnKev a TieMev, Kal 7aon) opyn éemeabai
TWa. mdoviy Thy amo THs €Amidos Too Tywpyoacbat:
ov pev yap TO olecOar revEecbar dv edierat,
ovdels Sé trav dawopevwy aduvdtwy édierar
aitd, 6 8 dpyilopevos edierar Svvarav avT@.
610 KaAds cipnra wept Ovpod

Os Te TOAD yAvKiwv péAvTos KaTaAe.Bopevoto
avop@v ev ornfecow ae€erar:

* In i. generally (cp. i. 2. 22).

> Gomperz translates pawouérns * real or apparent’; Jebb
omits gawouévys and translates gawouévny * see ae
Cope confines both to the meaning ‘* manifest.”

¢ Iliad, xviii. 109 (cp. i. 11. 9).
172

RHETORIC, II. 1. 8—1. 2

The emotions are all those affections which cause “4,
men to change their opinion in regard to their
judgements, and are accompanied by pleasure and
pain; such are anger, pity, fear, and all similar
emotions and their contraries. And each of them
must be divided under three heads ; for instance, in
regard to anger, the disposition of mind which makes
men angry, the persons with whom they are usually
angry, and the occasions which give rise to anger,
For if we knew one or even two of these heads, but
not all three, it would be impossible to arouse that
emotion. The same applies to the rest. Just as, then,
we have given a list of propositions * in what we have
previously said, we will do the same here and divide
the emotions in the same manner.

2. Let us then define anger as a longing, accom-
panied by pain, for a real or apparent revenge for a
real or apparent slight,” affecting a man himself or
one of his friends, when such a slight is undeserved.
If this definition is correct, the angry man must
always be angry with a particular individual (for
instance, with Cleon, but not with men generally),
and because this individual has done, or was on the
point of doing, something against him or one of his
friends ; and lastly, anger is always accompanied by
a certain pleasure, due to the hope of revenge to
come. For it is pleasant to think that one will
obtain what one aims at; now, no one aims at what
is obviously impossible of attainment by him, and
the angry man aims at what is possible for himself.
Wherefore it has been well said of anger, that

Far sweeter than dripping honey down the throat it spreads
in men’s hearts.°

173

ARISTOTLE

> cal ‘ \ ¢€ Z / ~ ‘
aKodovbe? yap Kat ydovy tis did Te TodTO Kat
dvd Tt SvarpiBovow ev TO TyswpetcOar TH Scavoia-
u} otv ToTE yevopevn davracta ndoviy €provel,
wotep 7 TOV evuTtviwy.

3 °Emel S % dAvywpia éotiv evepyera. 54éns meph
TO pndevos Gov dawdpuevov’ Kal yap Ta Kaka

\ > A x 2s a \ ‘
Kat tayaba d&va oidueba omovdis <ivat, Kal Ta
ouvreivovta mpos abra: doa Sé pndey Te 7 peKpov,
> ‘ a” c / , > > A ow

obddevos afta droAauPdvouev. tpia 8 ear «tidy
cAtywplas, Katappovyncis Te Kal émnpeacpos Kal

4 UBpis: 6 Te yap Katadpovar dAvywpet> doa yap
olovrar undevos a&va, TovTwv Katadpovotaw, TOV
dé undevds akiwv dAtywpotow: Kal 6 éemnpedlwv
daiverar Katadpovetv. ots yap 6 emnpeaopos
> \ a / 9 Ne > A 2))9
eumrod.op.os Tats BovAjceow ody wa te adt@ GAA
Wa pn ekeivw. émel odv ody Wa adT@ Tt, dAL-
ywpet: SHAov yap dtu odre PBAdibew droAapBaver-
° a \ an ‘ > > , aa. > lanl
éfoPeiro yap av Kat odK wAvyadpet* ovr’ wpedAfjoat
nn 299A ” / > , \ * AA
av ovdev ad&vov Adyou: edpdvrile yap adv wore
pidros elvar.

5 Kat 6 tBpilwy 8 ddAvywpet ote yap uBpis ro
BAdmrew Kal dumeiv' éf’ ols aioxdvn eott TO

1 A¢ reads mpdrrew kal \évyew, adopted by Roemer.

4 The thought of revenge in the future, as distinguished
from dwelling upon it in the present.

> Or, “those in which this tendency does not exist, or is
trifling.”

¢ Or, “how to make him his friend,” ¢i\os being for
gidov by attraction.

4 In Attic law tfps (insulting, degrading treatment) was

174

RHETORIC, IT. u. 2-5

for it is accompanied by a certain pleasure, for this
reason first,¢ and also because men dwell upon the
thought of revenge, and the vision that rises before
us produces the same pleasure as one seen in dreams.

Slighting is an actualization of opinion in regard
to something which appears valueless; for things
which are really bad. or good, or tend to become so,
we consider worthy of attention, but those which are
of no importance or trifling ® we ignore. Now there
are three kinds of slight: disdain, spitefulness, and
insult. For he who disdains, slights, since men dis-
dain those things which they consider valueless and
slight what is of no account. And the spiteful man
appears to show disdain; for spitefulness consists in
placing obstacles in the way of another’s wishes, not
in order that any advantage may accrue to him who
spites, but to prevent any accruing to the other.
Since then he does not act in this manner from self-
interest, it is a slight; for it is evident that he has
no idea that the other is likely to hurt him, for in
that case he would be afraid of him instead of slight-
ing him; nor that he will be of any use to him
worth speaking of, for in that case his thought would
be how to become his friend.°

Similarly, he who insults another also slights him ;
for insult ¢ consists in causing injury or annoyance
a more serious offence than aixia (bodily ill-treatment). It
was the subject of a State criminal prosecution (ypag%), aixia
of a private action (éixn) for damages. The penalty was
assessed in court, and might even be death. It had to be
proved that the defendant struck the first blow (ii. 24. 9).
One of the best known instances is the action brought by
Demosthenes against Midias for a personal outrage on
himself, when choregus of his tribe and responsible for the
equipment of a chorus for musical competitions at public

festivals.
175

for]

1379 a

ARISTOTLE

maoxovTt, pn wa te yernrar adr dAdo 7) drt
> > ~ ~

eyeveto, GAN Srrws HobA: of yap avturowbrTes
oby UBpilovow adda TYyswpobvrar. aitiov B€ THs
ndovis Tots bBpiLovow, drt otovrar Kak@s Sp@vres
adtovs vmepéxew paAdov. 810 of veo Kal ot

/ ¢ / ¢ /, \ w ec f
mAovovo. wPprorat: stmepexew yap otovrar vPpi-
Covres. vBpews dé aryria, 6 8 aryudlwv ddvywpet:
TO yap pndevos avov ovdeulay exer Tyunv, OvT
ayafob ovre Kaxob. 610 Ayer opylopevos 6
"Ayirreds

y ROLES Er \ \ ” /, + ee |

HTiwnoev’ Eddy yap exer yépas avTos
Kal

¢ / > Os. F, /

Woe Tw atiunrov petavdoTyny,

ws Sia tadra dpyilopuevos. mpoonkew 8° olovrar
modvwpeicbar bd THY NTTOVWY KATE. yévos, Kara
Suva, Kat apeTyv, Kal dAws ev @ av TadT@
drrepexy OAV, olov ev xpruacw 6 tAOvaLos TEVnTOS
Kat ev T@ A€yew pytopiKds aduvdtov eimeiy Kat
dpxwy apxyouevov Kal apyew a&vos oldjevos Too
apxyecbar akiov. S10 eipynrat

Oupos 5é péeyas €oTt SioTpepewv Baoidjwv
Kal ,

> , \ / ” /
aAAd TE Kal petomoabey Exe KOTOV"

® Tliad, i. 356.

> Iliad, ix. 648. jeravderns, lit. “ one who changes his
home,” used as a term of reproach (see also Glossary).

¢ ratr@. Other readings are raira, or ris.

4 Tliad, ii. 196.

¢ Iliad, i. 82. The words are those of the soothsayer
Calchas to Achilles, and the reference is to Agamemnon.

176

RHETORIC, II. u. 5-7

whereby the sufferer is disgraced, not to obtain any
other advantage for oneself besides the performance
of the act, but for one’s own pleasure ; for retalia-
tion is not insult, but punishment. The cause of
the pleasure felt by those who insult is the idea that,
in ill-treating others, they are more fully showing
superiority. ‘That is why the young and the wealthy “
are given to insults; for they think that, in com-
mitting them, they are showing their superiority.
Dishonour is characteristic of insult; and one who
dishonours another slights him; for that which is
worthless has no value, either as good or evil. Hence
Achilles in his wrath exclaims :

He has dishonoured me, since he keeps the prize he has
taken for himself,?

and
[has treated me] like a dishonoured vagrant,”

as if being wrath for these reasons. Now men think
that they have a right to be highly esteemed by
those who are inferior to them in birth, power, and
virtue, and generally, in whatever similar respect ¢
a man is far superior to another ; for example, the
rich man to the poor man in the matter of money,
the eloquent to the incompetent speaker in the
matter of oratory, the governor to the governed,
and the man who thinks himself worthy to rule to
one who is only fit to be ruled. Wherefore it has
been said : .
Great is the wrath of kings cherished by Zeus,

and

Yet it may be that even afterwards he cherishes his
resentment, ?
N 177

ARISTOTLE

fod ”

8 dyavaxrobor yap dia tiv drepoyiv. ere bd” Or

Tis oleTar ed mdoxew detv’ odrou 8” cial ods Eb

if “a” Cal *” > \ n” > 3 td nn ~
TEeTOLnKEV 7) Trovet, 7) adtos 7 8. adrov Tis H TOV
adrob tis, 7 BovAerar 7) eBovdAjhn.

9 Wavepov otv ek toitwv dn mas T Exovres
> / > \ A / A A a > \
dpyilovrat atrot Kal tict Kat Sua ota. adrol
bev yap, otav AvTdvTat- edierar yap twos 6
Aurrovpevos: edv te obv Kar edOuwpiay driodv

“~ ~ A ~
avTicpovon Tis, olov TO Subdvt. mpos TO meiv,
edv TE Uy, Spolws tadTo daiverat ovetv? Kal

/
€dv Te avrimpdtrn Tis edv Te pu) ovpmparrn
edv te aAAo TL evoxAH ovTws ExovTa, Tois maaw

10 dpyilerar. 510 Kdpvovres, mevopevor, [roAenodv-

tes], ep@vres, Supadvtes, dAws emiOvpotvres Kal

“~ \ /,

py KatopPotvres dpyidot <ict Kat edcrapdpynror,

pddvora ev mpos Todvs TOD TapdvTos dAvywpobvras,

olov Kduvwv jev Tois mpds THY vocoV, mevdomEVoS

a an a ‘ \

de Tois mpos THv meviay, 7oAcu@v dé Tois mpos Tov

~ a ” ¢ /

moAceuwov, ep@v dé Tois mpos Tov épwra> dpoiws
a \ ov

dé Kal tots ddAois: mpowdomoinrar yap €xacTos
~ 4

m™pos THv ékdorov dpyiv tro tod tadpyovtos
/,

11 7a0ous. Er. 5° Cav ravavria TUyn Mpoadexdpevos*

a \ A A ‘ A / iA ‘

Ave? yap waddAov 76 7odd mapa Sd€av, Homep Kat
, ‘ \ A / A / “a /

TépTret TO TOAD mapa ddkav, eav yévyntar 0 BovAerar.

* rots mpos thy vécov: lit. ‘*the sick man [is angry with
those who slight him] in regard to his illness,” that is, by
making light of it.

> Or, “his suffering at the moment.”

178

RHETORIC, II. m. 8-11

_ for kings are resentful in consideration of their
superior rank. Further, men are angry at slights
from those by whom they think they have a right
to expect to be well treated; such are those on
whom they have conferred or are conferring benefits,
_ either themselves, or some one else for them, or one
_ of their friends ; and all those whom they desire, or
_ did desire, to benefit.
_ It is now evident from these considerations what
is the disposition of those who are angry, with whom
they are angry, and for what reasons. Men are
angry when they are pained, because one who is
pained aims at something; if then anyone directly
opposes him in anything, as, for instance, prevents
him from drinking when thirsty, or not directly, but
_seems to be doing just the same; and if anyone ~
goes against him or refuses to assist him, or troubles
him in any other way when he is in this frame of
mind, he is angry with all such persons. Wherefore
_the sick, the necessitous, [those at war], the love-
sick, the thirsty, in a word, all who desire something
and cannot obtain it, are prone to anger and easily
excited, especially against those who make light of
their present condition; for instance, the sick man
is easily provoked in regard to his illness,* the
necessitous in regard to his poverty, the warrior in
regard to warlike affairs, the lover in regard to love-
affairs, and so with all the rest; for the passion?
"present in his mind in each case paves the way for
his anger. Again, men are angry when the event
* contrary to their expectation, for the more un-
expected a thing is, the more it pains ; just as they
are overjoyed if, contrary to expectation, what they
desire comes to pass. From this it is obvious what

179

— ere’

EEE a a ee

—

:

ARISTOTLE

\ \ e \ / ‘ / %. 4 ,
510 Kai Hpar Kai xpdvor kat diabécers Kal HAuciar
ex tovtwy davepai, Tota. <dKivnto mpos dpyiv
Kat 700 Kal morte, Kal Ore Gre waAdAov ev Tovrous
ya a \ 2 2
eat, aAAov Kai evKivynTor.
> \ A s ud ” Ne! ‘
12 Adrot bev OUV OUTWS EXOVTES EUKLVNTOL TMpOoS
/ > / a ~
opyjv, opyilovrar dé tots te KatayeAdou Kal
/ \ / ¢ / / ‘
xAevalovar Kal oxwmrovow: bBpilovar ydp. Kal
tois Ta Tovadra BAdwrovow boa BBpews onmeta.
avayrn S€ tovabra elvar Gd pure avti Twos purr”
% / a A ” A a oes
agera tots mowdow: on yap Soxet di’ bBpw.
13 Kat Tois Kakds Aéyovor Kal Karadpovodar sept
“a > ‘ / / = eda
& avrot pddvora orovddlovow, otov ot emi dido-
, 4, 77 >? X ,
cogia dirotipovpevor edv tis eis THY piAocodiar,
¢ t al oad. | a 97 77 > A 2) 7 ¢ , \
ot 8 emt TH idéa dv tis eis TH dav, dpoiws Sé
14 Kal emi trav ddAwv. rabra dé TOAAG pGAAov, dv
dmomrevawor pn dmdpxew adrois, 7 SAws 7) p47)
> ~ nn A ~ > A \ / ”
1879b Laxup@s, 7) 7) SoKeiv: errevdav yap adddpa olwvrat
dmdpxew ev TovTots* ev ols oxwmToVvTaL, ov dpovTi-
a cod a \ /
15 Covow. Kat tots pidows paAdrov 7 Tots pr) didrors:
“A >
olovTar yap mpoonkew paAdov maoxyew «0 ta
~ a / ood ,
16 avTav 7) pH. Kal Tots ciOopevors TYysdy 7 dpovri-
2. / \ MA c a“ ‘ ‘ ec ‘
lew, eav mdAw put) ovtTws OprAdow: Kal yap tro
a ‘ \
TovTwy olovrat Katadpoveicbar: tatra yap av

1 év robros is bracketed by Spengel: Cope explains it as
**in those particular things’ (philosophy, personal beauty,
and the like).

® evxlynro refers grammatically to diadécers and HArKlat.
180

RHETORIC, II. um. 11-16

are the seasons, times, states of mind, and conditions
of age in which we are easily moved ¢ to anger ; and
what are the various times, places, and reasons,
which make us more prone to anger in proportion
as we are subject to their influence.

Such then are the dispositions of those who are
easily roused to anger. As to the objects of their
anger, men are angry with those who ridicule, mock,
and scoff at them, for this is an insult. And with
those who injure them in ways that are indications
of insult. But these acts must be of such a kind
that they are neither retaliatory nor advantageous
to those who commit them; for if they are, they
then appear due to gratuitous insult. And men
are angry with those who speak ill of or despise
things which they themselves consider of the greatest
importance; for instance, if a man speaks con-
temptuously of philosophy or of personal beauty in
the presence of those who pride themselves upon
them ; and so in all other cases. But they are far
more angry if they suspect that they do not possess
these qualities, either not at all, or not to any great
extent, or when others do not think they possess
them. For when they feel strongly that they do
possess those qualities which are the subject of
mockery, they pay no heed to it. And they are
more angry with those who are their friends than
with those who are not, for they think that they
have a right to be treated well by them rather than
ill. And they are angry with those who have been
in the habit of honouring and treating them with
respect, if they no longer behave so towards them ;
for they think that they are being treated with con-
tempt by them, otherwise they would treat them as

181

ARISTOTLE

17 mrovetv. Kat Tots ju) avTuTovodow €b, pndé THV
ionv avtamodiodow. Kal Tois TavayTia Trovodow
adrois, €av TTOUs Wow: Katadpovely yap mavTes
ot Towdro. daivovrar, Kal of pev ws HTTOvwY ot
8 ws map ArTdovev.

is Kai tois ev pndevi Ady ovow, ay Tt dhuywpBot,
paMov dmdKeuTas yap 1 opy?) THs dAvyepias 7™pos
Tovs 2) mpoonKovras, Tpoonjier dé Tots HTTOOL

19 p27) OAvywpeiv. Tots dé pidrois, edv Te ph) ed Aeywow
H Tmowdow, Kat érc paGAdAov éav ravavtia, Kal éeav
ph aicbdvwvrar Seopevwv, domep 6 ‘Avripdvros
TAnéirmos 7H Mehedype: dAvywplas yap TO ry
aicbavecbat onpetov: av yap ppovrilopen, ov

20 NavOdver. Kal Tots emixatpovar Tals druxiaus Kal
GAws edlvpovpevors ev tais adr@yv arvxiais 7
yap exOpod 7 oAvtywpotvros onpueiov. Kal Tots
pq ppovrilovow, éav Avmyjowow: 816 Kal Tots

21 Kaka ayyéehAovow opyilovrar. Kat Tots 7) dxovovar
rept aura 7) Oewpéevors 7a, adr av pabra- GL0L0L
ydp «iow 7) dAtywpodow 7 xOpois: ot yap piror

22 guvadyobouw, Dewsprevor dé ra oixeta, gaira mavres
dXyotow. er. Tots dAvywpotot mpos mévre, mpos
ots pirorysobvrar, mpds ods Oavudlovow, bd? dv
BovrAovrar Bavpalecbar, 7 ods aicydvovrar, 7 ev
Tots aioxuvouevois adrovs: év rovrois édy Tis

* Plexippus was the uncle of Meleager. The allusion is
obscure. tt may refer to Meleager giving the skin of the
Calydonian boar to Atalanta, which his uncle wanted. One
of Antiphon’s tragedies was named Meleager (T.G.F. p. 792).

> Literally, “for the things which (=the persons whom)
one respects, do not escape notice.”

182

RHETORIC, II. 1. 17-22

before. And with those who do not return their
kindnesses nor requite them in full; and with those
who oppose them, if they are inferiors ; for all such
appear to treat them with contempt, the latter as if
they regarded them as inferiors, the former as if
they had received kindnesses from inferiors.

And they are more angry with those who are of
no account, if they slight them ; for anger at a slight
was assumed to be felt at those who ought not to
behave in such a manner; for inferiors ought not
to slight their superiors. And they are angry with
friends, if they neither speak well of nor treat them
well, and in an even greater degree, if they do the
opposite. And if they fail to perceive that they
want something from them, as Plexippus% in Anti-
phon’s tragedy reproached Meleager ; for failure to
perceive this is a sign of slight ; since, when we care
for people, these things are noticed.? And they are
angry with those who rejoice, or in a general way
are cheerful when they are unfortunate ; for this is
an indication of enmity or slight. And with those
who do not care if they pain them ; whence they are
angry with those who bring bad news. And with
those who listen to the tale of their faults, or look
on them with indifference, for they resemble slighters
or enemies ; for friends sympathize and all men are
pained to see their own faults exposed.“ And further,
with those who slight them before five classes of
persons: namely, their rivals,those whom they admire,
those by whom they would like to be admired, those
whom they respect, or those who respect them ;
when anyone slights them before these, their anger is

¢ The real friend, therefore, would feel as much pain as
the other whose faults are exposed.

183

ARISTOTLE

23 OAtywpH, opyilovrar padAov. Kat ois els Ta
Towatra dAvywpotow strep dv adbrois aiaypov p1
Bonbetv, ofov yovets, réxva, yuvaikas, apyopevous.
kal Tois xdpw pt) amodwWotow: mapa TO TpoohKov

24 yap 7 oAvywpia. Kal Tots eipwvevopevots mpos

25 omovddlovtas’ KatadpovytiKoy yap 7 e€ipwvreia.
Kal Tots Tv dAAwy edrointiKois, eav pn Kal
abt@v' Kat yap totro KatadpovytiKov, TO pt)

26 afwobv dv mdvras Kat avtév. mountucoy 8 dpyis
kat 7 Anon, ofov Kal 4 THY dvowatwy ovTws odca
Trept puKpdov' odAvywpias yap SoKet Kal 4 AjOy
onpetov elvar: du’ apedrcvay prev yap 4 AjnOn yly-

27 veTar, 4 8 dpeAea ddvywpia eotiv. ois prev odv
opyilovra: Kat ws €xovres Kal Oud Tota, dpa

1380a elpyTas’ SHAov 8’ dru Séou av adrov KaracKkevalew
T® ASyw Tovovrovs olou dvres dpyiAws Exovow,
Kal Tovs evavtiovs TovTois evdxous dvTas ed’ ols
épyilovrat, Kal Tovovrovs olois dpyilovrat.

3. "Ezet Se€ 7d dpyileoOa evavtiov TO mpai-
veoBar Kat dpyn mpadrynt., Anmréov mas Eexovtes
mpGol «iat Kat mpos Tivas mpdws éxovor Kai dia

2Tivwy TpavvorvTar. €oTw 51) mpdiivois KaTdoTaats

3Kkal npeunats opyfjs. e€i ovv dpyilovrar Tots
dAtywpotow, ddvywpia 8 eariv éxovovov, davepov
OTL Kal Tots pndev To’TwY ToLODaW 7 aKovGiws

4 Tovodaw 7) pawopevors TovovTois mpGol eiow. Kal

Tois Tavavtia av emoinoav BovAopévois. Kat door

* Cope translates “rulers and governors”; but ean
dpxec#a. be used in a middle sense ?

> To avoid the apparent tautology (§ 17), Roemer (Rhein.
Mus. xxxix. p. 503) boldly conjectures xalpew: “ not to
return another’s greeting.”

184

RHETORIC, II. 1. 23—111. 4

greater. They are also angry with those who slight
such persons as it would be disgraceful for them not

to defend, for instance, parents, children, wives, and ~

dependents. And with those who are ungrateful,? -

for the slight is contrary to all sense of obligation. —

And with those who employ irony, when they them- ~

selves are in earnest; for irony shows contempt.
And with those who do good to others, but not to
them ; for not to think them worthy of what they
bestow upon all others also shows contempt. Forget-
fulness also is a cause of anger, such as forgetting
names, although it is a mere trifle, since even for-
getfulness seems a sign of slight; for it is caused by
indifference, and indifference is a slight. We have
thus stated at one and the same time the frame of
mind and the reasons which make men angry, and
the objects of their anger. It is evident then that
it will be necessary for the speaker, by his eloquence,
to put the hearers into the frame of mind of those
who are inclined to anger, and to show that his
opponents are responsible for things which rouse
men to anger and are people of the kind with whom
men are angry.

3. And since becoming angry is the opposite of
becoming mild, and anger of mildness, we must
determine the state of mind which makes men mild,
towards whom they become mild, and the reasons
which make them so. Let us then define making
mild as the quieting and appeasing of anger. If
then men are angry with those who slight them, and
slight is voluntary, it is evident that they are mild
towards those who do none of these things, or do
them involuntarily, or at least appear to be such; and
towards those who intended the opposite of what

185

ARISTOTLE

Kat adroit eis adtods Towobro. oddels yap adros
5 abrobd SoKet odvywpeiv. Kal Tots dpoAoyodor Kal
peTaperAopevois* ws yap exovtes Siknv To Avmet-
afar emt trois memoimpéevois Tmavovtat THS oOpyis.
onpciov dé emi THS TOV oikeT@v KoAdoEws: TOUS
fev yap avtiAéyovtas Kal dpvovpévous paAdov
KoAdlouev, mpos dé Tods opohoyobyras Sucaiws
KohdleoBae mravdpela Oupovpevor. airvov oi ore
dvavoxuvria TO Th pavepa apvetcbar, ve 8° ap-
atoxuvTia dAvtywpia Kal Katadpdovnois: wv yodv
6 moAd Katappovodpev, ovkK aicyvvouela. Kal Tots
TATEWOUPLEVOLS POs adTOdS Kal pq) avTLAeyovow,"
daivovra: yap ouodroyeiv Arrovs elvat, ot & irrous
poBodvrat, foPovpevos Se ovddets dhuycwpet. Ore
de mpos TOUS Tamewvoupevous TaveTar Opyyh, Kat
ot KUves SnAodow od SdxKvovres Tods Kabilovras.
7 Kal Tots omovddlovot mpdos tods omovddalovras:
Soke? yap orovddlecbat GAN’ od Katadpovetobar.
g kal Tots peilw Kexapiopevois. Kal Tots Seouevous
g Kal Tapattoupevois* Tamewdrepor yap. Kal Tots
ya bBprorais pnde XAcvaorais pnd’ dAvycipors, 7
eis pndeva 7 7) Ha eis xpnoTovs pnd? cis Tovovdrous
10 ofot wep adroit. dAws 8 ex tTav evaytiwy det
okoreivy Ta Tmpaivrucd. Kal ods hoPodvrar 7 ai-
oxvvovTaL’ Ews yap dv ovTws exwow, ovK dp-
yilovrar advvarov yap aya poPetcbar Kal dp-

2 étamlyns 8 ’Odvoja ov Kives bAakdpumpoc’ | ob wey KeKdy-
youres émédpamov’ a’rap ’Odvoceds | &fero Kepdocivy (Odyssey,
xiv. 29-31).

> That is, greater than their present disservices.

186

RHETORIC, II. mm. 4-10

they have done, and all who behave in the same way
to themselves, for no one is likely to slight himself.
And towards those who admit and are sorry for a
slight ; for finding as it were satisfaction in the pain
the offenders feel at what they have done, men
cease to be angry. Evidence of this may be seen in
the punishment of slaves; for we punish more
severely those who contradict us and deny their
offence, but cease to be angry with those who admit
that they are justly punished. The reason is that
to deny what is evident is disrespect, and disrespect
is slight and contempt; anyhow, we show no
respect for those for whom we entertain a profound
contempt. Men also are mild towards those who
humble themselves before them and do not contradict
them, for they seem to recognize that they are
inferior ; now, those who are inferior are afraid, and
no one who is afraid slights another. Even the be-
haviour of dogs proves that anger ceases towards
those who humble themselves, for they do not bite
those who sit down.t And men are mild towards
those who are serious with them when they are
serious, for they think they are being treated
seriously, not with contempt. And towards those
who have rendered them greater services. And
towards those who want something and deprecate
their anger, for they are humbler. And towards
those who refrain from insulting, mocking, or slight-
ing anyone, or any virtuous man, or those who
resemble themselves. And generally speaking, one
can determine the reasons that make for mildness
by their opposites. Thus, men are mild towards
those whom they fear or respect, as long as they feel
so towards them, for it is impossible to be afraid and

187

ARISTOTLE

ll yileoOar. Kal tois Si” dpyiy moujoaow odK
opyilovras 7) ATTOV opyilovras: od yap dv’ dAvywpiav
patvovrar mpatar’ oddels yap opylopevos oAvycopet-

1380 b 7) pev yap oAvywpia dArvrov, 7 8 dpyi) wera AVays.

12 Kal Tots aioxuvouevous adrou,

Kai EXOVTES de evavtios TO dpyileobat dfjAov
ore mpdot clot, ofov ev mada, ev yeAwtt, €v
coprh, | ev edn Epig, ev karopbdcer, ev mAnpuscet,
oAws €v dAumia Kat 7dovq p47) OBprorucy Kal ev
eAribu € emueuKel. ETL KEXPOVLKOTES Kal p2) DmTdyvLOL

13 TH opyh, ovres* maver yap opyny 3 xXpovos. mavet
de Kab ETEpov opynv peilen 7) 7 map dAAov Anpbetoa
TYyLepla mpotepov: S10 €d Diroxparys, eim6vTos
Twos opylopevov Tob Sijpov " rt ovk atroAoyel; ’
“ovmw ye’ én. “ adha mote;”’ “ 6rav dd-

Aov Bw SvaBeBAnwevov~”’ mpao. yap ‘yiyvovrat,

drav ets GAAov TH Opyiyv dvahdowow, olov ovvepy

ext “Epyodidov: padAov yap yaderaivovtes 7

KadAtobéver adetoay dia 1rd Kadduobévovs rH

14 mporepaia Katayv@vat Odvarov. Kal eav eAe@ow"

Kal eav petlov Kakov memovOdTes Maw 7 ot opyt-

¢ They regard the disrespectful treatment as merely a
temporary lapse.

> aAipoors : lit. # filling up.” The reference may be to the
‘* fulfilment ’’ of one’s desires, or to ‘‘ repletion”’ in the
matter of food (L. and S.), which seems less likely; ‘in
fulness of content ” (Jebb).

¢ Opponent of Demosthenes, and one of the pro-Mace-
donian part Impeached for his share in the disastrous
‘© Peace of Philocrates,” he went into exile and was con-
demned to death during his absence.

4 Ergophilus failed in an attack on Cotys, king of Thrace,
while Callisthenes concluded a premature peace with
Perdiccas, king of Macedonia.

188

°°

RHETORIC, II. m1. 11-14

angry at the same time. And against those who
have acted in anger they either feel no anger or in
a less degree, for they do not seem to have acted
from a desire to slight. For no one slights another
when angry, since slight is free from pain, but anger
is accompanied by it. And men are not angry with
those who usually show respect for them.*

It is also evident that those are mild whose con-
dition is contrary to that which excites anger, as
when laughing, in sport, at a feast, in prosperity, in
success, in abundance,’ and, in general, in freedom
from pain, in pleasure which does not imply insult,
or in virtuous hope. Further, those whose anger is
of long standing and not in its full flush, for time
appeases anger. Again, vengeance previously taken
upon one person appeases anger against another,
even though it be greater. Wherefore Philocrates,°
when someone asked him why he did not justify
himself when the people were angry with him, made
the judicious reply, “‘ Not yet.’ “‘ When then?”
“When I see someone accused of the same offence ”’ ;
for men grow mild when they have exhausted their
anger upon another, as happened in the case of
Ergophilus.? For although the Athenians were more
indignant with him than with Callisthenes, they
acquitted him, because they had condemned Calli-
crates to death on the previous day. Men also
grow mild towards those whom they pity’; and if
an offender has suffered greater evil than those

¢ Another reading is éav é\wo., ‘‘ if they have convicted
him.” This is adopted by Roemer, who refers to Plato,
Republic, 558 4, where, in speaking of the freedom allowed
to all who live under a democracy, it is remarked that, even

if a man is convicted by a court of justice, he takes no heed
of the sentence, which is very often not enforced.

189

ARISTOTLE

Comevor a av edpacav: worep eiAndévat yap olovrau

15 TyLwpiav. al eav dducety olewvrauw adrol Kal
Sucaters mdoxew* od ylyverat ‘yap uh opy?) mmpos
TO diavov" ov yap ETL Tapa. TO mpoojKov olovrat
maoxyew, 7 8 _Spyi Tobro iy. 510 Set TO Adyw
mpoxoAdLlew: dyavaxrobat yap TTOV rohalspevor

16 Kal ot Softer. Kal ea Ha aicOjnoecbat olwvrat
ore du” abrovs Ka av? dv emabov: 7 yap opy?)
Tav Kal? Exagrov cot: dihAov 8° ek Tob dpiopod.
810 dp0Bs memoinrar

paola *"Odvacja rrodurophiov,

as: od TETUYLCOpNILEVOS, el 47) qoero Kal _b¢ ob
Kat av@ drov. wore ovre tois dAdo dot a)
aioPdvovrat opyiLovrar, ovTEe Tots TebveBow ert,
ws memovOdor Te TO Eaxarov Kal ovK aAyjoovow
odd aicPnoopevors, 05 of dpytlopevor Ati
510 €d mepi rod “Exropos 6 trountys, maboat BovAd-
peevos Tov “AyiArda THs dpyfs TeOvedros,

\ \ \ a > , /
Kwdry yap 57 yatav decile: peveaivwr.

~ a 7 >

17 SfAov ody ort Tots Katampaivew Bovdopéevois eéx
~ . \ \

tovTwy tv témwv Xexréov, adbrovs pev mapa-

* Therefore, if you think that a man will never learn who
took vengeance on him, you will be Jess cruel; for anger is
personal, and so Odysseus, because he was angry. 1m capri
a savage punishment, and wished Polyphemus to know i

>» Odyssey, ix. 504.

¢ Or, ‘‘as if Odysseus would not have considered himself
avenged, had P. remained ignorant. . .

a Or, "s with any who can no longer feel their anger.”
Cope translates: “ with all the rest Tretion those actually
within reach) who are out of sight.”’

190

RHETORIC, II. 1. 14-17

who are angry would have inflicted, for they have an
idea that they have as it were obtained reparation.
And if they think that they themselves are wrong
and deserve what they suffer, for anger is not aroused
against what is just ; they no longer think that they
are being treated otherwise than they should be,
which, as we have said, is the essence of anger.
Wherefore we should inflict a preliminary verbal
chastisement, for even slaves are less indignant at
punishment of this kind. And men are milder if
they think that those punished will never know
that the punishment comes from them in requital for
their own wrongs; for anger has to do with the
individual, as is clear from our definition. Wherefore
it is justly said by the poet :
Tell him that it is Odysseus, sacker of cities,®

as if Polyphemus would not have been punished,°
had he remained ignorant who had blinded him and
for what. So that men are not angry either with
any others who cannot know who punishes them,? or
with the dead, since they have paid the last penalty
and can feel neither pain nor anything else, which
is the aim of those who are angry.’ So then, in
regard to Hector, Homer, when desirous of restrain-
ing the anger of Achilles against a dead man, well
says :
For it is senseless clay that he outrages in his wrath.’

It is evident, then, that men must have recourse to
these topics when they desire to appease their
audience, putting them into the frame of mind

* To make the offender feel pain as part of the punish-
ment.
? Iliad, xxiv. 54.

° 191

ARISTOTLE

oxevdlovor Tovovrous, ols & opyibovrar, 7 po-
Bepods H aloxdvys a€ious 7 KeXapropevous 7
dkovtas 7) vmepaAyobvras Tots TeTOUNILEVOLS.
4. Tivas de prrodor Kal prcodon, Kat dua Ti,
THY dirdiav Kal TO pureiv Optadpevot A€yupev.
2 €oTw on) TO prety TO BovAcoBat TWL G olerau
ayaa, exeivov éveca aAXG. pI) avdTod, Kal TO Kara
1381a Svv api TPOKTUKCOY elvat tovtwv. didos 8 early
6 pray Kal dyruprdovjevos. olovrat dé. dpidrou
elvauw of ovTws exew oldpevor Tpos dAA7jAous.
3 rovTwy dé UrroKeyeveny dvdyien dirov elvar Tov
ovv7nddpevov Tots dyabots Kal ovvadyobvra Tots
Avmnpots By bud Tl ETEpoV ddd bv exewvov. yeyvo-
peveov yap dv BovAovrat Xalpovor mdvres, TOV
evavtiwy dé Avmobvrat, WOTE Tis _Bovdjoews
4 onpetov at Ada Kab at _18ovat. Kat ots 7) Tavrd,
dyaba eat KaKd, Kat ol Tots: avrots piro., Kai ob
Tots avrots €xOpot- Tavrd yap tovtos BovAccbat
dvdyKn, WOTE a TEP abr@ kat adAAw BovAdpevos,
TOUTW paiveras piros elvan.
5 Kai rods TeTOUKOTAS ra) prrobow, 7) avrovs 7
av KHSovTaL" 7 «€t peydha, 7 et mpobvpens, a et
/ ‘
év TowovTos KaLpois, Kal abray ever i ots av
6 olwvTaL BotAcoBar qrovetv ei. al tovs Td pilwy
pidous Kal prrobvras ots avrol pirodow. Kal
7 Tovs pirovpevors & bo TOV prrovpevew avrois. Kal
rods Tois avrois €xOpovs Kal prcodyras ods adrol

@ det may be translated “ to love” or “to like”; piAta
by “love,” “liking,” or ‘‘ friendship ” ; for piAos “friend ”
alone is suitable. For the two meanings cp. the use of aimer
in French, and lieben in German.

192 +

RHETORIC, II. ur. 17—1v. 7

required and representing those with whom they are
angry as either formidable or deserving of respect,
or as having rendered them great services, or acted
involuntarily, or as exceedingly grieved at what they
have done.

4. Let us now state who are the persons that men
love * or hate, and why, after we have defined love
and loving. Let loving, then, be defined as wishing
for anyone the things which we believe to be good,
for his sake but not for our own, and procuring them
for him as far as lies in our power. A friend is one
who loves and is loved in return, and those who think
their relationship is of this character consider them-
selves friends. This being granted, it necessarily
follows that he is a friend who shares our joy in
good fortune and our sorrow in affliction, for our own
sake and not for any other reason. For all men
rejoice when what they desire comes to pass and
are pained when the contrary happens, so that pain
and pleasure are indications of their wish. And
those are friends who have the same ideas of good
and bad, and love and hate the same persons, since
they necessarily wish the same things; wherefore
one who wishes for another what he wishes for
himself seems to be the other’s friend.

We also like those who have done good either to
us or to those whom we hold dear, if the services
are important, or are cordially rendered, or under
certain circumstances, and for our sake only ; and
all those whom we think desirous of doing us good.
And those who are friends of our friends and who
like those whom we like, and those who are liked by
those who are liked by us ; and those whose enemies
are ours, those who hate those whom we ourselves

oO 193

ARISTOTLE

~ \ ~ > a
pucotow, Kal tods pucovpéevovs b70 THY avrots
~ 7 A > 4 /
pcovpévwy? maou yap tovros tadTa ayaa dat-
. a 7 7 A 9 a
vetau elvar Kal adrots, Wote BovAcoOar ta avTois
> / Ld S lon , ” A > \
8 ayabd, 6 wep Hv TOO didov. ETL TOUS EVTTOLNTLKOUS
\ ‘ >
eis xpipata Kal eis owrnpiav: 50 Tovds €Aev-
~ \ ‘ /
Oepiovs Kal rods avdpelous TYyL@ar Kal Tods SiKatous.
4 > € , A \ > 4? phe 4
9 rovovrouvs 8 doAapBdvovor Tods pu) ad’ éTépaw
~ ~ lol / \
Cavras: towdro 8 of amo tot épydleoBat, Kat
/, c > \ / \ ~ ” c >
ToUTwY of amo yewpyias Kal T@v GAAwy ot avr-
A 7 \ \ 7 oe >
10 ovpyou padvwoTa. Kal TOUS owdpovas, OTL OUK
” ‘ A > 7, A ‘ > / \
ll dSucot. Kat Tods ampdypovas Sia TO adTO. Kal
ofs BovAdpeba didror civar, eav daivwvrar Bov-
“~ \ a) Se \
Adpevou: eiat Sé Tovwobrou of 7’ ayabol Kat’ apeTny
‘ ¢€ > / wn" > Ma ”“ > a /
Kal of evddKysor 7) ev dracw 7 ev Tots PeAtiorots
Hy? a /, ey? ¢ -“” Rn. We a 6
H ev tots Oavpalopevors bf airav 7 ev Tots Bav-
” \ a ~ ‘
12 palovow adrovs. €Te Tods 7Sets auvdvayayeiv Kat
~ “~ > \ \
ovvoinpepedaat tTotodro. 5° of evKoAoL Kai 47)
édeyKTiKol TOV apaptavopevwy Kat put) piAdverkot
/ lol /
pnde Svcépides* mdvtes yap of Tovobrot pmaxnTLKOL,
c A / > / ld 4
ot S€ paydpevor Tavavtia paivovras BovAccbar.

* Aristotle’s opinion of husbandry, in which tillage and
planting, keeping of bees, fish, and fowl were included, was
not nearly so favourable as that of Xenophon in his
Oeconomicus. In two lists of the elements of a State given
in the Politics, it comes first at the head of the lower
occupations. In its favour it is said that it forms the best
material of a rural democracy, furnishes good sailors, a
healthy body of men, not money-grabbers like merchants
and tradesmen, and does not make men unfit to bear arms.
On the other hand, it claims so much of a man’s time that

194

RHETORIC, II. tv. 7-12

hate, and those who are hated by those who are
hated by us ; for all such persons have the same idea
as ourselves of what is good, so that they wish what
is good for us, which, as we said, is the characteristic
of a friend. Further, we like those who are ready
to help others in the matter of money or personal
safety ; wherefore men honour those who are liberal
and courageous and just. And such we consider
those who do not live upon others; the sort of men
who live by their exertions, and among them
agriculturists, and, beyond all others, those who
work with their own hands.* And the self-controlled,
because they are not likely to commit injustice ;
and those who are not busybodies, for the same
reason. And those with whom we wish to be
friends, if they also seem to wish it; such are those
who excel in virtue and enjoy a good reputation,
either generally, or amongst the best, or amongst
those who are admired by us or by whom we are
admired.’ Further, those who are agreeable to
live or spend the time with; such are those who
are good-tempered and not given to carping at our
errors, neither quarrelsome nor contentious, for all
such persons are pugnacious, and the wishes of
the pugnacious appear to be opposed to ours.
he is unable to devote proper attention to political duties,
and should be excluded from holding office. He further
says that husbandmen, if possible, should be slaves (neither
_of the same race nor hot-tempered, for they will work better
| and are less likely to revolt); or, as the next best alternative,
barbarians or serfs. The favourable view taken by Aristotle
here and in the Ogconomics (probably not his) does not
agree with that put forward in the Politics.
» Spengel reads 7 év ols Qavudfovew a’roi and brackets [7

év Trois Oavmavouevos bd’ aitév]. dmracw, Berricros, and ois
will then all be neuter.

195

ARISTOTLE

13 Kai of émidéEvor Kai twhdoa' Kat dropetvar:
emt TtavTo yap duddrepor omevdovor TH mAnaiov,
Suvdpevol te oKwrrecbar Kal eupeA@s oKwr-

14 rovres. Kal Tods érawobdvras Ta brdpxovTa ayaba,
Kat tovtwy pdAwoTa a doBobvrar pr vmdpyew

15 adrois. Kat tos Kalapiovs mept oyw, mepl aur-

16 exdvnv, mept dAov tov Biov. Kat Tovds pur) dvELdt-

ls8lb Oras pare TOV dpapTndaTwy pnre Tav edepye-

17 THuaTwv: auddtepor yap eAeyKTiKOL. Kal TOds [L7)
pvnouxdKous, unde pvdraxtixods TOV eyKAnudTtwv,
GAN ebkatadAdkrovs: olovs yap av troAapBavwow
elvat mpos Tods aAAovs, Kal mpds adTods olovTat.

1g Kal Tovs pq) KaKxoAdyous pyde €lddTas payTe TA
TOv TAnciov Kaka pare TA abt@v, adda tayaba:

196 yap ayalds rotro Spa. Kat Tovds pr) avriretvov-
tas Tots opytlouevois 7 orrovddlovow: paxntuKol
yap of Towodro. Kal Tods mpos adrods omovdaiws
mws €xovtas, olov Javpalovras adbrovds Kal o7ov-

20 Saiovs droAapBavovras Kal yaipovras adrots, Kal
Tatra pdAvora memovOoTas wept a padtota Bov-
Aovrar adroi 7) Oavpaleobar 7% amovdaior doxetv

21 civar 7 Hdcis. Kal Tods Opolovs Kal TadTa émL-
TndevovTas, Eav 1) TrapevoxA@ot nd amo TavTod
4) 6 Bios: ylyverau yap ovTw TO

Kepapeds KEepapel.

bo
to

Kal Tos TOV ad’r@v emOvpobvras, dv evdéyerat
apa petéxew avrovs: ef dé pon, tadTo Kal ovTw

1 Spengel reads 7G matca kal 7r@ bropeivac (from A°).
Roemer (hein. Mus. xxxix. p. 504) supports this, on the
ground that rwédfew implies gross abuse, and would hardly
be spoken of as éupedOs oxamrewv.

196

RHETORIC, II. iv. 13-22

And those are liked who are clever at making or
taking a joke, for each has the same end in view as
his neighbour, being able to take a joke and return
it in good taste. And those who praise our good
qualities, especially those which we ourselves are
afraid we do not possess; those who are neat in
their personal appearance and dress, and clean-living ;
those who do not make our errors or the benefits
they have conferred a matter of reproach, for both
these are inclined to be censorious ; those who bear
no malice and do not cherish the memory of their
wrongs, but are easily appeased ; for we think that
they will be to ourselves such as we suppose them
to be to others; and those who are neither given
to slander, or eager to know the faults of their neigh-
bours nor our own, but only the good qualities ; for
this is the way in which the good man acts. And
those who do not oppose us when we are angry or
occupied, for such persons are pugnacious; and
those who show any good feeling towards us; for
instance, if they admire us, think us good men, and
take pleasure in our company, especially those who
are so disposed towards us in regard to things for
which we particularly desire to be either admired or
to be thought worthy or agreeable. And we like
those who resemble us and have the same tastes,
provided their interests do not clash with ours and
that they do not gain their living in the same way ;
for then it becomes a case of

Potter [being jealous] of potter.*

And those who desire the same things, provided it is
possible for us to share them; otherwise the same

® Two of a trade never agree (Hesiod, Works and Days, 25).
197

ARISTOTLE

23 ovupPaiver. Kad mpos ous ovrws EXOVOW WOTE jL1)
aicxivecbar Ta mpos dd€av, pea Katappovoovres..
24 Kal mpos ovs aicydvovrar Ta mpos aAnferav. Kal
mpos ovs proryobyrar, n op av CnAoboBar Bos-
Aovrat Kal jL1 Plovetobar, Tovrous dirotow 7
25 BovAovras pidror <tvau. Kal ols dv tayaba oup-
mparrwow, eav pn pedAdAn avrots eoeoba peilen
26 KaKd., Kal Tots Opolws kal Tovs dmovras Kal TOUS
mapovtas pirovow: 510 Kal Tods mept Tovs TeOvEd-
Tas TowvTous mavtes pidodow.
Kat ddws rods ofddpa dirAodirovs Kal jar)
eyKarareimovtas’ uddora yap pirotar Tav ayalav
27 robs gdidreiy ayabovs. Kal rods pa mAarTopevous
mpos avrovs: Tovwotro. S€ Kal of ta data ta
cavtav A€yovres. cipntar yap Ott mpdos Tovs
pidous TO. mpos d6€av ovK _aloxuvdjueBa: el odv 6
aioxuvopevos py) purei, 6 6 py aioxuvopevos pidobvrt
EOLKEV. Kal Tovs pt) hoBepovs, Kal ods Pappodpmev:
28 oddeis yap év poBetrar pire. «id de pidtas
éraupeta, olkevoTns ouyyevera. Kat doa TOLAOTO..
29 TounTuKd de prdtas xapes, Kat TO 41) SenBevros
mroujoan, Kal TO TounoavTa a dnrGoa avrod
39 Yap. OUTwWs EveKa paiverar Kal od did Te ETEpov.
reg TTept oe €xOpas Kat Tov pucety pavepov ws €K
rav evav Tie Set Gewpeiv. TOUnTUKA oe , &xOpas
31 dpy7}, emnpeacpos, SvaBoAyn. dpyi mev ody €orlv

« Those with whom we are ambitious of entering into
competition ‘‘in the race for distinction’ (Cope). ‘There is
no unfriendliness, whereas envy produces it.

> A parenthetical remark. Aristotle explains that he is
not thinking of merely conventional faults; if, then, one
who is ashamed of these is no friend, then one who i is not...

198

RHETORIC, II. rv. 23-31

thing would happen again. And those with whom
we are on such terms that we do not blush before
them for faults merely condemned by public opinion,
provided that this is not due to contempt; and
those before whom we do blush for faults that are
really bad. And those whose rivals we are,* or by
whom we wish to be emulated, but not envied,—these
we either like or wish to be friends with them. And
those whom we are ready to assist in obtaining what
is good, provided greater evil does not result for
ourselves. And those who show equal fondness for
friends, whether absent or present; wherefore all
men like those who show such feeling for the dead.
In a word, men like those who are strongly attached
to their friends and do not leave them in the lurch ;
for among good men they chiefly like those who are
good friends. And those who do not dissemble with
them ; such are those who do not fear to mention
even their faults. (For, as we have said, before friends
we do not blush for faults merely condemned by public
opinion ; if then he who blushes for such faults is
not a friend, he who does not is likely to be one).?
And men like those who are not formidable, and in
whom they have confidence ; for no one likes one
whom he fears. Companionship, intimacy, kinship,
and similar relations are species of friendship.
Things that create friendship are doing a favour,
and doing it unasked, and not making it public after
doing it ; for then it seems to have been rendered for
the sake of the friend, and not for any other reason.
As for enmity and hatred, it is evident that they
must be examined in the light of their contraries.
The causes which produce enmity are anger, spite-
fulness, slander. Anger arises from acts committed

199

ARISTOTLE

éx Trav 7pos éaurov, éxOpa S€ Kal dvev TOV mpos
€auTov" eav yap brroAapBavepev eivat Tove, pt-
cotmev. Kal 7 pev opyr) det mept Ta Kal” Exaora,
ofov Kadia LwKpdrer, TO Oe pisos Kal mpos
Ta yevn: TOV yap KAemrqy pool Kal Tov ovKopayryy
dias. Kal TO pev tarov Xpore, To 8 aviatov.
Kal TO pev Avms efeois, TO be KaKkovd’ alcbecbar
yap Bovrerar 6 6 opyelopevos, TO 8° ovdev Svadeper.
€oTt O¢€ TA bev _Avmnpa aiobnra mdvta, Ta. be
paduora Kaka mKvoTa aisOyrd, dducta Kal a-
ppoovry: oddev yap Avmet y Tapovata THS Kasclas.
Kal TO pev peTa AVIS, TO 9 ov pera Avmrns” 6 peev
yap opyilopevos Avmetrat, 6 be prod ov. Kal
6 pev Today a ay yevopevwy eAerjocvev, 6 6 8 oddevds:
6 pev yap avtimabety _PovAcrau @ opyilerar, 6

32 de p47) elvan. dpavepov oy eK rovrwv dre evdexerau
ex9povs Kal pidous Kal Ovras amodeKvivat Kal
pa) ovras Tovey Kal daoKovras Siadvew, Kal bu’
opyiy H Ou exOpay dyupoBntobvras ep Omorep:
dy Tpoapijrat Tus yew. Tota S¢ doBotvrar Kal
aves Kal m@s €xovTes, WS EoTat pavepov.

. "Eorw 87 doBos Avan Tis 7 Tapaxy) eK
ae peMovros Kaxood pbaptixod 7 Aum poo:
od yap mavra Ta KAKA poBodvrat, olov «i cor
ddikos 1 Bpadus, ann’ doa Avrras peydAas 7}
plopas dvvarat, Kal Tar éav pt) Topp aAra
ovveyyus gaivyrar wore pédew. Ta yap TrOppw
adddpa od dofotvrar: toacr yap mavres OTe amo-

232

* He wishes to see and know the result of the measures
taken against those with whom he is angry. Or, it may
mean that he wishes the object of his anger to feel his wrath,
and to know by whom, and for what, he is punished.

200

RHETORIC, II. tv. 31—v. 1

against us, enmity even from those that are not; for
if we imagine a man to be of such and such a char-
acter, we hate him. Anger has always an individual
as its object, for instance Callias or Socrates, whereas
hatred applies to classes; for instance, every one
hates a thief or informer. Anger is curable by time,
hatred not ; the aim of anger is pain, of hatred evil ;
for the angry man wishes to see what happens ; @
to one who hates it does not matter. Now, the
things which cause pain are all perceptible, while
things which are especially bad, such as injustice or
folly, are least perceptible ; for the presence of vice
causes no pain. Anger is accompanied by pain, but
hatred not ; for he who is angry suffers pain, but he
who hates does not. One who is angry might feel
compassion in many cases, but one who hates, never ;
for the former wishes that the object of his anger
should suffer in his turn, the latter, that he should
perish. It is evident, then, from what we have just
said, that it is possible to prove that men are enemies
or friends, or to make them such if they are not} to
refute those who pretend that they are,and when they
oppose us through anger or enmity, to bring them
over to whichever side may be preferred. The things
and persons that men fear and in what frame of mind,
will be evident from the following considerations.

5. Let fear be defined as a painful or troubled
feeling caused by the impression of an imminent
evil that causes destruction or pain; for men do not
fear all evils, for instance, becoming unjust or slow-
witted, but only such as involve great pain or de-
struction, and only if they appear to be not far off
but near at hand and threatening, for men do not
fear things that are very remote ; all know that they

201

ARISTOTLE

Bavotvrar, GAN’ dru odk eyyds, obdev dpovrilovow.
> \ ¢ /, a ~
2€i 6) 6 fdBos robr’ eoriv, avayKn Ta ToLvadra

A > bid / 4 ” ,
poPepa etvar doa daiverar dvvapw exew peyadnv
~ /
Tod Pleipew 7 BAdarew BAdBas eis AdTyv peydAnv
4 a ~
ovvrewovoas. 810 Kal Ta onueia Ta&v ToLovTwY
/ > A A 7 A / ~
poBepa eyyds yap daiverar ro foBepov: todo
> / ~ ~
3 ydp €oTt Kivduvos, poBepod mAnotacpos. Toradra dé
” a a“
exOpa te Kal. dpyn Suvayevwv movetv ti: SHAov
Ld 7, ~ .
yap oT. BovAovrar, wore eyyts €ior Tod movety.
4Kat addiucia ddvapuw Exovoa’ TH mpoapetobar yap
Cc »# + Mend \ ¢ , v4
50 dduKos dduKos. Kal ape? bBpilounevyn Sdvayw
1382b €youoa* OfAov yap Ort mpoaipeirar pev, OTay
c / > 7 uA \ lol \ / ~
6 OPpilynrar, del, Sivarar dé vov. Kat doBos Ta
Suvapevwv TL Tovnoa ev TapacKkevh yap avayKy
7 elvat Kal Tov ToLodrov. ézet 5° of modAol xeipous
Kal yTTovs Too Kepdaivew Kat Sedol ev Tots
Kwodvvois, poBepov ws emt To odd TO em’ adAw
adrov elvar, Wore ot ouvelddTes TEmTOLnKOTL TL
A a \
8 Sewov hoBepoi 7) Kareureiv 7) eykaradimety. Kal
A a > Cal
of Suvdpevoe aduxeiv rots Svvapevois adiKetobat:
Os yap emt To odd adixobow ot avOpwrot, dray
StvwrTa. Kal of HOuKnpEevor 7 vopilovTes adiKEt-
ofa: del yap THpovar Kaipov. Kal ot HOuKNKOTES, EaV
ddvapw exwor, foBepol, SedudTes TO avrimabety.
~ \ ¢ nw
g tméKeiTo yap TO Towtro poBepov. Kat ot TOV
~ 9
ab’t@v avTaywvioral, doa pa) evdéxerar apa
a Aa \ \
bmdpxew apdoiv: adel yap moAeuotor mpos Tovs

« By the definitions of anger and hatred.
» And therefore, having the inclination to be unjust, if he
has the power, he will be so.

202

RHETORIC, II. v. 1-9

have to die, but as death is not near at hand, they
are indifferent. If then this is fear, all things must
be fearful that appear to have great power of de-
stroying or inflicting injuries that tend to produce
great pain. That is why even the signs of such
misfortunes are fearful, for the fearful thing itself
appears to be near at hand, and danger is the
approach of anything fearful. Such signs are the
enmity and anger of those able to injure us in any
way; for it is evident that they have the wish,* so
that they are not far from doing so. And injustice
possessed of power is fearful, for the unjust man is
unjust through deliberate inclination.2 And out-
raged virtue when it has power, for it is evident
that it always desires satisfaction, whenever it is
outraged, and now it has the power. And fear felt by
those able to injure us in any way, for such as these
also must be ready to act. And since most men are
rather bad than good and the slaves of gain and
cowardly in time of danger, being at the mercy of
another is generally fearful, so that one who has
committed a crime has reason to fear his accomplices
as likely to denounce or leave him in the lurch.
And those who are able to ill-treat others are to be
feared by those who can be so treated; for as a
rule men do wrong whenever they can. Those who
have been, or think they are being, wronged, are also
to be feared, for they are ever on the look out for
an. opportunity. And those who have committed
some wrong, when they have the power, since they
are afraid of retaliation, which was assumed to be
something to be feared. And those who are our
rivals for the same things, whenever it is impossible
to share them, for men are always contending with

203

ARISTOTLE

4 \ a Fal
10 TowovToUs. Kat~ot Tots Kpeirroow adr@v hoPepot:
a AY \
BaAdov yap av Sivawro BAdmrew adrovds, i Kat
\ / ~
Tous KpelTTovs. Kal ovs poBodyrar ot KpetTTous
> ~ A ~
lL avr@v, dua radrd. Kal of rods Kpetrrouvs adt@v
> / a ~
avypnkoTes. Kal of tTois yTToow avTa@v eémt-
/ ”“ \
TBEwevor 7) yap dn hoBepot 7 adéybevres.
\ ~ > ~
Kai rév 7diunpuevav Kat éxOpdv 7 dvturdAwy
> ce 2 / A / e) > ec a
ovx of d€VOvp0L Kal TappnotacriKol, GAN ot mpaor
\ ” ~
Kal E€ipwres Kal tavobpyo. ddnAou yap ei eyyus,
LA > is) / \ a , / de \
12 wot ovderoTe havepol Sti TOppw. mavTa de Ta
\ / a ”“ ¢ / >
poBepa poBepwitepa, doa, dv dudprwow, éemavop-
Oacacbar pr evdé iAN 7) GAws adv; i
pon evdexerar, GAN 7 GAws advvara, 7
\ 2j> ¢ ad > es SON a > , y Dig ns
un ep éavtots add’ emi tots evavtiois. Kal av
Ad) / > ”“ A ¢ io ¢ S c Xr ~
BoyPerar py «low 7 pr) padi. ws amAds
> a 4 > oe 27)? A 2 , ”“
eirreiv, hoBepad éeorw doa ed” érépwv yvyvopmeva 7
SNA 2) / > \ \ > 4 \
péAAovra €Acewd eoTw. Ta pev odv doPepa, Kal
A A a 9
a poBodvra, axedov ws eimeitvy Ta peyiota TAdT
> / ¢ \ / > \ ~ a
€oTw’ ws be Siaxetwevor adrol doPobvra, viv
déywpev.
is Ei 64 éorw 6 doBos pera mpoodoKias Tod
, / \ 7, A oe > ‘
meioca0ai tu. pOaptixov mafos, havepov dt. oddels
a ~ > /, \ a“ ~ OL
poBetrar ta&v olouevwy pndev av mabeiv, odde
lot “ \ ” al soi 4 ey? es
radra & 7) olovrar mabeiv, oddé tovTous bf’ dv
/
7) olovrar, ovde ToTE STE pu) OlovTaL. avayKy

@ Or simply, “‘ near . . . far from us.”
204

“RHETORIC, II. v. 10-13

such persons. And those who are feared by those
who are stronger than we are, for they would be
better able to injure us, if they could injure those
stronger than ourselves ; and those whom those who
are stronger than ourselves are afraid of, for the
same reason. And those who have overthrown those
who are stronger than us and those who attack those
who are weaker, for they are either already to be
feared, or will be, when they have grown stronger.
And among those whom we have wronged, or are
our enemies or rivals, we should fear not the hot-
tempered or outspoken, but those who are mild,
dissemblers, and thorough rascals ; for it is uncertain
whether they are on the point of acting, so that one
never knows whether they are far from it.? All
things that are to be feared are more so when, after
an error has once been committed, it is impossible
to repair it, either because it is absolutely impossible,
or no longer in our power, but in that of our op-
ponents ; also when there is no possibility of help or
it is not easy to obtain. In a word, all things are to be
feared which, when they happen, or are on the point
of happening, to others, excite compassion. These
are, so to say, nearly all the most important things
which are to be feared and which men fear. Let us
now state the frame of mind which leads men to fear.
If then fear is accompanied by the expectation
that we are going to suffer some fatal misfortune, it
is evident that none of those who think that they
will suffer nothing at all is afraid either of those
things which he does not think will happen to him,
or of those from whom he does not expect them, or
at a time when he does not think them likely to
happen. It therefore needs be that those who think

205

oe
ARISTOTLE
/ a \ > / cal »” A
toivuv poPetobat Tovs olopevous te mabeiy av, Kat
14 rods bro ToUTwWY Kal TADTA Kat TOTE. OVDK OLOVTAL
1383 a we a. 4K ” ¢ 2 2 , , »”
€ mabeiv av ovre ot ev edruxiats peydAas dvTes
‘ ~ \ € A ‘\ sAb ‘
Kat Soxodvtes, S10 dBpiorai Kat oAlywpor Kat
Opacets (move? 5€ tovovTovs mAotTos iaxyds modv-
/ v4 + ¢ ” / /,
didia S¥vapis), ore ot On memovOevar mévTa
/ \ \ \ > J A \
vopilovtes Ta Sewa Kal amepvypevor mpos TO
” ‘
péAdov, wormep of arotupravilopevor 4Odn* adda
a ~ \ >
det Twa Amida dreivar owrnpias, wept ob ayw-
vi@ow. onpetov dé- 6 yap ddBos BovAcuticods
cal \ ~ >
motet, Kaito. ovdcis Bovdeverar mept THY ay-
, oy a 7 / @
15 cAmiotwv. ware del TovovTous TapacKevdlew, orav
9 BéArvov to hoPetobar adrovs, drt Towobroi eiow
a \
olor mafetv: Kai yap dddou peilous Emafov- Kat
/
Tovs opolous Serkvivar maaxovtas 7) memovOdras,
‘A € A v4 € > e > m” \ col
Kat v7o TowvTwy bh dv ok wovTo, Kal TadTa
kal TOTE OTE OVK WoVTO.
16 °Ezei dé wepi ddBov davepov ti eort, Kal Tov
~ ‘ ¢ ad ” , ‘
poPepGv, Kat Ws Exaoro. Exovtes Sedlacr, pavepov
a \ A
ex TovTwy Kal TO Oappeiv Ti Cort, Kal mepi mota
, ‘ ~ la / Ee
fappargo. Kat 7s Siaxeipwevor Oappadéor ciciv:
/ \ / > / ~ / \ ‘
TO Te yap Adpaos evavtiov TH PoBw Kal To Oap-
, ~ a 4 \ / i? > ‘
paréov 7@ hoBep@: wore pera havracias 7 €Amis
TOV owrnpioy ws eyyds ovTwv, TOV dé hoPepav
a” \ »” ”“ / + ” A ,
17 7) po) OvTwv 7) Téppw dovTwr. Ear. 5é Oappadda

206

RHETORIC, II. v. 13-17

they are likely to suffer anything should be afraid,
either of the persons at whose hands they expect it,
or of certain things, and at certain times. Those
who either are, or seem to be, highly prosperous do
not think they are likely to suffer anything ; where-
fore they are insolent, contemptuous, and rash, and
what makes them such is wealth, strength, a number
of friends, power. It is the same with those who
think that they have already suffered all possible ills
and are coldly indifferent to the future, like those
who are being beaten to death ; for it is a necessary
incentive to fear that there should remain some hope
of being saved from the cause of their distress. A
sign of this is that fear makes men deliberate,
whereas no one deliberates about things that are
hopeless. So that whenever it is preferable that the
audience should feel afraid, it is necessary to make
them think they are likely to suffer, by reminding
them that others greater than they have suffered,
and showing that their equals are suffering or have
suffered, and that at the hands of those from whom
they did not expect it, in such a manner and at
times when they did not think it likely.

Now, since we have made clear what fear and
fearful things are, and the frame of mind in each
case which makes men fear, one can see from this
what confidence is, what are the things that give it,
and the frame of mind of those who possess it ; for
confidence is the contrary of fear and that which
gives confidence of that which causes fear, so that
the hope of what is salutary is accompanied by an
impression that it is quite near at hand, while the
things to be feared are either non-existent or far off.
Confidence is inspired by the remoteness of fearful

207

ARISTOTLE

Td Te Sewa Toppw evra Kal 74 Oapparéa eyyus.
Kal emavopOacers eav dou Kal Bo7bevar, 7) modAat
7 peydrat 7) duper, Kal peryre Tducnpevou pare
HOUKNKOTES dow, dyTaywveorat TE 7 [7) dow
OAws, 7) e1) EXWOL dvvap, 7 Sdvapw € EXOVTES dav
piror 7 Tmemounkores ed 7 memovOores. 7H €av
mAetous dow ois ravra ouppeper, 7 7 KpetTTous, fe)

18 dudw. adroit d€ ottws Exovtes Oappardor «ici,

eav ToAAA KaTwp0wKévar olwvTat Kal pq) TeTrOV-
Bévar, 7 €av moAAdKis éAnAvbdtes eis Ta Sewa.
Kal Suarepevydores dow: dix@s yap dmabeis
yiyvovrau ot avOpwrrot, 7 TO pea) memetpacba 7
TO Bonfetas € Exew, Womrep ey rois Kara Oddarrav
xwSdvos of Te ATrELpoL Xeysdivos Pappodar Ta Ler-~
Aovra Kal ot Bonfeias € Exovres dua T7v epTretpiay

19 Kal ora Trois Opolois 7 pa) poBepov, pn de Tots

Wrroot Kal ov KpeiTTous otovrat elvau’ olovrat b€,
av KeKkparnKaow Y) adrav uy) TOV Kpeurroveny 7

20 Tov opoiw. Kat eay dmdpxew adrots olwvrat

TAciw Kal peilw, ols brepéyovtes hoBepot eciow-

~ aT \ ~ / a” > 4 /
1333 b Tadra 8° €atl wAHV0s xpnudtwv Kal ioxds cwpdtwv

21

kal diAwy Kal xwpas Kal T@v mpos ToAcMov Tapa-
oKev@v, 7 mag@v 7 TOV peylorov. Kal eay pa)
Toucnkores dow a pyndéva 7) py moMovs i oH)
TowovTous mepl ov poBodvrar. Kal oAws dy Ta
mpos Deods avrots Kadds €xn, TA TE dda. Kal Ta,
dao onpetoov Kat Aoyiwv: Dapparcov yap 7 opy},
TO Se put) GdiKeiv adrN’ aduKetabar dpyfhs mountiKor,

@ ru cwrhpa or some other word instead of ra Oappadéa
would be expected, to avoid the tautology. The fact of
remoteness inspires confidence, because we do not expect
fearful things to happen; while salutary things inspire it if
near at hand, because we expect them to happen.

208

RHETORIC, II. v. 17-21

things, or by the nearness of things that justify it.*
If remedies are possible, if there are means of help,
either great or numerous, or both ; if we have neither
committed nor suffered wrong ; if we have no rivals
at all, or only such as are powerless, or, if they have
power, are our friends, or have either done us good
or have received it from us ; if those whose interests
are the same as ours are more numerous, or stronger,
or both. We feel confidence in the following states
of mind : if we believe that we have often succeeded
and have not suffered, or if we have often been in
danger and escaped it ; for men are unaffected by
fear in two ways, either because they have never
been tested or have means of help; thus, in dangers
at sea, those who have never experienced a storm
and those who have means of help as the result of
experience have confidence as to the future. We are
also reassured, when a thing does not inspire fear
in our equals, our inferiors, or those to whom we
think ourselves superior; and we think ourselves
superior to those whom we have conquered, either
themselves or their superiors or equals. And if we
think we possess more or more considerable advan-
tages, such as make their possessors formidable ; such
are abundance of money, strength of body, Riedas:
territory, military equipments, either all or the most
important. And if we have never done wrong to
anyone, or only to a few, or not to such as are to be
feared ; and, generally, if it is well with us in regard
to the gods, especially as to intimations from signs
and oracles, and everything else of the kind; for
anger inspires confidence, and it is the wrong that we
suffer and not that which we inflict upon others that

P 209

ARISTOTLE

To dé Ociov drodapBaverar Bonbetv rots adiKov-
22 pévois. Kal Grav emyetpobyTes 7) pundev dv mrabety
pnde meiceoBar 7} KatopOdcew oiwvtar. Kal rept
pev tov hoBepdv kai Pappadrdwy cipyrat.
6. Ilota 8’ aicxydvovra: Kat dvavcyvyTobow, Kal
mpos Tivas Kal mas €xovtes, ex Tavde SiHAov.
2 €oTw 8 aicxdvn Avan Tis 7) Tapay? mepl TA Eis
adokiay pawopeva dépew TOV Kaxv, 7) Tapdvrwv
a / n“ /, ¢ > > , >
N yeyovorwy 7 peddASvTwv, 7 8’ avatoxyvvTia oAL-
3 ywpia tis Kal dmdBea wept ta adra Tadra. ef
a 4
87 é€oTw aicxdvyn 7) dpicbeica, avayKn aicxytvecbat
a ~ ~ A
emt Tots TowvTos TaV KaKav boa aicypa Soxet
> “ > ~ ”“ * / “~ > > \
clvat 1) avT@ 4 dv gpovtiler: Tovatra 8 éorlv
¢ > 4 , ” A Fe e . S A
00a amo KaKklas épya éotiv, olov to amoBadeiv
> / ”“ cal > ‘ , / \ A >
aonida 7 puyeiv: amd Sevias yap. Kal TO dzo-
4 oTephoa tapakarabijkny: am adiucias yap. Kal TO
ovyyevécbar ofs od Set 7) Srrov od Set 7} Gre uh}
5 det: am’ dxodacias ydp. Kat 7O KepdSaivew dao
puKp@v 7 am aicxyp@v 7 an’ aduvdrwy, ofov mevy-
,
tov 7 TéOvedtwr: SOev Kat 7) Tapomia, TO KAY
~ /
amo vexpod dépew: amd alcxpoKepdetas yap Kal
cal /
6 dveAevOepias. Kat 7d pi) Boney Suvdpevov eis
/ “ a ‘ ‘ “a
Xpyjwata, 7 Arrov Bonbeiv. Kal 7rd Bonbetcba
7 Tapa tdv Arrov edrdopwv. Kal Saveilecbar dre
cal a “ > a
ddfeu airetv, Kal aireiy dre amaireiv, Kal amaureiv
ore aireiv, Kat emaweiv wa Sdn airetv, Kal 7d

¢ It is assumed that the gods will be on our side if we have
suffered wrong ; suffering wrong rouses anger and at the same
time inspires confidence, if our relations with the gods are
such that we feel we can rely upon them for assistance.

210

RHETORIC, II. v. 21—v1. 7

causes anger, and the gods are supposed to assist
those who are wronged. Lastly, we feel confidence
when, at the beginning of any undertaking, we do
not expect disaster either in the present or future,
or hope for success. Such are the things that inspire
fear or confidence.

6. What are the things of which men are ashamed
or the contrary, and before whom, and in what frame
of mind, will be clear from the following considera-
tions. Let shame then be defined as a kind of pain
or uneasiness in respect of misdeeds, past, present,
or future, which seem to tend to bring dishonour ;
and shamelessness as contempt and indifference in
regard to these same things. If this definition of
shame is correct, it follows that we are ashamed of
all such misdeeds as seem to be disgraceful, either
for ourselves or for those whom we care for. Such
are all those that are due to vice, such as throwing
away one’s shield or taking to flight, for this is due
to cowardice ; or withholding a deposit, for this is
due to injustice. And illicit relations with any per-
sons, at forbidden places or times, for this is due to
licentiousness. And making profit out of what is
petty or disgraceful, or out of the weak, such as the
indigent or dead ; whence the proverb, “ to rob even
a corpse,” for this is due to base love of gain and
stinginess. And to refuse assistance in money
matters when we are able to render it, or to give
less than we can; to accept assistance from those
less able to afford it than ourselves ; to borrow when
anyone seems likely to ask for a loan, to ask for a
loan from one who wants his money back, and asking
for repayment from one who wants to borrow ; to
praise in order to seem to be asking for a loan, and

211

ARISTOTLE

> /
AMOTETUXHKOTA pNdev ATTov: mavTa yap avedev-
/ ~ Cal a“
8 depias raira onpeia. ro 8° erawelv mapédvras,
\ \ > \ \ ¢ ~ \ \ ~
Kal TO Tayaba pev treperawety Ta Se adda
DY , \ Ve a > ~ ,
ouvadeigew, Kat Td Urepadyeiv aAyodvre trapévta,
\ 7 lot
Kat TaAAa mdvta doa Tovatra: KoAaKelas yap
onpeta..
K A \ \ ¢€ 7 s “A ¢ 7
9 Kai to pn vropévew révous ods ot mpeaBdTepor
" ¢ ~ a
138427) of Tpupdvres 7 of ev eEovaia paddrov dvtes 7
Ld “
OAws of ddvvaTtwrepou médvTa yap wadaKias onpeta.
10 ‘ ee ae lL BM Ee > / \ A AA / \
Kat TO bh Er€pov ed maaxew, Kal TO TOAAaKIS, Kat
a > > / > / / 4 /
a €U emolnoev ovevdilew: pixporbvyias yap mavra
ll Kat tamewdTnTos onueia. Kal TO mept avdrod
>
mavra Aéyew Kat érayyéAAeoba, Kal TO TAAAdTpLA
€ ~ 4 > / /, ¢ , \ \
aitod ddoxew: ddAaloveias yap. opolws S€ Kal
amo Tav aGhAwy éExdotns TeV Tod WOovs KaKL@v
an \ \
Ta €pya Kal TA onucia Kal Ta poe atoypa yap
12 Kal aloxyvyTiKd. Kal emt tovTow TO TOV Kad@v
, a“ ¢
dv mares petéxovow 7 of Gpowor mdvTes 7) oF
Cal \ / ¢ / de r / ¢ Ov a
mAetoTou, 7) eTexXELV. dpoious dé Adyw dpoeOveis,
, Lid cal hid A > ”
moXitas, 7AuKas, ovyyeveis, dAws tods e€ igov:
,
alaxpov yap Hon TO pun meTéxELW, OLoV TaLdEvGEwS
~ ~ / / \
emt Toootrov Kal Tav GAAwy opoiws. mavta be
~ ~ “ > ¢ \ / 4 \
Tatra paddov, av du’ éavtov daivyrar: otrw yap
” > ‘ / ol ”“ ’ ‘ ” ~
70n amo Kakias padAov, av adbros 7 alrios Tap
a“ / /
13 drapEdvtwv 7 brapxovTwy 7) weAAdvTWY. mTacxXOV-
\ ~
tes S€ 7 TetrovOdTes 7 TELodpevot Ta ToLAadTa

212

RHETORIC, II. vi. 7-13

when you have failed to obtain it to keep on asking ; ;
for all these are signs of stinginess. And to praise
people when they are present, to overpraise their
good qualities and to palliate the bad, to show ex-
cessive grief at another’s grief when present, and all
similar actions ; for they are signs of flattery.

And not to submit to toils, which those put up
with who are older or live luxuriously or hold higher
positions, or, generally speaking, are less fitted to
do so; for all these are signs of effeminacy. To
accept favours from another and often, and then to
throw them in his teeth; for all these things are
signs of littleness and abasement of soul. And to
speak at great length about oneself and to make all
kinds of professions, and to take the credit for what
another has done ; for this is a sign of boastfulness.
Similarly, in regard to each of all the other’vices of
character, the acts resulting from them, their signs,
and the things which resemble them, all these are
disgraceful, and should make us ashamed. It is also
shameful not to have a share in the honourable
things which all men, or all who resemble us, or the
majority of them, have a share in. By those who
resemble us I mean those of the same race, of the
same city, of the same age, of the same family, and,
generally speaking, those who are on an equality ;
for then it is disgraceful not to have a share, for
instance, in education and other things, to the same
extent. All these things are the more disgraceful,
if the fault appears to be our own; for they are at
once seen to be due rather to natural depravity if
we ourselves are the cause of past, present, or future
defects. And we are ashamed when we suffer or
have suffered or are likely to suffer things which tend

213

ARISTOTLE

> /, Ld > > , / ‘ > /
atoxvvovTra. doa eis arysav geper Kal dveidn:
Tatra 8 éori ta cis banpernoes 7 odpatos 7
wv > ~ e > ‘ \ ¢ / \ \
Epywv atoxp@v, av éort To bPpilecOar. Kal ra
fev eis axoAaciay Kal éxovTa Kal akovta (Ta &
> / y~ > ‘ > / \ n” / ¢
ets Biav akovra)* amo avavipias yap 7 SetAlas 7
dropovl) Kal TO p47) apvvecOar.
SA \ > > ed a > > \ ‘ 4
peev odv aloxdvovtat, Tadr é€oTl Kal Ta
~ > \ \ \ > / / > ‘ ¢
14 Toadra: eet Sé wept adokias pavtacia early 7
aicxvvn, Kat tavTns atrijs xdpw aAdAd pi) Tov
atoBawdvrwy, oddelts dé THs ddEns dpovriler adr’
7 Sia tovs S0€dlovras, dvdykn tovTovs aiayv-
e / 4 '¢ > » ~
15 veoBar dv Adyov exer. Adyov 8 Eyer tHv Oavpa-
4 \ “ 4 \ ¢ > e oe
Covrwv, Kal ots Oavudler, Kat th’ dv BovAerau
, \ \ “a A \ &
Oavpdlecbar, Kat mpos ods dptAotipeirar, Kal av
\ a ~ / / \ -.
16 7) Katadpovet tis SdEns. OavpaleoBar pev ody
BovAovra: td trovtwv Kai Oavudlovor tovrous
doo. TL Exovow ayaloy tTav Tysiwv, 7 Tap ay
Tuyxavovor Sedpevor ofddpa Twos dv exetvor KUpLOL,
17 ofov of épdvres* hrrotysobvras S€ mpds Tods dpoious,
dpovtilovo. 8 ws adAnbevdvrwy trav dpovipwyr"
Tovobrot 8 ot Te mpeaBvrepor Kal of memadevpevot.
ig kal ta ev o¢0aduots Kai Ta ev pavep@ padAov-
Ld \ € / A > > a QA
d0ev Kal 7) Tapoysia, TO ev ofbadpois elvar aidd.
Sua Tobdro Tovs del mapecouevovs paAdov aicyd-
vovTa. Kal tovs mpooéxovtas avrois, dua TO eV
1384 b dplaApois dpporepa.
19 Kat rods 7) wept tadra evdyous SHAov yap ore

@ Kuripides, Cresphontes: alias év dpbadmotor ylyvera,
réxvov (7.G.F’. frag. 457).

214

RHETORIC, II. vr. 13-19

to ignominy and reproach; such are prostituting
one’s person or performing disgraceful actions, in-
cluding unnatural lust. And of these actions those
that promote licentiousness are disgraceful, whether
voluntary or involuntary (the latter being those that
are done under compulsion), since meek endurance
and the absence of resistance are the result of
unmanliness or cowardice.

These and similar things are those of which men
are ashamed. And since shame is an impression
about dishonour, and that for its own sake and not
for its results; and since no one heeds the opinion
of others except on account of those who hold it, it
follows that men feel shame before those whom they
esteem. Now men esteem those who admire them
and those whom they admire, those by whom they
wish to be admired, those whose rivals they are, and
whose opinion they do not despise. They desire to
be admired by those, and admire those who possess
anything good that is greatly esteemed, or from
whom they urgently require something which it is
in their power to give, as is the case with lovers.
And they are rivals of those who are like them ; and
they give heed to the men of practical wisdom as
likely to be truthful; such are the older and well
educated. They are also more ashamed of things
that are done before their eyes and in broad day-
light ; whence the proverb, The eyes are the abode
of shame. That is why they feel more ashamed
before those who are likely to be always with them
or who keep watch upon them, because in both cases
they are under the eyes of others.

Men are also ashamed before those who are not
open to the same accusations, for it is evident that

215

20

21

23

ARISTOTLE

rdvavria Soket Tovrois. Kal Tous pa ovyyva-
povucods Tots patvopevous dyaprdvew a yap Tis
avrTos mrovet, Tatra A€yerar Tots 7édas od vepwecay,
wate & pn movet, SHAov Ste veweoa. Kai Tovs
eayyeArixods moAXois: oddev yap Suadeper tay)
dokely 7) 47) efayyeMew. eLayyeArucol dé of Te
70uKn[LEvoL dud TO Taparnpety Kat Ob KaKoddyou:
elmep yap Kal TOvs pn apaprdvovTas, eT. waAXov
Tovs auaptavovtas. Kal ols 7 diatpiBy emt tats
Tov méAas dpaptiats, olov yAevacrais Kal Kwuwdo-
qowis' KakoAdyo. yap ws otro. Kal e€ayyeAri-
Kol . Kal ev ols pndev dmroreTUXTKAoW” womep
yap Davpalopevor Sudwewrau: 510 Kal Tods 7mp@Tov
denbevras TL atoxvvovrat ws ovdev mw ndo€nKores
év avrots. Towodrou 5° of Te apre Bovhdpevor piror
etvar (Ta yap BeArvora. TeGeavrat, 810 «bd exer 1
TOO Evpurisov dmdxpuats mpos Tovs Lvpakoatovs)
Kal Trav mdaAat yvepipeny of pendev ovve.oores.
aioxvvovrar 5° ob _HOvov abra TO pnbevra alayuv-
TnAa aAAa Kal Ta onpeta, olov ov povov dbpodu-
oidlovtes adda Kai Ta onpeta atrod. Kal ov
pLovov Tro.obyTes TA atoypd, aAAa Kal AéyovTes.
Omoiws dé ov TOUS etpnpevous Hovov aiayvvovrat,
ddd. Kal Tovs dydwoorras avrois, olov Depdmovras
Kal didovs tovtwv. drws 8 od aicytvovrar ov?

@ Jebb translates, “‘ who have never seen us break down.”

» The Greek scholiast says: ‘ Euripides, having been sent
as ambassador to the Syracusans, to ask for peace and
friendship, when they refused said: O Syracusans, if for no
other reason than that we are just feeling the need of your
friendship, you ought to respect our admiration.” Nothin
is known of this embassy. Hyperides has been cuareidall
instead of Euripides.

216

RHETORIC, IT. vi. 19-23

their feelings are contrary. And before those who
are not indulgent towards those who appear to err ;
for a man is supposed not to reproach others with
what he does himself, so it is clear that what he
reproaches them with is what he does not do himself.
And before those who are fond of gossiping generally ;
for not to gossip about the fault of another amounts
to not regarding it as a fault at all. Now those who
are inclined to gossip are those who have suffered
wrong, because they always have their eyes upon
us; and slanderers, because, if they traduce the
innocent, still more will they traduce the guilty.
And before those who spend their time in looking
for their neighbours’ faults, for instance, mockers
and comic poets; for they are also in a manner
slanderers and gossips. And before those from whom
they have never asked anything in vain,“ for they feel
as if they were greatly esteemed. For this reason
they feel ashamed before those who ask them for
something for the first time, as never yet having lost
their good opinion. Such are those who have re-
cently sought their friendship (for they have only
seen what is best in them, which is the point of the
answer of Euripides to the Syracusans),’ or old
acquaintances who know nothing against us. And
men are ashamed not only of the disgraceful things
we have spoken of, but also of indications of them,
for instance, not only of sensual pleasures, but also
of the indications of them; and not only of doing,
but also of saying disgraceful things. Similarly, men
are ashamed not only before those who have been
mentioned, but also before those who will reveal
their faults to them, such as their servants or friends.
In a word, they are not ashamed either before those

Q17

ARISTOTLE

dv mod Katadpovota. tis dd€ns Tod dAnbevew
> \ A / ‘A / > 4 LA
(oddeis yap madia Kal Onpia aicydverar) ovre
TAUTA TOvS YYwWpiyLovs Kal Tos ayv@ras, adAa
A /, A ~
TOUS pev yvwpiLovs Ta mpos aAnfevav SoxodyTa

Tovs d€ amwlev Ta pds TOV vomov.
24 Adroi dé dde diaxeipevor aioxuvbeiev dv, mp@rov
peev ei brrdpxovev mpos advtods Exovtes ovTwW TWeES
ov a a . T. > >
otous epapev elvar ovs aioxvvovtar. oav 8 odor
7) Oavpalopevor 7 Oavpdlovres 7 bp’ dv BovAovrar
Bavpdleobar, 7 dv dSéovrai twa xpelav dv pa
4 A wy \ n”“ is ~
tevEovrat adofour ovrTes, Kal odTor % opa@vTes
C4 7 \ lol 4 , >
(domep Kudias wept tis Ldpou KAnpovyias &dn-
/ ’ , \ ¢ A ~ A 7A ta
Lnyopynoev: H&tov yap broAaBety tobs “APnvaious
A av ~
mepteotavat KUKAw Tods “EXAnvas, ws sopa@vras
\ \ , > , A oN , n”
Kal p71) fovov akovoopevous a av ymdiowvrat), 7)
“a , > ¢ a“ nn /, > ,
dv mAnoiov dow ot Tovodro., 7 péed\Awow aioby-
ceobar. S10 Kal opdobar arvyotvtes td Tay
1885a CyAovvtwv mote od BovAovrar: Oavpacrat yap oi
” a
25 CnAwral. Kal drav Exwow a Kataroxdvovew Epya
~ ”“ n~
Kal mpaypara 7) adtav 4 mpoyovwv 7 a\Awy twadv
aA /
mpos obs brdpxe adbrois ayxoreia Tis. Kal OAws
e A e > 7 > ae hea! 5” or ¢ >
imép dv aicxvvovta adroit: eiat 8 obror of cipy-
, ‘ ¢ > »] A > 2 e /
pévor Kal of eis adtovs avadepopevor, dv Sidd-
” f / n” oN > oo
akador 7) ovpBovdo yeyovact, ) €dv Wow Erepor

@ This rendering involves a plural neuter with a plural
verb. Others take the actions or things in a good sense,
“deeds and fortunes, their own or their ancestors, which
they are likely to disgrace.”

218

RHETORIC, II. vi. 23-25

whose opinion in regard to the truth they greatly -
despise—for instance, no one feels shame before .,
children or animals—or of the same things before
those who are known to them and those who are
not; before the former, they are ashamed of things
that appear really disgraceful, before strangers, of
those which are only condemned by convention.
Men are likely to feel shame in the following
situations ; first, if there are any who are so related
to them as those before whom we said that they feel
shame. These, as we pointed out, are those who are
admired by them or who admire them, or by whom
they wish to be admired, or from whom they need
some service, which they will not obtain if they lose
their reputation. These, again, are either persons
who directly see what is going on (just as Cydias,
when haranguing the people about the allotment of
the territory of Samos, begged the Athenians to
picture to themselves that the Greeks were standing
round them and would not only hear, but also see
what they were going to decree); or neighbours ;
or those likely to be aware of what they say or do.
That is why men do not like, when unfortunate, to
be seen by those who were once their rivals, for
rivalry presumes admiration. Men also feel shame
when they are connected with actions or things which
entail disgrace,* for which either they themselves, or
their ancestors, or any others with whom they are
closely connected are responsible. In a word, men
feel shame for those whom they themselves respect ;?
such are those mentioned and those who have any _
relation to them, for instance, whose teachers or
advisers they have been; similarly, when they are

» j,.e. when they have done anything disgraceful.
219

26

27

to

ww

ARISTOTLE

7 \ “A ~ A A >
Gpovot, mpos ovs diAorywobyrat: moAAa yap ai-
oxuvopevor da Tods ToLovToOUs Kal TroLOHGL Kal Ov
movobow. Kat péeAdAovTes Opacba Kai ev pavep@
> / a / 4 > \ ~
avaoTtpepecbat Tots cuveiddow aiaxuvTnAol padA-
24% ov es | ~ ¢ A /
Aov eiotv. dev Kai “Avtipdv 6 Trowtis péeAdAwy
> / ’ ¢ \ / > \ A
anotuptavilecBar tro Aovuciov eimev, tiwv Tovs
ovvarofvycKew péAdovtas éyKadumTopmevous ws
” A ~ ~ ce / > 4 ” ”
qjeoav dua tav mvddv, “ti eyKaddmrecbe ” Edy:
con \ A / ¢ a ow 4 ” \ A
H pr avpidv tis buds i6n TovTwv;”’ TeEpt pev
> ~ \ A > / ~
otv aicxtvns Tatra: mept de avavoxuvtias diAov
ws ek TOV evavtiwy edropjooper.
, A / ” \ a | /, ”“ ~
7. Tiot S€ ydpw eyovot Kai emt tiow 7 Tas
4 lol »”
abrot €xovres, Optaapevors THv xapw ShAov Cora.
” A / | a ¢ ” / /
€otw 51) xapis, Kal? av 6 exwv Aéyerar yapw
aA >
broupyeiv’ Seoevw pr) avTi Twos, pnd Wa Te
> ~ ~ ¢ ~ GAN 7 > / 4 an
avT@ TH drrovupyobytt, iva exe TL weydAn
\ / 4 ~
S’ dv 7 odddpa Seopevw, 7 peydAwv Kat xadeTa@v,
a “ / i! ~ “
ev Katpois TovovTois, 7 povos, 7] mp@Tos, 7
/ / > + ay € > / \ 4,
pddora. Senoeis 5’ cioiv ai dpéfets, Kat To’Twv
7 ~ A / ~
pdAvora ai pera AVans TOD wn yryvomevou: ToLadrat
\ ae a ~
dé at emOvpiar, olov 6 épws. Kal at ev Tais Tod
1 Spengel reads cad’ jw 6 exw Aévyerar xd pw exew, droupyla
‘favour, in accordance with which he who has it is said to

feel benevolence, is rendering a service to one who needs
it,,?

« When on an embassy to Syracuse, he was asked by
Dionysius which was the best kind of brass. On his replying,

220

RHETORIC, II. v1. 26—vu. 3

in rivalry with others who are like them; for there
are many things which they either do or do not do
owing to the feeling of shame which these men
inspire. And they are more likely to be ashamed
when they have to be seen and to associate openly
with those who are aware of their disgrace. Where-
fore the tragic poet Antiphon,* when he was about
to be flogged to death by order of Dionysius, seeing
that those who were to die with him covered their
faces as they passed through the gates, said, ““ Why
cover your faces? Is it because you are afraid that
one of the crowd should see you to-morrow?” Let
this account of shame suffice ; as for shamelessness,
it is evident that we shall be able to obtain ample
knowledge of it from the contrary arguments.

7. The persons towards whom men feel benevolent,?
and for what reasons, and in what frame of mind,
will be clear when we have defined what favour is.
Let it then be taken to be the feeling in accordance
with which one who has it is said to render a service
to one who needs it, not in return for something nor
in the interest of him who renders it, but in that of
the recipient. And the favour will be great if the
recipient is in pressing need, or if the service or the
times and circumstances are important or difficult, or
if the benefactor is the only one, or the first who has
rendered it, or has done so in the highest degree.
By needs I mean longings, especially for things
the failure to obtain which is accompanied by pain ;
such are the desires, for instance, love; also those
‘that from which the Athenians made their statues of
Harmodius and Aristogiton,’”’ Dionysius ordered him to be
put to death.

» xdpis may mean (1) benevolence, the feeling which prompts
a favour ; (2) an actual favour conferred ; (3) gratitude.

221

ARISTOTLE

\
OWpatos KaKwaeo Kal ev KWodUvOLS* Kal yap 6
4 > A \ c 4 A epee:
Kwodvvedwv éemiupet Kal 6 Avmovpevos. 80 of &v
Tevia TaploTdwevor Kat duyats, Kav pukpa v77y-
> ~ ‘
peTnowow, Sua TO péyebos THs Serjoews Kal Tov
Kalpov Kexapiopévor, olov 6 ev AvKeiw Tov poppov
”
4 dovs. avdyKn obv pddvoTa pev eis tadTa exew
Thv vmoupyiav, «i dé pH, Els toa 7) pellw.

7 > > \ A ,@ \ 24? ,

Qor’ eet pavepov Kali dre Kal ed’ ofs yiyverar
Xapis Kal ms €xovor, Sprov dtr ek TovTwY Tapa-
oxevacréov, Tovs pev Sevxvdytas 7 dovtTas 7) ye-
yevnuevovs ev tovavrn dejoer Kal Amy, Tovs Sé
UmnpeTnKoTas é€v TovadTn xpela ToLotrdy TL 7
banpeTodvras. pavepov Sé€ Kai bev adapeiobar
evdexeTar THY Xdpw Kal Trovety axaplorous* 7) ‘yap
1385 b OTL aUT@V Eveka BrnpeTovow 7) danpernoay (TodTo
& ote Hv xdpis), 7) Ore ado TUyNS ovVverecev 7

, ” a > / > > >
ovvnvaykacbnoay, 7 Ot. amédwKav add ovK
cdwKav, elt’ eiddres cite ur audotépws yap tl
avti Twos, WoT ovd ovrws av ein xapis. Kal
mept amdcas Tas KaTnyopias oKemTéov: 1 yap

4, >? ‘ vn & 1a » Sale. | » Ta | A
Xapis €oTW 7 OTL TOdL 7) TOGOVdL 7 ToOLvovdl 7 more
mov. onpetov Sd, ei Edatrov pa) danperncar,
Kal et Tots €xOpois 7) rabra 7) toa 7) peilw: SHAov

or

for)

* Probably given to a beggar or vagrant who had nothing
to sleep on.

» That is, should have in view the satisfaction of urgent
wants and desires (Cope).

* Reading dre ; others read ols, “* by whom.”

4 ‘axapiorovs: the word generally means “ ungrateful,”
and so Jebb takes it here: ‘*and to make men ungrateful.”

¢ The other five categories in Aristotle’s list are: relation,
position, possession, activity, passivity.

‘ Because in that case their motives in rendering the
greater service cannot be disinterested.

222

RHETORIC, II. vir. 3-6

which arise in bodily sufferings and dangers, for
when a man is in pain or danger he desires
something. That is why those who help a man
who is poor or an exile, even if the service be
ever so small, are regarded with favour owing to
the urgency and occasion of the need; for in-
stance, the man who gave the mat* to another
in the Lyceum. It is necessary then, if possible,
that the service should be in the same direction? ;
if not, that it should apply to cases of similar or
greater need.

Since then it is evident on what occasions,° for
what reasons, and in what frame of mind a feeling
of benevolence arises, it is clear that we must derive
our arguments from this—to show that the one side
either has been, or still is, in such pain or need, and
that the other has rendered, or is rendering, such a
service in such a time of need. It is evident also by
what means it is possible to make out that there is
no favour at all, or that those who render it are not
actuated by benevolence ¢; for it can either be said
that they do, or have Hone so, for their own sake,
in which case there is no favour ; or that it was mere
chance ; or that they acted under compulsion ; or that
they were making a return, not a gift, whether they
knew it or not ; for in both cases it is an equivalent
return, so that in this case also there is no favour.
And the action must be considered in reference to
all the categories; for if there is a favour it is
so because of substance, quantity, quality, time, or
place.¢ And it denotes lack of goodwill, if persons
have not rendered a smaller service, or if they have
rendered similar, equal, or greater services to our
enemies ; for it is evident that they do not act for

223

ARISTOTLE

A Lud > A ~ ¢ ~ tA a” ‘J ~
yap or. ovd€ Tatra udv evexa. 7 ef haddAa
> a A
eldws* oddeis yap dporoye? Setobar davrAwy.
8. Kat wept pev tod yapileo@ar Kal dyapioreiv
” aA > > \ \ / > ~ A
elpyTa mota 5 eéAcewa Kal tivas €Acodor, Kal
~ > \ »” / ” Se. 7
2 m@s avrot exovtes, Aéywuev. eaTw 51) eAcos AUT
Tis emt gawouevw Kak dbaprixda 7 AvTnpPa
a /
Tob avatiov tuyxydvew, 0 Kav adbtos mpoadokn-
cevev av Tabeiv 7 TOv adtod Twa, Kal ToOOTO, 6Tav
/ / ~ \ bud > , \ /
TAnciov haivnra SHAov yap ott avayKn Tov per-
Aovra eXderoew tadpyew Tovdrov olov oleobat
mabey av Te KaKov 7) adtov 7) THY avTod Twa, Kal
a \ e ” > mG x ¢ ”
TOLOUTO KaKOV olov elipnTar ev TH Gpw 7 Opowov 7
7 \ A ¢ ~ > 7
3 mapatAnotov. 810 ore of mavTeADs amoAwAdres
> ~ ? \ A a“ v lal ” /
éXcotow (oddev yap av ért mabeiy olovrat: memov-
a >
fact yap) ovre ot brepevdatpoveiv olduevor, aAA
bBpilovow: «i yap dmavta olovrar badpxyew Ta-
/ OnA v \ \ A > } / 0 0 ~
yaba, dSijAov 6ti. Kat TO pH evdexecfar rrabetv
lol ~ a shal
4pndev Kakdv' Kal yap TodTo Tav ayabdv. cial
d€ TowodTor ofo. vouilew mabeiv av ot re memov-
/ ” \ / \ ¢ /
Odtes dn Kat diamepevydtes, Kal of mpeoBdrepo.
A \ \ A ‘ a '? 7, \ «3: cal
Kat 61a 70 dpoveiv kat dv” eurrerpiav, Kal of acbeveis,
\ c / a \ c /
Kat ot dSewAdrepor waAAov, Kai of merradevpevot:
a ” /,
5 edAdyioTo yap. Kal ols dadpyovat yoveis 7) TéKVA
yuvaikes’ abrod te yap ratra, Kal ofa mabetv
A > / \ ¢ 7 > > ) / 10 ”
67a elpnucva. Kal of pre ev avdplas mabe ovres,
e es ae , 2\7 \ a3 ,
olov ev opyh 7 Odpper (adAdytora yap Tod ecopevov
~ ous > ¢ a / A \
Tatra) unt ev bBprotiKH Svabecer (Kal yap odrot
224

RHETORIC, II. vir. 6—vu1. 6

our sake in this case either. Or if the service was in-
significant, and rendered by one who knew it; for no
one admits that he has need of what is insignificant.
8. Let this suffice for benevolence and the opposite.
We will now state what things and persons excite
pity, and the state of mind of those who feelit. Let
pity then be a kind of pain excited by the sight of
evil, deadly or painful, which befalls one who does
not deserve it; an evil which one might expect to
come upon himself or one of his friends, and when
it seems near. For it is evident that one who is
likely to feel pity must be such as to think that he,
or one of his friends, is liable to suffer some evil, and
such an evil as has been stated in the definition, or
one similar, or nearly similar. Wherefore neither
those who are utterly ruined, are capable of pity,
for they think they have nothing more to suffer,
since they have exhausted suffering ; nor those who
think themselves supremely fortunate, who rather
are insolent. For if they think that all good things
are theirs, it is clear that they think that they cannot
possibly suffer evil, and this is one of the good things.
Now those persons who think they are likely to
suffer are those who have already suffered and
escaped ; the advanced in age, by reason of their
wisdom and experience; and the weak, and those
who are rather more timid; and the educated, for
they reckon rightly ; and those who have parents,
children, or wives, for these are part of them and
likely to suffer the evils of which we have spoken ;
and those who are not influenced by any courageous
emotion, such as anger or confidence, for these
emotions do not take thought of the future; and
those who are not in a wantonly insolent frame of

Q 225

4

ARISTOTLE

A P A
aAdyioro. tod meiceoOai tv), GAN of perakéd
i : A
TrouTwy. prt ad ghoBovpevor apddpa: od yap
? a © '%9 , \ ‘ \ a
eAcodow ot exmetrAnypevor dua To <lvat mpos TO
7 oikeiw mabe. Kav olwvrat twas elvar emeiKets
¢ \ , 7 / 7 3¢/
6 yap pndéva oldpevos mavras oinoerar a€ious
~ 4 Ld \ if ” 4 @ >
1386a elyat KaKOD. Kal OAws 82) Tay Exn OVTwWS WoT
avapvnobjvar Tovatra ovpBeBynKdta 7 adT@ 7 TOV
€ ~ ai 5 / / n ciate ~ ¢ ~
adtod, 7) eArica yevécbar 7 abt@ 7 TOV adrod.
8 ‘Qs pev ody exovtes eXcobow, cipyntar, a 5
edcotow, €k TOD Opiaopod SijAov: 60a Te yap TaV
~ \ > lat / 4 > 4
AuTnpav Kat dduvnpdv Pbaptixd, mavra édcewa,
Kal 600 avaipeTiKd, Kal dowv 1 TUXN aiTia KaK@v
9 péyebos exdvtwy. eat 8 ddvvnpa pev kat dbap-
Tua Odvaro. Kal aikiat owudtrwy Kal Kakwoes
10 Kal yhpas Kal vdoou Kal tpodas. évdera, dv 8 %
TUXN aitia KaKav, adiria, dAvyodpiAia (Sud Kal To
dicomdaba azo tav didwy Kal avv7Pwv éeAcewor),
aioxos, dobéveva, avamnpia: Kat TO Gbev mpookerv
> / a / ~ \ \
ll ayabov tu mpafar, Kaxdv te ovpPivar. Kal 76
ToAAdKis TowodTov. Kal Td memovOdTos yeverbar
7. ayabdv, olov Atomeifee ta mapa Bacrrléws
~ / \ ‘ “ f : ~
teOvedre Karerréupn. Kal To 7 pndev yeyerf-
> ? “"\ , \ > ,
aba ayabov, 7) yevoprévewv jut) elvat amroAavow,
> > \ = > Aa “~ ‘ ‘ , , bee
Ed’ ofs ev ody €Acoto., Tadra Kal Ta Tovadra
> > ~ \ VA , A \ /
12 eotw: €Acodar dé Tovs TE yuwpifrous, €av pay opd-

226

RHETORIC, II. vir. 6-12

mind, for they also take no thought of future suffer-
ing; but it is those who are between the two ex-
tremes that feel pity. Those who are not in great
fear ; for those who are panic-stricken are incapable
of pity, because they are preoccupied with their
own emotion. And men feel pity if they think that
some persons are virtuous ; for he who thinks that
no one is will think that all deserve misfortune.
And, generally speaking, a man is moved to pity
when he is so affected that he remembers that such
evils have happened, or expects that they may
happen, either to himself or to one of his friends.

We have stated the frame of mind which leads men
to pity; and the things which arouse this feeling
are clearly shown by the definition. They are all
painful and distressing things that are also destruc-
tive, and all that are ruinous; and all evils of which
fortune is the cause, if they are great. Things dis-
tressing and destructive are various kinds of death,
personal ill-treatment and injuries, old age, disease,
and lack of food. The evils for which fortune is
responsible are lack of friends, or few friends (where-
fore it is pitiable to be torn away from friends and
intimates), ugliness, weakness, mutilation ; if some
misfortune comes to pass from a quarter whence one
might have reasonably expected something good ;
and if this happens often ; and if good fortune does
not come until a man has already suffered, as when
the presents from the Great King were not dispatched
to Diopithes until he was dead. Those also are to
be pitied to whom no good has ever accrued, or who
are unable to enjoy it when it has.

These and the like things, then, excite pity. The
persons men pity are those whom they know, pro- .

227

13

ARISTOTLE

dpa eyyds Bow oixedtyre tept S€ TovTous WoameEp
\ ¢€ \ Zr ” Py \ \ “A
mept adrods pédAovras exovow. 810 Kai “Apaots
emt pev TH viet ayouevm emi ro amobaveiv ovdK
> / ¢ / vw \ ~ 7 ~
eddKpvaev, ws paciv, emi S€ TH HiAw mpocatobytt:
ToUTo pev yap eAcewov, exeivo dé Sewov: TO yap
Sewov eTrepov Tob eAcewod Kal éxKpovoTuKov Tov
éAéov Kai modAadKis TH evavtiw ypHoysov. Ere
éeotow eyyds adbrots Tob Sewobd dvTos. Kal Tods
dpotovs éeAcodor Kara AAuKias, Kata On, Kara
e€eis, KaTA a€ipata, KaTa yevn’ ev mao yap
, lod / \ 9 ian bo) ¢ /
TovTois padAov daiverar Kal at’t@ dv vtrap§au-
oe \ \ > ~ Py cal a Lg 7 >?
cAws yap Kat evratla det AaBety dru, daca ed
er. ~ A , ee * 7,
aitav doBotvra, tadta em adddAwy yuyvomeva

14 €Xcotow. émel 8 eyyls dawdpeva ta maby

15

> / > \ \ \ ” 4 ”

édcewd eott, Ta Sé poupioaroyv ETos yevoueva 7
> / *” > > / ” / ” La

eodueva ovr éAmilovres ovTe peuvypevor 7) 6AwS

~ /

ovk €dcodow 7) ody cOpoiws, avdyKn Tovs ouP-

amepyalouevous oxrjuact Kat dwvais Kat eabAre
~ >

Kal OAws TH broKpice. eAcewor€pous «lvat eyyvds

yap movotor daivecbar To KaKOV pO oppdTwr

~ / \ \

movobvres, 7) ws péeAdov 7 Ws yeyovos. Kal Ta

, ” an / \ / > /
1386 b yeyovora apTu 7) wéAdovra Sua Taxéwv €Acewdrepa
a \
16 Sua TO adro. Kal Ta onpeia Kal tas mpd&es,

>

> ~ / ~ / \ @ ~
olov eobArds Te THY TeTovOdTwY Kai doa ToLabra,
‘ / \ @ ” a > a 4, old
Kal Adyous Kal doa ddAa Tdv ev TH TdOer dvTwv,
‘ / \
ofov Hon TeAcuT@vTwy. Kal pddloTa TO o7OU-

® Herodotus, iii. 14, where the story is told, not of Amasis,
but of his son Psammenitus.

® Jebb renders: ** Again men pity when the danger is
near themselves,”” which may mean when they see something
terrible happening to others and likely soon to befall them-

228

RHETORIC, II. vir. 12-16

vided they are not too closely connected with them ;
for if they are, they feel the same as if they them-
selves were likely to suffer. This is why Amasis“ is ,
said not to have wept when his son was led to execu-
tion, but did weep at the sight of a friend reduced
to beggary, for the latter excited pity, the former
terror. The terrible is different from the pitiable,
for it drives out pity, and often serves to produce
the opposite feeling. Further, the nearness of the
terrible makes men pity.’ Men also pity those who
resemble them in age, character, habits, position, or
family ; for all such relations make a man more likely
to think that their misfortune may befall him as
well. For, in general, here also we my conclude
that all that men fear in regard to themselves excites
their pity when others are the victims. And since
sufferings are pitiable when they appear close at
hand, while those that are past or future, ten thou-
sand years backwards or forwards, either do not
excite pity at all or only in a less degree, because
men neither expect the one nor remember the other,
it follows that those who contribute to the effect by
gestures, voice, dress, and dramatic action generally,
are more pitiable ; for they make the evil appear
close at hand, setting it before our eyes as either
future or past. And disasters that have just hap-
pened or are soon about to happen excite more pity
for the same reason. Pity is also aroused by signs
and actions, such as the dress of those who have
suffered, and all such objects, and the words and
everything else that concerns those who are actually
suffering, for instance, at the point of death. And

selves. Vahlen inserts od yap before érc: ‘* For men cease
to pity when the terrible comes close to themselves.”

229

ARISTOTLE

/ a “ :
Satovs elvar ev rots TovovTous Katpois dvras éAeEt-
vov' dzavra yap tatra dia TO eyyds patveobar
lanl ~ ‘ ” ‘ e > / ww A
padrXov zrovet Tov EXeov, Kal ws avaklov ovTos, Kat
ev odbaduois pawopnevov Tob mabovs.
9. “Avrixerrar 5é€ 7 éAcciv padiora pev 6
“~ ~ ~ a a >
Kadodo. veweoav: T® yap Avieicbar emi rats av-
‘
atlas Kakompaylas avrTikelwevov €or TpdTOV TWA
Kal amo Tob avrob 7Oovs 7 Avmeicar emi Tats
> / ? / \ + ‘ / ”
avagias edmpaylas. Kat dudw ta m&0n HOovs
~ a a /
2xpynoTod: Set yap emt pev rots avakiws mparrovor
Kak@s avvdxbecbar Kal édeciv, Tots dé ed vemeoav-
; \
adduckov yap TO Tapa THv aklav yeyvouevov, Sto
\ a a > / \ a / >
3 Kal Tots Deois amodidomev TO vewecdv. dogee 8
an“ \ ec / ~ > ~ A > \ > a
av Kat 6 POdvos TO eAceiv Tov adbrov avrixeiabat
TpoTov Ws atveyyus @v Kal tadbrov TO veweoay,
‘
eoTt 8 Erepov: Adin pev yap Tapaywdns Kal 6
/ > \ \ > > / > > > ~~ > ,
Odvos €ori Kai eis edpayiav, add’ od Tob avakiov
GAA Tod igov Kai dpolov. TO dé pt) OTL avT@ Te
7 4 > \ > o! 2% A /
cup Pyocetar ETepov, aAAd dv adrov tov mAygiov,
cal ” \
amracw opoiws det drdpyew. ov yap ETL €oTat TO
\ \
puev vewecois TO Se POdvos, adda PdBos, eav dia
Totro 4 Avan imdpxyn Kal 7 Tapayy, OTe adT@ Tt
” “A > \ ~ > / > /
4€o0Ta. datAov amd ths éxeivov edmpatias. dave-
A Pie a > yy i] / \ ‘ > / 10: 4,
pov 5° dru axodovbjoe Kal ra evavtia mdOn Tov-
a /
Tos’ 6 ev yap AvTovpevos emt Tots avakiws KaKo-
lan > a
mpayodow Habicerar 7 aAvmos Earat emi Tots

2 ** When the men, who are in such crises, are good men”
(Jebb). If they were not, their misfortune would appear
deserved.

» The signs and actions, and the demeanour of the
sufferer.

230

RHETORIC, II. viir. 16—1x. 4

when men show themselves undaunted * at such
critical times it is specially pitiable ; for all these
things,” because they come immediately under our
observation, increase the feeling of pity, both because
the sufferer does not seem to deserve his fate, and
because the suffering is before our eyes.

9. Now what is called indignation? is the antithesis
to pity; for the being pained at undeserved good
fortune is in a manner contrary to being pained at
undeserved bad fortune and arises from the same
character. And both emotions show good char-
acter, for if we sympathize with and pity those who
suffer undeservedly, we ought to be indignant with
those who prosper undeservedly ; for that which
happens beyond a man’s deserts is unjust, wherefore
we attribute this feeling even to gods. It would
seem that envy also is similarly opposed to pity, as
being akin to or identical with indignation, although
it is really different ; envy also is indeed a disturb-
ing pain and directed against good fortune, but not
that of one who does not deserve it, but of one who
is our equal and like. Now, all who feel envy and
indignation must have this in common, that they are
disturbed, not because they think that any harm will
happen to themselves, but on account of their neigh- |
bour ; for it will cease to be indignation and envy,
but will be fear, if the pain and disturbance arise
from the idea that harm may come to themselves
from another’s good fortune. And it is evident that
these feelings will be accompanied by opposite feel-
ings ; for he who is pained at the sight of those who
are undeservedly unfortunate will rejoice or will at
least not be pained at the sight of those who are

¢ yeueoav: ‘* the nobler brother of envy ” (Nietzsche).
231

ARISTOTLE

> , _ * ,
evavTiws KakoTpayodow* olov rods marpadoias
\ / ”
Kal puaipovous, Stay TUYwot TYLwplas, oddEels av
/ , lal \ / ar A a ,
Aunfein xpnords* Set yap yaipew emt tots Tovov-
€ > 7 1 o> 4 a > , >
Tos, ws 8 avtws Kal emi tots eb mpdrtovat Kat
ta odd + \ / \ a \
afiav’ dudw yap Sixata, Kat moved yatpew Tov
> ~ > / \ > /
emietky}’ avayKn yap €Anilew tmdpéar av, amep
~ ¢ , ‘ ~ ~ “~
57@ opmoiw, Kat adtT@. Kat €ort tod avrod 7Oovs
av ~ ~
anavra Ttadra, Ta 8 evavTia Tod evavriov: 6 yap
> / > > - \ , 24? e
avros eoTw emixaupéxakos Kal pOovepds: ef @
7 a / / >
iss7a yap Tis AvTetrar yryvopevw Kal brdpyovtt, avay-
a ~ PeeR “a ~ ~ a”
Kalov ToUTov emt TH aTepjoe. Kat TH PO0opa TH
, /
tovTov yxaipew. S10 KwdAvtika pev eAdov mavTa
~ > / /, A \ A > ta »
Tabra eoti, diadeper dé dia Tas eipnuevas aitias-
o ‘ \ a /
WOTE TpOS TO py EeAcELVa TOLely AmavTA dpoiws
/
XpHoy.a.
~ \ > \ ~ a /
6 IIparov pev otv epi Tod vewecay Adywper,
Tiot Te veweo@or Kal emi riot Kal mBs Exovtes
> / > \ ~ \ ~ »” \
7 avrol, «ira peta Tadta mepi Tay GAAwy. davepov
8 é€x ta&v cipnudvwv> ef ydp é€oTt TO vewecdv
Aureicbar eri TH hawopevw avakiws edrpayeiv,
~ ~ tae PS | ~ a
mpatov pev SfAov ote ody oldv 7° én maou Tois
> a ~ > ‘ > / bal > coal ”“
8 dyalois veucoadv: od yap «i Sikatos 7 avdpetos, 7
, \
ef aperyv Arerar, veweoroer TtovTw (ovde yap
wv » a > / /, ee > > >A
éAeou emt tots éevavtious TrovTwy eioiv), add’ emi
a 4
mAovTw Kal Suvdper Kal Tois TovwodTois, 6owv ws
¢ ~ > a * / > €¢ 3 \ ‘ c XK! 4
amAds eimeiv d£étol etow of ayabol [kai ot ta ddoer
” > 6 / t > / ‘ / \o@
éxovres ayabd, ofov edyéveray Kat KdAXos Kal doa

« There is justice both in the punishment of the parricide
and in the deserved good fortune of others. The conclusion

232

RHETORIC, II. 1x. 4-8

deservedly so; for instance, no good man would be
pained at seeing parricides or assassins punished ;
we should rather rejoice at their lot, and at that of
men who are deservedly fortunate ; for both these *
are just and cause the worthy man to rejoice, because
he cannot help hoping that what has happened to his
like may also happen to himself. And all these
feelings arise from the same character and their
contraries from the contrary ; for he who is malicious
is also envious, since, if the envious man is pained
at another’s possession or acquisition of good fortune,
he is bound to rejoice at the destruction or non-
acquisition of the same. Wherefore all these
emotions are a hindrance to pity, although they
differ for the reasons stated; so that they are all
equally useful for preventing any feeling of pity.

Let us then first speak of indignation, the persons
with whom men feel indignant, for what reasons,
and in what frame of mind; and then proceed to
the rest of the emotions. What we have just said
will make matters clear. For if indignation is being
pained at the sight of good fortune that is apparently
undeserved, in the first place it is clear that it is
not possible to feel indignation at all good things ;
for no one will be indignant with a man who is just
or courageous, or may acquire any virtue (for one
does not feel pity in the case of opposites of
those qualities), but men are indignant at wealth,
power, in a word, at all the advantages of which
good men are worthy. [And those who possess natural
advantages, such as noble birth, beauty, and all such
must refer to the latter; if his like is fortunate, he hopes he
may be.

» Because it is a man’s own fault, and pity is only felt for
what is undeserved.

233

9

10

ll

ARISTOTLE

~ > \ \ aye? a > , LZ
towavra|. ezeid1 dé 7d dpyatov eyyds tu paiverar
lo > aA >
Tob duce, avdyKn tots tatté eyovow ayabor,
oN
€av vewoTtl eéxovtes tvyxdvwot Kal Sia TovTO
evmpayaa., waAdov vewecav: padAov yap AvTobow
c A ~ Zz.
ot vewott mAovTobytes THv mdAau Kal dia yevos*
¢ / A A Ea \ , \ 4
Opoiws Se Kal dpxovres Kal Suvdpevor Kal moAv-
‘ zA nn
pirat Kat <v’TeKVoL Kal OTLObY THY TOLOUTwWY. KaV
\ a> a
dua Tabr’ GAXo 71 ayabov yiyvnras abrots, woavTws*
\ ‘ > ~ A ~ /
kat yap evrad0a paddov AvTodow of vedmAovTot
apxovres did Tov mAodrov, 7) of dpyadmAouTot,
c / A \ >. 2A ~ + ” > if <
Opotws Sé Kat emi tav ddAwv. aitiov 8 dr of
a ~ >
peev Soxodot 7a adrdv exew of 8 ov 7O yap del
M4 / ” > \ a 7 ¢
ovtw dawdpevov exew addAnbés Soxet, Wore oi
ETepol od Ta avTav éxyew. Kal eel ExaoTov THY
> ~ > ~ / ” > /, > A
ayabav od tod ruxdvTos déwov, adAAd Tis éeoTiv
> , \ 1 , fion te s
dvadoyia Kat TO apydrrov, olov dmAwy KaAXos
> a / € / > A ~ > / ‘
od TH Sixaiw dpudtrer GAAa TH avdpeiw, Kal
/ a
yayor duadepovtes ov Tots vewort mAovTovow
a \ A
adda, Tots edyevéow,—eav odv ayabos dy pa) Tod
‘ A ”
apuoTTovros Tuyxavn, veweonTov. Kal Tov 7TTw
~ a / —? A
T® Kpeitrov. audioPyreiv, pddvotra pev ody TOvS
ev T@ adbrt@: d0ev Kal robr’ elpynras,

« The first part of the sentence is clear: men are indignant
when what good men deserve is possessed by those who are
not good. ‘The literal translation of the text as it stands is:
**Men are indignant ... at all the advantages of which
good men and those who possess natural advantages. are
worthy ”’; but this cannot be right, since there is nothing in
natural advantages to arouse moral indignation, there is no
question of their being deserved or undeserved: Something
may have fallen out like ‘* but they will not be indignant
with those who possess natural advantages.’’ Roemer (Jthein.
Mus. xxxix. p. 504) suggests: odd’ el 7a pice Exovtw dyald
(understanding veueojoe: rovrots).

234

RHETORIC, II. rx. 9-11

things.|* And since that which is old seems closely
to resemble that which is natural, it follows that, if
two parties have the same good, men are more
indignant with the one who has recently acquired it
and owes his prosperity to it; for the newly rich
cause more annoyance than those who have long
possessed or inherited wealth. The same applies to
offices of state, power, numerous friends, virtuous
children, and any other advantages of the kind. And
if these advantages bring them some other advan-
tage, men are equally indignant; for in this case
also the newly rich who attain to office owing to
their wealth cause more annoyance than those who
have long been wealthy ; and similarly in all other
cases of the same kind. The reason is that the
latter seem to possess what belongs to them, the
former not; for that which all along shows itself
in the same light suggests a reality, so that the
former seem to possess what is not theirs.2 And since
every kind of good is not suitable to the first comer,
but a certain proportion and suitability are necessary
(as for instance beautiful weapons are not suitable
to the just but to the courageous man, and dis-
tinguished marriages not to the newly rich but. to
the nobly born), if a virtuous man does not obtain
what is suitable to him, we feel indignant. Similarly,
if the inferior contends with the superior, especially
among those engaged in the same pursuit,—whence
the saying of the poet,

> Soxey is a stronger word than ¢aivecOa, indicating an
intellectual operation as opposed to an impression received
through the senses. The idea is that where anything has
been so long in a person’s possession, it has come to be
regarded as his by right.

235

ARISTOTLE

Atavros 8° dddewe paynv TeAapwriddao-
Leds yap of veueoacy’, 67’ dpetvovi uwrt paxorro.

> \ , vn” ¢ ~ os eS ~ ,
1ss7b EL O€ (17), KaV OmWoodY 6 ITTwWY T@ KpEiTTOVL, Olov
> 4 ~
El 0 povoikes TH Sixaiw: BédATvov yap 7) Suxcavoodvy
THS LOVvatKs.
Oi A on ~ \ >. ah > , iad
is wev obv veeo@at Kat du’ d, €x rodTwv SHAov-
12 Tabra yap Kal ra Tovadrd eorw. adrol 8 ve-
peonTiucol eiow, éav dior ruyydvwow dvTes TOV
/ > a \ ~
peylorwv ayalav Kat tadra Kexrnuevo: TO ‘yap
~ / ns i $3
TOV Opolwy HEiadabar Tods pt) dpotovs od Sicacov.
, > aL
13 devrepov 8°, dv dvres ayabol Kal omovdator Tvy-
dvwow* Kpivoval te yap «0, Kal Ta GSiKa pucodow.
14 kai €av Prdrysor Kal dpeyopevor TwOv mpdkewv,
Kal pddvora rept tabra dudtyso. Gow dv Erepor
15 avdgvou ovtes Tuyxdvovow. Kat dAws ot a€vodvrTes
a \
avroi avtovs, av érépous pr) a&vobar, veweontiKol
TovTols Kat TovTwv. 610 Kal of avdpamod@dets
\ ~ ‘ > / > , Oo \
Kat pabddAor Kal adiddctrysor od veweanrucot: oddev
16 yap €oTw od éavrods olovras a&iovs elvar. davepov
& €« tovTwv enl moiois arvyodo. Kal KaKo-
~ , >
mpayodow 7 pi Tvyxdvovor xalpew 7 addmws
a “ /
eyew det ex yap Tov cipnuevwnw Ta avTiKeipevd
A 4,
€or. OfAa, Wor éav Tovs TE KpiTas ToLovToUS
mapackevdon 6 Adyos, Kal Tods akwdvtas éAect-
\ os e > = , > , A
oOo, kai éf’ ofs éXectobar, SeiEn avatiovs ev

* Iliad, xi. 542. Only the first verse is given in the
received text of Homer; the second is not found in any of
the mss. The reference is to Cebriones, a son of Priam slain
by Patroclus.

» It has been suggested to insert uh before rvyxdvwor: * if,
although virtuous and worthy, they do not happen to possess
such advantages.”’

236

RHETORIC, II. rx. 11-16

He avoided battle with Ajax, son of Telamon,* for Zeus
was indignant with him, when he would fight with a better
man;

or, if the pursuit is not the same, wherever the inferior
contends with the superior in anything whatever, as
for instance, the musician with the just man; for
justice is better than music.

From this it is clear, then, with whom men are
indignant and for what reasons; they are these or
of such a kind. Men are prone to indignation, first,
if they happen to deserve or possess the greatest
advantages, for it is not just that those who do not
resemble them should be deemed worthy of the same
advantages ; secondly, if they happen to be virtuous
and worthy, for they both judge correctly and hate
what is unjust. And those who are ambitious and
long for certain positions, especially if they are those
which others, although unworthy, have obtained.’
And, in general, those who think themselves worthy
of advantages of which they consider others un-
worthy, are inclined to be indignant with the latter
and. because of these advantages. This is why the
servile and worthless and unambitious are not in-
clined to indignation ; for there is nothing of which
they think themselves worthy. It is evident from
this what kind of men they are whose ill fortunes,
calamities, and lack of suecess must make us rejoice
or at least feel no pain; for the opposites are clear
from what has been said. If then the speaker puts
the judges into such a frame of mind and proves
that those who claim our pity (and the reasons why
they do so) are unworthy to obtain it and deserve

¢ Or, “ of which others happen to be unworthy.”
237

1388 a

5

ARISTOTLE

évTas Tvyxavew a€ious dé pu) Tvyxdvew, addvarov
éAeeiv.
10. Afjrov Sé€ Kai-émi riot Pbovotcr Kat Tice
‘ ~ ” ” > \ c 7 ,
Kal m@s €xovTes, eimep eat 6 POdvos Avan TIS
emt evmpayia pawopern Tadv eipnuevwv ayalav
\ \ ¢ / \ 7 ¢ an > A >
mept tods opolovs, py wa te adt@, adda Se
exeivous” PIovycovar pev yap of TovobTo. ols toi
¢
TWes Spovor 7 paivovrar. dpotous dé éyw Kata
YEvos, Karo ovyyeveray, cal TAckiay, Kal?” eéw,
kata dd€av, Kata Ta brdpxovTa. Kal ols puKpod
> , \ \ , (ll Babe \ € ae
eMcimer TO pn) mavTa brdpyew. 810 of peydra
mpatrovTes Kal ot edrvxobvres POovepoi eiow-
mdvras yap ovlovrac Ta adrdv dépew. Kal oi
7 | ers / \ / ea ih
TyLmpevor emi TU SiadepovTws, Kal pdAora emt
/ “A > , \ e /, sf
codia 7) evoayLovia. Kal of piAsryrot plovepes-
TEepor TOV adurorip. Kal ot Sofécodot" pidd-
TyLot yap emt codia. Kal ohus ot diAddo€ou epi
tt Oovepot epi Totro. Kal ot pixpoyuyxor-
mavTa yap peydaAa Soxet adrois <lvat.
> > e \ ~ \ \ > A ” 27?
Ed’ ofs 5€ P0ovotaw, Ta ev ayaba eipnras: ed
Lud \ “~ \ ~ ” “
coos yap drrodofovar Kai firorysobvra Epyous 7)
KTHact Kal dpéyovrat Sdéns, Kal doa edruynpara
€oTt, axedov trept mavta POdvos eort, Kal padvora
dv avrol } dpéyovrat 7 otovrat dety abrods Eyeww,
) dv TH KTHoE puKp@ vrepéxovow 7 piKp@ eA-
Aeirovow.
A \ \ ~ Ld \ ”
Davepov S€ Kai ofs dlovotow: dua yap eipnras-

* If some one else possesses the one thing which they think
necessary to complete their happiness, they are envious of
him, because they consider it ought to be theirs,

238

RHETORIC, Il. rx. 16—x. 5

that it should be refused them, then pity will be
impossible.

10. It is equally clear for what reason, and of
whom, and in what frame of mind, men are envious,
if envy is a kind of pain at the sight of good fortune
in regard to the goods mentioned; in the case of
those like themselves; and not for the sake of a
man getting anything, but because of others possess-
ing it. For those men will be envious who have, or
seem to have, others “like” them. I mean like in
birth, relationship, age, moral habit, reputation, and
possessions. And those will be envious who possess all
but one of these advantages %; that is why those who
attempt great things and succeed are envious, because
they think that every one is trying to deprive them
of their own. And those who are honoured for some
special reason, especially for wisdom or happiness.
And the ambitious are more envious than the un-
ambitious. And those who are wise in their own
conceit, for they are ambitious of a reputation for
wisdom; and, in general, those who wish to be
distinguished in anything are envious in regard to it.
And the little-minded, because everything appears
to them to be great.

The advantages which excite envy have already
been stated. Nearly all the actions or possessions
which make men desire glory or honour and long for
fame, and the favours of fortune, create envy,
especially when men long for them themselves, or
think that they have a right to them, or the possession
of which makes them slightly superior or slightly
inferior.

And it is evident whom men envy, for it has just
been stated by implication. They envy those who

239

ARISTOTLE

Tots yap eyyds Kal Xpove, kal Tomm Kal ArKia
Kat dd&n pbovotow. <dOev eipyrat

‘ \ A A ~ oF
TO ovyyeves yap Kai POoveiv ériorarat.

Kat 7pos ovs prroryobyrac: piroripodvrat pev yep
7 pos Tous etpnyevous, mpos dé Tovs [evpiooTov Eros
ovTas 7) TOS, Tovs €oojievous n TéOvedras ovdeis,
otd€e mpos Ttods éf’ ‘HpakdAciats or7jAats. 008? dv
Tod olovrat map avrots 7) mapa Tots aAdots Aei-
mreo0an, od’ dv moAd brepéxew, WoavTws Kal mpos
TovTous Kal mepl Ta ToLadra. eémel Sé mpos Tods
avraywvioTas Kal avrepaoras Kal dAws Tovs TAV
abrav edenevous diAdotiyobyrar, avayKn padvora
tovto.s P0oveiv: Sbev cipnrat

co

Kal KEepapeds KEpapel.

Kal Tois Taxd ot H ports TUYOVTES 7) PL) TUXOVTES
Plovotow. Kat dv 7 KeKTHLEvwv 7 KaTopHovyTwY
overdos avrois: elai dé Kal obTOL eyyds Kal GpotoL’
dpAov yap dt. map’ avrovds od Tuyydvover Tod
ayalot, wore todro Avrotv move tov POdvor.
9 Kal Tois 7) Exovat TadTa 7) KEKTHMEVOLS Goa avToIs

mMpoonkev 7) KeKTHVTO TOTE’ Huo mpEaBUrepor vew-
10 Tépots. Kal ot moAAa Samavncavres els Tavro Tots
11. dniya plovotow. dijAov be Kal ep’ ols Xalpovow
of TowdroL Kal emi Tiot Kal TAs ExovTes* Ws ‘yap

on

# According to the scholiast, from Aeschylus.

>» Two rocks at the east end of the Straits of Gibraltar,
supposed to be the limit westwards of the ancient world.

¢ That is, no one will attempt to compete with them in
their special branch of study. Roemer reads xal mpéds rods
mwept ra rowadra, translated by Jebb as if there were a full

240

RHETORIC, II. x. 5-11

are near them in time, place, age, and reputation,
whence it was said,

Kinship knows how to envy also ;4

and those with whom they are in rivalry, who are
those just spoken of ; for no man tries to rival those
who lived ten thousand years ago, or are about to
be born, or are already dead; nor those who live
near the Pillars of Hercules;® nor those who, in
his own opinion or in that of others, are either far
inferior or superior to him ; and the people and things
which one envies are on the same footing.° And
since men strive for honour with those who are
competitors, or rivals in love, in short, with those
who aim at the same things, they are bound to feel
most envious of these ; whence the saying,

Potter [being jealous] of potter.¢

And those who have succeeded with difficulty or have
failed envy those whose success has been rapid.
And those whose possessions or successes are a re-
proach to themselves, and these, too, are those near
or like them; for it is clear that it is: their own
fault that they do not obtain the same advantage,
so that this pains and causes envy. And those who
either have or have acquired what was naturally
theirs or what they had once acquired ; this is why
an older man is envious of a younger one. Those
who have spent much envy those who have only
spent little to obtain the same thing. And it is
clear at what things and persons the envious rejoice,
and in what frame of mind; for, as when they do

stop at vmepéxew. ‘In like manner we vie with those
engaged in such or such pursuits.”
71.4, 91.

R 241

ro

“

ARISTOTLE

? ” ~ 4 ” 2 \ cal >
odk éxovres AvTobyTa, ovTwWS ExovTES Em TOIS EV=
avtiows HoOncovTaL. Ware av avTol wey TapacKeva-
cbdaw otrws éxew, ot 8 edreciofar H Tvyxavew
twos ayabod d&vovpevo. Mow olor of eipnmevor,

~ \ ~
dHAov ws od TevEovrar eA€ov Tapa TOY Kupiwv.

ll. las 8 éxovtes CnAodot Kal ta Tota Kal
yee, / > - > > ‘ ~ > /, > ~
emi tiow, evbévd éari SHAov. ei yap éeore CijAos

/ ~
Avr tis emt dawopern mapovoia ayal@v evripwv
Kal evdexouevwv adT@ AaPetv rept Tods dpolovs TH

/ > bd TAA 5 a J wars. ‘ ee i”
ducer, ody ott GAAw GAN’ Gti odxi Kai adT@ €or"
dud Kal émekés eorw 6 CHAos Kal emietK@v, TO
de fa a oA \ 5A ; ¢ \ \ 42.A
€ dboveiv datAov kai davrAwv: 6 pev yap avrov
mapackevacer dia Tov ChArov Tuyxavew TOV ayabar,
¢ A \ / \ om” \ \ / 2. 7
6 d€ Tov mAnaiov pH exew Sia Tov POdvov: avayKy

> ~
51) CyAwrikods pev elvar Tods a€wbvtas avrovds
> A a \ » 291 \ > aes ,
1388b dyaba@v. dv pr) exovow* obdels yap a€vot ta pawwo-

207 \ ¢ , \ ¢. ,

2peva advvata. 810 of véow Kat ot peyadoyuyxot
TowwoTot. Kal ols dadpxer Tovatra ayaba a Tay
evripwv a&ia éorw avdpa@v- ort yap Tadra tAcbros
Kal moAvdiAria Kal dpyat Kai doa Tovadra: ws yap
mpoonkov abrois ayabois elvar, dt mpoonKe Tots
ayabas éxovot, Cndoto. ta Tovabra Trav ayabar.
3 Kal ovs of ddA aéwtow. Kal dv mpoyovor 7

a val ” /
ovyyevets 7) olketo 7) TO EOvos 7 7 OAs EvTyLot,

# “The same state of mind which is absent in the painful
feeling will be present in the joy excited by the opposite
occasions,” meaning that, if one set of circumstances pro-
duces pain, the opposite will produce pleasure (Cope). Or,
omitting od« before éxovres, “* For in the same frame of

mind as they are pained (at another’s good fortune) they
will rejoice in the contrary state of things ” (at another’s bad

fortune).
> Something like “* although they are within their grasp ”’

is needed to complete the sense.
242

RHETORIC, II. x. 11—x1. 3

' not possess certain things, they are pained, so when
they do possess them, they will rejoice in the opposite
cireumstances.* So that if the judges are brought
into that frame of mind, and those who claim their
pity or any other boon are such as we have stated,
it is plain that they will not obtain pity from those
with whom the decision rests.

11. The frame of mind in which men feel emula-
tion, what things and persons give rise to it, will be
clear from the following considerations. Let us
assume that emulation is a feeling of pain at the
evident presence of highly valued goods, which are
possible for us to obtain, in the possession of those
who naturally resemble us—pain not due to the fact
that another possesses them, but to the fact that we
ourselves do not. Emulation therefore is virtuous
and characteristic of virtuous men, whereas envy is
base and characteristic of base men; for the one,
owing to emulation, fits himself to obtain such goods,
while the object of the other, owing to envy, is to
prevent his neighbour possessing them. Necessarily,
then, those are emulous who hold that they have a
claim to goods that they do not possess; for no
one claims what seems impossible. Hence the
young and high-minded are emulous. And so are
those who possess such advantages as are worthy of
honourable men, which include wealth, a number of
friends, positions of office, and all similar things.
For, believing it their duty to be good, because such
goods naturally belong to those who are good, they
strive to preserve them. And those are emulous,
whom others think worthy of them. Honours ob-
tained by ancestors, kinsfolk, intimates, nation, or

243

ARISTOTLE

CnAwtixot wept ratra: oikela yap olovrar atrois
> \ + f¢ > > > A ‘ \
4eivar, Kat a&wor tovtwv. «i 8 éoti Cydwra ra
evra ayabd, avayKn Tas Te apeTas civat ToLvavras,
kat daa Tots dAdos ddéApa Kal edvepyeTiKa:
TyL@ot yap Todvs evepyeTobvTas Kal Tovs ayabous.
Kal dowv ayabdy amddavois tots mAnciov éotiv,
e ~ A / ~ % /
olov mAobros Kat KaAAos paddAov byretas.

5 Wavepov dé Kai of CnAwrtol tives: of yap tadra
Kal Ta Towra KexTnuevo. Cndwrot. oT de
TadTa Ta eipnueva, olov avdpia codia apy: ot yap
apxovtes moAAovs Sivavrat €b qoveiv, oTparnyot,

6 pyTopes, mavTes of Ta ToLatra Suvdpevor. Kal

e GPR / bal \ r
ois moAAot Gpovot BovAovrat eivar, 7 moAAot yre-
a” / ? a“ “A \ /
pysor, 7 pidot modAoi. 7 ods modAoi Gavpalovew,

77 ods adroit Oavydlovow. Kal dy E€mawor Kat
eykapia A€yovrat 7) bd mounTtav 7) Aoyoypddwv.
Katappovoto. dé tadv evavTiwv: evavTiov yap
fhAw Karadpovynais eort, kal To Cndoby TH Kata-
fpovety. avdykn S€ todvs ottws Exovtas wate Cy-
AHoai twas 7 CndAobobar, Kkaradpovntixkods elvat
ToUTWY TE Kal emt TOUTOLS Goo Ta eVaYTIA Kaka
” “ > A a ~ ‘ /
€xovot Tov ayalav tav CyndAwrdv. 810 moAAdKis
Katappovotcar THv evTvxovVTWwY, OTay dvev TV ev-

~ a >
time ayabayv trdpyn avrois » TUxn. St av pev

¢ Spending one’s money benefits one’s neighbour to a’
certain extent, and beauty is always pleasant to look upon.
One does not admire anyone because he is in good health,
so much as because he is handsome.

» * Who have many acquaintances or friends ” (Jebb).

© Noyoypégdor means either the oldest Greek historians
(or rather ‘‘ chroniclers ’’), or the writers of speeches for use
in the law courts, or of panegyrics.

4 xai éri rovros. According to Cope, an unnecessary

244

RHETORIC, II. x1. 3-7

city make men emulous in regard to such honours ; for
they think that these honours really belong to them
and that they are worthy of them. And if highly
valued goods are the object of emulation, it neces-
sarily follows that the virtues must be such and all
things that are useful and beneficial to the rest of
mankind, for benefactors and virtuous men are
honoured ; to these we may add all the goods which
our neighbours can enjoy with us, such as wealth
and beauty, rather than health,*

It is also evident who are the objects of emulation ;
for they are those who possess these or similar
goods, such as have already been spoken of, for
instance, courage, wisdom, authority ; for those in
authority, such as generals, orators, and all who have
similar powers, can do good to many. And those
whom many desire to be like, or to be their acquaint-
ances or friends; ® those whom many or ourselves
admire ;_ those who are praised or eulogized either
by poets or by prose writers.° The opposite char-
acters we despise ; for contempt is the opposite of
emulation, and the idea of emulation of the idea of
contempt. And those who are in a condition which
makes them emulate, or be emulated by, others, must
be inclined to despise those persons® (and for that
reason) who suffer from defects contrary to the
good things which excite emulation. That is why
we often despise those who are fortunate, whenever
their good fortune is not accompanied by highly
valued goods. The means of producing and destroy-
parenthetical note (‘and on such occasions”). Jebb refers
both rov’rwy and rovros to persons: “tend to show contempt
to or about those who.” The ‘‘reason”’ in the translation

above is that they suffer from the want of “the highly
valued goods.”

245

ARISTOTLE

otv Ta T7aOn eyyiyverar Kal Svadverar, €€ av at
mioreis ylyvovTat mept adrayv, eipnras.

12. Ta d€ On moiot twes Kara Ta abn Kal
Tas €€eis Kal Tas HAuKias Kal Tas TUYas, SvehAO@ev

g peta Tatra. Aéyw dé maby pev opyny émOvpiav
Kal Ta Toladra, mepl @v elpyKapyev mpoTepor,
efeus d€ dperas Kal KaKlas* elpnTat dé Trepl ToUrey
mporepov, Kal Tota mMpoarpodvran exaoTot, Kal moto

1389 a TpaxTuKol. HAcKiat 3 cial veorns Kal aK) Kal
yhpas. tuxnv Se rAEyw edyeverav Kal mobrov Kal
duvdpets Kal Tavavtia TovToLs Kal GAws edTvxiav Kal
dvorvyxiav.

3 OF pev obv véow ra 7%On iol emiBvpnriKol, Kal
olo. movetv wv ay éemOupjowow. Kal TOV Tept
TO o@pa emBvuidv pddvora .axoAovOnriKot «ict
Tais mepl ta adpodio, Kal axpatets ravrns.

4 edueTraBoror Sé Kali axbixopou pos Tas éemBupias,
Kat apddpa pev emiOvuotor, taxéws dé mavovrat:
d€elar yap at Bovdrjoes Kail od peydAa, womep

5at Tov KaypLvOVTeoV Sixpar Kal treivat. kal Bupuol
Kal of VOup01 Kal olou dcodovbety TH Oppfp, Kal
WrTous clot ToD Ovpod: da yap pirorysiav ovK
dvexovrar dArywpovpevor, GAN’ dyavaxrovow, av

6 olwvTat dducetabac. Kat _Pidoriyoe peev clon, par-
Aov de pirdvucor: bTEpoXys yap emOupel 7] ” veoTns,
y] dé vikn bmepoxyn Tis. Kal apudw ratra. paAov
7 Ppiroxpiparor proxpyparor de evora dua 70

pare evoeias memerpactar, Wamrep TO Ilirraxod

7 éxer amropbeypua eis "Audidpaov. Kat od Kaxornfes

2 The ricres 40K} is resumed from ii. 1. 8. As the 7a0n
: and éfe.s have been discussed already, only the ages and
their character remain. ‘

246

RHETORIC, II. x1. 7—xu. 7

ing the various emotions in men, from which the
methods of persuasion that concern them are derived,
have now been stated.

12. Let us now describe the nature of the char-
acters of men according to their emotions, habits,
ages, and fortunes. By the emotions I mean anger,
desire, and the like, of which we have already spoken ;
by habits virtues and vices, of which also we have
previously spoken, as well as the kind of things men
individually and deliberately choose and practise. ,
The ages are youth, the prime of life, and old age. |.
By fortune I mean noble birth, wealth, power, and
their contraries, and, in general, good or bad fortune.*

The young, as to character, are ready to desire
and to carry out what they desire. Of the bodily
desires they chiefly obey those of sensual pleasure
and these they are unable to control. Changeable
in their desires and soon tiring of them, they desire
with extreme ardour, but soon cool; for their will,
like the hunger and thirst of the Bick, is keen rather
than strong. They are passionate, hot-tempered,
and carried away by impulse, and unable to control
their passion; for owing to their ambition they
cannot endure to be slighted, and become indignant
when they think they are being wronged. They are
ambitious of honour, but more so of victory; for
youth desires superiority, and victory is a kind of
superiority. And their desire for both these is
greater than their desire for money, to which they
attach only the slightest value, because they have
never yet experienced want, as Pittacus ® said in
his pithy remark on Amphiaraus. They are not ill-

® One of the Seven Wise Men of Greece.
Q47

ARISTOTLE

> > 72 \ \ / / *
aAN’ einfers dua TO pojTw TelewpynKevar mroAXdds
movnpias. Kal edmoro. dia TO pnmw modAAa
8 e€nraticba. Kai evéAmides' Womep yap ot oww-
Mevot, oUTW SiaDeppol ciow of veo dd THs P¥cews*
dpa d€ Kal dua TO prjmw moAAd amoreTuynKeval.
kat Cou Ta mActora eAmidu: 7) pwev yap €Amis Tod
péAdovrés €otw 7 Se pviun Tod mapovyopuevov,
tois d€ véois TO prev peAdov odd TO dé Tap-

A 7, ~ \ / ¢ / a

eAnAvbos Bpaxd: tH yap mpuoityn hucpa peuvncba
poev ovdev olov te, eAmilew dé mdavTa. Kal €v-

/ / > \ A > ld > / A
eLamdrntoi «iow dua TO eipnuevov> €Amilovor yap

¢ / p a / - \ ‘ 27
9 padiws. Kai avdperdrepor’ Oupddeis yap Kal eveA-
mudes, Ov TO pev a7) HoPetobar To dé Oappety trove?
ovte yap dpyilouevos ovdeis poPeirat, Td Te

> / > / / 5 / \ >
10 eArrilew ayabdv te Oappaddov éoriv. Kal aicxuv-
/ > , \ @ ¢ vA > \
TnAoi: od ydp Tw KaAa ETEpa brroAapBavovow, aAAd
Ll wemraidevytar bd Tob vowou povov. Kal peyadd-
yuyou ovTe yap bo Tod Biov mw TeTaTEWwYTA,
aAAa THY avayKaiwy areipol eiow, Kal TO a€ody
e \ / / ~ > 27

avrov peydAwy peyadoyvyia: robro 8 eveAmiBdos.
12 Kat paddov aipotvra: mpdtrew ta Kada tov
avpdepovTwy' TH yap WO [Hou padAdov 7} TO
oywopa, €oTr 8’ 6 pev Aoyopos TOO cupdéepovTos

¢€ \ > \ ~ ~ \ / ‘
137) 5é dpert) Tod Kadod. Kal didddiAdcr Kai didA-
1389 b €rarpor uGAAov Tav ddAwv HAuKidv dia TO yalpew
~ ~ ‘ / ‘ \ / /

TH ovliv Kal pjmtw mpos TO ovpdepov Kpivew

@ Or, ‘they do not look at things in a bad light, but in a
good,” i.e. they are not always ready to suspect.

» Social convention is the only law that they know, and
they are ashamed if they violate it, because as yet they have
no idea of higher laws which may command them to do so.

© #0os **in the widest sense, includes all that is habitual

248

RHETORIC, II. xm. 7-13

natured but simple-natured,* because they have never
yet witnessed much depravity ; confiding, because
they have as yet not been often deceived ; full of
hope, for they are naturally as hot-blooded as those
who are drunken with wine, and besides they have
not yet experienced many failures. For the most
part they live in hope, for hope is concerned with
the future as memory is with the past. For the
young the future is long, the past short ; for in the
morning of life it is not possible for them to re-
member anything, but they have everything to hope ;
which makes them easy to deceive, for they readily
hope. And they are more courageous, for they are
full of passion and hope, and the former of these
prevents them fearing, while the latter inspires them
with confidence, for no one fears when angry, and
hope of some advantage inspires confidence. And
they are bashful, for as yet they fail to conceive of
other things that are noble, but have been educated
solely by convention.? They are high-minded, for
they have not yet been humbled by life nor have
they experienced the force of necessity ; further,
there is high-mindedness in thinking oneself worthy
of great things, a feeling which belongs to one who,
is full of hope.

In their actions, they prefer the noble to the
useful ; their life is guided by their character ¢ rather
than by calculation, for the latter aims at the useful,
virtue at the noble. At this age more than any
other they are fond of their friends and companions,
because they take pleasure in living in company and
as yet judge nothing by expediency, not even their
and characteristic ; in a limited sense, it expresses the habitual
temper or disposition ’’ (Twining).

249

ARISTOTLE

/ 7 \ \ / : ‘ a ae
14 wndév, Wore nde Tods didrovs. Kal dmavTa emi
To paddrov Kat opodpdrepov apaprdvovet mapa
TO XiAavevov: mdvTa yap ayav mparrovaw’ dirAovat
Te yap ayav Kal prcodow dyav Kal tadAa wavTa
dpmoiws. Kal €idévat mdvTa olovras Kal dSwoyupi-
Covrat: Tobro yap airiv éors Kal Too mavTa ayav.
A \ > / > ~ > A \ >
skal Ta ddiuKypata adixodow eis BBpw Kal ov
KaKoupytay. Kat é€AentiKol dua TO mavras xP1-
orovs kal Bedrious brrohapBdvevv Th yap abray
aKkakia TODS médas petpodow, wor avagia mdoxew
16 JroAapBdvovew adbrovs. Kal diroyéeAwres, 510 Kal
evtpamreAou 7) yap evTpameAia memadevpern UBpis
eotiv. TO pev ody THY véewy ToLodTdv €oTw HOos.
13. Of d€ mpeoBirepor Kail mapnKmaKdres axedov
ex TOV evayTiwy TovTois Ta TAcioTa Exovow 7On-
\ \ ‘ A * 7 \ / >
dua yap To moAAa érn BeBiwKévar Kat mAciw e&-
nrarnola. Kal jwaprnkevar, Kal Ta TrAciw padAa
elvat TOV mpayparwv, ore SiaBeBavodvra ovdev,
2%rrov te ayav amavra 7) det, Kal olovrat, toact
& ovdev. Kai apdioByrotvres mpooriléaow del
To lows Kal taxa, Kal mdvra Adéyovow ovTw,
/ > > ld ‘ 7 of ” \
3 mayiws 5° obey. Kal KaKxojfeis eloiv’ EoTe yap
Kakonea TO él TO xeipov BroAapPdvew mavra.
ére Se KaxUromToi elo. Sia THY amoTiav, amLoTOL
\ > > / \ ” ~ , A
45€ du’ eurreipiav. Kat ovte didodar ohddpa ovre
~ A ~ > A A \ / ¢ /,
pucodar bia Tadra, adAa Kara THV Biavros brr0by
Kat gdidodaw ws puojoovres Kal picodow ws
5 piAngovtes. Kal pixporsvyou da TO TeTaTewHaOau

@ One of the Seven Wise Men of Greece. The maxim was
Mnéev dyav, Ne quid nimis, Never go to extremes.

> Or, “ better than they really are.”

¢ One of the Seven Wise Men of Greece.

250

RHETORIC, II. xa. 14—xurt. 5

friends. All their errors are due to excess and
vehemence and their neglect of the maxim of Chilon,*
for ney do everything to excess, love, hate, and

everything else. And they think they know every-

is due to insolence, not to wickedness. And they are*!?*

virtuous and better than themselves®; for they
measure their neighbours by their own inoffensive-
ness, so that they think that they suffer undeservedly,
And they are fond of laughter, and therefore witty ;
for wit is cultured insolence. Such then is the **»-
character of the young. :
13. Older men and those who have passed their
prime have in most cases characters opposite to those
of the young. For, owing to their having lived many
years and having been more often deceived by
others or made more mistakes themselves, and since
most human things turn out badly, they are positive
about nothing, and in everything they show an
excessive lack of energy. They always “ think,”
but “know ” nothing; and in their hesitation they
always add “perhaps,” or “maybe”; all their
statements are of this kind, never unqualified. They
are malicious; for malice consists in looking upon
the worse side of everything. Further, they are
always suspicious owing to mistrust, and mistrustful
owing to experience. And neither their love nor
their hatred is strong for the same reasons; but,
according to the precept of Bias,’ they love as if they
would one day hate, and hate as if they would one
day love. And they are little-minded, because they

251

ARISTOTLE

e A ~ / > \ A / OL *
do Tod Biov: ovdevds yap pweyddov odde meEpiTTOD,
6daAAa ta&v mpos Tov Biov emiBvupodow. Kal av-
eXevOepou Ev yap TL TOY avayKaiwy % odcia, Gua
dé Kal Sia THY eurreipiay tloaow ws yaderov TO
, \ cs A > ~ A \
7 KTHCaCVaL Kal pddiov TO amoBadeiv. Kat Sevdrol
Kat mdavra mpopoyricol evavtiws yap didKewrae
Tots véos* Kareyuypevor yap eiow, of dSé Oeppot.
@oTe mpowdoroinke TO yhpas TH Seria: Kal yap
c / / / > / \ / \
86 ddBos Kardibv&is tis eoriv. Kal piAdlwor, Kat
pddvora emi TH TeAevTaia Hepa Sia TO TOD amovTos
elvar thy emiOvpiav, Kal od dé evdeeis, Tovrov
9pddvora emObuueiv. Kat pidavror waGAdrov 7 Set
puxporsuyia ydp Tis Kal avTn. Kal mpds TO oUp-
td ~ > > > \ ‘ 4 a “
dépov (iow, adr’ od mpos 7d Kaddv, waAdov 7
cal ‘ A / > A \ \ /
det, dua TO pidavror elvar: TO pev yap avpdéepov
1390a avTa® ayabdov éort, TO 5é Kaddv amrADs.
10 Kati avaicyvvror waAdov 7) aicxuvrndot: dia yap
TO pq) Ppovtilew opoiws rod Kadod Kal Tob ovp-
11 dépovros oAvywpodar Tod Soxety. Kal duaéAmides
dua THY euTreipiay: Ta yap mAciw TAY yvyvomevwv
padrAd eorw: amoPaive. yotv ta moAAa emi To
12 xetpov: Kal ere dua THY SetAiay. Kab CHou rH puvnpn
paAdrov 7) TH €Amidu: Too yap Biov to pev Aoumov
s\/ A \ \ /, v A ¢ \
dAiyov To d€ mapeAnAvOds wrodd, Ear. SE 7 bev
eAmis rob wédAovros 4 S5é pv}jun TOV Taporyopevay.
Omep airiov Kal THs adoAecyias adrois: dvareAodat
yap Ta yevopueva A€yovTes’ avapysvnoKdpevot yap
13 7Sovrar. Kal of Ovpol d&eis pev daobevets Se
elow, Kal at émilvuior ai pev exAeAolmacw ai
dé dobevets eiow, wore ovr’ emiBvunriKol ovre
A \ \ > / > \ \ ‘
mpaktiKol KaTa Tas emOuuias, aAAa Kata TO

252

RHETORIC, II. xi. 5-13

have been humbled by life ; for they desire nothing
great or uncommon, but only the necessaries of life.
They are not generous, for property is one of these
necessaries, and at the same time, they know from
experience how hard it is to get and how easy to
lose. And they are cowardly and inclined to antici-
pate evil, for their state of mind is the opposite of
that of the young; they are chilled, whereas the
young are hot, so that old age paves the way for
cowardice, for fear is a kind of chill. And they are
fond of life, especially in their last days, because
desire is directed towards that which is absent and
men especially desire what they lack. And they
are unduly selfish, for this also is littleness of mind.
And they live not for the noble, but for the useful,
more than they ought, because they are selfish ; for
the useful is a good for the individual, whereas the
noble is good absolutely.

And they are rather shameless than modest ; for
since they do not care for the noble so much as for
the useful, they pay little attention to what people
think. And they are little given to hope owing to
their experience, for things that happen are mostly
bad and at all events generally turn out for the
worse, and also owing to their cowardice. They live
in memory rather than in hope; for the life that
remains to them is short, but that which is past is
long, and hope belongs to the future, memory to the
past. This is the reason of their loquacity ; for they
are incessantly talking of the past, because they take
pleasure in recollection. Their outbursts of anger
are violent, but feeble; of their desires some have
ceased, while others are weak, so that they neither
feel them nor act in accordance with them, but only

253

ARISTOTLE

KEepoos. 510 Kal l owdpovuxol paivovrar ot Erm AuKobroe
al Te yap emBupian aveikaot, Kat dovAevovar TO
14 Kepdet. Kal paMov Cou Kara Doyropdy 7 Kara
TO 00s" 6 pev yap Aoyiop.os Tob aupdepovTos TO
S° 700s Ths dperis €oTwW. Kal TadiKHMaTa adu-
15 KoBow ets KaKoupytav, ovK ts UBpw. éAenrucot dé
Kal ob yepovres etow, GAN’ od dua TadTO Tots véots*
ot pev yap Sia diAavOpwriav, ot dé bv acbéverav:
TavTa yap ovovtar eyyds elvar adrots mabeiv,
~ * 5 > / 4 > / >? \
tobro 8 jv edentikdv. S0ev odvpriKoi eior, Kal
> > / 2O\ , > / A A
ovK edTpdzreAot obde diAoyedoiot evaytiov yap TO
> ‘ ~ , ~ A > / \
16 dduptiKov TH dpidoyéAwrt. Tav pev odv vewY Kat
Tov mpeofvtépwv ta On Towtray wor eel
amodexovTar mavTes Tos TH ohetépw 7Oer reyo-
pevovs Adyous Kai Tods dpoiovs, odK adnAov THs
A ~ ~ \
xpwpevot Tots Adyous Tovwodror davodvrar Kal adrol
kat of Adyot.
14, Of Sé€ dkpualovres avepov dtr preraéd
a

TovTwy TO 00s Eoovra, éexaTépwv adaipodvres

\ c / \ A / ~
THhv vmepBodAjv, Kat ovte ofddpa Oappodvres

~ /

(Qpacvrns yap To ToLobrov) ore Alav doBovpmevor,
2 kadds dé pos audw exovres, ovTE Maou MLaTEVOVTES
ovTe mow amotobvTes, adda Kata TO dAnbes
1390b Kplvovtes GAAov. Kal ore mpds TO Kadov Cavres

/ ” ‘ \ / > ‘ \ »*
fLdvov ovTe mpos TO oupdepov, adAa mpos audw.
\ 4 A A 4 \ > / > A ‘
Kal odre mpos Peida) ore mpos dowTiav, adAAd mpos
370 appoTTrov. opuoiws Se Kal mpos Ovpov Kal
> / ‘
mpos emOuvuiav. Kal owdpoves pet avdpias Kal

* Or, ‘‘ speeches which resemble (or reflect) it’ (their
character).

254

RHETORIC, II. xu. 13—-x1v. 3

from motives of gain. Hence men of this age are
regarded as self-controlled, for their desires have slack-
ened, and they are slaves to gain. In their manner
of life there is more calculation than moral character,
for calculation is concerned with that which is useful,
moral character with virtue. If they commit acts of
injustice it is due to vice rather than to insolence.
The old, like the young, are inclined to pity, but
not for the same reason ; the latter show pity from
humanity, the former from weakness, because they
think that they are on the point of suffering all kinds
of misfortunes, and this is one of the reasons that
incline men to pity. That is why the old are
querulous, and neither witty nor fond of laughter ;
for a querulous disposition is the opposite of a love
of laughter. Such are the characters of the young
and older men. Wherefore, since all men are willing
to listen to speeches which harmonize with their
own character and to speakers who resemble them,*
it is easy to see what language we must employ so
that both ourselves and our speeches may appear to
be of such and such a character.

14. It is evident that the character of those in the
prime of life will be the mean between that of the
other two, if the excess in each case be removed.
At this age, men are neither over-confident, which
would show rashness, nor too fearful, but preserving
a right attitude in regard to both, neither trusting
nor distrusting all, but judging rather in accordance
with actual facts. Their rule of conduct is neither
the noble nor the useful alone, but both at once.
They are neither parsimonious nor prodigal, but
preserve the due mean. It is the same in regard to
passion and desire. Their self-control is combined

255

ARISTOTLE

dv8peior pera owppoovrys. ev yap Tots véous Kat
Tots yépovat dujpytar tabra* eioi yap of pev véow
dv8petou Kal dxoAaorot, ot de mpeoBvrepor awdpoves
Kal devhoi. os dé KabddAov eireiv, doa pev Sujpyrac
y) vedTns Kal TO yipas Tv apehipenv, tadra apdw
Exovow, 6oa oe drrepBdMovow 9 €AXelzovot,
4 Toure TO jérpiov Kal TO dpporrov. dxpwdler dé
TO peev odpa aso Tov TpiaKoVTa er@v béxpe TOV
TEVTE Kal TpedeovTa., u) de puxn Teplt Td. évos Se
TEVTHKOVTA, mepl poe oby veorTyTos Kal ynpws
Kal dcpuijs, Toiwy nOdv ExaoTrov eoTrw, cipnabw
TooatTa.
15. epi dé Ta daro TUXNS yeyvopeveny ayabar,
du doa abrav Kal ta YOn row dirra ovpBaiver
2Tois avOpwros, Aéywpev eheEfs. edyeveias pev
otv 706s €ott TO diAdoTysdrepov elvar Tov KE
, > A oe /, 4 ¢€ /,
pevov adriy: dmavres yap, drav bmdpxyn TL, mpos
TOTO owpevew cada, 4 S edyévera evTyLoTns
TUS mpoyovenv coriv. Kal KatadpovntiKoy Kal
TOV Cpotoy €oTi Tots _mpoyovois tots avray, ddr
moppo TAvTO. paMov i ] eyyvs yuyvopeva evTLOTE pa.
Kat evadaLlovevra.. €oTt O€ evyeves pev Kara TH
Tob yévous apeTHv, yevvaiov d€ Kata TO pu) e&-
ioracba. Tis Ppvcews: Omep ws emi TO Todd ov
ovpBaive. tots evyevéow, aA’ «iow of moddXol
evTeXcis: hopa yap Tis eoTw ev Tots yeveow avdp@v
woTrep ev Tois KaTa Tas XwWpas yuyvopevots, Kal
éviore av 7 ayabov TO yévos, eyyivovrat did Twos
xpovov avodpes mepitrol, Kamreita mdAw avadidwow.
e€iorarar d€ Ta prev edhvad yéevyn eis paviKwTEpa

oo

* i.e. the advantages and distinctions the family possessed
256

- RHETORIC, II. x1v. 3—xv. 3

with courage and their courage with self-control,
whereas in the young and old these qualities are
found separately ; for the young are courageous but
without self-control, the old are self-controlled but
cowardly. Speaking generally, all the advantages
that youth and old age possess separately, those in
the prime of life possess combined ; and all cases of
excess or defect in the other two are replaced by
due moderation and fitness. The body is most fully _
developed from thirty to thirty-five years of age, the
mind at about forty-nine. Let this suffice for youth,
old age, and the prime of life, and the characters
which belong to each.

15. Let us next speak of the goods that are due
to fortune, all those, at least, which produce certain
characters in men. A characteristic of noble birth
is that he who possesses it is more ambitious ; for all
men, when they start with any good, are accustomed
to heap it up, and noble birth is a heritage of
honour from one’s ancestors. Such men are prone to
look down even upon those who are as important as
their ancestors, because the same things % are more
honourable and inspire greater vanity when remote
than when they are recent. The idea of noble birth
refers to excellence of race, that of noble character
to not degenerating from the family type, a quality
not as a rule found in those of noble birth, most of
whom are good for nothing. For in the generations
of men there is a kind of crop as in the fruits of the
field; sometimes, if the race is good, for a certain
period men out of the common are born in it, and
then it deteriorates. Highly gifted families often

of old; such distinctions, when possessed by those of later
date, are less thought of.

8 257

ARISTOTLE

/
70n, otov of am’ >AAKkiBiddov Kat of aad Avovuaiov
~ \
Tob mpotépov, Ta Sé ordoywa eis aBeATepiay Kal

0 / e c > ‘ Kid ‘ I rNé
vwlpornta, olov of amo Kiwwvos cal IlepuxAéous
Kat LwkKparovs.

16. TH dé mAovTw a EmeTrar On, émumodfs
> \ > cal ov ¢ \ \ \ ¢ /
cot idety dracw: bBpiotal yap Kal drepyjdavot,
maoxovTés TL DO THS KTHGEwWS TOD TAOUTOU’ wWa-

13914 qep yap €xovTes atavra Tayaba otTw SudKkewrTat*
¢ \ “~ / ~ 3¢/ ~ EA

6 yap mAodros olov Tym Tis THs a€ias TOV dAdwy,

2 did paiverat ova dmavra elvat avtTod. Kal Tpu-

pepot Kat oaddkwves, Tpupepol ev Sia Thy tpudiv

Kal THY evoerEw Tis eddaupovias, caddKwvres 5€

Kat addotkor dia TO mavTas ciwbévar SvarpiBew

mept TO epwpevov Kal Oavpalowevov ta avrav,

\ a ” 0 es ~ \ 1AA “a A >? ’
Kat T@ oteabar Cydrobv tovs adAAouvs & Kal adrot.

\ ~
dpa dé Kal eikdTws TodTo mAaaxovow* TroAXol yap
elow ot Sedpuevor THY exdvTwv. Oev Kal TO
Luyswvidov eipyntrat wept Tv cody Kat mAovoiwy
mpos Thy yuvaika tiv “Iépwvros epomevyy méTepov
yevéobar Kpeirtrov aAovowov 7 aoddv: mAovatov
val ” ~ a ~
eizetv' tovs cohodvs yap hn opav emi tais Tov
3 mAovaiwy Ovpais SuatpiBovras. Kat TO olecOat
agéiovs «iva apxew: Exew yap olovrar my eveKev
»” ” \ ¢ > / > 4 >
dpyew afiov. Kal ws ev Kedhadaiw, dvorrov ev-
4 Saipovos 700s mAovrouv éoriv. Siadeper dé Tots
vewoTt KeKTnuEvois Kal Tots méAa Ta HOn TH
a ~ A , \ \ om» .
dmavra paAdov Kai pavAdtepa Ta Kaka Exew TOS
veotrAovTous’ WoTep yap amadevaia mAovTov éoTt
TO vedtAovTov elvat. Kal aduKnuaTa ddvKodoW

258

RHETORIC, II. xv. 3—xv1. 4

degenerate into maniacs, as, for example, the de-
scendants of Alcibiades and the elder Dionysius ;
those that are stable into fools and dullards, like the .
descendants of Cimon, Pericles, and Socrates. a
16. The characters which accompany wealth are
plain for all to see. The wealthy are insolent and
arrogant, being mentally affected by the acquisition
of wealth, for they seem to think that they possess
all good things ; for wealth is a kind of standard of
value of everything else, so that everything seems
purchasable by it. They are luxurious and swaggerers,
luxurious because of their luxury and the display of
their prosperity, swaggerers and ill-mannered because
all men are accustomed to devote their attention to
what they like and admire, and the rich suppose that
what they themselves are emulous of is the object
of all other men’s emulation. At the same time this
feeling is not unreasonable ; for those who have need
of the wealthy are many in number. Hence the
answer of Simonides to the wife of Hiero concerning
the wise and the rich, when she asked which was
preferable, to be wise or to be rich. ‘‘ Rich,’ he
answered, “‘ for we see the wise spending their time
at the doors of the rich.” And the rich think they
are worthy to rule, because they believe they possess
that which makes them so.“ In a word, the character
of the rich man is that of a fool favoured by fortune.
At the same time there is a difference between the
character of the newly rich and of those whose wealth
is of long standing, because the former have the vices
of wealth in a greater degree and more; for, so
to say, they have not been educated to the use of
wealth. Their unjust acts are not due to malice,

« ““ What makes power worth having ” (Cope).
259

ARISTOTLE

> 4 > b A \ ¢ A A A
od KakoupyiKd, adda ta pev bBpiotuca Ta Se
akpatevTiKd, olov eis aikiay Kal pouyelay.

\ ‘

17. “Opoiws dé Kal mept Suvdpews oyedov Ta

lal 4, 3 A \ A \ \ Rd Te
mAciora pavepa éotw On: Ta wev yap Ta adTa ExEL
¢ 7 ~ , \ A / /
2% dvvapis TH mAovTW TA Se BeATiw: pidoTysdrepot
4
yap Kat avdpwoéorepol eiot Ta On of Svvdpevor

~ / A \ 7 / ” 4 > Ld

Tav tAovoiwy bia TO edicobar Epywv doa e€ovaia

3 avTois mparrew dia THv Sivayw. Kal omovda-

>

oTiKwTepor dua TO ev éemedeia elvat, avayKale-
a \ 4,

4 evo oKoTrety TH TrEpl THY SUvapwW. Kal GEeuVoTEpoL
a /

7) Bapdrepou rove? yap eudaveotépovs Td afiwpa,

\

did perpidlovow: Eore dé 7) ceuvorns padaK? Kal

~ /

evoxjuwv BapiTns. Kav aducdow, od piKpadicynTal

elow aAdd peyaddduKor.

€ > b) / A \ / ~ > / yw

5 ‘H & edroxia xara Ta pdpia Tav eipnuevwn exer
Ta “On eis yap Tatra ovvteivovew at péyvorat
doxotoar elvar edrvxiar, Kal ére eis edteKviay Kal

~ /
1891b TA KATA TO C@pa ayala wapacKevdle % edrvxia
a“ \ >

6 wAcoventetv. drepnpavwdtepor prev odv Kal Ga-
Aoyrororepor Sia THY edTvYIay eiciv, Ev 8 aKodov-

lal / i a > / A / / >
Get BéArvorov HOos TH edruxia, Ste PiAdMeoi eiar
Kal €xovot mpos TO Deidv mws, muatevovtes Sid
Ta yuyvopeva ayaba amo ths TUyns. TMEpi pev

S ~ , ~
otv tav Kal’ jAKiavy Kat Tvxynv HOdV elipyrat:
Ta yap evavtia THY eipnuevwv ex TaV evavTiwv

@ év émmedela: “* because they are administrators ”’ (Jebb).
» The three divisions are noble birth, wealth, and power.
The meaning is that the highest kinds of good fortune tend
or converge to these (i.e. to noble birth, wealth, and power).
kara ra popia might also mean “in part.’? Hobbes, in his -
Brief of the Art of Rhetorick, paraphrases: ‘the manners

260

RHETORIC, II. xvi. 4—xvu. 6

but partly to insolence, partly to incontinence, which
tends to make them commit assault and battery and
adultery.

17. In regard to power, nearly all the characters
to which it gives rise are equally clear ; for power,
compared with wealth, exhibits partly identical, and
partly superior characteristics. Thus, the powerful
are more ambitious and more manly in character
than the rich, since they aim at the performance of
deeds which their power gives them the opportunity
of carrying out. And they are more energetic ; for
being obliged to look after their power, they are
always on the watch. And they are dignified rather
than heavily pompous ; for their rank renders them
more conspicuous, so that they avoid excess ; and
this dignity is a mild and decent pomposity. And
their wrongdoings are never petty, but great.

Good fortune in its divisions ® exhibits characters
corresponding to those which have just been men-
tioned; for those which appear to be the most
important kinds of good fortune tend in their diree-
tion; further, good fortune furnishes advantages
over others in the blessing of children and bodily ~
goods. Now, although men are more arrogant and
thoughtless owing to good fortune, it is accompanied
by a most precious quality. Fortunate men stand
in a certain relation to the divinity and love the
gods, having confidence in them owing to the benefits
they have received from fortune. We have spoken °
of the characters associated with different ages and
fortunes ; the opposite characters to those described,

of men that prosper, are compounded of the manners of the
nobility, the rich, and those that are in power, for to some of
these all prosperity appertains.”’
© ji. 19-14; ii. 15-17.
261

ARISTOTLE

pavepa €otw, olov wévytos Kal arvxods 700s Kal
GOvvarov.

18, “Evel 8 4) trav miBavdv AdSywv ypHots mpos
Kpiow €oTi (mepi Gv yap topwev Kal Kexplkaperv,
ovdev ert Set Adyou), Ear. Sé, av TE mMpos Eva, TIS
TH Adyw xpwpevos mpotpérn 7 amotpémn, olov
ot vovberobvTes trovotow 7 melOovres (oddev yap
HTTOV KpiTHS O Eels: Ov yap Set metoat, obTds eoTW
ws aTAds <imety KpiTis), eav Te Mpos audioPyTodvTa
edv Te mpos t7d0eow A€yn Tis, dpolws: TH yap
Aoyw avdyKn yxpho0a Kai dvaipety ravaytia,
mpos & wWormep audisByrotvta Tov Adyov rovetrat.
woattws dé Kal ev Tots emideuKTLKOis’ WoTEp yap
mpos Kpitiv Tov Bewpov 6 Adyos ouveornKer.
OAws 5€ povos early anA@s Kpitis ev Tots moAu-
TiKols ay@ow 6 Ta Cyrovpeva Kpivwv: Ta Te yap
approByrovpeva Cyretrar ms exer, Kal mept wv

ovAcvovrat. mept Sé€ Tav KaTa Tas modAwTelas
nO&v ev tots cupBovdAcutixois elpyrat mporepov.
worte Siwpiopevoy av ein mas Te Kal dia TWwv
Tovs Adyous HOiKods mounréov.

« Having dealt with ethical and pathetie proofs, Aristotle
proceeds to the discussion of topics of enthymemes common
to all three kinds of Rhetoric. The difficulty in the Greek
lies in the absence of a suitable apodosis to the long sentence
beginning é7el dé 7) ray miOavev. Grammatically, it might be
aore duwpicpévov dy eln, but it by no means follows that ‘* since
the employment of persuasive speeches is directed towards a
judgement .. . therefore it has been determined how... .
we must make our speeches ethical.” Spengel, regarding
éwel 6@. . « Bov\edovra: merely as an enlargement of ii. 1, 2,
brackets the passage. Cope suggests that something has
fallen out after BovAevoyrac: ** Since in all the three kinds of
Rhetoric the object is to secure a judgement, ft have shown
how to put the judges into a certain frame of mind in the

262

RHETORIC, I. xvu. 6—xvut. 1

for instance, of the poor, of the unfortunate, and of

the weak, are obvious from their opposites.

18.¢ Now the employment of persuasive speeches
is directed towards a judgement ; for when a thing
is known and judged, there is no longer any need of
argument. And there is judgement, whether a
speaker addresses himself to a single individual and
makes use of his speech to exhort or dissuade, as
those do who give advice or try to persuade, for this
single individual is equally a judge, since, speaking
generally, he who has to be persuaded is a judge ;
if the speaker is arguing against an opponent or
against some theory, it is just the same, for it is
necessary to make use of speech to destroy the
opposing arguments, against which he speaks as if
they were the actual opponent; and similarly in
epideictic speeches, for the speech is put together
with reference to the spectator as if he were a judge.
Generally speaking, however, only he who decides
questions at issue in civil controversies ° is a judge
in the proper sense of the word, for in judicial cases
the point at issue is the state of the case, in de-
liberative the subjects of deliberation.© We have
already spoken of the characters of forms of govern-
ment in treating of deliberative rhetoric, so that it
has been determined how and by what means we
must make our speeches conform to those characters.

discussion of the characters and emotions]. I have also
spoken of the characters of the forms of government; so
that this part of the subject need no longer detain us.” It
is generally agreed that we have not the chapter as originally
arranged, although it is not supposed that any part of it is
non-Aristotelian (see Cope and note in Jebb’s translation).

» Both forensic and deliberative.

¢ Or, “for in both forensic and deliberative arguments the
issue is the state of the case.” Rie

263

2

ARISTOTLE

"Bw \ be A 7 A / ~ /
met O€ Tept ExaoTov prev yéevos TaV Adywv
a” Ss \ / a, & / > > ~ > a
ETEpov Tv TO TEAOS, TEpt atravTwy 8 abr@v eiAnppe-
7
var dd€au Kal mpordoes eiaiv, e€ dv tas miorTeis
fpépovot Kai ovpBovrctovres Kal emderkvdpevot
\ > ~ ” > > A, 2 > \ \
Kat apdioPytobvtes, ert 8 €& Gv HOtKOvS Tods
Aoyous evdéxerae Troveiv, Kal Tepl TOUTWY SidpLoTat,

\ c¢ a Cal \ ~ ~ = \
3 Aowrov jpiv Seely epi THv Kowdv- mao yap

1392 a

avaykaiov Ta tTept tod Svvarob Kal advvdtov
mpooxphaba. ev rots Adyous, Kal Tovs pev ws
€oTa. tovs dé ws yéeyove meipadobar Serxvivar.
ert S€ mept peyélouvs Kowov amdvrwy éotl Tay
Aoywr' xp@vrar yap mavres TH pecodv Kal avew
Kal ovpBovrevovtes Kal erawodvTes 7) péyovTes
Kal Kkarnyopobyres 7) azroAoyovpevor. tovTwv de
Sioptobevrwy epi Te evOvpndtwv Kow?y TreipadOpev
eimretv, €l TL EXOMEV, KAL TEPL TAapadeLypaTwY, OTwWS
ta Aowra mpoobévtes arrodapev tHy €& apyfs mpo-
feow. ort 5€ TOV KowBv 70 pev avbEew oikevoratov
Tots emideiKTLKOIs, WamrEp ElpyTat, TO dé ‘yeyovds
Tots Sukavikots (rept TovTwy yap 7) Kplows), TO de
duvaroy Kal éadjevov Tois ovpBovdAeuTiKots.

19. Ilp@rov pev obv repi dvvarod Kai advvarov
déeywpev. adv 87 todbvavriov 7 Suvarov 7 elvau 7)
yeveoOar, Kai TO evavriov dd€evev av elvar Svvarov:
olov et duvarov avOpwrov byracjvar, Kal voojoat
9 yap adr? Sdvapis TOV evavtiwv, evavtia. Kal

ads Os > i. 4-8. © 1.933 10-15:
4 ji, 9. 40. Amplication is to be understood of the
exaggeration of both great and small things. It is most

264

RHETORIC, II. xvmr. 2—xrx. 1

Now, since each kind of Rhetoric, as was said,* has
its own special end, and in regard to all of them we
have gathered popular opinions and premises whence
men derive their proofs in deliberative, epideictic,
and judicial speeches, and, further, we have deter-
mined ¢ the special rules according to which it is
possible to make our speeches ethical, it only remains
to discuss the topics common to the three kinds of
rhetoric. For all orators are obliged, in their
speeches, also to make use of the topic of the possible
and impossible, and to endeavour to show, some of
them that a thing will happen, others that it has
happened. Further, the topic of magnitude is
common. to all kinds of Rhetoric, for all men employ
extenuation or amplification whether deliberating,
praising or blaming, accusing or defending. When
these topics have been determined, we will endeavour
to say what we can in general about enthymemes
and examples, in order that, when we have added
what remains, we may carry out what we proposed
at the outset. Now, of the commonplaces amplifica-
tion is most appropriate to epideictic rhetoric, as has
been stated ;4% the past to forensic, since things past
are the subject of judgement ; and the possible and
future to deliberative.

19. Let us first speak of the possible and the im-
possible. If of two contrary things it is possible
that one should exist or come into existence, then
it would seem that the other is equally possible ; for
instance, if a man can be cured, he can also be ill;
for the potentiality of contraries, gua contraries, is

suited to epideictic oratory, in which there is no doubt as
to the facts; so that it is only necessary to accentuate their
importance or non-importance.

265

ARISTOTLE

2et TO dpovov dvvarov, Kal TO dwowov. Kal Et TO
3 xaAerwrepov Svvardv, Kal TO pdov. Kal et TO
4 ormovdatov Kat Kaddcv yevéoPar duvarov, Kat dAws
duvarov yevéobar: xadremutepov yap Kadny oikiav
57) otkiay elvar. Kal ob 7) apxn Sivarar yeveobar,
Kat TO Tédos: oddev yap ylyverar odd apxerat
yiyvesar tv aduvdrwy, oiov TO avpmeTpoy TV
dudperpov civar otr’ dv apEarto ylyvecbar ovre
ylyverar. Kal ob Td Tedos, Kal % apy? Suvarn:
6 a7ravra yap e€ apyns yiyverar. Kal el TO DorEpov
Th ovoia 7 TH _yeveoet duvatov yeveobar, Kal TO
Tporepov, olov €c i dvdpa yeveoban Suvarov, Kal mraida.
mporepov yap exeivo ylyverau: Kal et maida, Kal
7 avopa: apxn yap exetv7). Kal @v €pws 7 emBupia
pvoe €otiv: oddeis yap TtOv aduvarwv pa ovd"
8 émiOuped ws emt TO TOAD. Kal dv emioTHMat etot
Kal téxyvat, dvvaTa Tatra Kai eivar Kal yeveobar.
9 Kal Gowv 7) apy? THs yevéoews ev TovTols eoTlv a
nets avayKdoayev dv i) Teloamev: tadra O°
10 €orly dv Kpeitrouvs 7 KUpior H pido. Kal dv Ta
pepyn Suvard, Kal TO OAov. Kat vy TO dAoy dvvaror,
Kal Ta epn ws el TO TOAV: ei yap mpocxXLopa
Kat Kedadris Kal yiTwv dtvarar yeveoBat, Kal
brodjpara Svvarov yevéobar, Kal ei brod%jpara,
ll Kal mpdoxiopa Kal Kehadris Kal yirmv. Kal ei TO

@ As a general rule, from their nature as contraries,
although it may not be true in particular cases. If a man
is ill, he may also be well, although in particular cases
certain qualities may make him more liable to one or the
other, eg. he may suffer from an incurable disease”
(Schrader).

266

RHETORIC, II. xrx. 2-11

the same.” Similarly, if of two like things the one
is possible, so also is the other. And if the harder
of two things is possible, so also is the easier. And
if it is possible for a thing to be made excellent or
beautiful, it is possible for it to be made in general ;
for it is harder for a beautiful house to be made than
amere house.’ Again, if the beginning is possible, so
also is the end; for no impossible thing comes, or
begins to come, into existence ; for instance, that the
diameter of a square should be commensurable with
the side of a square is neither possible nor could be
possible. And when the end is possible, so also is the
beginning ; for all things arise from a beginning. And
if that which is subsequent in being or generation can
come into being, so then can that which is antecedent ;
for instance, if a man can come into being, so can
a child, for the child is antecedent ; and similarly,
if a child can come into being, so can a man, for the
child is a beginning. And things which we love or
desire naturally are possible ; for as a rule no one
loves the impossible or desires it. And those things
which form the subject of sciences or arts can also
exist and come into existence. And so with all
those things, the productive principles of which re-
side in those things which we can control by force
or persuasion, when they depend upon those whose
superiors, masters, or friends we are. And if the
parts are possible, so also is the whole; and if the
whole is possible, so also are the parts, speaking
generally ; for instance, if the front, toe-cap, and
upper leather,? can be made, then shoes can be
made, and if shoes, then the above parts. And if

» An argument a fortiori. If a beautiful house can be
built, so can a house of any kind; for this is easier.
The meaning of the Greek words is quite uncertain.
267

ARISTOTLE

, a ~ ~ / \ \
1392b yevos OAov tTa&v duvarav yevéoOar, Kat To e€tdos,
\ > \ > \ A wv e > a /
Kat €l TO €ldos, Kal TO yevos, olov et mAotov yeveobat
duvarov, Kat Tpinpyn, Kal et Tpinpy, Kat motor.
\ > - ~ A A , ‘A
12 Kai «¢ Odrepov trav mpos dAAndAa TeduKoTwr, Kat
Oarepov, ofov «i SumAdovov, Kal jusov, Kal et Hucov,
13 Kat durAdowov. Kal ef dvev téxvns Kal TapacKeuas
~ ,
duvarov yevéobar, uGAXov bia réxvyns Kat emyeActas
/ iJ \ > / ww
duvarov: dbev Kat "Ayabwu elpyrat

Kal pny Ta ev ye xpi) TéexVN mpdooew, TA BE
npiv avaykn Kal réyn mpooylyverac.

14 Kal et Tots xelpoot Kal yrToot Kal adpovearépots
duvardv, Kal Tots évavtiois paddov, waTep Kal
*looxpatns én Sewov elvar et 6 pev Evbuvos
” b) \ \ \ / ¢ ~ A \

15 euabev, atros dé pn Suvicerar edpeiv. mepl de
advvarov dSiAov ort €x TAav evaytiwv Tots eipypévots
bmrdpyYet.

16 Ei d€ yéyovev 7) uu) yéyover, ek TavdE oKeTTEoV.
Tp@Tov pev ydp, et TO Hrrov ylyvecOar meduKos

17 yéyovev, yeyovos av ein kal TO waAAov. Kal ei TO

\
votepov eiwlos yiyveoBar yéyovev, Kal TO mpdoTEpov
/ e > > / \ ” /

yéyovev, olov et emAcAnora, Kal euabé more
ig ToUTo. Kal e¢ ed¥varo Kai éeBovdeTo, mémpaxer

/ / ov / ~ /
mavrTes yap, orav Suvdpevor BovAnOdor, mpdr-
>? \ \ ) / ” > > / \

19 Tovow* eumodwv yap ovdev. Ere ef eBovAeTO Kal

« 7.G.F. p. 165.
268

RHETORIC, I]. xrx. 11-19

the whole genus is among things possible to be made,
so is the species, and if the species, so the genus ;
for example, if a vessel can be built, so can a trireme,
if a trireme can, so can a vessel. If of two naturally
corresponding things one is possible, so also is the
other; for instance, if the double is possible, so is
the half, if the half, so the double. If a thing can
be made without art or preparation, much the more
can it be made with the help of art and carefulness.
Whence it was said by Agathon ¢:

And moreover we have to do some things by art, while
others fall to our lot by compulsion or chance.

And if a thing is possible for those who are inferior,
or weaker, or less intelligent, it will be still more so
for those whose qualities are the opposite; as
Isocrates said, it would be very strange if he were
unable by himself to find out what Euthynus had
learnt [with the help of others]. As for the im-
possible, it is clear that there is a supply of arguments
to be derived from the opposite of what has been said
about the possible.

The question whether a thing has or has not
happened must be considered from the following
points of view. In the first place, if that which is
naturally less likely has happened, then that which
is more likely will most probably have happened. If
that which usually happens afterwards has happened,
then that which precedes must also have happened ;
for instance, if a man has forgotten a thing, he must
once have learnt it. If a man was able and wished
to do a thing, he has done it ; for all men do a thing,
when they are able and resolve to do it, for nothing
hinders them. Further, if a man wished to do it

269

ARISTOTLE

be col ” > hA \ 299. 7. A > tA
pndev trav Ew exddvev, kal ei edvvato Kal wpyi-
\ 7 LSS. F A > 4 c ‘A : pm.
Cero, Kai ef edvvaro Kai emeOUper* ws yap emi TO
/ od > / oD) / \ ~ .
ToAv, @v opéyovrat, av Svvwvrar, Kal movdvow,
rok Ro 5 $3 , ¢ 3 > a. ¢ ~s
ot ev fatrAor &’ axpaciav, ot 8 emvetkets OTe TOV
20 emueuc@v emiOvpotow. Kai ei eueAre yiyvecbar,
“ ‘ a 3
Kal Toveiy' eiKos yap Tov peAdovTa Kal mrovnoa.
vhs , ¢ , hea ey, na ¢ J
21 Kal ef yéyovey doa medvKer mpd ekelvov 7 €VEKa
bd] / e > Ed ‘ > / \ >
exeivov, olov et jotparbe, Kai eBpovrnoev, Kal et
> ld \ ” A > A Na
emetpace, Kal empatev. Kal ef doa voTepov me-
/, , ”“ ec / , \
pve ylyvec0ar 7 0d evexa yiyveTau yéeyovev, Kat
v4 >
TO TpoOTEpov Kal TO TOUTOV Eveka yeyovev, Otov Et
> , A ” ‘ > ” A
éBpovrnce, Kal notpaiev, Kal ef Empage, Kal
> / ” \ 7 c / \ A >
22 éreipacev. eoTe Se TovTwy andvrwy Ta pev €&
> / A > ¢ r Baap’ A \ ud A \
avayKns Ta 5° ws emi TO TOAD OUTWS ExoVTA. TeEpt
~ 7 \ 7 ~ /
5é Tob pn yeyovévar pavepov ote ek TOV evayTiwv
a > /
Tots eipyevots.
\ ‘ ~a > , > ~ 7 A ~ ,
1398a Kat mepi rod écopevov ex tay adray SiAov- 76
23 \ > PS) / \ » , “ ” A \
Te yap ev duvduer Kal BovdAnoe: dv Eorar, Kal TA
> >? é / Ay 2 od \ Xr ~ \ 8 4,
ev emOvpia Kal dpyf Kat Aoyrop@ pera Svvdpews
~ ~ ~ “a nn
ovTa. Oia Tatra Kal «i ev Oph Tod Tov 7
, ” ¢ \ > \ \ Ad /
peAAjoe, eorar: Ws yap emt TO TOAD ylyveTat
~ \ >
24 wadAov ra péAAovTa 7) Ta pun péAAovTAa. Kat €t
, ,
mpoyeyovev doa mpdorepov treddxer yiyveoBar, olov
> a > ‘ e ‘ > ‘ @ 7,
25 €¢ ovvvedet, cixos Boa. Kal ef TO EveKa TOUTOV
270

RHETORIC, IT. xix. 19-25

and there was no external obstacle; if he was able
to do it and was in a state of anger; if he was able
and desired to do it; for men as a rule, whenever
they can, do those things which they long for, the
vicious owing to want of self-control, the virtuous
because they desire what is good. And if anything
was on the point of being done, it most probably
was done ; for it is likely that one who was on the
point of doing something has carried it out. And if
all the natural antecedents or causes of a thing have
happened ; for instance, if it has lightened, it has
also thundered ; and if a man has already attempted
a crime, he has also committed it. And if all the
natural consequences or motives of actions have
happened, then the antecedent or the cause has
happened ; for instance, if it has thundered, it has
also lightened, and if a man has committed a crime,
he has also attempted it. Of all these things some
are so related necessarily, others only as a general
rule. To establish that a thing has not happened,
it is evident that our argument must be derived from
the opposite of what has been said.

In regard to the future, it is clear that one can
argue in the same way; for if we are able and wish to
do a thing, it will be done ; and so too will those things
which desire, anger, and reasoning urge us to do, if we
have the power. For this reason also, if a man has
an eager desire, or intention, of doing a thing, it will
probably be done ; since, as a rule, things that are
about to happen are more likely to happen than those
which are not. And if all the natural antecedents
have happened ; for instance, if the sky is cloudy, it
will probably rain. And if one thing has been done
with a view to another, it is probable that the latter

271

ARISTOTLE

yeyovev, Kat TobTo €ikos yevecbat, oiov ef Dewéeduos,

Kal oikia.

26 ITepi de peyeBous Kat puKpoTnTos: TOV TpAyLaTwy
Kal peiLovds Te Kal eAdrrovos Kal hws peydAwy
Kal pucp@y eK TOV Tpoerpyseveov Hiv eori pavepov:
elpnTat yap ev Tots ovpBovdreurixots mepi TE [e-
yebous ayabéay kal mrept Too peilovos amA@s Kat
eAdrrovos. wor emel Kal? Exaorov TOV Adyev
TO Tporel}Levov Tédos ayabov €oTw, olov To Up
pépov Kal TO kadov Kal TO dikaov, pavepov 6 Ort bu

27 éxcelvenv Anmréov Tas avéhoes maow. To be Tropa

radrda Tu Cnreiv mrept peyebous dmdds Kal drrepoxns

kevohoyeiv éoriv: KUpUsrepa yap €oTe mpos THY

Xpetav TOV Kaborov Ta Kal? eExaora. TOV mpay-

pare. mrept pev obv Suvarod Kat dduvdrou, Kat

TOTEpPOV yéyovev 7) od yéyovev eal eorat H ovK

€orTat, rt d€ qepl peyeBous Kal puKpoTnTos TaV

TpayLaTwv etpj ow TavrTa.

20. Aowrov Sێ rept tav Kowdy mictewy dmacw
eirreiy, emetmrep elpynTar mepl Tov idiwv. etot 5°
at Kowal morets do TO Yevel, mrapddevypa Kal
evOEunpua Y) yap yvaopn p€pos evOuunpatos € eoTiv.
mparov pev ovv mepl mrapadelyparos Aéyopev:
Spovov yap _emayuyh TO Trapddevypwa, 7 8 én-
aywyh apx7.

Ilapadevyparwy 8 <td dvo* &v pev yap €oTt
mapadelypwaros <idos 70 éyew _mpdypara Tpo-
yeyevnpeva, ev 5é€ To adbrov rovetvy. tovrov 8 &
3 ev trapaPoAn Ev dé Adyo, ofov ot Aicueor Kat

ArBuxot. ort dé TO wev mpdypara Aéyew" Tovdvde

bo

1 Spengel’s alteration of the Paris ms. (A°) reading mapa-
delyuara héyeuv.
272

RHETORIC, II. xrx. 25—xx. 3

will also be done; for instance, if a foundation
has been laid, a house will probably be built.

What we have previously said clearly shows the
nature of the greatness and smallness of things, of
the greater and less, and of things great and small
generally. For, when treating of deliberative
rhetoric,* we spoke of greatness of goods, and of the
greater and less generally. Therefore, since in each
branch of Rhetoric the end set before it is a good,
such as the expedient, the noble, or the just, it is
evident that all must take the materials of amplifica-
tion from these. ‘To make any further inquiry as to
magnitude and superiority absolutely would be waste
of words ; for the particular has more authority than
the general for practical purposes. Let this suffice
for the possible and impossible ; for the question
whether a thing has happened, or will happen, or
not ; and for the greatness or smallness of things.

20. It remains to speak of the proofs common to
all branches of Rhetoric, since the particular proofs
have been discussed. These common proofs are of
two kinds, example and enthymeme (for the maxim
is part of anenthymeme). Let us then first speak of
the example ; for the example resembles induction,
and induction is a beginning.?

There are two kinds of examples; namely, one
which consists in relating things that have happened
before, and another in inventing them oneself. The
latter are subdivided into comparisons or fables, such
as those of Aesop and the Libyan.’ It would be an

cab Bey

» Asa starting-point and first principle of knowledge.

¢ The Libyan fables were of African origin. They are

mentioned by Quintilian (Inst. Orat. v. 11. 20) and belonged
to the class of animal fables.

T 273

ARISTOTLE

7 ” Is Ld Aa \ /
Tl, WoTrep Et Tis A€you Oru Set mpds Bacréa wapa-
1398 b oxevalecOar Kal pur eav Alyurrov yxeipmoacba-
\ \ cal > / /, ‘ a

Kat yap Aapetos od mpotepov dueBn mpiv Atyumrov
AaBev, AaBdw dé SieBy, Kai mdAw Béepéns od
mpotepov emexeipnoe mpiv eAaBev, AaB dé Sehr:

” A e a4 / 4 ‘ >
wate Kat odtos eav AdBy, SiaByoerar: 510 ovdK

> / \ \ A 4, e

4 €mitperréov. tTrapaBodAr d¢€ ta LwxKparickd, otov
et Tis A€you STL od Set KAnpwrods apxew* Sporov
yap Worep av el Tis Tovs aOAnTas KAnpoin pur) ot
”“ Yi > / > > a ” / n”
av dvvwrvra. aywvrilecbar add of av Adywow, 7
Tt&v TAwTipwr 6v Twa det KvBepvav KAnpwoeter,
e / A 4, > \ \ A > rs
ws déov Tov AaxovTa adAa ju} TOV emLoTdpevoV.

5 Adyos dé, ofos 6 Urnovyopov wept Daddpidos
kat Alowmov tbrép Tob Syuaywyod. Xrnaixopos
fev yap, €Aopévwv otparnydv adroxpdropa Tay
“Ipepatwy Dddapw Kali wedAAcvtwv dvdaxiy Siddvat
Tov owpatos, TaAAa diadexOeis cizev adrois Adyov
ws Unmos Kateixe Aeywdva pdvos, eADovtos 8
eAddov Kai diadbetpovros tiv voprv Bovddpevos
Tyswpnoacbar tov eAahov npwta twa avOpwrov
el S¥vaiT’ av pet? adTob KoAdoa Tov Edadov, 6 S
” 2\ # A \ > \ > ~ Te
epnoev, eav AdBn xadwov Kal abros avaBH em
avrov €xwv aKovTia: ouvopodroynoavros dé Kal
dvaBavros, avTi Tod TYyLwpyoacba adros édov-

« The rapaZod7 as understood by Aristotle is a comparison
and application of cases easily supposable and such as occur
in real life, for the purpose of illustrating the point in ques-
tion ; the fable, on the other hand, is pure fiction.

274

RHETORIC, II. xx. 3-5

instance of the historical kind of example, if one
were to say that it is necessary to make preparations
against the Great King and not to allow him to
subdue Egypt; for Darius did not cross over to
Greece until he had obtained possession of Egypt ;
but as soon as he had done so, he did. Again,
Xerxes did not attack us until he had obtained
possession of that country, but when he had, he
crossed over; consequently, if the present Great
King shall do the same, he will cross over, wherefore
it must not be allowed. Comparison is illustrated
by the sayings of Socrates ; for instance, if one were
to say that magistrates should not be chosen by lot,
for this would be the same as choosing as representa-
tive athletes not those competent to contend, but
those on whom the lot falls; or as choosing any of
the sailors as the man who should take the helm, as
if it were right that the choice should be decided by
lot, not by a man’s knowledge.®

A fable, to give an example, is that of Stesichorus
concerning Phalaris, or that of Aesop on behalf of
the demagogue. For Stesichorus, when the people
of Himera had chosen Phalaris dictator and were on
the point of giving him a body-guard, after many
arguments related a fable to them: “A horse was
in sole occupation of a meadow. A stag having
come and done much damage to the pasture, the
horse, wishing to avenge himself on the stag, asked
a man whether he could help him to punish the stag.
The man consented, on condition that the horse
submitted to the bit and allowed him to mount him
javelins in hand. The horse agreed to the terms
and the man mounted him, but instead of obtaining
vengeance on the stag, the horse from that time

275

ao

1394 a

~I

ie 2)

ARISTOTLE

Aevoev 71m TO avOpeirrey. “ otrw be Kal dyes,”
epn, “‘ opare ry BovAdpevot Tovs mroAcpious
Typeopnoacbar tavto mdOnre TH int Tov pe
yap Xadwev €, EXeTE 707, EAdpevor oTparnyov avTo-
Kpdropa eav dé dvdaxiy Sate Kal avaBiAvar
edonre, SovAcdoere dn Daddpid..” Atowmos be
ev Lduw ovvnyopdv Snpaywy@ Kpwvopevep mept
bavdrov edn addrreka SiaBaivovoay ToTapov am-
wobiivar eis Papayya, od Suvapevnv 8 exPijva troAdv
xpovov Kaxorrabety, Kal Kvvopaioras mroMods
exeobau avris: €xivov dé Tavepeevov, ws e«ldev
avriV, Karoucretpavra epwrray él apehor avTis
TODS kuvopaiords: Hv dé ovK ev: epopevov be
dua Ti, OTL ObTOL pev pavar 78m prov mAjpers clot
Kat dAtyov €AKovow ata eav dé Tovrous apedn,
erepo. eAOdvTes mewdvTes exmiodvTal jrov TO
Aowrov aiua. “arap Kal dtpas,”’ edn, “@
avdpes Ldpwor, obros pev oddev ert Brdiber (rAov-
ovos yap €orw): av S€ Tobrov amoKrelvyre, ETEpoL
n€ovat TEVITES, ot Opty avaAdoovet Ta Kowd
KA€rrovres. * etot 8 ob Aoyou SnenyopuKot, Kat
exovow ayabov Tobro, OTL mpdypaTra jwev edpelv
Gpowa yeyervnueva xaderdv, Adyous Se paov-
movfjoa yap Se? womep Kal mapaBodAds, av tis
dvvnTat TO Gpovov Opay, Strep padov éeotw ex dido-
copias. pdw pev otv mopicacba ra dia rev
Abywv, xpnoyndrepa Sé mpds Td BovActoacba
Ta dua TOV Tpayudrwv: duo.a yap ws emt To word
Ta peAAovra Tois yeyovoow.

« “Literary knowledge” (Jebb); “ literature ” (Cope,
276

RHETORIC, II. xx. 5-8

became the man’s slave. So then,” said he, “‘ do
you take care lest, in your desire to avenge your-
selves on the enemy, you be treated like the horse.
You already have the bit, since you have chosen a
dictator ; if you give him a body-guard and allow
him to mount you, you will at once be the slaves of
Phalaris.”” Aesop, when defending at Samos a
demagogue who was being tried for his life, related
the following anecdote. ‘A fox, while crossing a
river, was driven into aravine. Being unable to get
out, she was for a long time in sore distress, and a
number of dog-fleas clung to her skin. A hedgehog,
wandering about, saw her and, moved with com-
passion, asked her if he should remove the fleas.
The fox refused and when the hedgehog asked the
reason, she answered: ‘They are already full of
me and draw little blood ; but if you take them away,
others will come that are hungry and will drain what
remains to me.’ You in like manner, O Samians,
will suffer no more harm from this man, for he is
wealthy ; but if you put him to death, others will
come who are poor, who will steal and squander your
public funds.”” Fables are suitable for public speak-
ing, and they have this advantage that, while it is
difficult to find similar things that have really hap-
pened in the past, it is easier to invent fables ; for
they must be invented, like comparisons, if a man
is capable of seizing the analogy ; and this is easy if
one studies philosophy.* Thus, while the lessons con-
veyed by fables are easier to provide, those derived
from facts are more useful for deliberative oratory,
because as a rule the future resembles the past.

Introd. p. 256, who, however, in his annotated ed. explains :
* intellectual study and mental exercises in general ’’).

277

ARISTOTLE

9 Act de yphobae Tots Tapadelypact pa) exovra
poev evOvpjpara ws dmodeiEeow () yap miotis
dia Tovtwv), exovra 5é€ ws paprupiows, émAoyw
xXpwpevov Tots evOvpjuacw: mpoTiWeweva prev yap
Eoucev eTrayoyh, tots dé pytopikots ovK otketov
emayoyn aAnv ev dAiyots, emAeyoueva de pap
tuplois, 6 dé pedprus mavtayod milaves. 810 Kal
mporevre pev dvdynn ToAAa A€éyew, emdA€yovte
d€ Kal & icavov: bdprus yap morTos Kal els
XpnoYWLOS. Toa pev obv <td mapadevyparo,
Kal 7@s avTois Kal mOTE XPNOTEOV, ElpyTac.

21. Ilepi de yraponoyias, pnbevros tt €or
youn, pador dy yevouro pavepov mepl Trolwy
TE Kal more Kal Tiow dpLorrer xpiobae T@ YVW[LO-

2 Aoyeiv év Tots Adyous. eo dé yraun dnddavars,
od pevro. wept TOV Kal? Exaotov, olov motds Tis
"Iduxparyns, adAa KabbdAov: Kal od wept mavTwv

parns, p
Kabodov, olov OTt TO «vd TH Kapton evavriov,
adda mrepl dowy at mages cial, Kat atpera x
pevKTa €or mpos TO mparrew. wor erel TA €v-
Oupjnpata 6 mept TovTw avAdAoyiapds eoTt axEddv,
Td Te oupTrepaopara Ta evOvunuaTwr Kal ai apyal
adaipebévros Tot avAAoyitop,00 yv@mat eior, otov

xp7) 5° ov 7708”, ds Tis aptippwv méduk’ avnp,
matdas Tepioods exdiddoKxea0ar codovs.

_TobTO prev odv yrwpn’ mpooTeDeions Sé€ THs aitias
Kal Tod dia Ti, evOUuNpa eoTL TO aTrav, olov

“If we have no enthymemes, we must use examples
instead of them; for they are useful for persuasion,
although they do not really demonstrate anything. If we
have enthymemes, we must use examples in corroboration
of them (see 21. 3 note).

278

RHETORIC, II. xx. 9—xx1. 2

If we have no enthymemes, we must employ
examples as demonstrative proofs, for conviction is
produced by these; but if we have them, examples
must be used as evidence and as a kind of epilogue
to the enthymemes.* For if they stand first, they
resemble induction, and induction is not suitable to
rhetorical speeches except in very few cases ; if they
stand last they resemble evidence, and a witness is in
every case likely to induce belief. Wherefore also
it is necessary to quote a number of examples if they
are put first, but one alone is sufficient if they are put
last ; for even a single trustworthy witness is of use.
We have thusstated howmany kinds of examples there
are, and how and when they should be made use of.

21. In regard to the use of maxims, it will most
readily be evident on what subjects, and on what
occasions, and by whom it is appropriate that maxims
should be employed in speeches, after a maxim has
been defined. Now, a maxim isa statement, not how-
ever concerning particulars, as, for instance, what sort
of a man Iphicrates was, but general ; it does not even
deal with all general things, as for instance that the
straight is the opposite of the crooked, but with the
objects of human actions, and with what should be
chosen or avoided with reference to them. And as the
-enthymeme is, we may say,’ the syllogism dealing with
such things, maxims are the premises or conclusions
of enthymemes without the syllogism. For example:

No man who is sensible ought to have his children taught
to be excessively clever,¢
is a maxim; but when the why and the wherefore
are added, the whole makes an enthymeme ; for
instance,

> Putting the comma after cxedév. ¢ Eur. Medea, 296.
279

ARISTOTLE
xwpls yap aAns as éxovow apyias,
Odévov wap aorGv aAddvovor dvapevi.
1394 b KL TO
otk €oTw Os Tis TavT avip eddatpovel.
Kal TO
ovx €oTrw avdpd@yv ds tis €or’ édedOepos
ywuopn, mpos S€ TH exonevw evOdpnua:
Xpnpdrwr yap SobAés éotw 7 TvxNS.

3«i 57 core yep 70 elpnpevor, avayKn TérTapa
eld clvat yuopns’ H yap per emuAdyou €oTat 7

4 dvev emAoyov. dmodei~ews pev ovv Sedpevat
clow doa mapasogov tu Aéyovow oy] apdroBynrov-
pevov" Goa be padev mapdsofov, dvev emdoyou.

5 ToUTwy © avayKn Tas pev dia TO mpoeyv@obat
pndev Seicbar emddyou, olov

> ‘ 7 ¢ / ” / > ov 7 Crow val

avopi 8 byvaivew apioroy eoTw, ws y jpiv SoKet:
paiverat yap Tots moAdois obrw* Tas 8 aya Aeyo-
peevas SyjAas elvar emPrEpacw, ofov

ovdels epauTis Os Tis obK del piAci.

~ A > > / ¢ \ > / ¥.
6 Tov Se per emidrAdyou at pev evOupAparos jpepos
clo, WoTrEp

« “ The idle habits which they contract ” (Cope).

» Euripides, Stheneboea (frag. 661, T.G.F.).

¢ Euripides, Hecuba, 858.

4 Maxims with an epilogue are (1) imperfect enthymemes,
or (2) enthymematic in character, but not in form; those
without an epilogue are (1) such as are well known, or (2)
such as are clear as soon as they are uttered.

280

RHETORIC, II. xxr. 2-6

for, not to speak of the charge of idleness brought against
them,* they earn jealous hostility from the citizens.

Another example :

There is no man who is happy in everything ; ?
or,

There is no man who is really free.

The latter is a maxim, but taken with the next verse
it is an enthymeme :

for he is the slave of either wealth or fortune.¢

Now, if a maxim is what we have stated, it follows
that maxims are of four kinds ; for they are either
accompanied by an epilogue or not.? Now all those
that state anything that is contrary to the general
opinion or is a matter of dispute, need demonstrative
proof; but those that do not, need no epilogue,’
either because they are already known, as, for in-
stance,

Health is a most excellent thing for a man, at least in our
opinion,’
for this is generally agreed ; or because, no sooner
are they uttered than they are clear to those who
consider them, for instance,

He is no lover who does not love always.”

As for the maxims that are accompanied by an
epilogue, some form part of an enthymeme, as

* Something added as a supplementary proof, the why
and the wherefore ; in iii. 19 it is used for the peroration of
a speech.

* From Simonides or Epicharmus.

9 Euripides, Troades, 1051.

281

ARISTOTLE
xp7) 5° od mol” Goris aptidpwr,
ai 8° evOupnparical pév, otk evOuprpatos dé
peépos* almep Kal pddvor eddoKysotow. eiot 8°

a > a > , lol 7 \ w
avira. ev doas eudaiverar Tob Aeyouevov TO aitiov,
oiov ev TO

abdvarov opynv pa) dvAacce Ovyros wv:

TO pev yap pavar p47) bet a det purdrrew TH opynv
youn, TO d€ mpookeievov “ Ovnrov ovTa’’ TO
dua Ti Aeyer. Spowov S€ Kai TO

Ovara xpn tov Ovardv, odk abavara tov Ovarov
dpoveiv.

A > > ~ > 4 , ww
7 Wavepov obtv ék Td eipnuévwy Toca TE €idy
yams, Kal qept Trotov exaoTov petcei ht mept
pev yap ta&v audioByrovpevwv 7 Tapa, dd€wv pu)
dvev emtAdyou, aA 7 mpobevra. TOV emidoyov
youn xpjola rd ocuprepdopatt, olov et tis
” ¢. 3 ‘ \ > > A * cal a
elmou “‘ éya prev odv, émrevd7) ote POoveiabar Set
wv > 3 \ ” ~ , 7 ON
ovr’ apyov civar, od dyut yphvar trawdevecIar,’ 7
TooTO TMpoeiTovTa. emeutretv TA epmpooer. mept
dé T&V pr) TrapaddEwyv adipAcov dé, mpoorevra 70
g dvdte otpoyyvAdrara. dpworret 8° ey Tots Towod-
Tos Kat Ta Aakwvika amopléypatra Kal ra
aivvypwaTrwdn, olov el tis A€yer Omep Urnoixyopos
1395 a ev Aoxpots elzev, ott od Set bBproras elvar, dws
9p of Tértuyes yxapdlev ddwow. apporrer de
yuwpmodroyeiy HAiKia pev mpeoBurépors, epi de

@ See §2.

» They partake of the nature of, but not of the form of,

enthymemes.
¢ Author unknown (7.G.F. p. 854).

282

RHETORIC, IT. xxr. 6-9

No one who is sensible, ete.,@

while others are enthymematic, but are not part of an
enthymeme ;? and these are most highly esteemed.
Such are those maxims in which the reason of what
is said is apparent: for instance,

Being a mortal, do not nourish immortal wrath ; ¢

to say that one should not always nourish immortal
wrath is a maxim, but the addition “‘ being a mortal”
states the reason. It is the same with

A mortal should have mortal, not immortal thoughts.4

It is evident, therefore, from what has been said,
how many kinds of maxims there are, and to what
it is appropriate to apply them in each case. For
in the case of matters of dispute or what is contrary
to the general opinion, the epilogue is necessary ;
but either the epilogue may be put first and the
conclusion used as a maxim, as, for example, if one
_were to say, “‘ As for me, since one ought neither to
be the object of jealousy nor to be idle, I say that
children ought not to be educated”; or put the
maxim first and append the epilogue. In all cases
where the statements made, although not para-
doxical, are obscure, the reason should be added as
concisely as possible. In such cases Laconic apo-
phthegms and riddling sayings are suitable; as, for
instance, to say what Stesichorus said to the Locrians,
that they ought not to be insolent, lest their cicadas
should be forced to chirp from the ground. The
use of maxims is suitable for one who is advanced

4 According to Bentley, from Epicharmus.

¢ Meaning that the land would be devastated and the
trees cut down.

283

ARISTOTLE

TOUTWY Gv EuTeipos Tis eoTiV, WSs TO MeV }41)
TnAuKodTov OvTa yywpodoyeiy ampemés WoTrep Kal
TO pvlodroyetv, mept 8 wv depos, HAWiov Kat
amaidevtov. onueiov 8 ikavov: of yap aypotkot
pdAvora yvwportvrot <iol Kal padlws amopatvovrat.
10 Ka®éddrov d€ jut) dvtos Kabddov cimeiy padiora
apporre. ev oxetAacu@ Kai Sewwoer, Kal ev
ll rovTows 7) apxdopevov 7) azrodei~avta. xphabar dé
det Kai tats TeOpvAnpevais Kal Kowals yrvapats,
eav Wor xpnoy.or Sia yap TO elvat Kowal, Ws pj0-
Aoyotvtwy andvrwr, dpbds éxew Soxotow, ofov
Trapaxadobvre emt TO Kwdvvevew 7) Ovcapevous

e > ‘ ¥ Wa \ ,

eis olwvos dpioros apuvveobar mept marpys,

\ - \ A “ +
Kal él TO NTTOUS OVTAS

Evvos *Evudduos,

Y 324 4 > ~ ~ 7 ~ A , A 4
Kal em TO avaipety THY €xOpav Ta TéKVA Kal ndEeVv
aoltKoovTa

, a / , a ,
vymlos Os TaTépa KTElvas Tatdas KaTaAetzeL.

12 "Ere evar ta&v mapoyudv Kal yvapai eiow,
13 olov mapousia “‘’Arrixds mdpouxos.’ det S€ Tas
youpas A€yew Kal rapa Ta Sednpoorevpeva (Aéyw
d€ dednuoorevpéeva ofov To Tv@Oe cavrdév Kat TO
Mydev ayav), drav 7) ro HOos paivecBar pédAn
BéArvov, 4 abyntiKds cipnuevn H. eote dé maby-
TUuKH pév, olov et Tis dpyilopevos dain weddos
@ Tliad, xii. 243. > Tliad, xviii. 309. ¢ j. 15. 14.

4 Of. Thucydides, i. 70, where the Corinthians complain

of the lack of energy shown by the Spartans, as compared

with their own restless and troublesome neighbours, the
Athenians.

284

a lh

RHETORIC, II. xx1. 9-13

in years, and in regard to things in which one has
experience ; since the use of maxims before such an
age is unseemly, as also is story-telling; and to
speak about things of which one has no experience
shows foolishness and lack of education. A sufficient
proof of this is that rustics especially are fond of
coining maxims and ready to make display of them.

To express in general terms what is not general is
especially suitable in complaint or exaggeration, and
then either at the beginning or after the demonstra-
tion. One should even make use of common and
frequently quoted maxims, if they are useful; for
because they are common, they seem to be true,
since all as it were. acknowledge them as such ; for

_ instance, one who is exhorting his soldiers to brave

danger before having sacrificed may say,
The best of omens is to defend one’s country,¢
and if they are inferior in numbers,
The chances of war are the same for both,”

and if advising them to destroy the children of the
enemy even though they are innocent of wrong,

Foolish is he who, having slain the father, suffers the
children to live.¢

Further, some proverbs are also maxims; for
example, “ An Attic neighbour.” Maxims should
also be used even when contrary to the most popular
sayings, such as “‘ Know thyself” and ‘‘ Nothing in
excess,’’ either when one’s character is thereby likely
to appear better, or if they are expressed in the
language of passion. It would be an instance of the
latter if a man in a rage were to say, “ It is not

285

ARISTOTLE

> € lal / pee: ~~ >
eivac ws Set yryvwoxew atrdév: obros yotv et
eylyvpwoKkev eavTov, ovK av ToTe oTparnyeiVv
> / \ \ s / hd > a a
néiwoev. TO de HOos BéArvov, dre od Set, wWorrep
, lal ¢ / > \ ~ lal
daci, pirciv ws puonoovtas aAAd paAdov puceiv
¢ / lal \ ~ / \ la

14.@s didAjoovras. det 5€ TH AcE tiv mpoaipeow
auvdnroby, <i dé un, THY airiay émA€yew, olov 7)

4 > / 7 ce ~ ~ > 4 /
ovtws elmdovrTa, OTe “ det directv ody Worep paciv,
> > e oR 4 > 7, \ / ”

a ws del diAjoovra émBovAov yap Odarepor,
d8e “ ob apéoket d€ pou TO Acydpuevov" det yap

ae y dAnOwov pirov ws prdijoovra det pireiv.”
Kal “‘ ovdé TO pndev ayav: det yap To’s ye KaKkovs

1395 b dyav puceiv.”

15 "Exovor 8° eis Tovs Adyous BowBevay peydAny
ptav poev 87) Sud Ty PpopTiKoTyTa Tov dcpoaray:
Xaipovar yap, edv TUS Kaborov ) Aéyow € emeTuxy TOV
do€Gv as éxeivor Kata pépos Exovow. 46 Se A€yw,
5 Aov cor ade dpa dé Kal mas de? adras Onpevewv.

9 , dua np

7) peev yap youn, Worep elpyrat, dmopavors Kab-
odo € €oTiv, xaipovar dé Kalddov Aeyopevov 6 a) Kara
pépos mpovmroAapPdvovres Tuyxdvovow: olov et TIS
yelToat TUXOL KEeXpnmevos 7 TEKVoLs PavAots, a7o-
deEair’ dv Tob eimovTos OTL

29 \ / 7
ovdev yeitovias xaderwrepov,

OTe oddev TAcBuchTepov TexvoTrouas. wore det
oroxaleabau 7Os TuyXdvovor mota mpotroAap-

Bavovres, «i ovrw mepl TOUTWY xabdrov déyew.
16 ravrnv te dy exer piay xphow TO yvwpodoyeiy,

i. $f Want of cultivation and intelligence” (Cope). “* Amour-
propre”’ (St. Hilaire).
» In reference to their own particular case.

286

RHETORIC, II. xxr. 13-16

true that a man should know himself; at any rate,
such a man as this, if he had known himself, would
never have claimed the chief command.” And one’s
character would appear better, if one were to say
that it is not right, as men say, to love as if one
were bound to hate, but rather to hate as if one were
bound to love. The moral purpose also should be
made clear by the language, or else one should add
the reason; for example, either by saying “ that it
is right to love, not as men say, but as if one were
going to love for ever, for the other kind of love
would imply treachery ”’ ; or thus, “ The maxim does
not please me, for the true friend should love as if
he were going to love for ever. Nor do I approve
the maxim ‘ Nothing in excess,’ for one cannot hate
the wicked teo much.”

Further, maxims are of great assistance to speakers,
first, because of the vulgarity? of the hearers, who are
pleased if an orator, speaking generally, hits upon
the opinions which they specially hold. What I
mean will be clear from the following, and also how
one should hunt for maxims. The maxim, as we
have said, is a statement of the general ; accordingly,
the hearers are pleased to hear stated in general
terms the opinion which they have already specially
formed. For instance, a man who happened to have
bad neighbours or children would weleome any one’s”
statement that nothing is more troublesome than
neighbours or more stupid than to beget children.
Wherefore the speaker should endeavour to guess
how his hearers formed their preconceived opinions
and what they are, and then express himself in
general terms in regard to them. This is one of
the advantages of the use of maxims, but another

287

ARISTOTLE

Kal €répav KpeltTw HOtKods yap Trovet Tos Adyous.
Hos 5° Exovow of Adyor, ev daors SHAN 1) Mpoaipeats.
at S€ yy@pat macat tobro mower Sua TO amo-
paivecba. Tov Thy yvapnv réyovra KaldAov zrepl
TOV TpoaipeTav, WoT av xpnoTal wow at yv@par,
Kat xpynoTonOn daiveobar mowto. tov Aéyovra.
Tept ev odv yropuns, Kal TL eoTt Kal méca Edn
abtis Kat TOs xpyotéov abrH Kat tiva wpédevay
exer, elpjo0w rooabtra.

22. Ilepi 5’ evOvpnudtwv Kabddrov Te cimwper,
tiva tpdmov det Cyteiv, Kal peta Tatra Tovs
ToTous’ aAAo yap eldos éxatépov tovTwy éoriv.

2ort pev ovdv TO evOdpunpa avdAdoyiopos Tis €oTL,
elpytar mpoTepov, Kal mas avdAdoyropes, Kat Ti
3 duadépes Tav SdiadextTiK@v: ovre yap moppwhev
ovre mavtTa det AapBavovtras cuvdyew: TO ev yap
doadés Sua TO pHKos, TO S€ adodAccyia dia TO
davepa A€yew. Tobro yap airiv Kal Tod mBava-
Tépous eivat Tovs amaideUTOUs TAY TETaLOEUPLEVWV
év tots dxAou, wonep paclv of momtal Tods
amawWevTous Tap OxAw povoikwTepws A€yew: ot
peev yap Ta Kowa Kat KabdAov A€yovow, ot 8 e&
dv toacr, Kal Ta eyyts. wor ovK €€ amavTwv
tOv SoxovvTwy GAN éx tadv wpiopevwv Xexréov,

DI a t * 4 > , \
1396a olov y TOlS KplvovOly 7 OUS amrodێxovTar. Kat

tobro 8°, dT otrw daiverat, SHAov elvar } maow

@ The conclusion must not be reached by means of a long
series of arguments, as it were strung together in a chain:
cp. i. 2. 12, where the hearers are spoken of as unable to
take in at a glance a long series of arguments or “to follow a
jong chain of reasoning” (o0dé NoylferOar réppwHer).

288

RHETORIC, II. xxr. 16—xxr. 3

is greater ; for it makes speeches ethical. Speeches
have this character, in which the moral purpose is
clear. And this is the effect of all maxims, because
he who employs them in a general manner declares
his moral preferences ; if then the maxims are good,
they show the speaker also to be a man of good
character. Let this suffice for what we had to say
concerning maxims, their nature, how many kinds of
them there are, the way they should be used, and
what their advantages are.

22, Let us now speak of enthymemes in general
and the manner of looking for them, and next of
their topics ; for each of these things is different in
kind. We have already said that the enthymeme is
a kind of syllogism, what makes it so, and in what it
differs from the dialectic syllogisms ; for the con-
clusion must neither be drawn from too far back @ nor
should it include all the steps of the argument. In
the first case its length causes obscurity, in the
second, it is simply a waste of words, because it
states much that is obvious. It is this that makes
the ignorant more persuasive than the educated in
the presence of crowds; as the poets say, “ the
ignorant are more skilled at speaking before a
mob.” ® For the educated use commonplaces and
generalities, whereas the ignorant speak of what they
know and of what more nearly concerns the audience.
Wherefore one must not argue from all possible
opinions, but only from such as are definite and
admitted, for instance, either by the judges them-
selves or by those of whose judgement they approve.
Further, it should be clear that this is the opinion

> Euripides, Hippolytus, 989.
U 289

ARISTOTLE

] Tots mAcéoros. Kal pi) povoy cuvayew ex TOV
> , > A 5. Bd ~ ¢ tA \ Xr ,
dvayKaiwy, dAAd Kal éx T@v ws emt TO Todd.

4 IIparov pev otv Set AaBetv Stu wept od det
Aéyew Kai avdAdoyilecban etre rodiTiK@ ovdAAoyrop@
<i?’ dmowwodv, davayKatov Kal Ta TovTm Exew
€ / ”* / a ” \ \ ” >
UmdpxovTa, 7) mavTa % evar pndev yap exw €€&

5 oddevos av exous ovvayew. A&dyw 8 olov mOs av
Suvaieba ovpBovdcvew *AOnvaiors ei moAcunréov
} pay moAEunreov; 7) €xovTes Tis 7) SUvayuis adTav,

4 \ An Sh. & \ MA /
MOTEpoV vavTiK?) 7) TECiKT 7) Gupw, Kal avTNH TOON,
‘ , 7 an / 45.9 , ” \ /
Kal mpoaodor tives 7) Pidor Kal éxOpot, Ere Se Tivas

, / ‘ ~ ‘ \
moA€wous meToAcunKao. Kal m@s, Kal TaAAa 7a
~ A a > eet 4 \ > a
6 Tovadra; 7% emawweiy, ef pn Exourev THY ev Larapive
/ “ \ > ~ / mal \ ¢€
vavpayiav 7 THY ev Mapabadv. paxynv 7} Ta dep
‘HpaxArcddv mpaxbevta 7 dAdo te THY ToLwodTwr;
éx yap T&v trapxyovTwy 7 SoKxodvTwy stmdpxew
~ > A 4 ¢ / A ‘

7 KaA@v érrawodor mavres. dpoiws S€ Kal béyovow
ék TOV evaytiwy, oxoTobvTes Ti dmdpxet TOLODTOV
avrots 7) Soxet dndpyew, olov dre tods “EAAnvas

4 \ » \ ‘ 7
KaresovAmaavto, Kal tTodvs mpos tov PdpBapov
ouppaxecapevovs Kal dpiorevoavTas jvopamo-

, > / A / ‘ A
Sicavtro Aiywiras Kat Lloriaudéras, Kat doa
~ ~ /
dAda rowitra, Kal €l Te GAAo ToLwdroy audprnua
dmrdpxe adrois. ws 8 avrws Kat ot KaTnyopodyTes
Kal of dmoAoyovpevor ex THY brapxdovTwy oKoTrOv-

8 evo. Karnyopodct Kal dzrodoyodvra. oddev dé
290

RHETORIC, II. xxu. 3-8

of all or most of the hearers ; and again, conclusions
should not be drawn from necessary premises alone,
but also from those which are only true as a rule.
First of all, then, it must be understood that, in
regard to the subject of our speech or reasoning,
whether it be political or of any other kind, it is
necessary to be also acquainted with the elements
of the question, either entirely or in part ; for if you
know none of these things, you will have nothing
from which to draw a conclusion. I should like to
know, for instance, how we are to give advice to the
Athenians as to making war or not, if we do not
know in what their strength consists, whether it is
naval, military, or both, how great it is, their sources
of revenue, their friends and enemies, and further,
what wars they have already waged, with what
success, and all similar things? Again, how could
we praise them, if we did not know of the naval
engagement at Salamis or the battle of Marathon,
or what they did for the Heraclidae, and other
similar things? for men always base their praise
upon what really are, or are thought to be, glorious
deeds. Similarly, they base their censure upon
actions that are contrary to these, examining whether
those censured have really, or seem to have, com-
mitted them; for example, that the Athenians sub-
jugated the Greeks, and reduced to slavery the
Aeginetans and Potidaeans who had fought with
distinction on their side against the barbarians, and
all such acts, and whatever other similar offences
may have been committed by them. Similarly, in
accusation and defence, speakers argue from an
examination of the circumstances of the case. It
makes no difference in doing this, whether it is a

291

ARISTOTLE

duadepes mept “APnvaiwy 7) Aaxedaysoviwy 7
avOpwrov 7 Oeod tatdro robdro Spay: Kal ‘yap
ovpBovretovra tH *AyiAded Kal emawodvTa Kat
peyovra kal Karnyopobvra | Kal drrodoyoupevov
b7rép adrod 70, tmdpxovra 7 SoKodvra dmrdpxew
Anmréov, iy” eK TOUTWW Adyuprev émawobvres 7
peyovres et Tt Kaddv 7 aiaxpov dmdpxet, KaT~
nyopobytes 8° 7 dmrohoyovpevot el TL Sixavov 7) aouKov,
ovpBovdevorres 8 et tt ouppepov 7 PhaBepsr.
9 duolws be TovTos Kal mepl mpayparos oTovobv,
olov rept Sucavoowvigs, ei ayalov 7 Py. ayabov,
ex TOV UrapxovTwy TH Sixavoovvyn Kal TO ayala.
10 “Qor’ émeid) Kal mavtes otrw daivovrat aro-
dexvuvres, edv Te axpiBeorepov edv Te wadaKkwrepov
1396 b ovAAoyilwrrar (od yap €€ amdvrwyv AapBdvovow
GAN ek tTa&v epi Exactov trapxdovTwv, Kal dia
Tod Adyou SiAov dtu advvarov adAws Serxvdvat),
davepov oTt avayKatov, Womep ev Tois TomucKots,
mpO@Tov trept Exaorov éxew e&erreypeva mepl TOV
11 evdexopevenv Kal Trav eTUKALPOTATOY, mrept de THY
e€ droyviov yeyvopeveny Cnrewv TOV avrov TpOTOV,
amoPX€rrovra 7) eis Adpiora GAN’ «is Ta. dmrdpxovTa,
mept @v O Adyos, Kal. Teprypdpovtas OTt mAcioTa
Kal eyytraTra Tov mpdayyaros: Oow pev yap av
mArciw éxnta. Tov drapyovTwy, Tooo’Tw paov
Seucvvva, 6ow S eyyUTepov, ToooUTe olKerdTepa.
12 Kal Wrrov kowd. Aéyw dé Kowa _pev TO érraweiv
tov “AywrdAda dru avOpwros Kal ote TOV Huileav

@ Or, “ by means of the speech it is impossible to prove
anything otherwise ” (Cope).
i. 14. mp&ror : i.e. ** the speaker’s chief care should be...’

292

RHETORIC, II. xxi. 8-12

question of Athenians or Lacedaemonians, of a man
or a god. For, when advising Achilles, praising or
censuring, accusing or defending him, we must grasp
all that really belongs, or appears to belong to him,
in order that we may praise or censure in accordance
with this, if there is anything noble or disgraceful ;
defend or accuse, if there is anything just or unjust ;
advise, if there is anything expedient or harmful.
And similarly in regard to any subject whatever.
For instance, in regard to justice, whether it is good
or not, we must consider the question in the light
of what is inherent in justice or the good.

Therefore, since it is evident that all men follow
this procedure in demonstration, whether they reason
strictly or loosely—since they do not derive their
arguments from all things indiscriminately, but from
what is inherent in each particular subject, and
reason makes it clear that it is impossible to prove
anything in any other way *—it is evidently neces-
sary, as has been stated in the Topics,’ to have
first on each subject a selection of premises about
probabilities and what is most suitable. As for those
to be used in sudden emergencies, the same method
of inquiry must be adopted ; we must look, not at
what is indefinite but at what is inherent in the
subject treated of in the speech, marking off as many
facts as possible, particularly those intimately con-
nected with the subject ; for the more facts one has,
the easier it is to demonstrate, and the more closely
connected they are with the subject, the more suit-
able are they and less common.’ By common I mean,
for instance, praising Achilles because he is a man,

¢ The more suitable they will be, and the less they will
resemble ordinary, trivial generalities.

293

ARISTOTLE

\ ¢ a8 I > , ~ \
Kal o7t emt to “IXov eorparedoaro: radra yap
A a a
Kat addows drdpxer modois, wor oddév paAdov 6
~ > a
tovobros *AyWAéa. errawel 7 Avopjdyv. idia Sé &
ee lat a ‘
pndevi dAAw ovpBeBnkev 7 7@ "AxiAAe?, ofov 7d
> a ~ 4
amoxretvat tov “Exropa tov dpictroy tav Tpawy
\ \
kat Tov Kuxvov, ds exwAvoev dmavtas dmoBatvew
drpwros av, Kal dre vedraros Kal odK évopKos
@v éorpdrevoev, kal doa dAAa Tovadra.
a Coal ‘
13 Eis pev obv tpdmos ris éxAoyis Kal mp@ros
a an /
obTos 6 Tomucds, Ta S€ oToLyeta TOV evOvpnudrenv
Aéywpev (ororxeiov 5é Aeyw Kal rd7ov. evOvpHparos
TO abrTd). mp@rov 8° cimwyev wept Sv avayKatov
> a ~ a
14 «levy mp@rov. €or. yap T&v evOvpnudrov €ldn
dvo* Ta pev yap SeuKtiKd eorw Ste €oTw } ovK
” \ > > / \ , ° >
coTw, Ta 8 edeyKTiKd: Kal Suadeper Womep ev
a a ” \ / *
15 Tots SuaAextixots €Aeyyos Kal ovAdoytopds. €art
dé TO pev Secxrixcy evOdpnua rd €€ dpodoyou-
pévwv ovvdyew, TO dé eAeyKTiKoy TO Ta dVvO"o-
c a \
16 Aoyotpeva ovvdyew. oyeddov pev ody tyuiv mept
~ ~ “A At Ss /
exdoTwy TOV €iddv TOV xpynoipwv Kal dvayKaiwy
\ c /
€xovTat of Tomo. e&ereypevar yap at mpordoets
‘ @ /, > ¢ > > e 8 Cal / 4
mept exaotdv eiow, wor €€ dv Set déepew Ta
evOuuypara Torwy mept ayalod 7% KaKod 7) Kadod
" > a nN , n” 1OL A ‘ ~ 0d
H atoxpod 7 ducaiov 7) addixov, Kai wept Tay HOD
4 > ta
Kat tralnudrwv Kal eewv woatrws €iAnppevor
CY a ¢ 4 / e / ” 5’ CAA
17 Huy vadpyovot mpoTEpov of TOmoL. ETL ov
/ \
i307a TPOTOV. KaOdAov epi andvrwy AdBwyer, Kal

* The demonstrative enthymeme draws its conclusion
294

RHETORIC, II. xxi. 12-17

or one of the demigods, or because he went on the
expedition against Troy; for this is applicable to
many others as well, so that such praise is no more
suited to Achilles than to Diomedes. By particular
I mean what belongs to Achilles, but to no one else ;
for instance, to have slain Hector, the bravest of the
Trojans, and Cycnus, who prevented all the Greeks
from disembarking, being invulnerable; to have
gone to the war when very young, and without
having taken the oath ; and all such things.

One method of selection then, and this the first,
is the topical. Let us now speak of the elements of
enthymemes (by element and topic of enthymeme I
mean the same thing). But let us first make some
necessary remarks. There are two kinds of enthy-
memes, the one demonstrative, which proves that a
thing is or is not, and the other refutative, the two
differing like refutation and syllogism in Dialectic.
The demonstrative enthymeme draws conclusions
from admitted premises, the refutative draws con-
clusions disputed by the adversary. We know
nearly all the general heads of each of the special
topics that are useful or necessary ; for the proposi-
tions relating to each have been selected, so that
we have in like manner already established all the
topics from which enthymemes may be derived on
the subject of good or bad, fair or foul, just or
unjust, characters, emotions, and habits. Let us
now endeavour to find topics about enthymemes in
general in another way, noting in passing ° those
from facts admitted by the opponent; the refutative draws
its conclusion from the same, but the conclusion is one
which is disputed by the opponent.

> Or, “ noting in addition ” (Victorius); or, “* pointing
out, side by side’ (Jebb).

295

ARISTOTLE

Réywwev Tapacnpmaivopevor Tovs éeAeyKTiKOds Kal
Tovs amodeKTLKODs Kal Tods Tov dawomevwv
evOupnudtwr, odk dvtwy dé evOvunudtwv, émetzep
od6€ ovAdoyiopdv. SyndAwbérvtwy dé TodTwv, Tepl
Tov oewv Kal evordcewv Siopiowpev, mdbev
Sei pos Ta evOvpypata dépew.

23. "Koti 8 eis ev romos ta&v Seutik@y ek
T@V evavTiwv: Set yap oKoreiv ei TH evavTiw TO
evavtiov bmdpxer, avatpobvra pev et pr dmdpyxet,
Katackevdlovra dé ei brdpyxet, olov ott TO ow-
dpovely ayabdv: to yap axoAacraivew BAaBepov. 7
ws ev TH Meconuakd: «i yap 6 mdAeuos attos
TOV TAapovTwy KAK@V, ETA THS elpHvns Set erray-
opPwdcacbar.

cimep ‘yap ovde Tots KaK@s Sedpaxcow -
akovolws Sikaiov «is opyyv tecetv,
ov’ av avayxaocbeis tis «bd Spaon Twa,
mpoonKov €oT. THO odethecar ydpw.

GAN’ <izep eoriv ev Bpotois wevdyyopeiv
mbavda, vopilew xpi oe Kal tovvaytiov,
+ > > ~ A lA Cal
amuot aAn0A moda ovpBaivew Bporois.

2 “Addos ék rdv spolwv mrdcewv: dpoiws yap
Sei dmdpyew 7 pi) Brdpxew, olov or. 7d Sixatoy
od mav ayabov: Kal yap av 70 dixaiws: viv 8° ody
aiperov TO dixaiws amobaveiv.

3 “AMos ék t&v mpds ddAndra: ei yap Bardpw
drdpyer TO KAADS 7) Sixaiws movhoa, Oarépw To

* Assuming that self-control is good, then if the opposite
of good (that is, bad) can be predicated of lack of self.

control, this proves the truth of the first proposition; other-
wise, it may be refuted.

296

RHETORIC, IJ. xx. 17—xxir. 3

which are refutative and those which are demon-
strative, and those of apparent enthymemes, which
are not really enthymemes, since they are not
Syllogisms. After this has been made clear, we will
settle the question of solutions and objections, and
whence they must be derived to refute enthymemes.

23. One topic of demonstrative enthymemes is
derived from opposites ; for it is necessary to con-
sider whether one opposite is predicable of the other,
as a means of destroying am argument, if it is not,
as a means of constructing one, if it is ;% for instance,
self-control is good, for lack of self-control is harmful ;
or as in the Messeniacus,”

If the war is responsible for the present evils, one must
repair them with the aid of peace.

And,

For if it is unfair to be angry with those who haye done
wrong unintentionally, it is not fitting to feel beholden to
_ one who is forced to do us good.¢

Or,

If men are in the habit of gaining credit for false state-
ments, you must also admit the contrary, that men often
disbelieve what is true.4

Another topic is derived from similar inflexions, for
in like manner the derivatives must either be pre-
dicable of the subject or not; for instance, that the
just is not entirely good, for in that case good would
be predicable of anything that happens justly ; but
to be justly put to death is not desirable.

Another topic is derived from relative terms. For
if to have done rightly or justly may be predicated
of one, then to have suffered similarly may be

> Cf. i. 13. 2 note. ¢ Authorship unknown.

¢ Euripides, Thyestes (Frag. 396, 7.G.F.).
297

1397 b

ARISTOTLE

memovOevar, Kat ei KeAcoa, Kal TO memoUnKevat,
¢ © / / \ ~ ~ ce
olov ws 6 teAdvns Atopédwv repli trav TeAaV “ ek
yap pnd tuiv aioxpov 7d mwdciv, ob5° Hiv ro
dveicba.”’ Kat « t@ memovOdr. TO Kadk@s 7
dixaiws tmdpyet, Kal TH woujpoavTr, Kal ef TH
~ oe
mouoavTl, Kal TH temovOdtt. eat. 8 ev TovTW
/
Tapadoyicacbat €f yap Sixaiws émabev rt, Siuxatws
mémovlev, GAN’ tows ody bd cob. 816 Set oxoretv
\ > + ¢ \ a ‘ c /
xXwpis ef dfs 6 mafav mabey Kal 6 movjoas
mowjoa, elra xphoba. dmotépws apuorrer’ eviore
yap Svadwyret 7d ToLwodrov Kal obdev KwAVEL, Wome
ev T® “AAkpaiwve TH Ocodéxrov |
/ \ \ \ + > / ~ H
penrépa de tHv on ov tis eordyer Bpotav;
dyot 8° admoxpwopuevos “ adda SdvadaBdvra xypr)
a. Be > / A ~ > / ~
oxoTeiv. €pomevns dé ths ~AAdeoiBoias mas,
droAaBav Pot
\ \ a ” > \ A \ ~

Thy pev Oaveitv Expwav, ewe Sé pur) KTavelv.

\ e e \ / / \ ~ >
Kat olov » mept-Anpoabevous dixn Kal Tav amo-
krewdvrwv Nuxdvopa: ere yap ducaiws expiOnoav
amoxreivat, Sucaiws edokev amobaveiv. Kat wept Tod
OxnBnow dmobavevros, mepi ob éxédevoe Kpivar ef
dixatos Hv amobaveiv, ws odK dducov Ov TO GrroKTEtvat
Tov diKkaiws amobavevra..

« The argument is that if there was no disgrace in selling
the right of farming the taxes, there could be none in
purchasing this right.

® Pupil of Plato and Isocrates, great friend of Aristotle,
the author of fifty tragedies and also of an *“‘ Art” of Rhetoric.
Alemaeon murdered his mother Eriphyle. Alphesiboea, his
wife, says to him, Was not your mother hated? To this he
replied, Yes, but there is a distinction; they said she de-
served to die, but not at my hands.

298

RHETORIC, II. xxim. 3

predicated of the other; there is the same relation
between having ordered and having carried out, as
Diomedon the tax-gatherer said about the taxes, “ If
selling is not disgraceful for you, neither is buying
disgraceful for us.”* Andif rightly or justly can be
predicated of the sufferer, it can equally be predicated
of the one who inflicts suffering; if of the latter,
then also of the former. However, in this there is
room for a fallacy. For if a man has suffered justly,
he has suffered justly, but perhaps not at your hands.
Wherefore one must consider separately whether the
sufferer desérves to suffer, and whether he who inflicts
suffering is the right person to do so, and then make
use of the argument either way; for sometimes
there is a difference in such a case, and nothing
prevents [its being argued], as in the Aemagon of
Theodectes ® :

And did no one of mortals loathe thy mother ?

Alemaeon replied : “‘ We must make a division before
we examine the matter.”” And when Alphesiboea
asked “‘ How ?”’, he rejoined,

Their decision was that she should die, but that it was not
for me to kill her.
Another example may be found in the trial of
Demosthenes and those who slew Nicanor.’ For
since it was decided that they had justly slain him,
it was thought that he had been justly put to death.
Again, in the case of the man who was murdered at
Thebes, when the defendants demanded that the
judges should decide whether the murdered man
deserved to die, since.a man who deserved it could
be put to death without injustice.

¢ Nothing is known of this trial.

299

ARISTOTLE

4 *A)os exc Too paMov Kal Wrrov, olov “‘ €f pnd
ot Geot mdvra ioaot, oxoAR ot ye dvOperrou ”
tobro yap cor, el @ paMov av _Umdpxot a)
bird pyet, diAov 6: ore obd @ irrov. 70 5° ore Tovs
mAnotov Turret Os ye al TOV marépa, ex TOD, €t
To Jitrov dmdpxet, Kal TO paMov dmdpxet, Kal
Omr6T€pov a ben deiEar, <i? ore brdpyet lO Ort

5 ov. €re et pyre waAAov pre Hrrov: dbev eipyrat

Kal oos pev jolxTpos maidas dmoAécas Tarp"
Oiveds 5° ap’ odyi KAewdv damoA€cas , ydvov;

KaL OTL; el By dé Onoeds 7duenoev, 08" *AdeE-
avdpos, Kal €t tan’? of i Tuvdapidae, ovd’ ’AAeEavdpos,
Kat et IldrpoxAov “Exp, Kal “Axréa ’"AX<E-
avdpos. Kal €t pnd of aAXot Texvirae padror, otd”
ot pirdoogor. kat ef pnd ot orparnyol padror,
Ort HTTOVT AL ToAAdKis, odd’ of _ cogiorat. Kat
ore “ed Set Tov Wueirny Tis dpeTépas dd&ys ém-
perctobar, ka bpas ris Tay ‘EMyver.””

6 ”“ANos eK Too TOV xpovov oKomreiy, olov ws
“Iducparns ev TH _™pos ‘Appodiov, ore “et amply
Tounoa, néiovv Ths eikdvos Tuyelvy eav Troljow,

«The argument is that since men beat their fathers less
commonly than they do their neighbours, if they beat their
fathers they will also beat their neighbours, and the Paris
ms. in a longer form of the argument has an explanatory
addition to this effect, inserting after tardpxe the words rods
yap mwarépas irrov rinTovaw 7% Tods myolov.

In a similar passage in the Topics (ii. i» eixds (or doxodr)
is inserted after ua\\ov and #rrov. Welldon suggests that
here also the reading should be 7d #rrov elxés and 7d waddov
eixés (Grote, Aristotle, p. 294).

» From the Meleager of Antiphon (7.G./’. p. 885).

300

RHETORIC, II. xxur. 4-6

Another topic is derived from the more and less.
For instance, if not even the gods know everything,
hardly can men; for this amounts to saying that if
a predicate, which is more probably affirmable of one
thing, does not belong to it, it is clear that it does
not belong to another of which it is less probably
affirmable. And to say that a man who beats his
father also beats his neighbours, is an instance of
the rule that, if the less exists, the more also exists.*
Either of these arguments may be used, according
as it is necessary to prove either that a predicate is
affirmable or that it is not. Further, if there is no
question of greater or less ; whence it was said,

Thy father deserves to be pitied for having lost his children ;
is not Oeneus then equally to be pitied for having lost an
illustrious offspring ? ®

Other instances are: if Theseus did no wrong,’
neither did Alexander (Paris); if the sons of
Tyndareus did no wrong, neither did Alexander ;
and if Hector did no wrong in slaying Patroclus,
neither did Alexander in slaying Achilles ; if no other
professional men are contemptible, then neither are
philosophers ; if generals are not despised because
they are frequently defeated,? neither are the
sophists ; or, if it behoves a private citizen to take
care of your reputation, it is your duty to take care
of that of Greece.

Another topic is derived from the consideration
of time. Thus Iphicrates, in his speech against
Harmodius, says: “If, before accomplishing any-
thing, I had demanded the statue from you in the

¢ In carrying off Helen.
4 The Paris ms. has @avarotvrat, “ are put to death.”

301

ARISTOTLE

” + / 74 e 2 > / A ,
édoTe av: toujcav7t 8° dp” od Sacere; un Tolvuv
/ \ ¢ a / 3 a ”?
péAdovres ev drrvaxvetabe, raldvres 8° adaipetabe.
1398a Kat maAw mpos TO OnBalovs Stetvac Diduamov eis
\ ay / Lf ce > \ ~ > a
Thy Arrucny, ore “et mplv Bonbjoa «is Owxeis
nkiov, bréaxovro av: dromov obv ei Sidte mpoeiro
Kal emlorevoe pi) Sipcovow.”
7 “Ados ex trav eipnudva Kal” adbrods mpos Tov
> / , RR 2 / > ~ 7,
etmdvra* Suadéper S€ 6 Tpdmos, olov ev T@ TevKpa:
e > / > 4, ‘ > ~ >
@ expnoato “Idiucpdrns mpdos “Apiotopavra, én-
epdmevos ei mpodoin av Tas vats émt xpiuacw: od
4 A” 6¢. > ”? ce \ \ n” >
packovtos dé “‘ <ira’’ elev “od pev dv ’Apioto-
~ > ‘ ba) / > ‘ > eal > 7 ”
padv ovK av mpodoins, éya 8 dv “Iduxpdrns;
a > ¢ / ~ ov ~ 2 inl
det 8° drdpxew paAdov dv SoxodyTa dduhoat
> aA > \ / a a“ / > \
exeivov' ef dé pj, yedotov dv davein, ef mpos
> / : ~ a / Ww > \
Apioreiény Katyyopotvra TobTo Tis elmevev, GAAG
mpos amatiav TOO Karyyopou: dAws yap BovAerat 6
katnyop@v BeAriwy eivas tod devyovros: robr’ ody
> / ee / > » / > 4
e€eréyyew act. Kabddov 8 dromds eorw, Stay Tis
emiTyLe GAXois & adros Trove? 7) TOUCELEV AV, 7) TpO-
Tpémn Tovey & adTos py) Tovet nde Toinoerey ay.

« Fragment of a speech of Lysias. It was proposed to
put up a statue to the famous Athenian general Iphicrates
in honour of his defeat of the Spartans (392 8.c.). This was
later opposed by Harmodius, probably a descendant of the
tyrannicide. The speech, which is considered spurious, was
called % repli rijs eikévos.

» Or, ‘‘ the ways of doing this are various ” (Jebb).

¢ The illustration is lost or perhaps purposely omitted as
well known. The Teucer was a tragedy of Sophocles.

@ Tt would be absurd to use such an argument against
the accusation of a “just man” like Aristides, and to pre-
tend that he is more likely to have committed the crime. It

302

RHETORIC, II. xxi. 6-7

event of my success, you would have granted it ;
will you then refuse it, now that I have succeeded ?
Do not therefore make a promise when you expect
something, and break it when you have received it.”’ ¢
Again, to persuade the Thebans to allow Philip to
_ pass through their territory into Attica, they were
told that “ if he had made this request before helping
them against the Phocians, they would have pro-
mised; it would be absurd, therefore, if they refused
to let him through now, because he had thrown
away his opportunity and had trusted them.”

Another topic consists in turning upon the op-
ponent what has been said against ourselves ; and
this is an excellent method.’ For instance, in the
Teucer® ... . and Iphicrates employed it against
Aristophon, when he asked him whether he would
have betrayed the fleet for a bribe ; when Aristophon
said no, ‘‘ Then,” retorted Iphicrates, “if you,
Aristophon, would not have betrayed it, would I,
Iphicrates, have done so?” But the opponent must
be a man who seems the more likely to have com-
mitted a crime ; otherwise, it would appear ridiculous,
if anyone were to make use of such an argument in
reference to such an opponent, for instance, as
Aristides 4; it should only be used to discredit the
accuser. For in general the accuser aspires to be
better than the defendant; accordingly, it must
always be shown that this is not the case. And
generally, it is ridiculous for a man to reproach
others for what he does or would do himself, or to
encourage others to do what he does not or would
not do himself.

must only be used when the opponent’s character is suspect,
and lends itself to such a retort.

303

ARISTOTLE

8 ”“ANos ef optop.od, olov dru TO Sarpdviov oddéev
€oTw aX’ 7 Geos 7 Oeod &, epyov" Kaitou dorus oveTae
Oeod €, Epyov elvan, ToUToV dvdyen oleobae kal Deods
elvat. Kal ws ‘Ipuxparys, ort yevvaeraros 6
BeArvoros: Kal yap “Appodicn kal “Apworoyetrove
ovodev TpOTEpov bTHpXE ‘yevvatov mplv yevvaioy Tt
mpagar. Kal OTL ouyyeveorepos atros: “ra ‘yoov
épya ovyyeveotepa €or 7a, ea, Tots “Appodiou
Kal “Apuoroyetrovos H Ta od. Kal ws év TO
“ArcEdvdpe, 6 ore mavres av oporoyijoevay TOvS 41)
Koopious ovx €vos ocparos ayarav dmddavow. Kat
bu 6 LwKparns ovK edn Badilew ws >ApyéAaov:
UBpw yap edn elvan To py Svvacbar dptvacbat
dpotos: €v mabdvra., dorep Kat Kaxds. TaVTES
yap obrot dpiodpevor Kal AaBdvres ro Ti €oTt,
ovAdoyilovrat mept dv A€yovow.

9 “AMos ek Tod mocaxyds, ofov ev Tots tomuKots
mept Tod opbas.

10 “AXXos ek Suaipecews, olov <i mavres TpLav
EVEKEV dducodow: 2 Tose yap €vexa 7 TobdE 7
Tobde: Kal bud pev 7a Svo advvarov, dia de TO
tpitov ovd atroi dacw.

* The reference is obviously to Socrates, who claimed that
a daimonion (a certain divine principle that acted as his
internal monitor) checked his action in many cases. When
accused of not believing in the gods, he was able to prove,
by his definition of the. daimonion, that he was no atheist.
Similarly, Iphicrates, by his definition of yevvatos and ovy-
yevjs could refute the allegation that he was ignoble and
show that his deeds were more akin to those of Harmodius
and Aristogiton than to those of his opponents. Paris could
say that he was not intemperate, because he was satisfied
with Helen alone. Lastly, Socrates refused an invitation

304

RHETORIC, II. xxi. 8-10

Another topic is derived from definition. For in-
stance, that the daimonion*® is nothing else than a
god or the work of a god; but he who thinks it to
be the work of a god necessarily thinks that gods
exist. When Iphicrates desired to prove that the
best man is the noblest, he declared that there was
nothing noble attaching to Harmodius and Aristo-
giton, before they did something noble; and, “I
myself am more akin to them than you; at any
rate, my deeds are more akin to theirs than yours.”
And as it is said in the Alexander ® that it would be
generally admitted that men of disorderly passions
are not satisfied with the enjoyment of one woman’s
person alone. Also, the reason why Socrates refused
to visit Archelaus, declaring that it was disgraceful
not to be in a position to return a favour as well as
aninjury.° In all these cases, it is by definition and
the knowledge of what the thing is in itself that
conclusions are drawn upon the subject in question.

Another topic is derived from the different significa-
tions of a word, as explained in the Topics, where the
correct use of these terms has been discussed.4

Another, from division. For example, ‘‘ There are
always three motives for wrongdoing; two are
excluded from consideration as impossible; as for
the third, not even the accusers assert it.”
to visit Archelaus, king of Macedonia, because he would
be unable to return the benefits received, which would imply
his so put to shame, and make the invitation a kind of
insult.

> Of Polycrates.

e “ Just as it is to requite them with evil ” (Jebb).

# Supplying [Aehéxrac] mepl rod dpOds [xpfoOa abdrois].
Others render: “in reference to the use of the word 6p0és”
(but 6p06s does not occur in the passage in the Topics, i.
15). A suggested reading is rep! rovrou 6p0ds elpnrat.

D4 305

ARISTOTLE

ll "AMos ef emayuyis, ofoy ex THs IlemapyGias,
1398b OTL TeplL TOY TEKVWY at yovaikes mavraxod du-
opilovor Tadnbés* TobTo pev yap "AOivnot Mavrig
T@ pHyrope dpupioByrobyre mpos TOV viov 7 peATHp
dnédnvev, todro Sé OnBnow "lopnviov Kai LriA-
Bavos dpudioByntotvrwy 7 Awdwvis dmédectev
*lopnviov tov vidv, Kai dua totro MerraXicKov
"lopnviov evourlov. Kal mdAw ex Tod vouov Tob
@ecodéxrov, «i Tots KaKkds emyednfetor trav
> / 7 > / \ > Ud
aAdoTpiwy immwv ob mapadiddacr Tovs oikelous,
ovoe Tots avarpéeyact tas aAAotpias vads: odKodv
> ¢ / 2J? ¢ / \ a ~ te
el Ouoiws ep amdvTwy, Kal Tois Kak@s dvddkéaor
tHv aAdotpiav ob xpnotéov éorlv eis THY oiketav
owrnpiav. Kat ws "AAKkiddpas, dtu mavres Tods
cofovs tiyudow: Idpior yody ’Apyidoxov Kaimep
BAdodynpwov dovra teTysjKaot, Kat Xior “Opnpov
> ” / \ a A /
ovk Ovra ToAitiKév, Kal MuriAnvator Lama) Kaimrep
yuvaika odtoav, Kat Aakedayuovio. Xitwva trav
yepovTev erroinoav HKLora diroArAdyou ovres, Kal
‘Trahiarac ITvbayépar, Kal Aapiparnvot /Avag-
ayopav févov OvTa eGayray Kal TyL@ow ere Kal
vov ... 6tt “A@nvator tois UdAwvos vomors ypnod-
pevor evday.ovncav. Kat AaKxedaysdvio. tots Av-
, \ / og ¢ / /
Kovpyou, kat OnBrnow dua of mpoordra dirdcodot
eyevovTo Kat evdaysdvycev 7) mdoAts.

* Mantias had one legitimate son Mantitheus and two
illegitimate by a certain Plangon. Mantias at first refused
to acknowledge the latter as his sons, until the mother
declared they were.

» The name of the mother; or simply, “the woman of
Dodona,”’ like ‘‘ the woman of Peparethus.”’

¢ Others read roXirny, “ although he was not their fellow-
citizen ” (but Chios was one of the claimants to his birthplace).

306

RHETORIC, II. xx. 11

Another, from induction. For instance, from the

case of the woman of Peparethus, it is argued that.

in matters of parentage women always discern the
truth ; similarly, at Athens, when Mantias the orator
was litigating with his son, the mother declared
the truth;* and again, at Thebes, when Ismenias
and Stilbon were disputing about a child, Dodonis ®
declared that Ismenias was its father, Thettaliscus
being accordingly recognized as the son of Ismenias.
There is another instance in the “law”’ of Theo-
dectes: “If we do not entrust our own horses to
those who have neglected the horses of others, or
our ships to those who have upset the ships of others ;
then, if this is so in all cases, we must not entrust
our own safety to those who have failed to preserve
the safety of others.” Similarly, in order to prove
that ‘men of talent are everywhere honoured,
Alcidamas said: ‘‘ The Parians honoured Archi-
lochus, in spite of his evil-speaking; the Chians
Homer, although he had rendered no public services ;°
the Mytilenaeans Sappho, although she was a
woman ; the Lacedaemonians, by no means a people
fond of learning, elected Chilon one of their senators ;
the Italiotes honoured Pythagoras, and the Lampsa-
cenes buried Anaxagoras, although he was a for-
eigner, and still bold him in honour... .4 The
Athenians were happy as long as they lived under
the laws of Solon, and the Lacedaemonians under
those of Lycurgus ; and at Thebes, as soon as those
who had the conduct of affairs became philosophers,’
the city flourished.”

4 Something has fallen out, what follows being intended
to prove that the best rulers for a state are the philosophers.

¢ Epaminondas and Pelopidas. One would rather expect,
**as soon as philosophers had the conduct of affairs.”
307

¥

12

1399 a

ARISTOTLE

nn ¢

” b] / “A ‘
AMos €k Kpicews epi tod abrod 7 spolov 7
> /
evavriov, wadvora pev ef mavres Kal del, et S€ pt},
> > o ~ ~
GAN’ ot ye mActorou, 7) codoi, 7 mavrEs 7) of mActoToL,
an” > La a”
nj ayabor. 7 ei adrol of Kpivovtes, 7) ods amo-
4 c ,
déxovrar of Kpivovres, 7) ofs pr oldv Tre evavriov
Kpwew, olov tots Kupiots, 7) ols pa) KaAdv Ta evav-
, / a
Tia Kpivew, olov Oeots 7 marpl 7 SiWacKdAas,
o ‘ > , > ) A >
womep TO els Miéidnpidny eiwev AdroxdAjs, et
a \ a Pal ~
Tais prev ceuvais Beats ixavds elyev ev ’Apeiw
/ Py ~ OL. M 8 ‘iS 5° + ” V4
mayw dobvar dicnv, Miévdnuidn 8 ov. 7) worep
LA
Lamdw, dt. ro arrobvickew Kaxdv: of Oot yap
4 /
oUTw Kekpikaow: amébvnokoy yap av. % ws
> /

Aptotinmos mpos Adrwva émayyeArucdirepdv Tt
> / ¢ ” ce > ‘ A ov an © a ¢ ~
elmovTa, ws eto: “adda py 6 y éraipos Har,
edn, “‘odfev rowbtrov,” Aeywr tov Lwxpdrnv.
\ ¢ /, > “~ > , \ /
Kat “Hynovrmos ev Acddois jpwra tov Oeov,

/
mpoTepov Kexpnuevos “Odvpriacw, et adt@ radbra
a ~ ,
Soxet dmep TH matpl, ws aicypov dv ravavria
a a >
eirelv. Kal mept rhs “EAevns ds ” looxparns
Eypaisev Ott omrovdaia, eiep Onoeds expwev: Kal
‘
mept “AdcEdvdpov, dv at Beal mpoéxpwav, Kat mept
, a > /
Evaydpov, ott orovdaios, domep “looxparns dynoww:

* Athenian ambassador to Sparta (371 8.c.), whose ag-
gressive policy he attacked. His argument is that, if the
Eumenides could agree without any loss of dignity to stand
their trial before the Areopagus, as described in Aeschylus,
surely Mixidemides could do the same. Nothing is known
of Mixidemides, but it is clear that he refused to submit
his case to it, when charged with some offence.

» The story is told of Agesipolis (which others read here)
in Xenophon, Hellenica, iv. 7. 2. The Argives, when a
Lacedaemonian army threatened to invade their territory,
were in the habit of alleging that it was festival time, when
there should be a holy truce. This obviously left the door

308

RHETORIC, II. xxii. 12

Another topic is that from a previous judgement
in regard to the same or a similar or contrary matter,
if possible when the judgement was unanimous or
the same at all times; if not, when it was at least
that of the majority, or of the wise, either all or
most, or of the good; or of the judges themselves or
of those whose judgement they accept, or of those
whose judgement it is not possible to contradict, for
instance, those in authority, or of those whose judge-
ment it is unseemly to contradict, for instance, the
gods, a father, or instructors ; as Autocles % said in
his attack on Mixidemides, “ If the awful goddesses
were content to stand their trial before the Areopagus,
should not Mixidemides?’’ Or Sappho, ‘‘ Deathis an
evil; the gods have so decided, for otherwise they
would die.” Or as Aristippus, when in his opinion
Plato had expressed himself too presumptuously,
said, ‘‘ Our friend at any rate never spoke like that,”
referring to Socrates. Hegesippus,’ after having
first consulted the oracle at Olympia, asked the god __
at Delphi whether his opinion was the same as his
father’s, meaning that it would be disgraceful to con-
tradict him. Helen was a virtuous woman, wrote
Isocrates, because Theseus so judged ; the same ap-
plies to Alexander (Paris), whom the goddesses chose
before others. Evagoras was virtuous, as Isocrates
open to fraud, so Agesipolis (one of the Spartan kings) con-
sulted the oracle of Zeus at Olympia to ask whether he was
to respect such a truce. The reply of the oracle was that
he might decline a truce fraudulently demanded. Toconfirm
this, Agesipolis put the same question to Apollo: “Is your
opinion as to the truce the same as that of your father
(Zeus)?” ** Certainly,” answered Apollo. Agesipolis there-
upon invaded Argos. The point is that really Apollo had

little choice, since it would have been disgraceful for the son
to contradict the father.

309

ARISTOTLE

Kovav yobv dvotuyjoas, mdvras tods dAdous
Tapadirayv, cs Edaydopav jAdev.

13 “AAos ex t&v pepOv, womep ev rots TomKois,
Tota Kiyo 7 uy: Hoe yap 7) de. Tapddevypa
ex Tod Lwxpdrovs tot Meodéerov: “eis motor
tepov HoeBnkev; tivas Oedv od reTiuncey Ov 7%
modus vopiter;”’

14 “ANos, ézeid2) emi TOv mAcCloTwv ovpPaiver dol?
ereobai tu TH atbt@ ayabov Kal Kakov, ex Tod
axodovbotvros mpotpémew 7) amoTpémew Kal KaT-
nyopetvy 7 atrodoyeiobar Kal éeraweiv 7) péyew.
olov TH maWevoer TO hOovetcbar axodrovbei Kakov,
To 5€ codov elvar ayabov: od Toivuy Set radevecOar,
hboveicbar yap od Set: Set ev odv madevecbar,
cofov yap «ivar Set. 6 TdOmos odTdOs eoTW 1
Kaddinmou téxvn mpocdraBodcoa Kai To Svvarov
Kat TaAAa, ws elpynrac.

15 “Ados, 6trav mepi Svoiv Kal dyrTikeyévow 7
mporpemew 7) darorpémew dén, Kal T@ mpdrepoy
cipnpevep Tpomrep emt dupotv xpijobac. dvadéeper
dé, Ort exel pev Ta _TUXOVTa. dvruriBerau, evradla
dé Tdvavria. olov iépeva ovK ela TOV vLOV ony
nyopetv: av bey yap, epn, TO. Sixava Aێyys; ot
dvOpwrroi GE pLLancovoW, ed de 7a dduKca, ot Geni.
det prev ody Synunyopeiv: eav prev yap ra dixava

@ After his defeat at Aegospotami (405 8.c.) the Athenian
general Conon, fearing for his life, took refuge with
Evagoras, king of Cyprus—a proof, according to Aristotle,
of the goodness of the latter.

» If the genus can be affirmed of any subject, then one or
other of the species, which make up the genus, must also be
predicable of it. If the proposition to be maintained is,

310

RHETORIC, II. xxm. 12-15

says, for at any rate Conon? in his misfortune,
passing over everyone else, sought his assistance.

Another topic is that from enumerating the parts,
as in the Topics: What kind of movement is the
soul? for it must be this or that.2 There is an
instance of this in the Socrates of Theodectes : “* What
holy place has he profaned? Which of the gods
recognized by the city has he neglected to honour ? ”

Again, since in most human affairs the same thing
is accompanied by some bad or good result, another
topic consists in employing the consequence to ex-
hort or dissuade, accuse or defend, praise or blame.
For instance, education is attended by the evil of
being envied, and by the good of being wise ; there-
fore we should not be educated, for we should avoid
being envied; nay rather, we should be educated,
for we should be wise. This topic is identical with
the “ Art”’ of Callippus, when you have also in-
cluded the topic of the possible and the others which
have been mentioned.

Another topic may be employed when it is neces-
sary to exhort or dissuade in regard to two opposites,
and one has to employ the method previously
stated in the case of both. But there is this differ-
ence, that in the former case things of any kind
whatever are opposed, in the latter opposites. For
instance, a priestess refused to allow her son to
speak in public ; “ For if,” said she, ‘‘ you say what
is just, men will hate you ; if you say what is unjust,
the gods will.” On the other hand, “ you should
the soul is moved, it is necessary to examine whether any
of the different kinds of motion (increase, decrease, decay,
change of place, generation, alteration) can be predicated of
the soul. If not, the generic predicate is not applicable,

and the proposition is refuted.
311

ARISTOTLE

Aéeyns, ot Beoi oe diAjoovow, eay S€ Ta ddiKa,
of avOpwror. trovtl 8 orl tadto TO Aeyoméver
To €dos mpiacbar Kai tods dAas: Kai 7 BAatowors
Tobr’ eotiv, dray Svotv evavriow éxatépw ayabov
kal KaKOV Emnrat, evavTia éxdrEepa EKarepots.

”v > A > > \ ~ > “~

16 “Addos, ered) 08 radta davep@s emawodat
Kal apav@s, adda davepads pev ra Sixata Kat Ta

A > ~ / 307 A A 4
KaAd, erawodo. pdAvora, (dia dé Ta ovpdepovta
padAov BovdAovra, €x TovTwy meipacbar auvayew
Odrepov: Trav yap tapaddéwy obTos 6 Témos KUpWd-
TATOS €OTW.

17 *AAos ék tod avddoyov radra ovpBaivew* ofov
6 “Iduxpdryns tov vicv adrod vedrepov ovtTa THs
HAckias, dtu péyas Hv, Aevroupyety avayKaldovTwy,
elmev ott ef Tovs peyddous Tay maldwv avdpas
vopilovor, Tovs puuKpods TV avdp@v taidas «ivar

1399 b Pndrodvrar. Kal Weodéxrns ev TH vouw, Ort
moAiras ev moetobe rods pcboddpovs, ofov
LrpdBaxa Kai Xapidnuov bia thy emveikevav’
guyddas 8 od mowoete Tods ev Tots pucboddpors
avyKeora Svatrempayl.evous ;

” > ~ A cal oA ’ , @

18 "AdXos ex Tob TO aupBatvov éav 4 radbrov, ort
kal €€ @v ovpBaiver tavrd: olov Hevodavyns éAeyev
OTL Opoiws aceBodow ot yevécbar dacKovres Tovds

* The bad with the good. The exact meaning of
Bdalowors (see Glossary) has not been satisfactorily explained.
In the definition given of the retortion of a dilemma, the two
opposite things would be speaking truth or untruth; the two
opposite consequences, pleasing men and pleasing God.

é.g. aman may say that an honourable death should be
preferred to a pleasant life, and honest poverty to ill-acquired
wealth, whereas really he wishes the opposite. ‘If then his

words are in accordance with his real wishes, he must be
confronted with his public statements; if they are in accord-

312

RHETORIC, II. xxii. 15-18

speak in public; for if you say what is just, the
gods will love you, if you say what is unjust, men
will.” This is the same as the proverb, ‘‘ To buy
the swamp with the salt ’ ¢; and retorting a dilemma
on its proposer takes place when, two things being
opposite, good and evil follow on each, the good and
evil being opposite like the things themselves.

Again, since men do not praise the same things
in public and in secret, but in public chiefly praise
what is just and beautiful, and in secret rather wish
for what is expedient, another topic consists in
endeavouring to infer its opposite from one or
other of these statements.? This topic is the most
weighty of those that deal witlt paradox.

Another topic is derived from analogy in things.
For instance, Iphicrates, when they tried to force his
son to perform public services because he was tall,
although under the legal age, said : ‘“‘ If you consider
tall boys men, you must vote that short men are
boys.” Similarly, Theodectes in his “ law,’ ¢ says :
“ Since you bestow the rights of citizenship upon
mercenaries such as Strabax and Charidemus on
account of their merits, will you not banish those
of them who have wrought such irreparable mis-
fortunes ?”’

Another topic consists in concluding the identity
of antecedents from the identity of results.? Thus
Xenophanes said: “There is as much impiety in

ance with the latter, he must be confronted with his: secret
wishes. In either case he must fall into paradox, and con-
tradict either his publicly expressed or secret opinions”
(Sophistici Elenchi, ii. 12, Poste’s translation).

¢ This ‘“‘law’”’ (already mentioned in 11) is said to have
been an oration on the legal position of mercenaries.

¢ Cause and effect.

313

-“

ARISTOTLE

\ a > a , > 4, ‘
Beods trois amobaveiy A€yovow: aupotépws yap
ovpBaiver pur elvar rods Beovs mote. Kai dAws
\ \ a > ¢ /, / ¢€ >
S€ 7d ovpPatvov e€ éxarépov AapBavew ws radbro
We) Pegs | / A / > | si > \
aet* ““ wéAXere Sé Kpivew od mept “looxpdrous ahha
mept emurndevpatos, el xpi) pidocodetv.”’ Kal drt
TO Siddvar ynv Kal vdwp dovdevew eoriv, Kal TO
peTexew THS KoWhS elphvns Tovey TO Tpoo-
TaTTopwevov. Anmtéov 8 omotepov dv xpropov.
"Ados €k Tob 7) TadTO Tods adbrovs acl atpetoba
4 “ / > > PP e ? / \
votepov 7 mpdotepov, add’ avdradw, olov 7éd€ TO
evOvpna, “ei hevyovres pev euaxouela dSmws

/ / \ / Li A
KateAOwpev, KkateADovres S5é devEducla Srrws pur)
paxywucba’’ oré pty yap TO pevew ayti Tod

/ ¢ ~ Lae A \ \ / > \
peaxecOar apodvro, ore Se TO py paxeoOar avTi
TOO pur) pevew.
\ - ¢ > ba) w a” / ,
os TO ob &ver’ av ein yevoiro, TovTou
¢ , > ” a > , ”
évena pavar elvar } yeyevfobat, olov ei Soin av
\ @7 > > / / Ld ‘ a>
Tis Twi Ww’ adedAdpevos Avon. bev Kal Toor
elpnTat,
a c , > > 4 ' /
moAAois 6 Saipwv od Kar’ evvovay pépwv
/ / > / > > o,
peydra Sidwow edrvxnpat’, aad’ wa
\ ‘ , > /,

Tas avpdopas AdBwow émipaveorépas.

kal To €x TOO MeAcdypov rod “Avripvtos,

4 Tsocrates, Antidosis, 173.

> The peace concluded between the Greeks (although the
Lacedaemonians held aloof) and Alexander the Great after
the death of Philip of Macedon (336 B.c.).

¢ Lysias, xxxiv. 11.

4 j.e. after their return, they preferred to leave the city
rather than fight. This is Cope’s explanation, but the
meaning of the clause éré wey . .. ypoivro is then some-
what obscure. A more suitable interpretation would be:
““At one time they preferred to return from exile at the
price of fighting: at another, not to fight, at the price of

314

RHETORIC, II. xxmr. 18-20

asserting that the gods are born as in saying that
they die; for either way the result is that at some
time or other they did not exist.” And, generally
speaking, one may always regard as identical the
results produced by one or other of any two things :
“You are about to decide, not about Isocrates alone,
but about education generally, whether it is right to
study philosophy.’’* And, “‘ to give earth and water
is slavery,” and “to be included in the common
peace’ implies obeying orders.” Of two alter-
natives, you should take that which is useful.

Another topic is derived from the fact that the
same men do not always choose the same thing
before and after, but the contrary. The following
enthymeme is an example: “ If, when in exile, we
fought to return to our country [it would be mon-
strous] if, now that we have returned, we were to
return to exile to avoid fighting’ !¢ This amounts
to saying that at one time they preferred to hold
their ground at the price of fighting ; at another,
not to fight at the price of not remaining.4

Another topic consists in maintaining that the
cause of something which is or has been is something
_ which would generally, or possibly might, be the cause
of it; for example, if one were to make a present
_ of something to another, in order to cause him pain
by depriving him of it. Whence it has been said :

It is not from benevolence that the deity bestows great

blessings upon many, but in order that they may suffer
more striking calamities.¢

And these verses from the Meleager of Antiphon :

being exiled a second time (St. Hilaire), but one does not
see how this can be got out of the Greek.
¢ The author is unknown.

315

21

1400a

22

ARISTOTLE

b] ¢ , a? v A /
ovy iva Krdvwou Op’, omws Sé waptupes
apeths yevwvrar Mededypw mpos “EAAdda
peri F YPP “TMPos ;

\ \ > ~ Ai ~ (3) Sy , 4 e
Kat TO ek Tod Alavtos rod @eodéxrov, dtu 6

~ >
Avopndns _mpocirero ’"Odvecda od TYLA, adn’ iva
jTTwV 7 0 aKorovdar: evdexerau yap TovTOV EveKa
a
moupoa.

"Aos Kowds Kal Tots ayudioByrobot Kai rots
ovpBovdcvovot, oKxomeiy TA mpoTpémovTa Kal a7o-
TpéeTOVTA, Kal WV EveKa Kal TMpaTToVoL Kal pevyou-
ow: TadTa ydp cow a éav ev drdpyn Set mparrew
[eav d¢ wn drdpxn, 7) TparTew], olov €f Svvarov
Kal pddiov Kal wdéApov 7 adr@ 7 didois, 7 Bra-

a /

Bepov exOpois kat emlripwov, 7) eAdrrav 7 Cnpia
Tob mpdypatos. Kal mporperrovra 8 €k rovrTwv
Kal “amrorpemovrat ex TOV evavrion, ex d€ T&V
abtav TovTwv Kal KaTyyopodat Kal amoAoyobvrat*
ex pev TOV amoTperdovTwy amoAoyobdvrar, ex dé
Tov MpOTpEeTTOVT@Y kaTyyopovow. éore 5’ 6 témos
obros oAn TEXVN a te Ilaudirov Kai 7 KaMimmov.
os ek Tv SoKodvTwv pev yiyvecbau d-
miotwy dé, ott ovK av edokav, ei put) Hv H eyyds

. - @ lot ”“ \ \ » ”“ \ | ee €

Hv. Kal ort waAAov: 7 yap Ta dvra 7} Ta eikdra brT0-
/, > . a ” A \ > /¢ > A
AapBdavovow: «i odv dmorov Kal pi) eikds, dAnbes
dv ein’ o¥ yap dud ye TO eikds Kal mBavov SoKet
ovtws. olov *AvdpokAjs eAeyev 6 Tlirbeds Kar-

@ Frag. 2 (T.G.F. p. 792).

» Iliad, x. 218; ep. T.G.F. p. 801.

¢ By pointing out what is likely to deter a man from
committing a crime, and vice versa.

4 The argument is: we accept either that which really is,
or that which is probable; if then a statement is made which

316

RHETORIC, II. xxi. 20-22

Not in order to slay the monster, but that they may be

witnesses to Greece of the valour of Meleager.*
And the following remark from the Ajax of Theo-
dectes, that Diomedes chose Odysseus before all
others,° not to do him honour, but that his companion
might be his inferior; for this may have been the
reason.

Another topic common to forensic and deliberative
rhetoric consists in examining what is hortatory and
dissuasive, and the reasons which make men act or
not. Now, these are the reasons which, if they
exist, determine us to act, if not, not ; for instance,
if a thing is possible, easy, or useful to ourselves or
our friends, or injurious and prejudicial to our
enemies, or if the penalty is less than the profit.
From these grounds we exhort, and dissuade from
their contraries. It is on the same grounds that we
accuse and defend; for what dissuades serves for de-
fence, what persuades, for accusation. This topiccom-"
prises the whole “ Art”’ of Pamphilus and Callippus.

Another topic is derived from things which are
thought to happen but are incredible, because it
would never have been thought so, if they had not
happened or almost happened. And further, these
things are even more likely to be true ; for we only
believe in that which is, or that which is probable :
if then a thing is incredible and not probable, it will
be true; for it is not because it is probable and
credible that we think it true.¢ Thus, Androcles ¢ of
is incredible and improbable, we assume that it would not
have been made, unless it was true.

¢ Athenian demagogue and opponent of Alcibiades, for
whose banishment he was chiefly responsible. When the
Four Hundred were set up, he was put to death. Pitthus
was an Athenian deme or parish.

317

ARISTOTLE

nyop@v Tob _vopov, érret eGopuByoay abTre etrrovre

* d€ovrat ot vopot vdpov Too dvopBccovros” Kal
yap ot ixOves dAds, kairo odK elas ovde mBavov
ev dAun Tpepopevous deicbar adds, Kat TO. oreupura
eXaiov’ Kaito. amorov, e€ dv Edatov yiyverat, Tara
deiobar eAaiov.”

23 "AMos eAeyKTiKOS, TO TO. dvoporoyovpeva oKO-
met, el TL dvopohoyoupevoy € €x mdvreov al Xpovenv
Kal a AN Kat Ave xwpis peev emt Tob dyucpe-
aBnrobvtos, olov “Kat dot pev dirciv dpas,
ovvaioce S5é Tois Sandy Mt xwpis 8° ex’ adrod,
‘kat dnot pev elval pe diAdduxov, odK exe dé
dmodetbau Seducagpevov ovdepiav Suny,” xwpis
8 én’ adbrod Kat Tob ayproBnrobvros, “Kal obros
peev od Seddvetke TwTOT OvdEV, eyad 5é Kal ToAAOds
AdAvpau pay.”

24 “AMos Tots mpodiaBeBAnuevors Kal dvOpdirrous
‘Kal mpdypacww, 7 Soxobor, TO Aéyew thy airiay
Tov tapaddéou: €ott ydp te dv 6 daiverat. olov
broPeBAnuevns twos Tov abris vidv dua TO aomd-

eo0at €d0xet ouveivar TH perpaxi, AexI€vros

d€ Tod airiov ervOn 1) a) SvaBory- Kal olov € ev TO Atavre
T® Ocodéxrov ‘Odvaceds Aéyet Tpos rov Atavra,
Sudrt dv8pedrepos dv tod Alayros od Soxet.

25 “AAXos amo rob airiov, dv te brdpyn, Ore ort,
Kav pn drdpxn, OTe ovK EoTW* Gua yap TO alriov
Kat o0 alriov, Kat avev airiov odféy €orw. olov
Aewddpas dmoAoyovpevos te KarnyopnaavTos
@OpacvBovArAov sti Hv arnArirns yeyovds ev TH

* Understanding dafeSrjocda. Others read wh (for 4)
doxotcr, “* when there seems no reason to suspect them.”

318

RHETORIC, II. xxi. 22-25

Pitthus, speaking against the law, being shouted at
_ when he said “ the laws need a law to correct them,”
went on, “ and fishes need salt, although it is neither
probable nor credible that they should, being brought
up in brine; similarly, pressed olives need oil,
although it is incredible that what produces oil
should itself need oil.”

Another topic, appropriate to refutation, consists
in examining contradictories, whether in dates,
actions, or words, first, separately in the case of the
adversary, for instance, ‘‘ he says that he loves you,
and yet he conspired with the Thirty;” next,
separately in your own case, “he says that I am
litigious, but he cannot prove that I have ever
brought an action against anyone ’’; lastly, sep-
arately in the case of your adversary and yourself
together: ‘“‘ he has never yet lent anything, but I
have ransomed many of you.”

Another topic, when men or things have been
attacked by slander, in reality or in appearance,’
consists in stating the reason for the false opinion ;
for there must be a reason for the supposition of
guilt. For example, a woman embraced her son inv
a manner that suggested she had illicit relations with
him, but when the reason was explained, the slander
was quashed. Again, in the Ajax of Theodectes,
Odysseus explains to Ajax why, although really more
courageous than Ajax, he is not considered to be so.

Another topic is derived from the cause. If the
cause exists, the effect exists; if the cause does not
exist, the effect does not exist ; for the effect exists
with the cause, and without cause there is nothing.
For example, Leodamas, when defending himself
against the accusation of Thrasybulus that his name

319

ARISTOTLE

axpomrorer, GAN exkorsat emt Trav TpidKovra, ovK
evdexeobau epn: paMov yap av muorevew aire
Tovs TpidkovTa eyyeypapperns ths exOpas mpos
Tov Onpmov.

26 "AMos, ei evedeXeTo BéArvov | dMuws 7 7 evdexeTat

av 7 ovpBovrever 7} Y TparrTer 7 mem paxe oKomety:

1400 b Pavepov yap. ore el cz) ovTws eXEl, od mémpaxev"
ovodeis yap EKMY TO patra Kal yuyvwoKkwy m™po-
aupetran. eo7e d€ TovTo pebdos- moAAdKis ‘yap
dorepov yiyverar SHAov mas Hv mpagar BéAriov,
mportepov dé adxnAov.

27 "AMos, éray tu evayriov wéAAn mparrecbar Tots
TETpPAyLLEvols, a4a oKoTreiv: olov Sevodavys °EAed-
Tas epwrdow «i Odwor 7H AevKobég Kat Opnvdovw,
7 PM, ovveBovrcver, ei pev Deov brroAapBavovor,
pa) Opnvetv, el S dvopumov, pony OWew.

28 os TOmos TO €K TOV uaprn Devry KaT~-
nyopet 7 drrohoyetoBar, olov ev Th Kapxivov
Mnbetg ot pev KaTnyopobow Ort Tovs maidas dim
eKTEWweV, ov paiveoBar yobv adrovs: muapre yap
7 Myjdeva wept thy amooroAjy ta&v taidwv: 2%

2 The names of traitors were inscribed on a brazen pillar
in the Acropolis. Leodamas supported the oligarchical,
Thrasybulus the democratical party. In answer to the
charge that he had had his name removed from the pillar
when his party came into power, Leodamas replied that,
if he had been originally posted as an enemy of the people
and a hater of democracy, he would have preferred to keep
the record, as likely to increase the confidence of the Thirty
in him, than to have it erased, even though it branded him
as a traitor.

» If a person has not taken the better course, when he
had the chance of doing so, he cannot be guilty.

¢ Leucothea was the name of the deified Ino. She was
the daughter of Cadmus and the wife of Athamas king of
820

RHETORIC, Il. xxm. 25-28

_ had been posted in the Acropolis * but that he had
erased it in the time of the Thirty, declared that
it was impossible, for the Thirty would have had
more confidence in him if his hatred against the
people had been graven on the stone.

Another topic consists in examining whether there
was or is another better course than that which is
advised, or is being, or has been, carried out. For
it is evident that, if this has not been done,’ a
person has not committed a certain action ; because
no one, purposely or knowingly, chooses what is bad.
However, this argument may be false ; for often it
is not until later that it becomes clear what was the
better course, which previously was uncertain.

Another topic, when something contrary to what
has already been done is on the point of being done,
consists in examining them together. For instance,
when the people of Elea asked Xenophanes if they
ought to sacrifice and sing dirges to Leucothea,’ or
not, he advised them that, if they believed her to be
a goddess they ought not to sing dirges, but if they
believed her to be a mortal, they ought not to
sacrifice to her.

Another topic consists in making use of errors
committed, for purposes of accusation or defence,
For instance, in the Medea of Carcinus,* some accuse
Medea of having killed her children,—at any rate,
they had disappeared; for she had made the mis- _
take of sending them out of the way. Medea herself

Thebes. The latter went mad and, in order to escape from
him, Ino threw herself into the sea with her infant son
Melicertes. Both became marine deities,

. i poet, contemporary of Aristophanes (7.G.F,
p. 798).

Y 321

ARISTOTLE

amoXoyeitrar dtu ovK dv Tods maidas daAAa Tov

~ \

"Idoova av amékrewev TobTo yap jwaptev av pe)

mowjoaca, elmep Kal Odrepov émoincev. €oTe

6 Tonos odtos Tod evOuunuaros Kal Td €ldos GAH

7) T™poTepov Meodw@pou TExv7.

” > 4 Ars LEY a - e ~

29 “AXAos amo Tod dvopuaros, olov ws 6 LodoKAfs

cadds Ldynpw® Kal hopotoa rovvoua,
‘ ¢ > “a ~ ~ > / tA ,
Kal ws ev Tois TOV Dedy eraivois eiwhacr A€yew,
Kat ws Kovwy OpacvBovdov OpactBovdov éexdA«r,
\ c / rd és. ee 4
kat “Hpddiuxos @pactpayov “del Opacvpaxos
p>? \ A teh \ ~ ” \ ,
ei,’ kat I1@Aov “ dei od ma@dos €f,’’ Kai Apaxovra
\ Od hud > > / c la > \
Tov vomobérnv, ote odK avOpwmov of vopor adda
dpdKovtos: xaAevoi ydp. Kat ws % Hdpumidov
°“E / > \ >A. aL
KdBn «is tTHv >Adpodirny
\ A > > ~ > 4 wv lol
Kal Tovvoy opbads adpoovvyns apxe. Oeds.
Kal ws Xarpyywv
IlevOeds ecouevns ovudopds émuvupos.

30 Eddoxiye? 5é€ paddov t&v evOvunudrwr ra
eeyeTiuKa, TOV amrodeuTuKdv Sia TO ovvaywyihyv
pev evavriow eivar ev pixp@ To eAeyKtiKov ev-

, > » \ ‘ ~ > ~
Ovpnpa, wap’ adAnda 5€ davepa elvar TH axpoarh

* An early edition, afterwards enlarged. It must have
contained something more than the topic of “errors” to be
of any use.

» Sophocles, Tyro, Frag. 597 (7.G.F.). The reference is
to Sidero (cldnpos, iron), the cruel stepmother of Tyro.

* Thompson’s rendering (Introd. to his ed. of Plato’s
Gorgias, p. 5). ‘*Colt” refers to Polus’s skittishness and
frisking from one subject to another.

4 Troades, 990.

322

RHETORIC, II. xxi. 28-30

pleads that she would have slain, not her children,
but her husband Jason; for it would have been a
mistake on her part not to have done this, if she had
done the other. This topic and kind of enthymeme
is the subject of the whole of the first “ Art” of
Theodorus.@

Another topic is derived from the meaning of a
name. For instance, Sophocles says,

Certainly thou art iron, like thy name.

This topic is also commonly employed in praising the
gods. Conon used to call Thrasybulus “ the man
bold in counsel,’ and Herodicus said of Thrasy-
machus, “ Thou art ever bold in fight,”’ and of Polus,
.“ Thou art ever Polus (colt) by name and colt by
nature,” © and of Draco the legislator that his laws
were not those of a man, but of a dragon, so severe
were they. Hecuba in Euripides? speaks thus of
Aphro-dite :

And rightly does the name of the goddess begin like the
word aphro-syne (folly) ;

and Chaeremon ¢ of Pentheus,
Pentheus named after his unhappy future.

Enthymemes that serve to refute are more popular
than those that serve to demonstrate, because the
former is a conclusion of opposites ‘in a small compass,
and things in juxtaposition are always clearer to the

e Frag. 4 (7.G.F.). The name Pentheus is from 7év@os
(sorrow).

* * Admitting the apparent correctness of the opposing
argument, we may prove the contradictory of its conclusion
by an unassailable argument of our own, which is then
called an elenchus”’ (Thomson, Laws of Thought, § 127).

323

ARISTOTLE

a / \ \ ~ > ~ ‘ ~
padAov. mavtwv S€ Kal Tdv edeyKTiKa@V Kal TOV
decxtixa@v avAdoyiopav OopuBeirac pddvora Ta
To.adra doa apydopmeva mpoop@ar pn TH emutoAjs

\ a :
civar (dua yap Kat adrot ép’ adrois yxaipovar
mpoacbavemevor), Kal dowv Tooobrov borepilov-
ow woof dua cipnuevwy yvwpilew.

24. "Ezei 8 evddyerar Tov prev elvat avddoye~

/ \ A \ s \ / / > / A
opov, Tov dé pur) elvar pev daiveobar dé, avayKn Kat
evOdunua To pev elvar evOdunua, TO dé pur) elvae
paivecbar dé, érreimep TO evOvunua avdAdoyropos Tis.

2. Toro 8 eiot rv dawopevwv evOvunudtwv ets
l40la ev 6 Tapa THv A€~w, Kal TovTOV EV Lev [LEpos,
worep ev Tots SiadexriKois, TO pn ovdAAoyrodjevov
ouptepacpaTiun@s TO TeAevTatoy etzetv, odk apa:
TO Kal TO, avdyKn apa TO Kal Td. Kal Tos ev-
Oupijpact TO ovveoTpaupevws Kal avTiKeyLevws
elev dhaiverar evOvpnua 7 yap tovatrn Adis
xopa cor evOvunuaros. Kal Eoue TO ToLodTOY
elvar wapa TO oxfqpa Ths AeEews. Eore Se eis 7d
tH A€Eeu avAdoytoTiKGs A€yew xpHoysov TO avdA-
AoytopBv moAAdv KedddAara A€yew, GTe TodS juev
” a 22 hhs2 > / \ 7 @
éawoe, Tots 8 érepois eryswpynoe, Tos 8 “EAAnvas
> /, LA \ \ 4, > ”
nArevoepwoev' ExaoTov pev yap TovTwy €€ aAdwv
amedetxOn, ovvteDevtwv 5é paiverat Kat €k Ttodtwv
ru ylyveobar.

“a A \ A \ ¢ , c \ 4

Ev 8€ 76 apa tiv opwvoplav, ds TO ddvat

a ~ > e ‘ ¢
orrovdatov elvar pov, ad’ od y’ early 7 TYyuwraTy
TacGv TEAETH TA yap PVOTHpLA TATA TYyLMTaTH

@ Jsocrates, Evagoras, 65-69.
> Or equivocation, in which a single term has a double

meaning.
324

RHETORIC, II. xxu1. 30—xxiv. 2

audience. But of all syllogisms, whether refutative
or demonstrative, those are specially applauded,
the result of which the hearers foresee as soon as
they are begun, and not because they are superficial
(for as they listen they congratulate themselves
on anticipating the conclusion); and also those
which the hearers are only so little behind that they
understand what they mean as soon as they are
delivered.

24. But as it is possible that some syllogisms may
be real, and others not real but only apparent,
there must also be real and apparent enthymemes,
since the enthymeme is a kind of syllogism.

Now, of the topics of apparent enthymemes one
is that of diction, which is of two kinds. The first,
as in Dialectic, consists in ending with a conclusion
syllogistically expressed, although there has been no
syllogistie process, “‘ therefore it is neither this nor
that,” ‘so it must be this or that’; and similarly
in rhetorical arguments a concise and antithetical
statement is supposed to be an enthymeme ; for such
a style appears to contain a real enthymeme. This
fallacy appears to be the result of the form of ex-
pression. For the purpose of using the diction to
create an impression of syllogistic reasoning it is
useful to state the heads of several syllogisms :
“ He saved some, avenged others, and freed the
Greeks ’’;* for each of these propositions has been
proved by others, but their union appears to furnish
a fresh conclusion.

The second kind of fallacy of diction is hhomonymy.?
For instance, if one were to say that the mouse is an
important animal, since from it is derived the most
honoured of all religious festivals, namely, the

325

ARISTOTLE

, n ” , 2 te ‘ > a
tedeTH. 1 et Tis KUva eyKwpidlwy Tov ev TO
> ~ 7 ” ‘ ~ id /
ovpav@ ovprrapadapBaver 7 Tov Ilava, ore Iivdapos
edycev

> / id , lol v4 ‘
® pakap, ov Te weydAas Veod Kiva mavTodamov
kaXdéovow *OAdvpriot.

9 OTe TO pndeva elvar KUva aTYLdTaToY eoTW,
wote TO KUva SHAov OTe Tiwov. Kal TO KOWWwVLKOV
ddvat tov ‘Epujy eivar pddvota tOv Oedv* pdvos
yap Kadcirar Kowds “Epps. Kal 7rd Tov Adyov
elvat orrovdaidTatov, 6tt ot adyalol avdpes od xpn-
* > \ 4, > \ »” \ \ / - uv
pdtwv adda Adyou eiciv dor: TO yap Adyou a&vov
ody amAds déyerat.
” ‘ / La / nn A
3 “Ados To dinpnuevov ovvrilevra Aéyew 7 TO
ovyKelevov Siaipodvra émel yap tavrov Soxet
elvar odK Ov Tadbrov ToAAdKis, O7OTEpoY xpnoYuw-
~ a na ” \ ~ &) 7
Tepov, TovTo Set mrovetv. eat. S¢ TodTo EvOvdruov
Adyos, olov Td €idevat ott tTpinpys ev Ilewpace?
\ a
eoTiv: ExaoTov yap oldev. Kal Tov Ta oToLxela

4 Deriving pvorjpia (uiev, to close the lips) from pis
(mouse).

» A fragment from the Parthenia (songs sung by maidens
to the accompaniment of the flute), Pan is called * the dog
of Cybele,” the great nature-goddess of the Greeks, as bein
always in attendance on her, being himself a nature-god.
The fact that Pindar calls Pan “dog” is taken as a
glorification of that animal.

* xowds ‘Epufs is a proverbial expression meaning
**halves!”? When anyone had a stroke of luck, such as
finding a purse full of money in the street, anyone with
him expected to go halves. Hermes was the god of luck,
and such a find was called épyaiov. Kxowwvrixds is taken to
mean (1) liberal to others, or (2) sociable.

@ \éyos: (1) speech ; (2) account, esteem.

326

RHETORIC, II. xxiv. 2-3

mysteries *; or if, in praising the dog, one were to
include the dog in heaven (Sirius), or Pan, because
Pindar said,?

O blessed one, whom the Olympians call dog of the Great
Mother, taking every form,

or were to say that the dog is an honourable animal,
since to be without a dog is most dishonourable.
And to say that Hermes is the most sociable of the
gods, because he alone is called common ;° and that
words are most excellent, since good men are con-
sidered worthy, not of riches but of consideration ;
for Adyov agvos has a double meaning.?

Another fallacy consists in combining what is
divided or dividing what is combined. For since a
thing which is not the same as another often appears
to be the same, one may adopt the more convenient
alternative. Such was the argument of Euthydemus,
to prove, for example, that a man knows that there
is a trireme in the Piraeus, because he knows the
existence of two things, the Piraeus and the trireme ; °
or that, when one knows the letters, one also knows

¢ Very obscure and no explanation is satisfactory. The
parallel passage in Sophistici elenchi (20. 6) is: “Do you
being in Sicily now know that there are triremes in the
Piraeus?” The ambiguity lies in the position of ‘‘ now,”
whether it is to be taken with “in Sicily ” or with “in the
Piraeus.’’ At the moment when a man is in Sicily he cannot
know that there are at this time triremes in the Piraeus ;
but being in Sicily he can certainly know of the ships in the
Piraeus, which should be there, but are now in Sicily (Kirch-
mann). St. Hilaire suggests that the two clauses are: Do
you now, being in Sicily, see the triremes which are in the
Piraeus? and, Did you when in Sicily, see the triremes
which are now in the Piraeus? The fallacy consists in the
two facts (being in the Piraeus and the existence of triremes
in Sicily), true separately, being untrue combined.

$27

ARISTOTLE

> , Lid ‘ ” \ A ” A
EMLOTALEVOV OTL TO Emos oldEev* TO Yap EOS TO
avTo €oTw. Kal émel TO Sis TocodTOV vooM@des,
pnde ro & ddvar dyrewov eivas’ aromov yap et
\ 7 > \, a / > MA \ i >
7a dvo ayala év Kakov éoTw. otTw pev obv éedey-
/ 58 de 8 / >? 4, > “ 2 06
KTiKov, Wde Se SeuxTiKdv* od yap eoTw ev ayabov
8 4 7 Ld \ ¢ /, / 4,
vo Kakd. Odos dé 6 Tém0s TrapadoytoTiKos. maAw
\ , > v4 4 /
TO TloAvkpdrous eis OpacvBovdov, are TpidKovra
Tupdvvous KateAvoev* ovvrifnot yap. 7) TO ev TO
’Opéorn TO Ocodéxrov: ek Srarpécews yap éorw.

, / , /
dixaidv eotw, 7% Tis dv Kelvyn TéoW,

> / ih \ ~ / a
daroBvnoKew tavryy, Kal TH TmaTpl ye Tyswpelv
Tov vidv: ovKoby Kal Tadra TémpaKxrat’ cuvTeDevra
101d yap tows odKére Sikatov. ein 8 av Kal mapa TH
eMeufiww: apaipetrar yap TO bd Tivos.
“A 8 \ / \ / / ”
Aros S€ Tém0s TO Sewedoer KaTacKevdlew 7)
> Ud ~ > > \ ov \ , Ly
dvackevdlew. tobto 8 éotw déray, pa) delEas ort
erroingey, avénon TO mpaypa* moved yep, sia
7) ws ovTe memroinKev, oray 6 Thy aitlay Exwv av
7 as mremounKer, 6Tav 6 KaTyyopav opyilnrar. ove
ouv corly evOunpa: mapadoyilerat yap 0 aKpoaris
Ort erroinoev 7 ovK emroinoev, od SeBevypevor.
‘
5 “Ados 7d ek onpeiov: aovAdoyioTov yap Kat
Tobro. olov el tis A€you “ rais oAcot ovpdéepovaw
c 7 A ¢ \ ‘A PS) , \ >A 4
of epa@vres: 6 yap “Appodiov Kal "Apioroyeirovos

»

* Thrasybulus deposed the thirty individuals and put
down the single tyranny which they composed; he then
claimed a thirtyfold reward, as having put down thirty
tyrannies.

> Frag. 5 (7.G.F.).

328

RHETORIC, II. xxrv. 3-5

the word made of them, for word and letters are the
same thing. Further, since twice so much is un-
wholesome, one may argue that neither is the
original amount wholesome ; for it would be absurd
that two halves separately should be good, but bad
combined. In this way the argument may be used
for refutation, in another way for demonstration, if
one were to say, one good thing cannot make two
bad things. But the whole topic is fallacious. Again,
one may quote what Polycrates said of Thrasybulus,
that he deposed thirty tyrants,* for here he combines
them ; or the example of the fallacy of division in
the Orestes of Theodectes ® : “ It is just that a woman
who has killed her husband” should be put to death,
and that the son should avenge the father ; and this
in fact is what has been done. But if they are com-
bined, perhaps the act ceases to be just. The same
might also be classed as an example of the fallacy
of omission ; for the name of the one who should put
the woman to death is not mentioned.

Another topic is that of constructing or destroying
by exaggeration, which takes place when the speaker,
without having proved that any crime has actually
been committed, exaggerates the supposed fact ; for
it makes it appear either that the accused is not
guilty, when he himself exaggerates it, or that he is
guilty, when it is the accuser who is in a rage.
Therefore there is no enthymeme ; for the hearer
falsely concludes that the accused is guilty or not,
although neither has been proved.

Another fallacy is that of the sign, for this argu-
ment also is illogical. For instance, if one were to
say that those who love one another are useful to
States, since the love of Harmodius and Aristogiton

329

ARISTOTLE

v / A , a xy ”“ uv
€pws KatéAvoe tov TUpavvov Immapyov.” 7 €t
tis A€you Ste KAéemryns Avovtavos: rrovnpds ydp*
> ~ ~
aovdddy.oTov yap Kat Tobro: ob yap mas movnpos
mY , > > ¢ v ~ /
KAérrns, GAN’ 6 Khéntns Tas Tovnpos.

6 “ANos dia 7d ovpPeBnKds, ofov 6 Aéyer Tlodv-

4 nw
Kpatns «is Tods ps, OTL eBonPnoav Siatpayovres
A 4 an ” / A 38 ~ ~

Tas veupds. 7 €t Tis hain TO émi deimvov KAnOAvat
TYyMrarov: Sia yap TO pi) KAnOAvar 6 >AxiAAEds
> / aA ] A > tA ¢ °° ¢ >
eunvice Tots *“Ayatots ev Tevédm 6 8 ws arysa-
Copevos eunvicev, ovveByn S€ Todro emt Tod pn
KAnOfvar.

7 "Ados 76 rapa 70 édpevov, olov ev T@ *AXeE-
ta a / ¢€ A A ‘\ ~
dvdpw, dru weyaddrvyos: drrepio0wv yap Tv ToAA@Y
e , > a 7 > € , Ld A
OmiAtay ev TH "Idn SdiétpiBe Kal? adrov: sre yap
ot peyaddibvyor towbdror, Kai obros peyaddybuyos
dd€evev av. Kat érel KadAwmioTns Kal viKTwp TAG-
vaTat, mouxds* ToLooToL yap. Spovov de Kal ort ev
Tots tepots of mTwxol Kal ddovar Kal dpyodvTat, Kat
iA aA 7 »” > ~ 7 n~ /
ott Tots duydow eEcorw oikeiv érov av OéAwow:
ort yap Tois SoKxodow evdayovety drdpyer Tadra,
Kal ols tatra tbrdpye., Sdéavev dy evdatmovery.

* Herodotus, ii. 141. The story was that, when
Sennacherib invaded Egypt, a host of field-mice devoured
all the quivers, bowstrings and leather shield-holders of the
Assyrians. Apollo was called Smintheus (culvdos, mouse)
and was represented on coins with a mouse in his hand,
either as the mouse-slayer and protector of crops, or because
the animal was sacred to him. The story, alluded to else-
where, was of Greek, not of Egyptian origin. Similar

330

RHETORIC, II. xxtv. 5-7

overthrew the tyrant Hipparchus ; or that Dionysius
is a thief, because he is a rascal; for here again the
argument is inconclusive ; not every rascal is a thief
although every thief is a rascal.

Another fallacy is derived from accident ; for in-
stance, when Polycrates says of the mice, that they
rendered great service by gnawing the bowstrings.*
Or if one were to say that nothing is more honourable
than to be invited to a dinner, for because he was
not invited Achilles was wroth with the Achaeans at
Tenedos ; whereas he was really wroth because he
had been treated with disrespect, but this was an
accident due to his not having been invited.?

Another fallacy is that of the Consequence.” For
instance, in the Alexander (Paris) it is said that Paris
was high-minded, because he despised the companion-
ship of the common herd and dwelt on Ida by himself ;
for because the high-minded are of this character,
Paris also might be thought high-minded. Or, since
a man pays attention to dress and roams about at
night, he is a libertine, because libertines are of this
character. Similarly, the poor sing and dance in the
temples, exiles can live where they please; and
since these things belong to those who are apparently
happy, those to whom they belong may also be
thought happy. But there is a difference in condi-
panegyrics on ridiculous things or animals included pots,
counters, salt, flies, bees, and such subjects as death, sleep,
and food.

» Sophocles, The Gathering of the Greeks (T.G.F. p. 161),
a satyric drama. His not being invited was a mere accident
of the disrespect.

¢ Assuming a proposition to be convertible, when it is not;
it does not follow, assuming that all the high-minded dwell
by themselves, that all who dwell by themselves are high-
minded.

331

ARISTOTLE

Suaddper 5€ 7H Tas: 810 Kal eis THY EAAeubw
euminre.
8 “ANos mapa 76 avairioy ws altiov, oiov TO aya
peta ToOTO yeyovevat’ TO yap peTa TOOTO ws
Sua. Totro AapBdvovor, Kai pddvora of ev Tats
/ e ¢€ ¢ / \ bl
moXreiats, olov ws 6 Anpuddyns tiv Anpoobévous
modreiav mavTWY TOV KaK@v aitiav’ pet eKElvynV
yap avveBy 0 ToAEpos.

9 “AAdos rapa tiv Meus tod mote Kal Tas,
ofov ori duxaiws “Ade~avdpos eAaBe tiv ‘“HAevyv:
aipeais yap att edd0n mapa Tod maTpos. ov yap
det tows, aAAd TO mpOrov: Kal yap 6 maTHp jwExpL

14028 roUTov KUplos. 7) €l Tis hain TO TUMTEW TOUS
> / 7 > > A 4 > oe
€devbepous bBpw «ivar: od yap mdytws, add’ dray
apxn Xeipav adixwv.

” ” > a > a A \ ¢ ~

10 “Erte womep ev Tots EpioTiKots, Tapa TO amdAd@s

lo f

Kat pi amd@s, adda i, yiyverar Pawdpevos
avAdoyiopos* ofov ev pev tots SvadexTiKots, drt
> \ A 1, on wv * \ \ A oN \ »+ \@
€orl TO 17). Ov Ov" EoTL yap TO [47 OV pt) OV. Kal OTL
emiaTnTov TO ayvwoTov: €oTL yap emoTnToV TO
dyvworov Tt ayvworov. oUTw Kal ev TOS pyTOpt-

a 7, A ‘ ~
Kots €oTi paivopuevov evOdunua mapa TO 7) amAds
> , > \ , > / »” A ~ > /
eikos, GAAA Ti eiKds. €aTt d€ ToOTO od KabodAov,
¢ \ 7A. 10. r /,
worep kat Aydbwr Aéyet

@ The poor want to get money; the rich dance and sing
to amuse themselves, or to show that they can do as they
like. Exiles can certainly live where they like in a foreign
land, but would prefer to live in their own country ; the rich,
who are not exiles, travel to amuse themselves.

> The first ‘is’? means “‘ has a real, absolute existence”’;
the second ‘is’ merely expresses the identity of the terms of
the proposition, and is particular; but the sophistical reasoner
takes it in the same sense as the first. The same applies to
the argument about the unknown.

332

RHETORIC, II. xxiv. 7-10

tions ;* wherefore this topic also falls under the head
of omission.

Another fallacy consists of taking what is not the
cause for the cause, as when a thing has happened
at the same time as, or after, another; for it is
believed that what happens after is produced by the
other, especially by politicians. Thus, Demades de-
clared that the policy of Demosthenes was the cause
of all the evils that happened, since it was followed
by the war.

Another fallacy is the omission of when and how.
For instance, Alexander (Paris) had a right to carry
off Helen, for the choice of a husband had been
given her by her father. But (this was a fallacy), for
it was not, as might be thought, for all time, but
only for the first time ; for the father’s authority only
lasts tillthen. Or, if one should say that it is wanton
outrage to beat a free man; for this is not always
the case, but only when the assailant gives the first
blow.

Further, as in sophistical disputations, an apparent
syllogism arises as the result of considering a thing
first absolutely, and then not absolutely, but only
in a particular case. For instance, in Dialectic, it
is argued that that which is not zs, for that which
is not zs that which is not’; also, that the unknown
can be known, for it can be known of the unknown
that it is unknown. Similarly, in Rhetoric, an ap-
parent enthymeme may arise from that which is not
absolutely probable but only in particular cases,
But this is not to be understood absolutely, as
Agathon says :

333

1]

to

ARISTOTLE

Tax av Tis eiKos abro Toor’ elvaw Aéyou,
Bporoiat moAAa Tuyxavew ovk €ikoTa.

yiyverar yap 70 Tapa. TO cixds, Gore ets Kal TO
mapa TO eids. ei 5€ TobTo, eora TO i) elkos
elds. GAN’ ody amhas, aN’ @orrep Kat emi TOV
EploTiK@V TO KATA at Kal pos Ti Kal 7H od mpoc-
7iBéweva. mrovet THY ovxogarriar, kat evtadéa
Trap. TO €ikos elvat By amas adda ri eikos.
éoTt 8 eK TOUTOU Tob Torrou a Kopaxos TeXvn
ovyrKeypev7 dv Te yap pn evoxos H TH atria, ofov
dobevis @ av aiklas pevyn’ ov yap etKds" Kav evoxos
av, olov av toxupos wv: ov yap eixds, ort €ikos
epee dogew. Opotws be Kal emt TOV dMov: my)
yap evoxov avdyien 2 pA) evoxov elvat Th atria”
patverar bev obdv apddrepa eikora, €or d€ TO pev
eikds, TO 5€ odx amADs GAN Worep elpntar. Kal
To Tov nTTw Se Adyov KpeitTwW ToLely TodT’ eaTiv.
Kal evredbev Sixaiws edvoyxéepaivov of avOpwrot
70 Ipwraydpov éerdyyeAua: eddds Te yap eort, Kal
ovK ddn bes dd. Ppawopevov etkos, Kal ev ovocued
TEXVT) aad’ ev PNTOpUCH Kal EpLoTurct). Kat Tepl
pev evOvpnudtwyv Kat Tv ovTwy Kal TOV pavo-
peeve elpyTat.

25. Ilepi 5€ Avoews exdpevov €oTt THY <ipn-
peeve eizeiv. €or. d€ Avew 7) avtiavMoy.odpevov
) &voTraow eveyKdovTa. TO pev obv avtiavdAdoyi-

« This utterance of Protagoras gave particular offence as
apparently implying that the weaker cause was really
identical with the worse, so that to support it was to support
injustice. But, considering the high moral character ascribed
to Protagoras, it seems more probable to take the formula as
a statement of the aim of all ancient orators—how to over-
come stronger arguments by arguments weaker in themselves.

334

“RHETORIC, II. xxrv. 10—xxv. 2

One might perhaps say that this very thing is probable,
that many things happen to men that are not probable ;

for that which is contrary to probability nevertheless
does happen, so that that which is contrary to probabil-
ity is probable. If this is so, that which is improbable
will be probable. But not absolutely ; but as, in
the case of sophistical disputations, the argument
becomes fallacious when the circumstances, reference,
and manner are not added, so here it will become
so owing to the probability being not probable
absolutely but only in particular cases. The “ Art”
_ of Corax is composed of this topic. For if aman is not
likely to beguilty of what he is accused of, for instance
if, being weak, he is accused of assault and battery, his
defence will be that the crime is not probable ; but
if he is likely to be guilty, for instance, if he is
strong, it may be argued again that the crime is not
probable, for the very reason that it was bound to
appear so. It is the same in all other cases; for a
man must either be likely to have committed a
crime or not. Here, both the alternatives appear
equally probable, but the one is really so, the other
not probable absolutely, but only in the conditions
mentioned. And this is what “making the worse
appear the better argument’? means. Wherefore
men were justly disgusted with the promise of
Protagoras ® ; for it is a lie, not a real but an apparent
probability, not found in any art except Rhetoric and
Sophistic. So much for real or apparent enthymemes.
25. Next to what has been said we must speak of
refutation. An argument may be refuted either by
a counter-syllogism ® or by bringing an objection.
» In which the contrary of an opponent’s conclusion is

proved.
335

ARISTOTLE :

leobar SfAov oti ex Tav adr@v Tomwy evdexeTat
movetv? of ev yap avAdoyiopol ex Tav evdogwr,

3 Soxotvra S€ moAAa evavria adAnjdots eotiv. ai &
evotdoets dépovrar Kabamep Kal ev Tots TomeKots,
TeTpax@s* 7) yap e& éavrod 7) ek TOO Opolov 7H eK

4700 évavriou 7) ex TOv Kekpysrevaw. eyw de ad’

1402 b €avTod pev, olov ei mepl Epwros ely TO evOdunpa.
ws omovdaios, 7 e&voTaos dix@s° H yap Kalodov
elmovTa OTL aoa evdela TOVypoV, 7) KATA [LEpos
6rt ovk av eAéyeto Katvios épws, ef put) Hoav Kal

5 wovnpol épwres. amo dé Tod evayTiov EvoTacis
péperat, olov ef TO evOdunua wy dt 6 ayabos avnp
mdvras Tovs pidous €b zrove?, GAN’ odd’ 6 jroxOnpos

6 kak@s. ao dé Tod dpotov, ei hv TO evOdpnua
Ott of KaK@s merrovOdTes det pucodow, dT. add’

7008 of €6 memovOdres det didodow. ai dé Kpices
ai amd TOV yrwpipwr avdpav, olov et Tis evOdpunma
elrev Ott tots peOdovar Set ovyyvmpnv Exe,
ayvoobrTes ‘yap dpaprdvovow, évaTaots 6Tt ovKOUY
6 Ilurraxds aiverds: od yap av petlous Cnutas
evouobérnaev edv tis weOUwv apwapravn.

g °Emet d¢ ta evOvunwara A€éyerar ex TeTTApawv,
Ta S€ rérrapa tatr eorly <ikos mapdderypa
TeKunpLov onpetov, ore S¢ TA ev EK TOY WS Emi
TO TOAD 7) dvTwy 7) SoKodvTwv ovvynypeva evOvpa-

® j.e. the opponent’s enthymeme.

» Love is regarded as a desire, and therefore as bad as any
other desire. It is here included under the general head of
want.

¢ Incest: Ovid, Metamorphoses, ix. 454.

4 The contrary of ‘* good men do good to all their friends ”
is **bad men do harm to all their friends,” but this is not

336

RHETORIC, II. xxv. 2-8

It is clear that the same topics may furnish counter-
syllogisms ; for syllogisms are derived from probable
materials and many probabilities are contrary to one
another. An objection is brought, as shown in the
Topics, in four ways : it may be derived either from
itself,¢ or from what is similar, or from what is
contrary, or from what has been decided. In the
first case, if for instance the enthymeme was intended
to prove that love is good, two objections might be
made; either the general statement that all want °
is bad, or in particular, that Caunian love ° would
not have become proverbial, unless some forms of
love had been bad. An objection from what is
contrary is brought if, for instance, the enthymeme
is that the good man does good to all his friends ; it
may be objected: But the bad man does not do
harm [to all his friends}. An objection from what is
similar is brought, if the enthymeme is that those
who have been injured always hate, by arguing that
those who have been benefited do not always love.
The fourth kind of objection is derived from the
former decisions of well-known men. For instance,
if the enthymeme is that one should make allowance
for those who are drunk, for their offence is the
result of ignorance, it may be objected that Pittacus
then is unworthy of commendation, otherwise he
would not have laid down severer punishment for a
man who commits an offence when drunk.

Now the material of enthymemes is derived from
four sources—probabilities, examples, necessary signs,
and signs. Conclusions are drawn from probabilities,
when based upon things which most commonly occur

always true. Jebb gives the objection as: ‘No, the bad
man does not do evil to all his enemies.”

Z 337

ARISTOTLE

> ~ aed \ \ : a a \ ~

para ek Tav eikoTwr, Ta Se bv exaywyis dua Tod
¢ / A“, 2 of a” Xr / a A ‘ \ 66

dpotov, 7) €vos 7) TAELdvwr, drav AaBev to Kabodov
/

elra ovAdoyionrar Ta Kata pepos Sia Tapadety-

paros, Ta Sé 8.’ dvayxaiov Kal dvros 81a TeKpnpiov,
‘\ \ \ ~ / ”“ a, /, * >

Ta d€ Sia Tob Kaborov 7) Tod Ev péper OvTOS, Eav

>

Te Ov edv TE iH, Sia onpelwv, TO Se EiKds Ov TO
tte \ \ € ee | A sd , \ Lid \ ~

del GAAG TO ws emt TO TOAU, havepov OTL TA TOLADTA,

~ / ” , /

pev tav evOuunudrwy del oT. AVew Pépovta Ev-

€ \ 7, / > > > > \ sia

9 oracw, 7) Se Avars dawopevn aAX’ od« aAnOys det:
> \ id > ? / 7, ee / > >

od yap Ort ovk €ikos, Aver 6 evroTdpevos, GAN’ OTL

a | PS TM | a >

10 ovk dvayKatov. 516 Kal del Eoru tAcoverTEiv amr0-
~ ~ A ~

Aoyodpevov paddov 7) Katnyopobvra dia rodrov

Tov mapaAoyiopov: émel yap 6 pev KaTyyopav

‘

80? eikdtwv amodeikvvcw, €ote dé od Tabro AVoat
” Ld b] Lee | ~ & > > a > A >

}) Ort ovdK E€iKos 7) Ott odK avayKatov, del d° EXEL

évoracw TO ws emt Td ToAd: od ‘yap av Hv €tKos

GAN det Kal dvayKatov' 6 8é Kpurijs oterat, av
4 ~ “ > oA n“ > ¢ ~ /

ottw AvOqA, 7) ovdK EiKos elvat 7] OVX AVT@ KpLTEoY,

/ \

mapaAdoyilopevos, womep eAdyouev’ od yap ek

Tov avayKkaiwy Set adrov povov Kpivew, adda Kat

a ~ ‘ ~

é€k TOV eiKdTwY: TobTO ydp €oTL TO yuwoun TH

a” t4

dplorn Kpivew. ovKovv ixavdv av Avon ott ovK
> a > A a , if > > / ~

avayKatov, adAAa det Avew Ore OvK €lKOS, TOTO

be / baa} ss ¢ ” ~ e Se

€ avpBycerar, edv H 7 evoracis madAov ws €mt

‘ 7 > / A 4 ~ n”

ll 76 modd. évdéyerar Sé elvar rovadrnv diy@s, 7

« Translating dei inserted by Vahlen before dv7os.

» That is, if the argument is shown to be not ** necessary.”

¢ The important point in the conclusion drawn is that the
judge thinks it is not his business to decide, because the
argument is not necessary, whereas his duty is to decide, not
about things that are necessary but about things that are
probable.

338

RHETORIC, II. xxv. 8-11

or seem to occur; from examples, when they are
the result of induction from one or more similar cases,
and when one assumes the general and then con-
cludes the particular by an example ; from necessary
signs, when based upon that which is necessary and
ever % exists; from signs, when their material is the
general or the particular, whether true or not. Now,
the probable being not what occurs invariably but
only for the most part, it is evident that enthymemes
of this character can always be refuted by bringing
an objection. But the objection is often only
apparent, not real; for he who brings the objection
endeavours to show, not that the argument is not
probable, but that it is not necessary. Wherefore,
by the employment of this fallacy, the defendant
always has an advantage over the accuser. For
since the latter always bases his proof upon prob-
abilities, and it is not the same thing to show that
an argument is not probable as to show that it
is not necessary, and that which is only true for the
most part is always liable to objection (otherwise it
would not be probable, but constant and necessary),—
then the judge thinks, if the refutation is made in
this manner,? either that the argument is not prob-
able, or that it is not for him to decide,° being deceived
by the fallacy, as we have just indicated. For his
judgement must not rest upon necessary arguments
alone, but also upon probabilities ; for this is what
is meant by deciding according to the best of one’s
judgement. It is therefore not enough to refute an
argument by showing that it is not necessary ; it
must also be shown that it is not probable. This
will be attained if the objection itself is specially
based upon what happens generally. This may take

339

ARISTOTLE

TO xporw n Tots: TmpaypLaow, Kupidrara b€, <i
1408 a dppoiv: et yap Ta mAcovdKis ovTw, Tobr’ éorlv
eikos pGAAov.

12 Averar dé Kal Td onto. Kal Ta dua onpetov
evOupjpara ctpnpeva., Kav 7 imdpxovra, waomrep
eA€exOn €v Tois mpwros: OTe yap dovMdyvorov
€or mév onpeiov, d7Aov Hiv eK Tov dvahurucay .

13 ™pos d€ 7a TrapaderypaTrwon 7 avr Avous Kal. Td.
etkor a: édy TE yap EXCopLEV Tt ovx ovr, AdduTaL,
OTL OUK avayKaiov, el Kal Ta mhetw 7 7 mAEovaKts
dws: edy Te eal TO. mei Kal Ta meovd.cts
ovr, paxeréor, } OTL TO ma,pov ov Opovov 7 odx

14 opoius 7 Stadopay yé Twa EXEL Ta de TeKpajpua,
Kal TeKENpLBon evOvpnpara Kara pev TO dovAAd-
yeorov ovk €orat Aaa (SfHAov S€ Kai 7000 jp
eK T&Vv avadvuTiKav), Actmrera & as obx dmrdpxet
TO Aeyopevov Seucvivar. ei 5€ davepov Kat ore
brdpxYe. Kal OTe TeKurpiov, aAvTov Hdn ylyverat
Tovro’ mdvra yap yiyverar arrodei~er HOn pavepa.

26. To 8 avfew kai pewtv otk eaorw evbu-
pjpatos orouxetov” TO yap avTo Aéywn orouxetov
Kal To7ov’ €oTL yap oToLxelov Kal TOTS, «is O

a

xpivm ... mpdypnacw. If xpdvyw be taken to mean the
date, there are the following alternatives. The date may be
questioned, the facts admitted ; both date and facts may be
questioned ; both date and facts may be admitted, but
circumstances may have altered (a pound was worth twenty
shillings in 1914, not in 1924). Others take xpévw to mean
the greater number of times the same fact has occurred,
mpdyuace the more numerous facts that increase robability.
But xpévw ean hardly bear this meaning (see Jebb’s note).

> ji. 2. 18; or, “at the beginning,”’ ¢.e. of this book.

¢ Anal. priora, ii. 27.

4 On the other side, in the opponent’s favour.

340

RHETORIC, IT. xxv. 11—xxvr. 1

place in two ways, from consideration either of the
time or of the facts.t The strongest objections are
those in which both are combined; for a thing is
more probable, the greater the number of similar
cases.

Signs and enthymemes based upon signs, even if
true, may be refuted in the manner previously
stated ®; for it is clear from the Analytics ° that no
sign can furnish a logical conclusion. As for enthy-
memes derived from examples, they may be refuted
in the same manner as probabilities. For if we have
a single fact that contradicts the opponent’s example,
the argument is refuted as not being necessary, even
though examples, more in number and of more
common occurrence, are otherwise*%; but if the
majority and greater frequency of examples is on
the side of the opponent, we must contend either
that the present example is not similar to those cited
by him, or that the thing did not take place in
the same way, or that there is some difference.
But necessary signs and the enthymemes derived
from them cannot be refuted on the ground of not
furnishing a logical conclusion, as is clear from the
Analytics °; the only thing that remains is to prove
that the thing alleged is non-existent. But if it is
evident that it is true and that it is a necessary sign,
the argument at once becomes irrefutable ;. for,
by means of demonstration, everything at once
becomes clear.¢
' 26. Amplification and depreciation are not ele-
ments of enthymeme (for I regard element and topic
as identical), since element (or topic) is a head under

¢ That is, “‘when the tekmérion is converted into a syl-
logism.”’ For tekmérion see i. 2. 16.

341

ARISTOTLE

moAAa evOupmpara eumisrret. To oe avtew Kal
pevoby éorly evOupjpara m™pos TO deifar 6 ore peya
7 puuKpov, aomep Kal OTL dyabov 7 q Kakov 7} Sixavov
27) ddtkov kal Tv dd\Awv oroby. Tabra, 8 €or
mara, mrept a ot ovMoyvopot Kal Ta evOupjpara:
wor el ponde TOUT EKQOTOV evOupmpatos TOTS,
3 obde TO avEew Kai petobv. ovde Ta AvTiKa evOUULA-
pata eldds Tt eotw dddo THY KatTacKevacTiK@y"
dfAov yap ort Aver pev 7) SeiEas 7) VoTacw eveyKwv,
avramodekvvovot O€ TO aVvTiKElEVOV, Olov et
edeiEev Tt yeyovev, obdTos ST. od yeyovev, et 8°
6Tt o¥ yéeyovev, obTos Stu yeéyovev. ware ary
prev odK av ein Siagopa Tots adrois yap xp@vrau
apporepot* OTe yap ovK €oTw 77 2 €or, evOupnpara
4 peépovow: Uy] 8 evoraots odK eorw _evOdpnpya, adda.
Kka0dmep €v Tots TomuKois TO eimety Sd€av twa e&
Hs €orat SijAov ort ov ovMeAoyrora ) OTe peddds
5 Tt €tAndev. eel be 57) Tpla éorly a det mpay-
parevOjvat mept Tov Aoyor, bmép ev Tapadery-
patrov Kal yuwpav Kat evOvupnpatwv Kal dAws Tav
mept THhv Sdidvorav, dOev Te edtopyjoomev Kal ws
1403b adTa Avoopuer, cipjobw juiv tocadtra, Aoumov Se
dueADeivy epi A€Eews Kal tAaews.

# “Tntellectual capacity, as evinced in language (or
actions), and seen when the actors argue or make an appeal
to the feelings of others, in other lead when they reason or
plead with one of the other dramatis personae in the same
sort of way as a rhetor might do” (Bywater on the Poetics,
2, 1450 a 6, where the text is speaking of the didvoa of the
actors in a play).

“RHETORIC, II. xxvr. 1-5

which several enthymemes are included, but they
are enthymemes which serve to show that a thing
is great or small, just as others serve to show that
it is good or bad, just or unjust, or anything else.
All these are the materials of syllogisms and enthy-
memes; so that if none of these is a topic of
enthymeme, neither is amplification or depreciation.
Nor are enthymemes by which arguments aré refuted
of a different kind from those by which they are
established ; for it is clear that demonstration or
bringing an objection is the means of refutation.
By the first the contrary of the adversary’s con-
clusion is demonstrated; for instance, if he has
shown that a thing has happened, his opponent
shows that it has not; if he has shown that a thing
has not happened, he shows that it has. This, there-
fore, will not be the difference between them ; for
both employ the same arguments; they bring for-
ward enthymemes to show that the thing is or that
it is not. And the objection is not an enthymeme,
but, as I said in the Topics, it is stating an opinion
which is intended to make it clear that the adversary’s
syllogism is not logical, or that he has assumed some
false premise. Now, since there are three things in
regard to speech, to which special attention should
be devoted, let what has been said suffice for ex-
amples, maxims, enthymemes, and what concerns
the intelligence“ generally; for the sources of a
supply of arguments and the means of refuting
them. It only remains to speak of style and arrange-
ment.

343

g

> A lal
1, *Eretd7) tpia eorly a Set ampayparevOjvar
mept Tov Adyov, Ev wev ek Tw al mioTELs EcovTaL,
devrepov Se mepi tHv A€Ew, Tpirov dé ms xp7)
Tafa Ta pepn TOO Adyov, Tepl pev TAY mioTewv
EelpnTal, Kal EK TOOWY, OTL EK TPLOV EloL, Kal TADTA
a ~ ~ /
nota, Kat dua Ti Tooabra mova: 7 yap T@ adroit te
trerovOévas of Kpivovres, 7) TO Trovods Twas broAap-
4 \ / a nm > a /
Bavew rods Aéyovras, 7} TH drrodedety Oar we(Oovras
mavres. eipytar d€ Kal Ta evOvuypara, molev
A / ” \ A \ ov aA >
det mropilecba: eort yap Ta ev €ldn TOV evOvp-
parwv, Ta S€ TOTOL.
‘ \ a / > 7 / > > a >
2 Ilept d€ ris AcEews exdpevdv eorw eimeiv: od
\ > 7 ‘ ” “A a / > > > 4
yap amdoxpn To éxew & Set A€yew, GAN dvayKy
Kal Tavra wes Set cimeiv, Kal ovpBddrerar moAAa.
mpos TO pavivat mov twa tov Adyov. TO eV
> A > , \ , o ’
obv mpa@rov éelyribn Kara ddow, omep méduKe
mp@tov, adra Ta mpdypara ex Tivwy exer TO
miavev Sedtepov 5é€ TO Tadra TH AcEet SiabecBat:
tpirov d€ TovTwy, 6 dStvauw ev exer peyiorny.
ovmm 8 emKexeipnta, Ta mepl tiv dmdKpLow,
‘ sy > \ \ ‘ e yA > \
Kal yap els THv TpayiKyy Kal parywdiav dre
naphAQev: dmexpivovro yap avrot tas Tpaywdias
344

aS)

BOOK Iil

1. There are three things which require special
attention in regard to speech: first, the sources of
proofs ; secondly, style; and thirdly, the arrange-
ment of the parts of the speech. We have already
spoken of proofs and stated that they are three in
number, what is their nature, and why there are
only three ; for in all cases persuasion is the result
either of the judges themselves being affected: in a
certain manner, or because they consider the speakers
to be of a certain character, or because something
has been demonstrated. We have also stated the
sources from which enthymemes should be derived
—some of them being special, the others general
commonplaces,

We have therefore next to speak of style ; for it
is not sufficient to know what one ought to say, but
one must also know how to say it, and this largely
contributes to making the speech appear of a certain
character. In the first place, following the natural
order, we investigated that which first presented
itself—what gives things themselves their persuasive-
ness; in the second place, their arrangement by
style; and in the third place, delivery, which is of
the greatest importance, but has not yet been treated
of by any one. In fact, it only made its appéarance
late in tragedy and rhapsody, for at first the poets

345

ARISTOTLE

of mounrat TO m™p@rov. dijAov obv Ort ral mepl
Thy prTopucny €or TO Towobrov womep Kal Tepl
THY TOUNTLK HV" omrep Erepot TwWes empayparevinoay
4xat TAavewv 6 Trios. eore be avrn pev ev TH
gwvA, THs adbrH Set xpjabas mpos Exaorov mdBos,
olov TOTE peyddy Kal more pupa. Kad TOTE LEON,
Kal mAs Tots TOvols, otov ofeig Kat Bapeia Kal
peon, Kal pub ois Tlow 7™pos” éxaorov. pia yap
€or mept av oxomobow" Tada 8 eori péyebos
dppovio prbjucs. Ta pev odv d0ha oxedov ék TOV
aywvev obdrot AapBavovow, Kal xabdarep Exel
fueilov Swvavras viv Trav Toute ot droKpurat,
_ Kal Kara Ttovs mohuruxods ayavas bua THY Hox-
5 Onpiav TOV Trohrevdv. ovme be ovyKeiTar TE
Tept avta@yv, éemel Kal TO mEepl THv AeEw ore mpo-
~ \ = \ 7 ~ ¢
HAGev: Kat Soxet dhoptixov eivat, Kad@s vdrroAap-
1404 a Bavopevov. GAN’ odns ovons mpos ddfav THs
Tpayyarelas Tis TEpt THY pyTopiKHY, odK oOpIds
EXovTos, GAN’ ws avayKaiov tiv émy.eAcav moun
Téov, eel TO ye Sikatov pndev mArciw Cyreiv mepi
tov Adyov } ws pyre Avreiv pare edppaivew-
dikatov yap avrois aywvileobar roils mpayyacw,
WOTeE 7a\a ew Tod amodeiéat meplepya €oriv:
GAN’ Opos peya Sdwvarat, Kabdaep etpyrat, dud
6 TH TOO _ axpoarob poxOnpiay, To prev oby Tis
AeEews Spws exer Te puikpov avayKatov ev madon
SidacKadria: Suadéper yap ti mpos To dynAdoar
* Since the authors of tragedies acted their own plays,
there was no need for professional actors, nor for instruction
in the art of delivery or acting. This explains why no attempt
had been made to deal with the question. Similarly, the

rhapsodists (reciters of epic poems) were at first as a rule the
composers of the poems themselves.

346

RHETORIC, III. 1. 3-6

themselves acted their tragedies.* It is clear, there-
fore, that there is something of the sort in rhetoric
as well as in poetry, and it has been dealt with by
Glaucon of Teos among others. Now delivery is a
matter of voice, as to the mode in which it should
be used for each particular emotion ; when it should
be loud, when low, when intermediate ; and how the
tones, that is, shrill, deep, and intermediate, should
be used; and what rhythms are adapted to each
subject. For there are three qualities that are con-
sidered,—volume, harmony, rhythm. Those who use
these properly nearly always carry off the prizes in
dramatic contests, and as at the present day actors
have greater influence on the stage than the poets,
it is the same in political® contests, owing to the
corruptness of our forms of government. But no
treatise has yet been composed on delivery, since
the matter of style itself only lately came into
notice ; and rightly considered it is thought vulgar.’
But since the whole. business of Rhetoric is to in-
fluence opinion, we must pay attention to it,
not as being right, but necessary ; for, as a matter
of right, one should aim at nothing more in a speech
than how to avoid exciting pain or pleasure. For
justice should consist in fighting the case with the
facts alone, so that everything else that is beside
demonstration is superfluous ; nevertheless, as we
have just said, it is of great importance owing to the
corruption of the hearer... However, in every system
of instruction there is some slight necessity to pay
attention to style ; for it does make a difference, for

» In the law courts and public assembly.

¢ Cope prefers: ‘tis thought vulgar, and rightly so
considered.”

4 Or, “is concerned with appearance.”

347

ARISTOTLE

dt 7) Hdl eizety: od pévro ToGobrov, GAN’ arravra
davracia tatr’ éoti Kal mpos Tov aKpoaTHv* Sto
ovdels ovTW yewpeTpeiv SiddoKel.
> , \ > a ” J. iN / ~
ae Exewn pev ody Oray EADn TavTO mounoe TH
bmoKpiTiKh, eyKexeipnKac. Se em oAlyov TeEpt
abrijs eizeiv Tweés, olov Opactpaxos ev Tots €A€ous*
tA ?
Kal €oT. dvcews TO UroKpiTiKOV €lval, Kal aTEXVO-
Tepov, mept dé tiv AeEw evrexvov. So ‘Kal Tots
~ , / pe /
Tobro Suvapevois yiveror mdAw G0Aa, Kxabdzep
Kal tols KaTd TV dmoKpiow pytopow: of yap
ypapopevo Adyot peilov icxyvovor Sia thy Acew
H Sia TH Sudvoay.

8 “Hpgéavro pev ody Kwihoa TO mp@Tov, womep
TEPUKEV, OL TOLNTAL’ TA yap ovopMaTa pyLTyLara
coTiv, tanp&e Sé Kal 7 Pwr) mavT@v pupnTiKe=
TaTov T@v popiwy jyiv: S10 Kal ai Téxyvav ovv-
, Lud ec / ‘ ¢ ¢ A & ' of
éaTnoav, 4 Te parswoia Kal % droKpeTiKy) Kal aAAat

> \ > c \ / 77 ‘

9 ye. émel 8 of mountal A€yovres edHjOn dia Thv
i 2» / / \ / A ~
AeEw eddKovv rropicacbar tiv Sd€av, dia TobdTo
mountiKy mpwTn eyévero ré&~is, olov 7 Topyiov.
kal vov ért of ToAAot T&v arawWevTwy Todvs ToLov-
tous olovrat diadéyeabar KdAduoTa. TodTo 5° ovK
” > > ee / \ / rd > t
€otw, adr érépa Adyou Kai Trowpoews A€kis eoriv.

a \ \ a 2OA \ € \ /
dnAot S€ 7d ovpBaivov: odd yap ot Tas Tpaywdias
movouvTes Te yp@vTar tov adrov Tpdmov,
womep Kal ex Tov TeTpayerpwv eis TO tapPetov
peteBnoav dua TO 7TH Adyw Tobro TOV peTpwv

@ je. style, delivery, and acting, which are of no use to
serious students.
> A treatise on Pathos.

348

RHETORIC, III. 1. 6-9

the purpose of making a thing clear, to speak in
this or that manner; still, the difference is not so
very great, but all these things * are mere outward
show for pleasing the hearer; wherefore no one
teaches geometry in this way.

Now, when delivery comes into fashion, it will have
the same effect as acting. Some writers have
attempted to say a few words about it, as Thrasy-
machus, in his Eleot®; and in fact, a gift for acting
is a natural talent and depends less upon art, but in
regard to style it is artificial. Wherefore people
who excel in this in their turn obtain prizes, just as
orators who excel in delivery ; for written speeches
owe their effect not so much to the sense as to the
style.

The poets, as was natural, were the first to give
an impulse to style; for words are imitations, and
the voice also, which of all our parts is best adapted
for imitation, was ready to hand; thus the arts of
the rhapsodists, actors, and others, were fashioned.
And as the poets, although their utterances were
devoid of sense, appeared to have gained their reputa-
tion through their style, it was a poetical style that
first came into being, as that of Gorgias. Even
now the majority of the uneducated think that such
persons express themselves most beautifully, whereas
this is not the case, for the style of prose is not the
same as that of poetry. And the result proves it ;
for even the writers of tragedies do not employ it
in the same manner, but as they have changed from
the tetrametric to the iambic metre, because the
latter, of all other metres, most nearly resembles

¢ Of Leontini in Sicily, Greek sophist and rhetorician
(see Introduction).

349

ARISTOTLE

ec / > rant »” 4 ‘ ~ >
Opoioratoy eivac tTHv adAAwv, ottw Kal TOV dvo-
/ > / 7 A \ £ 74 >
pdtwv adeikacw doa rapa tiv didAeKTov eoTw,
ofs of mpOrov éexdopovv, Kal ére viv of Ta EEdpeTpa
“~ a a ‘
movobyres” 510 yehoiov pyretoBau Tovrous ot adrol

10 odKert Xpovrar exeivyp TD Tpome. wore pavepov

1404b

bo

OTL OVX dmravTa oa mept i Ackews € cor elrrety, axpiBo-
Aoynreov 7) pew, dn’ ooa mrepl Touadrns otas Acyopev.
Tepi 3° exelvns <lpy ta ev Tots meEpt TOUNTURAS

2. “Eorw obv exeiva TeBewpnpeva, Kal aipiaben
Acews a OpeT?) capi) elva’ onpetov yap or 6 Adyos,
éay pa) dnAoi, ob TOUjoEL 70 éavTod €pyov: Kal
pyre Tomewny pyre dmep 70 aglopa, ad, m™pe~
movoay" » yap TounTUKT) tows ov Tamewn), adn’
od mpéTovoa Adyw. Tav 5 dvoudrwv Kal pnuarwv
caph pev movel Ta KUpla, fur) Tamewnvy Se aAAa
Kekoopnuerynv TaAXa dvomata Goa eipyrat ev Tots
Tept mounTiKhs’ TO yap e€adAdEat rove? faiveoBar
cepvotépav' womep ‘yap mpos Tovds Eé€vovs ot
avOpwro. Kal mpos tods moXiras, TO adbto ma-
axovat Kal mpdos THv AdEw. 81d Set rroveiv E€vnv
THv didAexrov’ Oavpactal yap T@v amovTwy eiaiv,
700 dé TO Oavpacrov. él pev ody THY péeTpwv
moAAd TE To”et TOUTO, Kal apuorTer é€Ket- mA€ov
yap e€€oTnKe Tepl a Kal mepi ods 6 Adyos: ev Se

@ i.e, the poetic style. See Poetics, 22, where the choice
of words and the extent to which out-of-the-way words and
phrases may be used in poetry is discussed.

» « Nouns and verbs” is a conventional expression for all
the parts of speech. Cp. Horace, Ars Poetica, 240, ** non ego
inornata et dominantia nomina solum | verbaqué,’ ”* where
dominantia is a literal adaptation of xépua (see Glossary), the
usual Latin equivalent for which is propria.

¢ Ch. 21.

4 \t is impossible to find a satisfactory English equivalent

350

RHETORIC, III. 1. 9—1. 3

prose, they have in like manner discarded all such
words as differ from those of ordinary conversation,
with which the early poets used to adorn their
writings, and which even now are employed by the
writers of hexameters. It is therefore ridiculous to
imitate those who no longer employ that manner of
writing. Consequently, it is evident that we need
not enter too precisely into all questions of style, but
only those which concern such a style as we are
discussing. As for the other kind of style,* it has
already been treated in the Poetics.

2. Let this suffice for the consideration of these
points. In regard to style, one of its chief merits
may be defined as perspicuity. This is shown by
the fact that the speech, eR Socket eee
meaning clear, will not perform its proper Tun ;
neither must it be mean, nor above the dignity of
the subject, but appropriate to it; for the poetic
style may be is not mean, but it is not appropriate
to prose. Of nouns and verbs it is the proper ones
that make style perspicuous °; all the others which
have been spoken of in the Poetics® elevate and
make it ornate; for departure from the ordinary
makes it appear more dignified. In this respect
men feel the same in regard to style as in regard to
foreigners and fellow-citizens. Wherefore we should
give our language a “ foreign? air” ; for men admire
what is remote, and that which excites admiration
is pleasant. In poetry many things conduce to this
and there it is appropriate; for the subjects and
persons spoken of are more out of the common. But

for the terms éévos, Eevixds, 7d Eevitov, as applied to style.
“Foreign” does not really convey the idea, which is rather
that of something opposed to “ home-like,”’—out-of-the way,
as if from *‘abroad.” Jebb suggests * distinctive.”

351

4

Or

for)

ARISTOTLE

tots yuAois Adyous TOMA eAdrroow* 7 yap brd0eots
eAdtTwv, érel Kat évrat0a, et SobA0s KadAverotro
/ ,

7 Atav véos, anpenéorepov, H mept Aiav piKpav*
> j ;
av’ €or. Kal ev rovrois émiovore\Adpevov Kal
avfavomevov TO mpéemov. 810 det AavOdvew rovoby-

\ \ a 7 / > A
Tas, Kal pn Soxeivy A&dyew memrAaAcpEeEvws GAA
mepvKoTws TobTo yap mOavov, exetvo Sé Tovvav-
/ ¢ \ ‘ > 7, 4,
Tiov’ Ws yap mpos émPBovArevovta SiaBdAdAovra,
/
Kaldmep mpos Tovs olvous Tovs pmepLypevous, Kal
olov 7 Ocoddpov pwr mémovbe mpos tiv Tav
dd\Awv broKpitav> 7) ev yap Tod A€yovros ouKev
«Qo 93> , , 3 Peay PI we
elvar, at & aAAdtpiar. KAémrerar 8 «db, edv Tis
> ~ > / 7 > , ~ id
ex Tis eiwOvias diadéKrov exAéywv ovvriOH Orep
Evdpimidns move Kal drédevée mpOros.
” asa] / S At / > = c /,
Ovrwy 8° dvopdtwr Kai pnuatwv &e& dv 6 doyos
avvéoTnKkev, TOV S€ dvoudtwv tocabr éydovTwr
eldn Goa telewpynrar ev ois mept moujoews,
rovTwy yAwrrais pev Kal SurAots dvdpace Kal
TeTronevois ddvyaKis Kal dAvyayod ypyoréov
~ /
(67rov dé, vorepov epoduev, Td Te Sid Ti elpyrat:
bE \ cal \ > / an / \
emt TO petlov yap e€adAdrret Tod mpémovTos.) TO
A /
5é€ KUpiov Kal TO oiKelov Kal peTadopa ovat
XpHoyLor Tpos THY TV WiAdv Adywv AeEw. anwetov
~ \
d€, Ort TOVTOLS pLdvoLS TaVTES Xp@VTAL> TavTES yap
a A / a
petapopais duaArdyovrar Kal Tots olKelows Kal Tots
Kupioiss wore ShAov ws av «bd mou Tis, EoTar TE
€evikov Kat AavOdvew evddyerar Kal oadnveet.

@ Cp. Horace, Ars Poetica, 46, where it is said that the
choice and use of words requires subtlety and care, skill in
making an old word new by clever combination (callida
iunctura) being especially praised. > Chs. 3 and 7.
852

RHETORIC, IIT. 11. 3-6

in prose such methods are appropriate in much fewer
instances, for the subject is less elevated ; and even
in poetry, if fine language were used by a slave or
a very young man, or about quite unimportant
matters, it would be hardly becoming ; for even here
due proportion consists in contraction and amplifica-
tion as the subject requires. Wherefore those who
practise this artifice must conceal it and avoid the
appearance of speaking artificially instead of natu-
rally; for that which is natural persuades, but the
artificial does not. For men become suspicious of
one whom they think to be laying a trap for them, as
they are of mixed wines. Such was the case with
the voice of Theodorus as contrasted with that of
the rest of the actors; for his seemed to be the
voice of the speaker, that of the others the voice of
some one else. Art is cleverly concealed when the
speaker chooses his words from ordinary language *
and puts them together like Euripides, who was the
first to show the way.

Nouns and verbs being the components of speech,
and nouns being of the different kinds which have
been considered in the Poetics, of these we should
use strange, compound, or coined words only rarely
and in few places. We will state later ® in what places
they should be used ; the reason for this has already
been mentioned, namely, that it involves too great
a departure from suitable language. Proper and
appropriate words and metaphors are alone to be
employed in the style of prose; this is shown by
the fact that no one employs anything but these.
For all use metaphors in conversation, as well as
proper and appropriate words ; wherefore it is clear
that, if a speaker manages well, there will be some-

2a 353

ARISTOTLE

Tavrn 8 Hv 7 Tob pyropiKod Adyou dperh. Tadv 8
ovondtwv TH pev codioTh Suwvpiar yxphoysor
(7apa ravras yap KaKoupyet), T@ TounTH Se

1405a cuvwvypiar. Aéyw Sé Kvpid Te Kal ovvevupa,
olov ro mopevecBar Kat 7d Badilew: radra yap
apdorepa Kat Kvpia Kal ovvavuya aAdjAots.

Tt pev obv rovtwy Exaorov éort, Kal mooa €ldy
petapopds, Kal dtu Tobro mciorov Svvarat Kal
ev Toujoes Kal ev Adyous, elpnrat, Kabdmep. édé-

8 yowev, €v Tois mepl mownTiKAs’ TocovTw 8 ev
Aoyw Set pwadov Pirorovetcbar wept adrav, dow

e€ é\artovav BonOnudtwv 6 Adyos éort trav

LéTpwv. Kal TO aades Kal TO Hdd Kal Td EeviKov

exer podAvora 1% peradopa. Kat AaBelv odk eorw

gadrnv trap’ ddAov. Set dé Kai Ta eribera Kal Tas
peradhopas apporroteas Aéyew. tobro 8 erat

€x To avdAoyov: i Sé wy, amperes davetrar did

TO TrapddjAa ra evavTia pddvora daivecbar.

GANa Set oxoreiv, cis véw powikis, odrw yépovTe

10 7i- od} yap % avr) mpémer obs. Kal édv Te
koopetv BovAn, amo t&v BeATiWvwr Tov ev TabT@
yever péepew tHv petadhopdy, éedv te eyew, amo

Tay xeipdvev. éyw 8° ofov, émet Ta evayTia ev

TO avT@ yever, TO padvar Tov pev mrwyYEevovTa

evxecIa, Tov Sé edyouevov mrwyevew, STL dudw

aiTHGELS, TO cipnevoy eoTt Trove: ws Kal "Iduxpdrns

* This is a parenthetical note. > Chs, 21, 22.
¢ The different kinds of words.
@ Poetics, 22. 9: **for this alone cannot be borrowed

from another.”

¢ Begging (as a beggar does) and praying (as a priest
might) are both forms of asking, and by substituting one
for the other, you can amplify or depreciate.

354

RHETORIC, III. 1. 7-10

thing “ foreign ” about his speech, while possibly the
art may not be detected, and his meaning will be
clear. And this, as we have said, is the chief merit of
rhetoricallanguage. (In regard to nouns, homonyms
are most useful to the sophist, for it is by their aid
that he employs captious arguments, and synonyms
to the poet. Instances of words that are both
proper and synonymous are “ going” and “ walk-
ing”: for these two words are proper and have the
same meaning.) @

It has already been stated, as we have said, in
the Poetics,” what each of these things ° is, how many
kinds of metaphor there are, and that it is most
important both in poetry and in prose. But the
orator must devote the greater attention to them in
prose, since the latter has fewer resources than
verse. It is metaphor above all that gives per-
spicuity, pleasure, and a foreign air, and it cannot
be learnt from anyone else ;4 but we must make
use of metaphors and epithets that are appropriate.
This will be secured by observing due proportion ;
otherwise there will be a lack of propriety, because
it is when placed in juxtaposition that contraries are
most evident. We must consider, as a red cloak

suits a young man, what suits an old one; for the ~

same garment is not suitable for both. And if we
wish to ornament our subject, we must derive our
metaphor from the better species under the same
genus ; if to depreciate it, from the worse. Thus, to
say (for you have two opposites belonging to the
same genus) that the man who begs prays, or that
the man who prays begs (for both are forms of
asking)’ is an instance of doing this; as, when

355

a”

1

—

ARISTOTLE

Kadiiav entpaydprny aAN’ ov Sqdobyov. 6 5°
eon apintov avrov elvat- od yap day pntpaytpryy
avrov Kaneiv, ddA. dqdodxov _appw yap epi
Oedv, aAAad TO ev tipiov 79 be a diryuov. Kal O pev
SivovvdoKdAakas, abrot 8° abrovs Texvitas KaAodow:
ratra 8 dudw petadopd, 1 bev purrawovTwy 1
d€ rovvavriov. Kal of ev Anorat adTobs TmopioTas
kahobor vov" 510 eeore Aéyew TOV aSuxnoavra pev
dpapravew, TOV 5” duaptavovra dduchoar, Kat Tov
KAébavta Kat AaBetv Kat mopOjoa. To de ds 6

TyAedos Evpimidov dnoi,
, > 4 > A > /
Kwrmns avacoew, KamoBas eis Muaiav

> 7 bd ~ ‘ > / nn > 7-7 b}
amperes, OTe petlov TO avdooew 7H Kat’ akiav od

, > ” \ \ > lal a
KékXerrrat obv. ore de Kal ev ais avAAaBais
Gpaptia, €av p47 mdetas 7 onto puvis, otov
Avoviatos mpooayopever 6 xaAKods ev Tois éAeyetots

Kpavynv KadAorns

TH motnow, ore appa povat: pavdn dé 7 peTa-
opa Tais donors pwvais.
pop jos

@ See. 7. 32.

®’ Head of a distinguished Athenian family which held
the office of torch-bearer at the Eleusinian mysteries. A
man of notoriously dissipated character, he took some part
in politics.

¢ The dgdoixos or hereditary torch-bearer ranked next to
the hierophant or chief priest. In addition to holding the
torch during the sacrifices, he took part, in the recitation of
the ritual and certain purificatory ceremonies. The
unrpayiprac or mendicant pris collected alms on behalf of
various deities, especially the great Mother Cybele (whence
their name). They included both men and women of
profligate character, Y addicted to every kind of lewdness.

356

RHETORIC, III. nm. 10-11

Iphicrates ¢ called Callias ® a mendicant priest instead
of a torch-bearer, Callias replied that Iphicrates him-
self could not be initiated, otherwise he would not
have called him mendicant priest but torch-bearer ¢ ;
both titles indeed have to do with a divinity, but the
one is honourable, the other dishonourable. And
some call actors flatterers of Dionysus, whereas they
call themselves “‘ artists.” Both these names are
metaphors, but the one is a term of abuse, the other
the contrary. Similarly, pirates now call themselves
purveyors*; and so it is allowable to say that the
man who has committed a crime has “made a
mistake,’’ that the man who has “‘ made a mistake ”’
is “ guilty of crime,” and that one who has com-
mitted a theft has either “‘ taken”’ or “ ravaged.”
The saying in the Telephus of Euripides,

Ruling over the oar and having landed in Mysia,

is inappropriate, because the word “ ruling ’’ exceeds
the dignity of the subject, and so the artifice can be
seen. Forms of words also are faulty, if they do not
express an agreeable sound ; for instance, Dionysius
the Brazen“ in his elegiacs speaks of poetry as

the scream of Calliope ;

both are sounds, but the metaphor is bad, because
the sounds have no meaning./

4 Cf. ** convey’ the wise it call” (Merry Wives, I. iii.).
Either the euphemistic or unfavourable application of the
term may be adopted.

¢ According to Athenaeus, xv. p. 669, he was a poet and
rhetorician who recommended the Athenians to use bronze
money.

* A scream is neither articulate nor agreeable, like the
sound of poetry, although both are voices or sound, and to
that extent the metaphor is correct.

357

ARISTOTLE

12 "Ere dé od moppwlev Set, GAr’ exc Trev ovyyevav
Kal Tay Opoerd@y jeeradéepew TO. dvesvupa evo
paopeves, 6 ex Bev biAby €oTw Ort ovyyeves,

1405 b Oloy ev TH alviyware TH eddonpovvtt

avdp’ eldov mupl xadkov én’ dvépt KodAjoayra:

avaovupov yap TO mdBos, cor 8 dppen mpoobecis
Tus" KoMnow Tolvuv cle Tay Tijs oucvas mpooBoAjv.
Kal dhus ex tav bd rey weveny éort peraopas
AaBety emueucels” perapopal yap aivirrovrat, wore
13 OfAov ore ed [eTEVBVERTAL. Kal amo Kad@v-
KdAdos dé. dvdpatos TO pév, womep Arkdprios
déyer, ev tots pddois 7 TH onpawouevw, Kal
alayos d€ wWoatvTws. er. 5€ tpirov, 6 Aver Tov
codioTiKOV Adyov od yap ds &bn Bovowv ovbeva
aicxporoyeiv, _eimep” TO avro onpaiver 708€ dyrt
Too Tdd¢ <izeiv: Tobro yap €ore ped8os° €or yap
d\Ao dAAov KUpLcoTepov Kal chpouwpsevov paMov
Kat olicevdT€pov T@ trovety To m7payL.a. 7™po Oppdre.
ETL OVX OpLoiws E€xov onpaiver TOE Kal TOdE, WoTeE
Kal odrws ddAo dAAov KxddAvov kal aloxvov Deréov:
apdw ev yap td Kadov kal TO aicxpov onpat~
vovow, aN’ ovx 4 Kadov 7 ody H wioxpov: 7
Tatra pwev, adAa paMov Kal arTov. Tas d€ meTa-
popdas evred0ev _oloreov, dro Kaddv 7) TH govt
n TH Surdprer u] TH oper 7 adAy Tw aicbycet.
duadhéper 8’ eizeiv, oloy pododanruros Hos ud ov
H owixoddktvdos, 7) ێre davddrepov epvbpo-
daxtvdos.

@ Athenaeus, p. 452.
> Rhetorician and sophist o Heraclea in Pontus.

358

RHETORIC, III. nm. 12-13

Further, metaphors must not be far-fetched, but
we must give names to things that have none by
deriving the metaphor from what is akin and of the
same kind, so that, as soon as it is uttered, it is
clearly seen to be akin, as in the famous enigma,

I saw a man who glued bronze with fire upon another.

There was no name for what took place, but as in
both cases there is a kind of application, he called
the application of the cupping-glass “ gluing.” * And,
generally speaking, clever enigmas furnish good
metaphors; for metaphor is a kind of enigma, so that
it is clear that the transference is clever. Metaphors
should also be derived from things that are beautiful,
the beauty of a word consisting, as Licymnius says,
in its sound or sense, and its ugliness in the same.
There is a third condition, which refutes the sophist-
ical argument ; for it is not the case, as Bryson ® said,
that no one ever uses foul language, if the meaning
is the same whether this or that word is used; this
is false ; for one word is more proper than another,
more of a likeness, and better suited to putting the
matter before the eyes. Further, this word or that
does not signify a thing under the same conditions ;
thus for this reason also it must be admitted that
one word is fairer or fouler than the other. Both,
indeed, signify what is fair or foul, but not qua fair
or foul; or if they do, it is in a greater or less
degree. Metaphors therefore should be derived from
what is beautiful either in sound, or in signification,
or to sight, or to some other sense. For it does
make a difference, for instance, whether one says
“ rosy-fingered morn,’ rather than “‘ purple-fingered,”’
or, what is still worse, ‘‘ red-fingered.”’

359

14

15

1406 a

ARISTOTLE

\ > a > , ” A A 7 /
Kat €v trois émbérouw €or. pev ras embécers
mrovetoba amo davrov 7 aicxypob, olov 6 pnTpo-
gpovTns, €oT. 8 amo Tob Bedtiovos, ofov 6 maTpos
> , A ¢ / ov \ 297 ‘
apvvTwp* Kal 6 Liywwvidyns, ote prev edidov puobov
oriyov abit@ 6 vuknoas Tois dpedow, odk OEE
A a ‘
toveiv ws Svoxepaivwy eis aurdvous movetv, eet
&° ixavov Owe, éroinge

xalper’ aeMorddwv Ovyatpes imme:

KaiToL Kat TOv ovwv Ouvyatepes Hoav. ett TO
yy ¢ / ” > ¢ ¢ / “a
avto vroKopilecbar. ott 8 6 stroKopiapos, Os
éXatrov movet Kal TO KaKoV Kal TO ayallov, womep
\ , oe) / 4 > cal ,
Kal 6 “Apiotoddavys oxwrrer ev tots BaBuAwvios,
avTl pev xpvolov ypvoiddpiov, avTl 8 twariov
€ / > \ A / / ‘
iuaridpiov, avti dé AowWopias AowWopnudtiov Kai
voonpatiov. evAaBeiobar dé Set Kai maparnpeiv

ev apdotv TO méTpLov.

3. Ta de Yuypa ev rérrapot yiyverat Kata THV
dew, & Te Tots SimdAvis dvépacw, olov AuKddpwv
Tov moAvmpdcwmov ovpavov tis pLeyadoxopidov
vis Kal daxryv S€ orevordpov, Kal ws Topyias
wvopale, mrwxdpovoos KoAa€é, éemiopKyocavras Kal
Katevopkyoavras. Kal ws “AAKiddyas ““ wevous
pev thy yuynv tAnpovpevnv, trupixpwy de Thy
opw yryvowerny,” Kat ““redeahdopov wily Tiv
mpoOvpiav abtrav yevnoecba,” Kai “ rehkeapdpov
thy mela tdv Adywv Karéornoev,’ Kal “ Kvave-

@ Euripides, Orestes, 1588. In the preceding line Mene-
laus accuses Orestes as a matricide and ready to hea
murder on murder, to which Orestes replies, you should
rather call me the avenger of my father Agamemnon, who
had been murdered by his wife Clytaemnestra, the mother

360

RHETORIC, III. m. 14—111. 1

As for epithets, they may be applied from what is
vile or disgraceful, for instance, “ the matricide,” or
from what is more honourable, for instance, “ the
avenger of his father.” * When the winner in a mule-
race offered Simonides a small sum, he refused to
write an ode, as if he thought it beneath him to
write on half-asses ; but when he gave him a suffi-
cient amount, he wrote,

Hail, daughters of storm-footed steeds ! °

and yet they were also the daughters of asses.
Further, the use of diminutives amounts to the same.
It is the diminutive which makes the good and the
bad appear less, as Aristophanes in the Babylonians
jestingly uses “‘ goldlet, cloaklet, affrontlet, disease-
let ” instead of “ gold, cleak, affront, disease.” But
one must be careful to observe the due mean in
their use as well as in that of epithets.

8. Frigidity of style arises from four causes : first,
the use of compound words, as when Lycophron ¢
speaks of ‘‘ the many-faced sky of the mighty-topped
earth,” “‘ narrow-passaged shore’; and Gorgias of
“a begging-poet flatterer,’’ “those who commit
perjury and those who swear right solemnly.?”
And as Alcidamas says, “ the soul full of anger and
the face fire-coloured,” “‘ he thought that their zeal
would be end-accomplishing,” ““ he made persuasive
words end-accomplishing,”’ and “ the azure-coloured
of Orestes. ‘* Matricide’’ and ‘“‘avenger of his father”’
show the good and bad sides of the deed of Orestes.

> Frag. 7 (P.L.G. iii. p. 390). The winner of the mule-
race was Anaxilaus of Rhegium.

¢ A sophist, not the poet (author of the obscure Alexander
or Cassandra), who was later than Aristotle.

4 Lobeck conjectured xaremiopxjcavras, ““ who commit
out-and-out perjury.”

361

ARISTOTLE

xXpwv TO THS Oaddrrns WBeubescet? mdvra yap Tadra
TOLNTLKG. bua Thy dimAwow paiverac.

2 Mia per oby avTn airia, pla dé To xpfobat
ydrrats, ofov Avkdgpav & Rep v méAwpov avopa,
Kal Ukipwv ois avip, Kal °>AAKiddpas dOuppa
Th TOUNOEL, Kat T1V Tis pvoews aracbaXiav, Kai
aKkpaTw Ths Svavolas opyh TeOnypevov.

3 Tpirov o ev tots emberous TO. 7 paxpots 7
ducauipous 2 quKvois xpHobar- ev pev yap Tounoe
TpeTrer yara Acvicov etmety, ev € doy TH pev
dmpeméorepa,, TO b€, av i] araxoph, el ereyyer
Kal move? pavepov OTL mroinots eoriv emel Set ye
xpjoba adrois: e€adAdrrer yap To eiwOds, Kal
Eevixyy moved thy dew. addAda Set oroxaleobar
Too perplov, émrel petlov mrovet KaKOV TOD lh
Acyew" uy pev yap ovK exer TO €d, 7 SE TO KaKa@s.
duo Ta “Adcddpavros uxpa paiverar: od yap
idvopare XpHrae adr’ as edéopare Tots emBérots,
ovTw mTuKVOIs Kat peiLoor Kal emidxjAors, | olov ody
para ddd Tov vypov ispara, Kal ovKk ets “ToOpua
GAN’ eis rH TOV "loOpiwv mavyyupw, Kat odyl vopous
adra tos tev mdéAEwv Baowreis vopous, Kal ov
Spd GArAa Spopaia TH Tis poxijs opeh, Kal
odyxi jovaetov aAAa TO Tijs pvoews TmapaAaBav
povaeiov, Kal oxvOpwrov THVv ppovrida Tis puxijs,
Kat od xdpitos ada Travdijuov yapiros Snuwvoupyos,

* Sciron and Sinnis were both robbers slain by Theseus,
but Lycophron turns Sinnis into a yrOrra, using it adjectiv-
any destructive’; cf. ctvos, harm”; olvrns=clvvs.

» The meaning of zapada8dv is quite obscure: various
renderings are having taken to himself,’’ ‘received,’
** grasped,” ** inherited. The word soveeioy, originally a
haunt of the Muses, came to mean a school of art or literature.

362

RHETORIC, III. m1. 1-3

floor of the sea,” for all these appear poetical because
they are compound.

This is one cause of frigidity ; another is the use .
of strange words; as Lycophron calls Xerxes “a
monster of a man,” Sciron “‘ a human scourge *”’ ;
and Alcidamas says “ plaything in poetry,’ “ the
audaciousness of nature,” “‘ whetted with unmiti-
gated wrath of thought.”

A third cause is the use of epithets that are either
long or unseasonable or too crowded ; thus, in poetry
it is appropriate to speak of white milk, but in prose
it is less so; and if epithets are employed to excess,
they reveal the art and make it evident that it is —
poetry. And yet such may be used to a certain
extent, since it removes the style from the ordinary
and gives a “ foreign” air. But one must aim at the
mean, for neglect to do so does more harm than
speaking at random ; for a random style lacks merit,
but excess is vicious. That is why the style of
Alcidamas appears frigid ; for he uses epithets not
as a seasoning but as a regular dish, so crowded, so
long, and so glaring are they. For instance, he does
not say “ sweat ’’ but “ damp sweat”; not “ to the
Isthmian games ” but “‘ to the solemn assembly of
the Isthmian games ”’; not “ laws,” but “ the laws,
the rulers of states’; not “ running,” but “ with a
race-like impulse of the soul” ; not “‘ museum,” but
“having taken up the museum of nature”; and
“the scowling anxiety of the soul’’; “‘ creator,” not
‘of favour,” but “ all-popular favour’’; and “ dis-
The fault appears to consist in the addition of 74s picews, but
it is difficult to see why. Cope confesses his inability to
understand the passage. Jebb translates: ‘he does not

say, ‘having taken to himself a school of the Muses,’ but
*to Nature’s school of the Muses.’ ”

363

ARISTOTLE

Kal olKovojuos THs TOV aKovovTwy doris, Kal ov
KAddois aAAa tois tis tAns KAddots améKpuiper,
Kal od TO o@pa mrapnpmoxev add TH TOD odparos
aloxvvny, Kal dvripipov TH ris puxiis emBupiav
(tobro 8 dua Kal Sum Aoby Kal eiBerov, WOTE
Toinua ‘yiverat), Kal oUTws Ee€edpov THY TIS
pox8npias drrepBodnv. 610 TOUNTUKDS A€yovres
TH darpereta TO yehoiov Kal TO yuxpov eurrovodor,
Kal TO acades Sia TI ddodeaxiay: orav yap
yeyveoKovre ereu Barry, diadver TO oades TO
emuaKoreiy ot 8 dvbpwror trois dumAois Xpavrar,
oTav dvwvupov 7 Kal 6 Adyos edvatvOeros, olov TO
xpovorprBeiv: aN’ ay Todd, mdvTws TountuKov. 810
1406 b Xpnoperrarn 7 SumrAi_ AEs Tots S0upapBorrovois
ovrot yap popusders at dé _yA@rrat Tots émomrovots
OeEpLvov yap Kal av0ades- 7) peragopa de Tots iape-
Beiots: Tovrots yap viv xp@vrat, aomep eipnrat.
4 Kat ere réraprov ro yuxpov ev rats peradopais
ylyverau: elol yap Kal petadopal ampemeis, at pev
dua TO yeAotov (yp@vrar yap Kal of Kwp@dorovol
peradopats) , at dé dua TO cevov dyav Kal TpayuKov:
doadeis Sé, av mroppwHev. olov r opylas ' * xAwpa
Kal availa Ta mpaypatra’’: “ od de radra aioxpas
fev €omreipas, Kak@s Se €Oépicas:’ mounTiK@s
yap dayav. Kal ws *AAkWdyas thv diAocodiay

@ On this j Paseage Thompson (Gorgias, p. 179) says:
“The metaphor of reaping and sowing is a mere common-
place . ut ‘pallid and bloodless affairs’ is a phrase
which would need apology even from a modern.”’ On the
other hand, it is difficult to see what objection there is to
calling the Odyssey ‘‘a beautiful mirror of human life.”
Another reading is évaua, which Cope translates “ events

364

RHETORIC, III. ur. 3-4

penser of the pleasure of the hearers ’’; ‘‘ he hid,”
not ‘“‘ with branches,” but ‘‘ with the branches of the
forest’; ‘‘ he covered,” not “ his body,” but “ the
nakedness of his body.’ He also calls desire
*‘ counter-initiative ’’ of the soul ’’—an expression
which is at once compound and an epithet, so that
it becomes poetry—and “ the excess of his depravity
so beyond all bounds.” Hence those who employ
poetic language by their lack of taste make the
style ridiculous and frigid, and such idle chatter pro-
duces obscurity ; for when words are piled upon one
who already knows, it destroys perspicuity by a
cloud of verbiage. People use compound words,
when a thing has no name and the word is easy to
combine, as xpovotpifeiv, to pass time; but if the
practice is abused, the style becomes entirely poetical.
This is why compound words are especially employed
by dithyrambic poets, who are full of noise ; strange
words by epic poets, for they imply dignity and
self-assertion ; metaphor to writers of iambics, who
now employ them, as we have stated.

The fourth cause of frigidity of style is to be found
in metaphors ; for metaphors also are inappropriate,
some because they are ridiculous—for the comic
poets also employ them—others because they are too
dignified and somewhat tragic ; and if they are far-
fetched, they are obscure, as when Gorgias says :
“ Affairs pale and bloodless ’’*; ‘you have sown
shame and reaped misfortune ”’ ; for this is too much
like poetry. And as Alcidamas calls philosophy “ a
fresh with the blood in them.” If the two extracts are taken
together, it is suggested (apparently by the editor of Cope’s
notes) that the sense may be: “things green and unripe

(flushed with sap), and this was the crop which you . . .,”
the adjectives referring to green and unripe stalks of corn.

365

ARISTOTLE

emireixiop.a TOV vopwv, Kat THY “Odvooevay Kadov
avOpwrivov Biov Katortpov, Kat “ovdev Towodrov
abvpna TH Towoe. mpoodépwr’’ dmavra yap
tabra amiBava Sua Ta eipyueva. to de Topyiov
eis THY xeALOdva, eel Kat adrod meTo“ern adhKe
70 TEPITTWLG, apuora TOV TpayuK@v: ele yap
* Atoxpdv ve } Diropnra.”’ dpvibe ev yap, et
_ €TOWNGEV obK aioxpor, mapbevey d€ aiaxpov. €b
obv eAowddpyncev elroy 6 > adn’ odx 6 Eotw.
4. “Eore be Kal 7) elKeny petadopa. Svadhéper
ae puuKpov: OTay ev yap elan tov “AxiArea

;

e€ \ , > ,
ws 5€ A€wy emdpovoer,

> , > Li \ 66 / > / ”» ,
eikav eotw, dtav dé “ Adwy erdpovce,’ prerapopa:
dua yap TO dudw avdpetovs elvat, mpoonyopevae

2 juereveyKas A€ovra tov “Ayirdéa. XpyoyLov de )
eteeny Kal ev Aoyw, odvydxis d€* rounTiKov yap.
oloréar S€ Womep at peradopal: petadopal yap
clot Siadepovoa. TH ecipnucvm. eiot 8 eikoves
e “a ee 5 / > 715 /, Ld 7 a >
olov nv ’Avdpotiwy eis *ldpiéa, ote Spouos Tots ex
TOv Seopav Kvvidlois: exeiva TE yap mpoomimTovTa
ddaxver, Kat “ldpida AvOevta ex t&v Seopady elvar

/ \ ¢ 8 / ” 2A id
xarerdv. Kal ws Mecoddpmas cixaley “Apxidapov
Edéévw yewperpeiv odk emorapevw ev T@ avddAoyov"
gorau yap Kal 6 Hi€evos ’Apyidapmos yewperpikos.-
Kal TO €v TH TroATeia TH IlAdrwvos, dtu of Tovds

oo

@ Or, “a barrier against the laws.” This is the general
meaning of émreixioua, a border fortress commanding an
enemy’s country.

» Compare Iliad, xxii. 164 évdvriov Gpro ewv ds.

¢ Pupil of Isocrates and historical writer. Idrieus was a
prince of Caria, who had been imprisoned.

4 Meaning that there was no difference between Fuxenus

366

RHETORIC, III. tm. 4—1v. 3

- bulwark of the laws,” ¢ and the Odyssey “ a beautiful
mirror of human life,’ and “introducing no such
plaything in poetry.” All these expressions fail to
produce persuasion, for the reasons stated. As for
what Gorgias said to the swallow which, flying over
his head, let fall her droppings upon him, it was in
the best tragic style. He exclaimed, “Fie, for
shame, Philomela!”; for there would have been
nothing in this act disgraceful for a bird, whereas it
would have been for a young lady. The reproach
therefore was appropriate, addressing her as she was,
not as she is.

4. The simile also is a metaphor ; for there is very
little difference. When the poet says of Achilles,’

he rushed on like a lion,

it is a simile; if he says, “a lion, he rushed on,” it
is a metaphor ; for because both are courageous, he
transfers the sense and calls Achilles a lion. The
simile is also useful in prose, but should be less
frequently used, for there is something poetical about
it. Similes must be used like metaphors, which only
differ in the manner stated. The following are ex-
amples of similes. Androtion¢ said of Idrieus that
he was like curs just unchained ; for as they attack
and bite, so he when loosed from his bonds was
dangerous. Again, Theodamas likened Archidamus
to a Euxenus ignorant of geometry, by proportion ; 4
for Euxenus “ will be Archidamus acquainted with
geometry.” Again, Plato in the Republic * compares
without a knowledge of geometry and Archidamus with a
knowledge of geometry. ‘The proportion of geometrical
knowledge will remain the same, so that Archidamus can
be called an ungeometrical Euxenus, and Euxenus a geo-

metrical Archidamus (see note * on p. 370 for ** by pro-
portion ’’). ¢ 469 D.
367

1407 a

ARISTOTLE

a , . ee cal / “a
teQve@tas oxvAevovTes €oikact Tots KuUVidloLs, &
AY / / ~
tovs AlBovs Sdkver tod BadAovros od>y amropeva.
\ ¢ > \ ~ > ~
Kal 7 €is TOV Shor, STL Gpovos vavKAjpw iayup@
pev UroKwidw Sé. Kai 7 eis TA weTpA TOV TOLNTOV,
iid »” a + / ¢ / e ‘ 4
OTe €ouke Tots avev KddAovs wpaiois’ of pev yap
A
amavOyoavres, Ta Sé Siadvbévra ody Goa daiverat.
\ ¢ 4 > 4 > y > \
kat 7 IlepixAgovs eis Lapiovs, eovxevar adrods
a / “A \ \ / / /
Tots maidiois & Tov yupov déyerar ev, KAalovTa
\ 7 a
dé. Kat eis Bowwtovs, drt Gpouo rots mpivors*
Tovs te yap mpivovs bd’ adradv Katraxorreobat,
\ \ \ ‘ > / ,
kat tovs Bow Tods mpos adAAnAovs paxopevous.
\ e / \ ~ Ld AA / > “~
kat 6 Anpoobévns tov Siwov, OTL Gods eaTt Tots
ev tots Actos vavTiBow. Kat ws 6 AnuoKparns
w \ e7 a / a A va
eikace Tovs pyTopas Tats TitAais at TO pwopiopa
/ ~ 4 \ / ,
Katativovoat TH aidAw Ta Tratdia mapadcihovow.
Kat ws ‘“Avricbévns Kydioddorov tov Aemrov
a ” ov > v > ,
\Bavwr@ <ikacev, Ore azroAdvpevos eddpaiver.
\
maoas yap Tavras Kal wes eikdvas Kal Ws weTadopas
” / 7 bd ” > ~ c
é€coTt Adyew: woTe doar dav evdoKy@ow ws
perapopal AexPeioa, SijAov Sti abrar Kai eixdves
” \ ¢ YB ‘ / ,
€govTat, Kal at eikoves peTadopal Adyou Sedpevar.
ah \ la \ \ \ > ~ > /
del dé Set tiv petadopay tiv é€x tod avddoyov

> /, \ , ee / ~ ¢ ~
avramoduevar Kal emt Odrepa Tav Opoyev@v~ ofov

9 488 a. > 601 B.
¢ If metrical restrictions have been removed and they are
read as prose.

368

RHETORIC, III. 1v. 3-4

those who strip the dead to curs, which bite stones,
but do not touch those who throw them; he also
says that the people is like a ship’s captain who
is vigorous, but rather deaf;% that poets’ verses
resemble those who are in the bloom of youth but
lack beauty ;® for neither the one after they have
lost their bloom, nor the others after they have been
broken up,’ appear the same as before. Pericles said
that the Samians were like children who cry while
they accept the scraps. He also compared the
Boeotians to holm-oaks ; for just as these are beaten
down by knocking against each other,’ so are the
Boeotians by their civil strife. Demosthenes com-
pared the people to passengers who are seasick.f
Democrates said that orators resembled nurses
who gulp down the morsel and rub the babies’ lips
with the spittle? Antisthenes likened the skinny
Cephisodotus to incense, for he also gives pleasure
by wasting away. All such expressions may be used
as similes or metaphors, so that all that are approved
as metaphors will obviously also serve as similes
which are metaphors without the details. But in
all cases the metaphor from proportion should be
reciprocal and applicable to either of the two things
of the same genus ; for instance, if the goblet is the

4 Meaning that they did not appreciate the benefits re-
ceived from the Athenians, who conquered the islands
(440 B.c.).

¢ Or, “are cut down by axes, the handles of which are
made of their own wood.” :

f It is disputed whether Demosthenes is the orator or the
Athenian general in the Peloponnesian War. The point of
the comparison is that in a democracy the general instability
of political conditions makes the people sick of the existing
state of things and eager for a change.

9 Aristophanes, Knights, 715-718.

2B 369

ARISTOTLE

<i 9 pidAn aomls Avovicov, kat riv domida apyorret
/, / ”
A€eyeobar duddnv ”Apeos.
5. ‘O pev obv Adyos ovvtiberar ex TovTwr.
” > > \ ~ /, ‘ ¢ , ~ >
€oTt © apxn THs AcLews TO EMnvilew: Ttobro 8
2€oTiv ev TévTe, TPATov pev ev Tois ouvdeopoLs,
av d70di8@ tis ws medpdKact mpdTepor Kal VorTEpor
ylyvecbar adAjAwv, ofov evot amartotow, womep
< La We yey A / > a \ v4 \ 4 ¢ /
6 pev Kal 6 eyw ev amare? Tov B€ Kal Tov Oo Be.
~ Nf he / > , > /, ‘
det Se Ews peuvnrar avrarrodidevar adAjAos, Kal
MATE pakpav amapTav pyre ovvdeopov mpd auV-
déopov arodibdvat Tob avayKaiov: ddvyaxyod yap
c / 66). 31..3 > 2 / ‘
apmorrer. “eyo 8’, émet poor elmev (FADE yap
KAéwv Sedperds re Kal a€i@v) éeropevdpuny mapa-
AaBav adrovs.’” é€v tov’rois yap moAAot mpo Tod
> / ; , ,
amodo8ncopevov avvdéopov. mpoeuPeBAnvrat ovy-
deopor. eav dé odd TO petagd yevnrar Tod
3 emopevounv, acadées. ev prev 8) To €d ev Tois
/ 4 \ A a 27 >
avvdeopots, SedTepov bé 7d Tots’ Blows ovdpacr
4réyew Kal pr) Tots mepiéxovow. TpiTov, fu)
apiBorows* Tatra dé, av pa) TavavTia tpoaiphrar.
Omep mowotow, oTrav pnbev pev exwor Adyew,
mpoomor@vrar dé te A€yew: of yap Towdro. ev

@ As the shield is to Ares, so is the goblet to Dionysus.
Proportion is defined (Hthics, v. 3. 8) as “an equality of
ratios, implying four terms at the least,” and the proportional
metaphor is one in which the second term is to the first as
the fourth is to the third; for then one can by metaphor
substitute the fourth for the second, or the second for the
fourth. Let A be Dionysus, B a goblet, C Ares, D a shield.
Then by the definition, the goblet is to Dionysus as the shield

370

RHETORIC, III. tv. 4—v. 4

shield of Dionysus, then the shield may properly be
called the goblet of Ares.*

5. Such then are the elements of speech. But
purity, which is the foundation of style, depends
upon five rules. First, connecting particles should
be introduced in their natural order, before or after,
as they require; thus, pév and éyo pev require to
be followed by 5¢ and 6 8. Further, they should
be made to correspond whilst the hearer still re-
collects ; they should not be put too far apart, nor
should a clause be introduced before the necessary
connexion ®; for this is rarely appropriate. For
instance, “ As for me, I, after he had told me—for
Cleon came begging and praying—set out, taking
them with me.” For in this phrase several connecting
words have been foisted in before the one which is
to furnish the apodosis ; and if the interval between
“T” and “set out” is too great, the result is
obscurity. The first rule therefore is to make a
proper use of connecting particles; the second, to
employ special, not generic terms. The third con-
sists in avoiding ambiguous terms, unless you de-
liberately intend the opposite, like those who, having
nothing to say, yet pretend to say something ; such
people accomplish this by the use of verse, after the
isto Ares. The metaphor consists in transferring to the goblet
the name belonging to its analogue the shield. Sometimes
an addition is made by way of explanation of the word in its
new sense, and the goblet may be described as the shield of
Dionysus and the shield as the goblet of Ares. The shield
and the goblet both come under the same genus, being
characteristics of a deity, and can therefore be reciprocally
transferred (Poetics, 21. 4).

> The apodosis. dzrodidéyac is used in the sense of intro-
ducing a clause answering to the rpéracis, and drédoors for
this answering clause.

371

ARISTOTLE

mrowjoet A€yovot Tadra, olov ’HumedoxAjs* hevariler
yap TO KUKAw Todd ov, Kal TaGxOVEW Of aKpoaral
Omep of moAAot mapa Tois pavTecw: Srav ‘yap
héywow apdiBora, cvumapavevovow.

Kpotoos “AAvy diaBas weyddAnv apyiv Karadicer.

\ \ \ ~
Kat Sia TO dAws €Aarrov elvar dudpTnwa, Sia TOV
~ ~ /
1407 b Yev@v Tod mpadypwatos A€yovow of pavers TUXOL
\ + ~ a
yap av tis padAov & Tois apriacpois apria 7
> ~
Tepiaca eirav pwadAdov 7 moa exer, Kal TO OTL
” a”
€oTa. 7) TO OTE, 51d Of ypnopodAdyor od mpoc-
/ “~ >
opilovrat To more. dmavra 51) Tabra Opoia* WoT
A 4
5 av py ToLwvTOV Twos Evexa, PevKTEOV. TETAapToY,
ws IIpwraydpas ra yévn tev dovondrwv dinpet,
appeva Kat O7jrea Kal oxe’y: Set yap amrodidovar
\ ~ > ~ ‘coe Dee ] ~ \ a
6 Kat Tadra dpbds: “7 8 €dotoa Kai diadcyOcioa
WxETO.” TEeuTTCY, ev TO TA TOAAA Kal dAtya Kal
a > Ad > re ce e + al) / ” / ”
Ev opbds dvopalew: “‘ of 5° eAPovres EruTTOV pe.
v a
"“Odws 5é Set? edavdyvworov elvat TO yeypap-
/
peevov Kal evppacrov: €ote Se TO adbrd. Smep ot
AA \ 7 } > ” io. “a \ ¢ fs)
moAXot otvdecpor odK Exovow odd a p47) pad.ov

*Of Agrigentum (c. 490-430), poet, philosopher, and
physician. Among other legends connected with him, he is
said to have thrown himself into the crater of Etna, so that
by suddenly disappearing he might be thought to be a god.
His chief work was a poem called Nature, praised by
Lucretius. The principles of things are the four elements,
fire, air, water, and earth, which are unalterable and in-
destructible. Love and hate, alternately prevailing, regulate
the periods of the formation of the world. The existing
fragments corroborate Aristotle’s statement.

» Herodotus, i. 53, 91. Croesus consulted the Delphian
oracle whether he should attack Cyrus the Persian or not.

372

RHETORIC, III. v. 4-6

manner of Empedocles.* For the long cireumlocution
takes in the hearers, who find themselves affected
like the majority of those who listen to the sooth-
sayers. For when the latter utter their ambiguities,
they also assent ; for example,

Croesus, by crossing the Halys, shall ruin a mighty
dominion.

And as there is less chance of making a mistake
when speaking generally, diviners express themselves
in general terms on the question of fact; for, in
playing odd or even, one is more likely to be right
if he says “even’”’ or “odd” than if he gives a
definite number, and similarly one who says “ it will
be” than if he states “when.” This is why sooth-
sayers do not further define the exact time. All such
ambiguities are alike, wherefore they should be
avoided, except for some such reason.° The fourth
rule consists in keeping the genders distinct—mas-
culine, feminine, and neuter,? as laid down by Prot-
agoras ; these also must be properly introduced: “She,
having come (fem.) and having conversed ( fem.) with
me, went away.’ The fifth rule consists in observing
number, according as many, few, or one are referred
to: “ They, having come (pl.), began to beat (pl.) me.”

Generally speaking, that which is written should
be easy to read or easy to utter, which is the same
thing. Now, this is not the case when there is a
number of connecting particles, or when the punctua-

Encouraged by the ambiguous oracle, he did so, but was
utterly defeated.

¢ The deliberate intention to mislead.

4 cxein, “inanimate things,” the classification probably
being male, female, and inanimate, not the grammatical one
of masculine, feminine, and neuter.

373

ARISTOTLE

Suacriga, womep ta “HpaxdAcirov. ta yap “Hpa-
/ / »” A \ 4
Kdeirov Suacrifar Epyov dia to addnAov elvar
ToTépw mpocKeTar, TH vorepov 7) TH MpodTepov,
olov &v TH apxn atbrod tod ovyypduparos: dyat
\ ce ~ / AQ? 37 3 Ae 4 ”
yap “rot Adyou Tobd’ édvTos aet a€dverou dvOpwmor
ylyvovrau’’’ adndov. yap 7d del, mpdos omorépw
/ v A Cal / ‘ \ >
7 Suaori€ar. €re Sé move? codouilew TO pun) azo-
ddvar, eayv pr emilevyvins apdoiy 6 dpuorrer
@ ” , n im \ 1 07 > , 4
olov 7 odov 7 xpaya, TO pev idcdv od Kowdv, TO
5° aloOdpuevos Kowdv. doadh d€ Kal av pu) mpobeis
eins, peAAwy troAAa peraéd éeuBdddrew: ofov
“éuedov yap Siadrexbeis exetww tade Kal rade
‘ 5D /, 8 ” > \ A com dM \
Kal de mopevecbar,” adda pr “ eucdAov yap
duarexOeis mopevecOar, <ita rdde Kal trade Kal
de eyeveto.”
6. Eis dyxov S€ ris AéeLews ovpBddAerar Tdde,
TO Adoyw xpholar avr’ dvdwaros, olov pu) KUKAov,
Gan’ énimedov 70 ex Tod péaov toov. eis 5é€ aur-
a /
2Topiav TO evavtiov, avTt Tod Adyou dvoma. Kal
€dv aioxpov 7 amperes: eav pev ev TH AOyw 7
aicxpov, Tovvowa Aé€yew, eavy 8 ev TH ovopare,
a ~ \ a
37ov Adyov. Kal perapopais SyAody Kat ois
‘
4 emérous, evAaBovpevov TO TrounTiKdV. Kal TO Ev

@ Heraclitus of Ephesus (c. 535-475). His chief work
was on Nature. From the harshness of his language and
the carelessness of his style he was called 6 cxorewés (the
obscure). According to him, fire was the origin of all
things; all things become fire, and then fire becomes all
other things. All things are in a constant state of flux; all
is the same and yet not the same. Knowledge is founded
upon sensual perception, but only the gods possess know-
ledge in perfection.

374

RHETORIC, III. v. 6—v1. 4

tion is hard, as in the writings of Heraclitus. For
it is hard, since it is uncertain to which word
another belongs, whether to that which follows or
that which precedes ; for instance, at the beginning
of his composition he says: “‘Of this reason which
exists ® always men are ignorant,’’ where it is un-
certain whether “ always” should go with “ which
exists”’ or with “are ignorant.” Further, a solecism
results from not appropriately connecting or joining
two words with a word which is equally suitable to
both. For instance, in speaking of ‘‘ sound” and
“colour,” the word “seeing” should not be used,
for it is not suitable to both, whereas “ perceiving ”
is. It also causes obscurity, if you do not say at the
outset what you mean, when you intend to insert a
number of details in the middle; for instance, if
you say: “I intended after having spoken to him
thus and thus and in this way to set out” instead
of ‘‘ L intended to set out after having spoken to him,”
and then this or that happened, in this or that
manner.

6. The following rules contribute to loftiness of
style. Use of the description instead of the name
of a thing ; for instance, do not say “circle,” but “a
plane figure, all the points of which are equidistant
from the centre.” But for the purpose of conciseness
the reverse—use the name instead of the description.
You should do the same to express anything foul or
indecent ; if the foulness is in the description, use
the name; if in the name, the description. Use
metaphors and epithets by way of illustration, taking
care, however, to avoid what is too poetical. Use

» Or, “although this reason exists for ever men are born
. . without understanding ’’ (Welldon).

375

ARISTOTLE

A ~ Lud ¢€ \ ~ tA aw
TOAAG Troteiv, Sep of TrovnTal moLotow: évds OvTOS
Aypevos Suws A€yovor

- > > - ,
Aevas eis “Ayaikovs
A
Kal
déArov pev aide toAvOupou SvamTvxat.

5 Kal pon emlevyviva, add éxatépw €ExaTepor,
“ris yovaucos THs HeeTepas.” éay de OVVTOMLWS,

6 rovvavriov “ Tis Terepas yuvaticds..” Kal pLeTa
ovvoeapLov Acyew" eav Oe ouvTopuas, avev pev
14082 OVVOEOpOV, p47) aovvoeTa Sé€, olov ‘ ‘ mopevbels Kal
7 Suadex Gets,” vi Tropevbeis Suede Any.” Kat To *Avtt-
padxov XpyoyLOV, e€& dv pn exer A€yew, O exetvos

mou emt Too Tevpnocod,
€oTt Tis HVvEepders OAtyos Addos*

avgeTrat yap ovtws eis dmeipov. eat. dé TodTO
Kal emt ayabdy Kal Kakav, OTws odK EXEL, OTOTEPWS
dv 7 xpynoyov. bev Kal Ta dvdpmara ot mowmrat
dépovar, TO axopdov Kat TO dAvpov pédos: eK TOV
oTepioewr yap emip€epovow: evdoKkiwet yap TodTO
ev tais peradhopats Aeydpevov tais avddAoyov, otov
TO pavat TI odAmuyya elvan péhos aupov.

‘y To de Tmpemrov efeu v) Aekis, edy “il mabyrucn
Te Kal 70uen Kal Tots drroKeyevous mpdypaow
dvdAoyov. to 8 avddoydv éorw, eav pare TeEpt
evoyKwy avroxapddAws Aéynrat pHTe Tept edreA@v
cepvas, nd emi TO edreAcl dvopare em) KoGpMos*

to

@ EFuripides, Iphig. Taur. 727.

» In Boeotia. ‘The quotation is = the Thebaid of
Antimachus of Claros (¢. 450 B.c. The Alexandrians
placed him next to Homer among the epic poets. In his
eulogy of the little hill, he went’on to attribute to it all the

876

RHETORIC, III. v1. 4—vn. 2

the plural for the singular, after the manner of the
poets, who, although there is only one harbour, say

to Achaean harbours,
and,
Here are the many-leaved folds of the tablet.¢

You should avoid linking up, but each word should
have its own article: tis yvvaikds Tis juerepas. But
for conciseness, the reverse: Tis jpetépas yuvaikds.
Employ a connecting particle or for conciseness omit
it, but avoid destroying the connexion ; for instance
“ having gone and having conversed with him,”’ or,
“having gone, I conversed with him.’’ Also the
practice of Antimachus is useful, that of describing
a thing by the qualities it does not possess; thus,
in speaking of the hill Teumessus,? he says,

There is a little wind-swept hill ;

for in this way amplification may be carried on ad
infinitum. This method may be applied to things
good and bad, in whichever way it may be useful.
Poets also make use of this in inventing words, as
a melody “ without strings ”’ or “ without the lyre ”’ ;
for they employ epithets from negations, a course
which is approved in proportional metaphors, as for
instance, to say that the sound of the trumpet is a
melody without the lyre. ~
7. Propriety of style will be obtained by the ex-
pression of emotion and character, and by proportion
to the subject matter. Style is proportionate to the
subject matter when neither weighty matters are
treated offhand, nor trifling matters with dignity,
and no embellishment is attached to an ordinary

good qualities it did not possess, a process which could
obviously be carried on ad infinitum.

377

ARISTOTLE

et de py, Kanpupdio. paiverar, | ofoy mrovet Krcogaov:
opotws yap €via eAeye Kal ei elmrevev dv “ morvea

3 UK). Tabyrucy dé, éav per ] UBpus, opy.lo-
poevov Ackus, eav dé aoeBh kal aloxpa, Sdvoxepat-
vovTos Kal edAaBoupevou kat déyew, av dé én
awed, ayapevws, éav de eAcewd, TaMEWaS, Kat

4 emt Tov dMwv de dpoiws. mBavot de TO mpay pa
Kat 7 oikela Adis: mapadoyilerat yap 7 pox?) ws
dAnbas A€yovros, Ort emt Tots Towovrous ovras
eExovow, wor’ olovrat, ra Kal po?) otrws exel, ws
6 Aéywr, Ta mpaypara. ovTws exew, Kal ovv-
opovorrabe’ 6 axovwyv ael TO TalnTiKds A€yovrt,

5 Kav penbev Aéyn. 8ud zoAAol KatamAnrrovet Tos
akpoaras BopuBobrres.

6 Kai 7x7 de atrn 0 €K Trav onpelov deikis,
ort aKxodovbe? 7 _ dpporrovoa. EKdOTW yever Kal
efeu. Aéyen be yevos. poev «al! Wuxiay, otov mais
H avnp 7 yepwr, Ay yuv7) i dvi, kat Adkwv 7

errands, ees 6 é, Kal’ ds TOLOS Tes TO Bicep:

Tov yap Kal’ dracay €&w ot Biou movi Twes. av
obv Kal Ta ovdpwara oikela A€yn TH E€er, TOLjoer
TO 400s: od yap tadra odd’ woatrws aypotKos
dv Kal emawWevpevos elmevev. maaxyovor de TL
of axpoaral Kal @ KaTakdpws xp@vrTat ot Aoyo-

9? €€

/ ce / 3° > 75 4 ” ? ¢
ypadot, “tis 8’ odk oldev;”’ “dmavres taaow™ Of0-

¢ By some identified with the tragic poet spoken of in the
Poetics, 2. His manner of expression, due to the wish to
use fine language, was ridiculous owing to its being out of
harmony with the subject. Others consider that he was not
a poet at all but an orator. érvu was a title of respect,
applied to females, whether they were goddesses or ordinary
women.

378

RHETORIC, III. vir. 2-7

word ; otherwise there is an appearance of comedy,
as in the poetry of Cleophon,* who used certain
expressions that reminded one of saying “ madam
fig.” Style expresses emotion, when a man speaks
with anger of wanton outrage; with indignation
and reserve, even in mentioning them, of things foul
or impious ; with admiration of things praiseworthy ;
with lowliness of things pitiable; and so in all
other cases. Appropriate style also makes the fact
appear credible; for the mind of the hearer is
imposed upon ° under the impression that the speaker
is speaking the truth, because, in such circumstances,
his feelings are the same, so that he thinks (even if
it is not the case as the speaker puts it) that things
are as he represents them; and the hearer always
sympathizes with one who speaks emotionally,
even though he really says nothing. This is why
speakers often confound their hearers by mere noise.

Character also may be expressed by the proof from
signs, because to each class and habit. there is an
appropriate style. I mean class in reference to age
—child, man, or old man; to sex—man or woman ;
to country—Lacedaemonian or Thessalian. I call
habits those moral states which form a man’s char-
acter in life; for not all habits do this. If then
anyone uses the language appropriate to each habit,
he will represent the character ; for the uneducated
man will not say the same things in the same way as
the educated. But the hearers also are impressed
in a certain way by a device employed ad nauseam
by writers of speeches:° ‘‘Who does not know?”
“ Everybody knows ”’ ; for the hearer agrees, because

» Or, “ draws a wrong conclusion.”
¢ Alluding to Isocrates.

379

ARISTOTLE

Aoyet yap 6 aKovwy _ aioxuvopevos, Omws peTexn
obmep Kal ot dAAou mavres.

8 To oe edicaipws 7 pn) edKatpws xpyobac Kowov

9 amdvTowv Tov eid@v eoriv. dicos & én mdon

1408b DarepBoAH TO OpvAovpevor: de? yap avrov abr@
mpoemumAnr rey" doKe? yap adn bes civat, émet ov

10 AavOdver ye 6 moved Tov A€yovTa. Ere Tois ava-
Aoyov Hy) maow dua. xXpjoacbae: ovr yap KAémreTau
6 ducpoarns. déywo d¢ oloy €av Ta ovopara o«Anpa
Hh, py Kat TH pwvyn wal TO mpoowme Kal Tois
apuorrovow: et de pn, avepov yiverat EKacTov
6 €oTw. éav dé Td pev TO Se pun, AavOdver mov
TO atrTo. e€av odv Ta padaKka oKAnpa@s Kal Ta
okAnpa padakads Aéynra, anibavov yiyverar.

ll Ta d€ dvouara ta SimdAG Kai ta emiBera mrEiw
Kal Ta. geva peddvora apporret A€yore mabnriKas-
ovyyveyun yap dpyilopeven KaKov pdvar ovpave-
pnKes 7) TreAadpiov elrreiv. Kal orav eX?) 799 Tovs
dcpoaras xal TOLno? evovordcat 2 émaivots 7
poyous 7 nH Opyh 7) gidia, olov Kal “Tooxpdrns Trovet
ev TO Tavnyypuc@ emt TéAeu, * “dyn de Kal yvespn -
kat ‘ol twes erAnoav:”’ pleyyovrat Te yap Ta
Towadro, evBovoralovres, WOTE Kal dmodéxovrat
dHAov Ste Opoiws Exovtes. S10 Kal TH omoer
jppocev: evlcov yap % mojo. % 8) ovTw det,

@ Or, “ to all the special rules given above.”

> The exaggeration should be brought forward first, by
way of forestalling the objection, and accompanied by some
limiting phrase. Quintilian (Jnst. Orat. viii. 3. 37) gives
as examples: “so to say,” “if I may be allowed to say so.’

¢ Adaptation of voice, features, etc., to the subject.

4 § 186, where yuviun is the reading, translated **name”’
above (lit. memory) for the sake of the jingle, which also

380

RHETORIC, III. vir. 7-11

he is ashamed to appear not to share what is a matter
of common knowledge.

The opportune or inopportune use of these devices
applies to all kinds of Rhetoric.* But whenever one
has gone too far, the remedy may be found in the
common piece of advice—that he should rebuke
himself in advance ;® then the excess seems true,
since the orator is obviously aware of what he is doing.
Further, one ought not to make use of all kinds of
correspondence ® together; for in this manner the
hearer is deceived. I mean, for instance, if the
language is harsh, the voice, features, and all things
connected should not be equally harsh; otherwise
what each really is becomes evident. But if you do
this in one instance and not in another, the art
escapes notice, although the result is the same. If
mild sentiments are harshly expressed or harsh
sentiments mildly, the speech lacks persuasiveness.

Compound words, a number of epithets, and
*‘foreign’’ words especially, are appropriate to an
emotional speaker ; for when a man is enraged it is
excusable for him to call an evil “ high-as-heaven ” or
** stupendous.” He may do the same when he has
gripped his audience and filled it with enthusiasm,
either by praise, blame, anger, or friendliness, as
Isocrates does at the end of his Panegyricus 4: ‘‘ Oh,
the fame and the name!”’ and “In that they endured.”
For such is the language of enthusiastic orators, and
it is clear that the hearers accept what they say in a
sympathetic spirit. Wherefore this style is appro-
priate to poetry ; for there is something inspired in
poetry. It should therefore be used either in this

appears in the Greek of Isocrates. All the mss. of Aristotle
give yvaunyv here, which shows that it is a misquotation.

381

ARISTOTLE

7H per” elpwveias, Omep L'opyias ézoier Kal Ta ev
T@ Daidpw.
8% To 53 oXH UA THS Aefews bet PATE EjLeTpov
eivat pare appvOj0v- TO jwev yap amifavev (ze-
thacbat yap Soxet) Kat apa kat eClornow: Tm™poo-
éxew yap TOLEt TD Opoiw, more madw n&ee.
aomep obv TOv KnpvKwY mpoAapBdvovor Ta Travdia
TO. “‘riva aipeiras emitpomov 6 dmreAevBepodpevos ;
2 Krgwva.” 7d dé dppubwov atrépavTov, det be
meTtrepavOar ev, pn pétpw Sé* andes yap Kal
ayVvwoToV TO aTretpoy. Tepaiveras dé apiOua@ mwavra*
6 d€ Tod oyrparos Ths AdEews apiuds pvOuds
3 corw, od Kal Ta péeTpA THNLATO.. Yt) pulwov Sei
€xew TOV Adyov, péTpov de By mroinwa yap €orat.
pub pov dé yun axpiBds- Trodro dé Eorar, cay expe
TOU 7.
4 Tdédv 56é prbuar 6 ev Tp@os OELLVOS aa
Aexrixfis appovias Sedpuevos, 6 8 tauBos adr

* 238 p, 241 e. In the first of these passages Socrates
attributes his unusual flow of words to the inspiration of the
nymphs, and tells Phaedrus not to wonder if he seems to be
in a divine fury, for he is not far from breaking out into
dithyrambs. An example of the irony (a term implying a
certain amount of contempt (ii. 2. 25)) of Gorgias is given in
the Politics (iii. 2). When asked how a person comes to be
a citizen, he answers: ‘‘as those are mortars which have been
made by mortar-makers, so those are Larissaeans who have
been made by artisans (dnuuovpyo's); for some of these were
Larissa-makers (dnusovpyovs). There is a play on the double
meaning of dnuwovpyés, (1) artisan, (2) magistrate, lit. people-
maker. Larissa-makers means makers of Larissaeans in
such numbers that they might be regarded as makers of
Larissa itself. It has also been suggested that \apuroroods
may mean ‘kettle-makers,’ from dpa ‘a kettle,’ so

382

RHETORIC, III. vir. 11—vuin. 4

way or when speaking ironically, after the manner
of Gorgias, or of Plato in the Phaedrus.4

8. The form of diction should be neither metrical
nor without rhythm. If it is metrical, it lacks per-
suasiveness, for it appears artificial, and at the same
time it distracts the hearer’s attention, since it sets
him on the watch for the recurrence of such and
such a cadence ; just as, when the public criers ask,
“Whom does the emancipated? choose for his
patron?” the children shout “Cleon.” If it is
without rhythm, it is unlimited, whereas it ought to
be limited (but not by metre); for that which is
unlimited is unpleasant and unknowable. Now all
things are limited by number, and the number
belonging to the form of diction is rhythm, of which
the metres are divisions.° Wherefore prose must be
rhythmical, but not metrical, otherwise it will be a
poem. Nor must this rhythm be rigorously carried
out, but only up to a certain point.

Of the different rhythms the heroic is dignified,
but lacking the harmony of ordinary conversation ;
the iambic is the language of the many, wherefore
called from having been first made at Larissa, but this seems
unnecessary. ‘The point is that Gorgias maintained that all
were citizens who were made so by the magistrates, that
citizenship was a manufactured article (see W. L. Newman’s
hote on the passage, and W. H. Thompson’s Appendix to
his edition of Plato’s Gorgias).

> He did not generally possess full rights of citizenship.
The point of the illustration is that the hearer looks for the
cadence just as confidently as, when a freedman is asked what
patron he selects, every one expects him to say ‘ Cleon.”’

¢ Bywater’s emendation for runrd of the mss. Aristotle
seems to be referring to the Pythagorean theory that
“number ” is the regulating force in all things, and in giving
shape to language ‘‘number”’ is rhythm, which reduces a
formless mass of words to order.

383

ARISTOTLE

eorw u) Aێis 1) TOV TOAAGY: 810 padvora mavTwv
TOV peTpev iapBeta pleyyovrat A€yorres. def dé
ceuvornra yevécbar Kat EKOTHOAL. 6 be Tpoxatos

1409 a KopSaxiKcrepos: dnAot dé Ta /_TeTpapeT pa €oTt yap
TPOXEpos pvO.0s Ta TETpapeT pa. Aeimeror Se
mou, @ exp@vro jev dir Opacupdxyov ap&dpevot,
obk elyov d€ Aéyew Tis 7 iy.

"Eore dé Tpiros 6 Taudy, Ka exOpevos TOV el-
preven’ Tpla yap mpos ov eoriy, exetvew de 6
poev Ev mpos ev, 6 d5€ dvo0 mpos ev. EXTOL dé Trav
Adywv To’Twv 6 Huwddvos: odtos 8° eotiv 6 Taidy.

5 0b pev odv aAXor did Te TA cipyueva aderéor, Kal
Sidr peer pucot: 6 d€ mratav Anmréos: azo pdvov
yap ovK €oT. wéTpov TOV pnbevrev prduar, adore
pddvora AavBavew. vov poev ody xp@vrat TO Evi
mavdve Kal apxyopevor, Set dé Siadepew THv reAevriy

6THS apxfs. éort dé mavdvos dvo eld dyTucetueva
aMArjAous, av TO peev év apxXn apporrer, aorep
Kal xp@vrau* obros 8° early ob apyet pev 7) aKpd,
teAevt@ou Sé tpets Bpayetar,

Aadoyeves <ire Avkiav
Kal
xpuocokoua “Exate mat Aids.

érepos 8 e& evavrias, ob Bpayetar apxovat Tpeis,
7 S€ paKkpa TeA€evTAIa."

~ 4
pera S€ yay Board 7 wKeavovy Hddvice WE.

* The heroic rhythm (dactyls, spondees, and anapaests) is
as 1 to 1, two short syllables being equal to one long;
trochaic and iambic 2 to 1 on the same principle; paean,
3 to 2 (three shorts and one long), being the mean between
the other two. > Understanding «al reXeurGrres.

¢ All three attributed to Simonides (Frag. 26 8: P.L.G.).

384

RHETORIC, III. vur. 4-6

of all metres it is most used in common speech ;
but speech should be dignified and calculated to
rouse the hearer. The trochaic is too much like the
cordax ; this is clear from the tetrameters, which
form a tripping rhythm. There remains the paean,
used by rhetoricians from the time of Thrasy-
machus, although they could not define it.

The paean is a third kind of rhythm closely related
to those already mentioned ; for its proportion is
3 to 2, that of the others 1 to 1 and 2 to 1, with
both of which the paean, whose proportion is 1} to 1,
is connected.* All the other metres then are to be
disregarded for the reasons stated, and also because
they are metrical; but the paean should be retained,
because it is the only one of the rhythms mentioned
which is not adapted to a metrical system, so that
it is most likely to be undetected. At the present
day one kind of paean alone is employed, at the

_ beginning as well as at the end; the end, however,
ought to differ from the beginning. Now there are
_two kinds of paeans, opposed to each other. The

one is appropriate at the beginning, where in fact it
is used. It begins with a long syllable and ends with
three short :

Aandbyévés | elre Avxtlav (**O Delos-born, or it may be
Lycia’’),
and.

Xpioedxbula "Hkdiré | wat Avés (**Golden-haired far-darter,
son of Zeus”’).
The other on the contrary begins with three short
syllables and ends with one long one :

pera 52 yav | VOdre 7 Dikivdy Alpdvice® wE (‘after earth
and waters, night obscured ocean’’).

2¢ — 885

ARISTOTLE

-_ A \ ~ € \ tal \
obtos dé tedevtiy ovet: 7 yap Bpaxeta dua TO
> \ a /
areAns elvat Trovel KoAoPov. da, det TH papa
dmoxdmreoBat Kal dyAnv elvau THY TehevT Hy, pe
dua TOV ypadhéa., pnde dua THY Tapaypadiy, GAG

7 dua TOV prOpov. OTL pev ovv etpvO pov det elvac
TH Aeew Kal pA) dppvbyov, Kat tives evUpvOpov
qovovor pvbwol Kal TOs EXOVTES, elpnTau.

9. Try dé AeEw dvdyien etva 7 etpojevny Kal
TO ovvdeopuep piav, darep at €v Tots SiBupapBors
dvaBoral, 7) Kareorpapperny Kat dpolay rats rev
apxaiwy trounT@v avriotpodois. % pev ovdv eipo-~

/ / ¢ > / > / cee / ,

2 wevn A€Eis_ 1) apxaia éoriv: ““Hpoddérov Movpiov
0 toropins amddeéis:” tavrn yap mporepov Lev
amavtes, viv d€ od moddol xpavrar. Aéyw- Se

> / a ie ” n, ie (wae ”“ \
cipopevynv, 1) ovdev exer TéAos Kal” abryy, dv ju1)
TO mpaypa Aeyopevov teAcwOH. EoTe Sé andes
dua TO admeipov' TO yap TéAos mdvres BovAovrar
Kabopav. Sidmep emi rots KaumtTipow exmveovor
Kal exAvovrat’ mpoopavres yap TO mépas ov Kap-

3 vovot mpoTEpov. 7 pev ovdv eipomevn Ths AcEews
> a / A . aa , /
€oTw Oe, KATEOTpappLev7) de 7 €v TEpLooots Aéyw
be mreptodov Ackw exovoav apX7y Kal. teAevT?Vv

1409 b abray Ka” adrny Kat péyebos evowvorrrov. 75¢ia
8 4 rovavryn Kal edpuabrys, deta pev dia TO evavTins
éxew TH atrepavTw, Kal OT dei TL olerar Exew O
dicpoarn)s [ai] memepdvOat Tt adT@* To dé py mdev
mpovoeiy elvar unde aview dndés. edpab)s b€, 6 ore
evpvnudveutos. Todro dé, dru apiOuov exer 7

* A dash below the first word of a line, indicating the end
of a sentence.

» kaumrripes, properly the turning-point of the dlavAos o1
double course, is here used for the goal itself.

386

RHETORIC, III. vir. 6—1x. 3

This is a suitable ending, for the short syllable, being
incomplete, mutilates the cadence. But the period
should be broken off by a long syllable and the end
should be clearly marked, not by the scribe nor
by a punctuation mark,* but by the rhythm itself.
That the style should be rhythmical and not un-
rhythmical, and what rhythms and what arrange-
ment of them make it of this character, has now
been sufficiently shown.

9. The style must be either continuous and united
by connecting particles, like the dithyrambic pre-
ludes, or periodic, like the antistrophes of the ancient
poets. The continuous style is the ancient one ; for
example, ‘‘ This is the exposition of the investigation
of Herodotus of Thurii.”” It was formerly used by
all, but now is used only by a few. By a continuous
style I mean that which has no end in itself and only
stops when the sense is complete. It is unpleasant,
because it is endless, for all wish to have the end in
sight. That explains why runners, just when they _,
have reached the goal,? lose their breath and strength,
whereas before, when the end is in sight, they show
no signs of fatigue. Such is the continuous style.
The other style consists of periods, and by period I
mean a sentence that has a beginning and end in
itself and a magnitude that can be easily grasped.
What is written in this style is pleasant and easy to
learn, pleasant because it is the opposite of that
_ which is unlimited, because the hearer at every
moment thinks he is securing something for himself
and that some conclusion has been reached ; whereas
it is unpleasant neither to foresee nor to get to the end
of anything. It is easy to learn, because it can be
easily retained in the memory. The reason is that

387

ARISTOTLE

€v mepiodois é€is, 6 mdvrwv edpvnovevtorarov.
510 Kal TA méeTpa TdvTEes pyvnovetovot AAAov TaV
4 xvdnv" apiOuov yap exer @ petpetrar. Set Se THv
meplodov Kat TH Siavoia TeTeAerobar, Kal 47)
duaxdmrecba worep TA LodhoKdrAdovs iapPeta,

Kadvdav pev nde yata Iledomias xbovds-

tovvavtiov yap éeorw wtrodaBety TH Svatpetobar,
Womep Kal emt TOO cipnuevov tiv Kadvddva etvar
Ths LleAomovvycov.

5 Ilepiodos S€ 4 perv &v Kaddous, 4S aeAjs. ore
& ev KwddAois pev réEis 1) TeTeAcLwevn TE Kal
denpnuevn Kat edavdmvevoros, uw) ev TH Svarpéecer
wotrep 1 €ipnuevn mepiodos, GAN’ GAn. K@Aov 8
€or TO ETrepov pdpiov TavTns. adhedAH Se Aeyw THY

6 povdKwdrov. Set dé Kal Ta KAAa Kal Tas TrEpLddous
pnre pvovpovs elvar pyre pakpds. TO perv yap
uuKpov mpoomraiew to\AdKis Tovet TOY akpoaTyy*
avayKn yap, Orav Tt opu@v emt TO Toppw Kat TO
feTpov, od Eyer ev CavT@ dpov, avtiorracOH mavoa-
pevov, olov mpoomraiew yiyvesDar Sua Thy avri-
Kpovow. Ta dé waKpa dmoAcimecOar mrove?, Warrep
ot e€wrépw amoxdpmrovres Tob Tépyaros’ amo-
Aeimovar yap Kai odrow Tods ovpmepurarobvras.
dpoiws S€ Kat ai mepiodor ai paxpat obca Adyos

® rav xvdnv: lit. what is poured forth promiscuously :
in flowing, unfettered language (Liddell and Scott).

» Really from the Moloager of Euripides, Frag. 515
(7.G.F.). The break in the sense comes after yata, IeXorias
xOovés really belonging to the next line: év dvrimébpOpots 1ébV
éxouvo’ etdaluwova. As it stands in the text, the line implies
that Calydon was in Peloponnesus, which of course it was
not. The meaning then is: ‘This is the land of Calydon,

388

RHETORIC, III. rx. 3-6

the periodic style has number, which of all things is
the easiest to remember ; that explains why all learn
verse with greater facility than prose,* for it has
number by which it can be measured. But the
period must be completed with the sense and not
stop short, as in the iambics of Sophocles,?

This is Calydon, territory of the land of Pelops ;

for by a division of this kind it is possible to suppose
the contrary of the fact, as in the example, that
Calydon is in Peloponnesus.

A period may be composed of clauses, or simple.
The former is a complete sentence, distinct in its
parts and easy to repeat in a breath, not divided like
the period in the line of Sophocles above, but when
it is taken as a whole.” By clause I mean one of
the two parts of this period, and by a simple period
one that consists of only one clause. But neither
clauses nor periods should be curtailed or too long.
If too short, they often make the hearer stumble ;
for when he is hurrying on towards the measure of
which he already has a definite idea, if he is checked
by the speaker stopping, a sort of stumble is bound
to occur in consequence of the sudden stop. If too
long, they leave the hearer behind, as those who do
not turn till past the ordinary limit leave behind
those who are walking with them. Similarly long
periods assume the proportions of a speech and

with its fertile plains in the country over against Pelopon-
nesus”’ (on the opposite side of the strait, near the mouth
of the Corinthian gulf).

¢ It does not consist in simply dividing off any words
from the context as the speaker pleases, but the parts of the
sentence as a whole are properly constructed and distin-
guished and the sense also is complete.

389

ARISTOTLE

yiverat Kat avaBodrAj dporov. dore yiverat 6
eoxwre Anpdkprros 6 Xtos «is Medavuamidnv
TowjoavTa avtl Tay avriotpodwy avaBodAds,

of r abt@ Kaka Tevxer avnp aw Kaka TevXw,
7 S€ pakpa avaBodn TO movjoaytt Kaxiorn:

apuoTres yap TO Towbrov Kal els Tovs peaKpo-
Kabhous Aéyew. at Te Aiav Bpaxdxcdor od repiodos
ylyverat: mporrer tj obv ayer Tov aKpoarHy.

7 Tis dé &v Kedous AcEews 1 pep Senpnwevn €otiv
n Oe ayriKerpevn Sunpnpern peev ofov * “modus
eBartpaca TOV Tas Travnyupets owvayovroy kal
Tovs yupuviKods ay@vas KaTaoTnodyTwy,” ayvTt-
Keysern, S€, ev H EexaTéepw TH KwAW 7 TpOS

1410a evayti@ evaytiov avyKeiTat 7 TavTo éméelevKTaL
tots evaytiois, olov “‘ audorépovs 8 wyynoav, Kal
Tovs UmopetvavTas Kal Tods axoAovéyoavTas: Tots
pev yap mAciw THs otKot mpooeKTnoayTo, Tots
dé ixaviy THv olKot KaréAumov.” evaytia bromo?)
aKodovbnots, ikavov mdAciov. “ adore Kal Tots
xXpnpatwr Seopevois Kal rots dmoAatca: BovdAo-
pevois.” dmddAavois. KTHCEL avTiKeiTaL. Kal ETL
“ guuBaiver moAAdKis ev tavras Kat Tods dpo-
vious artvyeiv Kal tovs ddpovas Katopboby.”’
y evds poev Tov dpuoretwv nEwwOnoav, od todd
be vaTEepov ay dipx7v Tis Badrarrns €AaBov.”
“ gAetoor pev dua THs Hrelpov, meledoar Se Sid

@ A well-known musician.

» Of Melos. He wrote rambling dithyrambie preludes
without strophic correspondence. Others take dvaBod} to
mean an entire ode.

390

RHETORIC, III. 1x. 6-7

resemble dithyrambic preludes. This gives rise to
what Democritus of Chios* jokingly rebuked in
Melanippides,® who instead of antistrophes composed
dithyrambic preludes :

A man does harm to himself in doing harm to another,
and a long prelude is most deadly to one who composes it ; ¢

for these verses may be applied to those who employ
long clauses. Again, if the clauses are too short,
they do not make a period, so that the hearer himself
is carried away headlong.

. The clauses of the periodic style are divided or op-
posed ; divided, as in the following sentence : “I have
often wondered at those who gathered together the
general assemblies and instituted the gymnastic con-
tests ’’; 4 opposed, in which, in each of the two clauses,
one contrary is brought close to another, or the same
word is coupled with both contraries; for instance,
“They were useful to both, both those who stayed
and those who followed ; for the latter they gained in
addition greater possessions than they had at home,
for the former they left what was sufficient in their
own country. Here “staying behind,” “‘ following,”
* sufficient,” ‘‘ more” are contraries. Again: “to
those who need money and those who wish to enjoy
it’; where “ enjoying” is contrary to ‘‘ acquiring.”
Again: “‘ It often happens in these vicissitudes that
the wise are unsuccessful, while fools succeed’: ‘‘ At
once they were deemed worthy of the prize of valour
and not long after won the command of the sea”:
“To sail over the mainland, to go by land over the

¢ Hesiod, Works and Days, 265. The second line is a
parody of 266, 4 5¢ Kaki Bovdh TG Bovdedoavre kakiorn.
4 The beginning of Isocrates’ Panegyricus.

391

ARISTOTLE

~ / \
Tis Oaddrrns, Tov pev “EAAjomovrov Cevéas, Tov
S "AG. 8 7 ”? “ce \ / , bd
w dwopv&as. Kat voce moditas dvras
/ A
vom Tis moAews orépeoba.”’ “ot pev yap
avTav KaKk@s amwdAovro, ot 8 aicypas eowbnoav.”
ef 9QO7 A a / > / ~ ~
idia rev trois BapBdpors oikérais xphoba, Kow7
\ \ ~ / >.
dé moAAods TOV ovppdywv mepiopay SovAevovras.”
cn ~ Ld ” / ss ”?
n Ca@vras e€ew 7) TedevTHoavTas KaTadeipew.
ss > a / \ / >
kat 0 ets IlevOddadv tis ele Kat Aukddpova ev
T® Sixaornpiw, “otro. & dyads olkou pev ovres
> DA 20 / i ¢ € a 77 ”? Aid
erwmaAouv, eAOdvres 8 ds buds edvyvra.’ daravra
8 yap Tatra tovel TO cipyuevov. Hdeia 8 cor %
tovavTn Adis, drt TavavTia yrwpydrara Kal
/ ~ "4 A Ld ”
TapadAAnAa paAAov yrapysa, Kat Oru €ouxe ovA-
a ¢ A ” \ ~ >
Aoyrope 6 yap éXeyxos ouvaywyn TOV ayTi-
KELLEVWY EOTLY. »
7A 10. \ > \ Ye f > 4
9 vTibeows ev odv TO ToOLodTOV eoTW, Taplowats
~ >
8’ €ay toa ta K@Aa, trapopoiwors 8 éeav dpora
Ta €oxaTa éxn eKdtepov TO K@Aov. advayKn Se
H &v apxn 7} emt reAcvTis exew. Kal apy) pev
> \ ee Pe! ¢ \ \ \ > / A
del Ta OvopaTta, 7 dé TEAEVT?) Tas eaydtas avAAaBds
Tod adrod ovdwatos mTwoELs 7) TO avTO dvoma.

2“ 'To dwell with us” (Jebb). The point seems to be
that the barbarian domestics were in a comfortable position
as compared with those of the allies who were reduced to
slavery; and there is a contrast between the desire of getting
servants for private convenience, while in a matter affecting
public life indifference was shown.

» All the above quotations are from the Panegyricus :
1, 35, 41, 48, 72, 89, 105, 149, 181, 186, with slight variations.
The last quotation is part of the sentence of which the
beginning appears in 7. 11 above. The whole runs: “ And
how great must we consider the fame and the name and the

392

RHETORIC, III. rx. 7-9

sea, bridging over the Hellespont and digging
through Athos”: “ And that, though citizens by
nature, they were deprived of the rights of citizenship
by law”: “‘ For some of them perished miserably,
others saved themselves disgracefully ” : ‘‘ Privately
to employ barbarians as servants,* but publicly to
view with indifference many of the allies reduced to
slavery’: “‘ Either to possess it while living or to
leave it behind when dead.’’® And what some one
said against Pitholaus and Lycophron® in the law-
court : ““ These men, who used to sell you when they
were at home, having come to you have bought you.”
All these passages are examples of antithesis. This
kind of style is pleasing, because contraries are easily
understood and even more so when placed side by
side, and also because antithesis resembles a
syllogism; for refutation is a bringing together of
contraries. .

Such then is the nature of antithesis ; equality of
clauses is parisosis; the similarity of the final
syllables of each clause paromoiosis. This must take
place at the beginning or end of the clauses. At
the beginning the similarity is always shown in
entire words; at the end, in the last syllables, or
the inflexions of one and the same word, or the
repetition of the same word. For instance, at the
glory which those who have highly distinguished themselves
in such deeds of valour will either have when living or will
leave behind after their death.”

¢ They murdered Alexander, tyrant of Pherae, being in-
stigated by their sister, his wife. Nothing is known of the
case referred to. According to Cope, the meaning is:
‘** When they were at Pherae, they used to sell you as slaves,
but now they have come to buy you”’ (referring to bribery

in court). Others take aveicfa: in a passive sense: ** they
have been bought,”’ i.e. have had to sell themselves to you.

393

ARISTOTLE

Py a \ A wv > A
ev dpxf peev Ta ToLabra “ aypov yap éAaBev apyov
map avrod,”

, > > / 7, A > > ,
Swpytot 7 éméAovto mapdppytol 7 éméecow*

ae 4" * r Roi SS. att 24 Sd
emt teAevtAs dé “ wHiPnoav adrov maidiov teTo-

, Py)? deo al , Suge
Kevat, GAN’ adrod airiov yeyovevar,”’ “ ev mAciorats
d€ dpovrict Kat ev éeAaxlorais nlow.” TTDUS
S¢ tavTob “‘ d&vos 5€ orabjvar yaAKods, obK a&vos
a“ ma) > A > * ce \ > > \ ‘
av xadkod.”. ratro 5 dvoya “od 8 adbrov Kai
Cavra edeyes Kaxds Kal viv ypdders KaK@s.”
> \ AA ~ be “e , ON ” 0 P5) / > »+ P) >
1410 b a0 ovdAdaBAs Sé “ri dv emabes Sewodv, ei avdp
/
cides apyov;’’ €orr 5€ dua mavra exyew Tavro,
Kat avriecw civar tadTo Kal mdpicov Kal ojoL0-
téXevtov. ai 8 apxal tav mepiodwyv ayedov ev
lad / > / esq ‘\ ‘
10 Tots ~@eodexrelois eEnpiOunvra. «iol Se Kal
evdeis avriléceis, olov Kat "Emiyappos eérotet,

TOKO. [ev ev THVWY eyo Tv, TOKA Sé Tapa THVOLS

eyo.

10. "Ewei 6é€ Sudprorar mepi tovrwy, mdbev
déyerar Ta aoreta Kal ta eddoxobvTa AeKTéov.
mrovetv bev odv e€oTi Tod edpvods 7) Tod yeyupva-

2 opevou, SeiEar 5é THs jueB05ov TavTAS. elrraprev
oby Kal SrapiOpunowpe0a* apy7) 8° €orw Hpi airy.
TO yap pavOavew padiws 75d ddoer maow €or,

@ Aristophanes, Frag. 649 (Kock, Com. Att. Frag. i. 1880).

» Tliad, ix. 526.

¢ The text is obviously corrupt.

4 See Introduction.

¢ Roemer’s text has dperal (excellences).

f There is no real antithesis, the sense of both clauses being
the same.

394

RHETORIC, III. 1x. 9—x. 2

beginning: “Aypdv yap €AaBev adpydv rap adrod,%
“for he received from him land untilled ”’ ;

Swpnrot r’ érédovro mapdppyrot 1’ éréecow,” “they were
ready to accept gifts and to be persuaded by words ;”

at the end: @7Oncav avrov raidiov tetoKévat, GAN
avtov aitiov yeyovévat,’ “they thought that he was
the father of a child, but that he was the cause of
it’; é€v wAciotars Sé ppovrTiow Kal ev édaxlorats
éArtow, “in the greatest anxiety and the smallest
hopes.” Inflexions of the same word: dfios de
erabjvar yadKots, ovK afios Ov Xadkod, “ worthy of
a bronze statue, not being worth a brass farthing.”
Repetition of a word: ob 8 avrév wal (@vra edXeyes
Kakas Kal viv ypdders xaxds, “ while he lived you
spoke ill of him, now he is dead you write ill of him.”
Resemblance of one syllable: ti dv eraes Servdv,
ei avép «ides apyov, “ what ill would you have
suffered, if you had seen an idle man?’’ All these
figures may be found in the same sentence at once—
antithesis, equality of clauses, and similarity of end-
ings. In the Theodectea® nearly all the beginnings °
of periods have been enumerated. There are also
false antitheses, as in the verse of Epicharmus :

TéKa pev ev Tivwy éywv hv, Toa dé mapa THvo.s éywv, “at one
time I was in their house, at another I was with them.’ /

10. Having settled these questions, we must next
state the sources of smart and popular sayings. They
are produced either by natural genius or by practice ;
to show what they are is the function of this inquiry.
Let us therefore begin by giving a full list of them,
and let our starting-point be the following. Easy
learning is naturally pleasant to all, and words mean

395

ARISTOTLE

Ta d€ dvdpara onuaiver TL, WoTe doa THY oVO-
pdtwv mov Huiv pdbnow, ydvora. at pev odv
yAdrrat dyvarres, Ta d€ KUpoa. lope. 7 de peTa-
Popa Trovet robro pddvwora: orav yap eiry TO yijpas
kahduny, emroinoe pabnow Kat yraow dua TOU
3 yevous" dupeo yap annvOnnora.. mowodou pev obv
Kad at TOV TounTav elicdves TO airs: Sidrrep a av €v,
aoretov aivera. €oTt yap 7 eiKwv, eadédep
elpyTat mpoTepov, peTapopa diadpepovoa mpobécer:
510 Frrov 76, GTt paKpoTépws* Kal ov Aéyet ws
tobro é€xeivo* ovKouy ovde tntret tobro y) boxy.
4 dvdyien 57) Kal Aefw al evOuunpara tadr’ evar
doreia, Ooa Trove? jp pdbnow raxetor. 510
oUTe Ta emumoAaua TOv evOupnpdrov evdonupsed
(€murdAava yap Aéyouev wa move dra, Kal @
pndev det Cnrijoat), oure doa cipnueva dyvoodpeva
cory, aan’ dow 7 dua. Acyopevew 7 yeaous
yiveTat, Kal el p11) mporepov Orripxev, 7) pouKpov
borepiler 7 Stidvova* yiyverar yap ofov payors,
exetvas dé _odd€repov.
5 Kara pev obdp THY didvovay Too Aeyouevov 76
Towadra _eddoxyret TOV evOopnuarev, Kata dé TH
éEw TO pev oxnmati, edv avticeysevws AEéynrat,

@ Odyssey, xiv. 213 dd’ éurns Kardunv yé o dlomat
elcopowvra | yryvéoxev. The words are those of Odysseus,
whom Athene had changed into an old beggar, to Eumaeus,
his faithful swineherd, in whose house he was staying un-
recognized.

» rpocbéce.: the addition of the particle of comparison
ws. mpobéce (the reading of the Paris ms.) would mean,
(1) “ manner of setting forth” (Cope), or (2) *‘ a metaphor,
with a preface ” (Jebb) (but the meaning of this is not clear).
The simile only says that one thing resembles another, not,

396

RHETORIC, ITI. x. 2-5

something, so that all words which make us learn
something are most pleasant. Now we do not know
the meaning of strange words, and proper terms we
know already. It is metaphor, therefore, that above
all produces this effect; for when Homer? calls old
age stubble, he teaches and informs us through the
genus ; for both have lost their bloom. The similes
of the poets also have the same effect ; wherefore, if
they are well constructed, an impression of smartness
is produced. For the simile, as we have said, is a
metaphor differing only by the addition of a word,?
wherefore it is less pleasant because it is longer ; it
does not say that this zs that, so that the mind does
not even examine this. Of necessity, therefore, all
style and enthymemes that give us rapid information
are smart. This is the reason why superficial
enthymemes, meaning those that are obvious to all
and need no mental effort, and those which, when
stated, are not understood, are not popular, but only
those which are understood the moment they are
stated, or those of which the meaning, although not
clear at first, comes a little later; for from the
latter a kind of knowledge results, from the former
neither the one nor the other.°

In regard to the meaning of what is said, then,
such enthymemes are popular. As to style, popu-
larity of form is due to antithetical statement ; for

like the metaphor, that it 7s another; since the speaker does
not say this, the result is that the mind of the hearer does not
go into the matter, and so the chance of instruction, of
acquiring some information, is lost.

° 'The meaning is: the two kinds of enthymemes mentioned
last do convey some information, whereas the superficial
enthymemes teach nothing, either at once, or a little later,
when reflection has made the meaning clear.

397

ARISTOTLE

olov “‘ Kai tHv Tots aAAows Kowiy eipyynv vopt-
Covrwy tots atradv idiois médemov-”’ avrixerrat
6 mdéAEpwos eipyvn. Tots 8° dvopacw, éav Exn peTa-
popav, Kat tavrnv pyr? dAdorpiav, xaAderov yap
ovvidetv, unt” emumdAauov, obdev yap Trovel TAaVELW.
ert €¢ TPO CupaTwy Troret? Opav yap Set Ta mpaT-
Tomeva paAAov 7» péAdovTa. Set dpa TovTwr
otoxalecbar tpidv, petapopds avtiecews ev-
epyetas.
7 Tév dé petadopdy rerrdpwv obodv edvdoxysovor
41a padoTa at Kar’ avadoyiav, domep LlepuxAds ehn
TH veoTnTaA THY amroAomEevnV ev TH TroAdu@ ovTwWS
jnpaviobar éx THs moAcews womep el Tis TO Eap eK
Tob evavtod eێAor. Kal Aemrivns epi AaKkedat-
pooviey, odk edv mepudeiv THY “EAAdSa érepohbadnov
yevonernv. Kat Kndioddoros omovddlovtos Xapn-
tos ev0uvas Sobvar wept tov *OdAvvOiaxov mdAEeov
nyavaKrer, paoKkwy eis mriypua Tov SHwov Eéxovra
tas ev0dvas eipdcbar Sobvar. Kat mapaxad@dy

@ Isocrates, Philippus, 73.

>» In the Poetics (21) metaphor and its four classes are
defined: ‘* Metaphor consists in assigning to a thing the
name of something else; and this may take place either
from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from
species to species, or proportionally. An instance of a
metaphor from genus to species is ‘here stands my ship,’
for ‘standing’ is a genus, ‘ being moored’ a species; from
species to genus: ‘Odysseus truly has wrought a myriad

ood deeds,’ for ‘myriad’ is a specific large number, used
for the generic ‘multitude’; from species to species:
‘having drawn off the life with the bronze’ and ‘having cut
it with the unyielding bronze,’ where ‘ drawn off’ is used in
the sense of ‘ cut,’ and ‘ cut’ in the sense of ‘ drawn off,’ both
being species of ‘taking away.’’’ For the proportional
metaphor see note on 4. 4 above.

398

RHETORIC, III. x. 5-7

instance, “‘ accounting the peace that all shared
to be a war against their private interests,” * where
“war ”’ is opposed to “ peace ’’; as to words, they
are popular if they contain metaphor, provided it be
neither strange, for then it is difficult to take in at
a glance, nor superficial, for then it doés not impress
the hearer; further, if they set things “ before the
eyes’; for we ought to see what is being done
rather than what is going to be done. We ought
therefore to aim at three things—metaphor, anti-
thesis, actuality.

Of the fourkinds of metaphor ® the most popular are
those based on proportion. Thus, Pericles said that
the youth that had perished during the war had dis-
appeared from the State as if the year had lost its
springtime.° Leptines, speaking of the Lacedae-
monians, said that he would not let the Athenians
stand by and see Greece deprived of one of her eyes.
When Chares was eager to have his accounts for the
Olynthian war examined, Cephisodotus indignantly
exclaimed that, now he had the people by the throat,
he was trying to get his accounts examined 4%; on
another occasion also he exhorted the Athenians to

1 SA.

4 e¥@wva was the technical term for the examination of
accounts to which all public officers had to submit when
their term of office expired. Cephisodotus and Chares were
both Athenian generals. ‘* Having the people by the throat ”’
may refer to the condition of Athens financially and his un-
satisfactory conduct of the war. But the phrase eis mviyya
Tov Sijuov éxovra is objected to by Cope, who reads ayayévra
and translates: “that he drove the people into a fit of
choking by his attempts to offer his accounts for scrutiny
in this way,” i.e. he tried to force his accounts down their
throats, and nearly choked them. Another reading
suggested is dyxovra (throttling so as to choke).

399

ARISTOTLE

ore tovs “AOnvaiovs eis EvBouay éemvovricopévous
7 ye
épn Seitv e€ievat 7d MidAriddov pyjdiopa. Kat
"Iduxparns omecapnevwv “AOnvaiwy mpos *Eni-
Savpov Kat thy mapadiay nyavaKrer, pdoKwv
avrovs Ta éfddia Tod zroAcuou mappphobar. Kal
TlevOdAaos tiv [Idpadov pdradov tod Sxpov,
Xnorov dé tyAlav tod Ilevpasews. Kat Mepuxdds
tv Alywav ddedciv exéAevoe tiv Anjunv Tod
Ilevparéws. Kat MotpoxaAjs otfev én movnpe-
repos «€lva, dvoudoas Twa Tov emetK@v* eKeivov
poev yap émitpitwy toKwy movnpevecOa, adrov
dé emidexdtwv. Kai To “Avatavdpidov iauPetov
imép tav Ovyarépwv mpds Tov ydov eyxpovt-
lovedr,

¢ 4 , ~ / « /

brrepypepot wo. TOV ydpwv ai mapHevor.

‘ \ 7, > > /, 7,
kat To [loAvev«rov «is azromAnkriKov Twa Lrevo-
urmov, TO pu) Stvacba. Hovyiav adyew bd THs
TUyns €v TevTecupliyyw voow Sedeuevov. Kat
Kndioddoros tas Tpinpets exdAer ptAwvas TroKt-

c , A \ a » A f
Nous, 6 Kvwv Sé€ 7a Kamndeia ta "Arrixa pidirva.

@ This may refer to a decree of Miltiades which was so
speedily carried out that it became proverbial. The expedi-
tion was undertaken to assist Euboea against Thebes.

» By making peace, Iphicrates said that the Athenians
had deprived themselves of the opportunity of attacking and
plundering a weak maritime city, and so securing provisions
for the war. The word é#éd:a properly means provisions
for a journey and travelling expenses.

¢ The Paralus and Salaminia were the two sacred galleys
which conveyed state prisoners.

# It commanded the trade of the Euxine.

¢ Moerocles was a contemporary of Demosthenes, and an
anti-Macedonian in politics. He seems to have been a
money-grubber and was once prosecuted for extortion. The

400

RHETORIC, ILI. x. 7

set out for Euboea without delay ‘and. provision
themselves there, like the decree of Miltiades.*”
After the Athenians had made peace with Epidaurus
and the maritime cities, Iphicrates indignantly de-
clared “that they had deprived themselves of pro-
visions for the war.’’® Pitholaus called the Paralus ¢
“the bludgeon of the people,” and Sestos “ the corn-
chest? of the Piraeus.” Pericles recommended that
Aegina, “the eyesore of the Piraeus,” should be re-
moved. Moerocles, mentioning a very “respectable”
person by name, declared that he was as much a
scoundrel as himself; for whereas that honest man
played the scoundrel at 33 per cent. he himself was
satisfied with 10 per cent. And the iambic of
Anaxandrides,/ on girls who were slow to marry,

My daughters are “ past the time ” of marriage.

And the saying of Polyeuctus% upon a certain
paralytic named Speusippus, “ that he could not keep
quiet, although Fortune had bound him in a five-
holed pillory of disease.’’. Cephisodotus called the
triremes “ parti-coloured mills,’ and [Diogenes] the
Cynic used to say that the taverns‘ were “ the

degree of the respectability (or rather, the swindling
practices) of each is calculated by their respective profits.

f Poet of the Middle Comedy: Frag. 68 (Kock, Com.
Att. Frag. ii.). The metaphor in brepiuepa is from those
who failed to keep the term of payment of a fine or debt.
Cope translates: ‘‘I find (uo.) the young ladies are . . .”

9 Athenian orator, contemporary of Demosthenes.

» As grinding down the tributary states. They differed
from ordinary mills in being gaily painted.

* Contrasted with the Spartan ‘“‘ messes,”’ which were of
a plain and simple character, at which all the citizens dined
together. The tavern orgies, according to Diogenes, repre-
sented these at Athens.

2D 401

1411 b

ARISTOTLE

Aloiev bé, ort eis LuceAiav TH morAw e&éxeay*
Tobro yap peradopa Kal 7™po Oppdrey. Kal
: @ore Bofjoat Thy ‘EMdda ” : Kat TobTo Tpomov
Twa peTapopa Kal mpd Oppdrony. kal Court
Kn duoddoros evra Betobar éxéeve pa) moh\as Tron
owot Tas ouvdpop.ds. Kal ‘looxparns 7pos Tous
ovvTpexovTas €v Tats mavnyvpeow. Kal olov ev
T@ emitadiw, Sudt. aévov hv éml To rape T@ TOV
év Larapive TeAevTNOaVTWY keipacbau TV ‘EMdda
ws ovyKarabamromerns Th dperH avT@y Tihs
eAevbepias: <i ev yap cimtev ore a&vov Saxpdoae
ovycarabamnropevns Tijs dperijs, petapopa Kal
TPO OMparov, TO. de “ri aperh tis eAevepias ’
dvriBeoty TWa EVEL. Kal ws "Iduxparns elev
“ yap odds po. Tay _Adyev dua pueowv Tay
Xapyre TET pay LEveV €oTiv:”’ petadopa Kat’
dvahoyiav, Kal TO dia pecov 7po Opparwv Trove.
kal TO ddvac mapaxaNety Tods kwduvvous — Tots
Kwdvvous BonOnoovras, po Op pare perapopa.
Kat Aveodéwv Urrep XaBpiov * “odde TV ieernptay
aisxuvbevres avrov, TI eikova TP xaheny ” .
peeTapopa yap ev T@ trapovtt, adn’ ovK Gel, add
T™po. Oppdrenv: KwSvvevovros ‘yap avrob ixerever
€lKiv, TO axfuxov 37) epipuxov, 73 Orrdpvn uct
Tov Tis ToAews epywv. Kal mdyra TpoTov
puuxpov dpoveiv pedeT@vres’’> Td yap peAeTav

@ Athenian orator, opponent of Demosthenes.

» Referring to the disastrous Sicilian expedition.

¢ Philippus, 12. Both cvvdpouds and ovvrpéxovras refer to
the collecting of a mob in a state of excitement.

4 The statue of Chabrias, erected after one of his victories,
represented him as kneeling on the ground, the position

402

RHETORIC, III. x. 7

messes’ of Attica. Aesion* used to say that they
had “drained” the State into Sicily,? which is a
metaphor and sets the thing before the eyes. His
words “so that Greece uttered a cry ”’ are also in a
manner a metaphor and a vivid one. And again,
as Cephisodotus bade the Athenians take care not
to hold their “ concourses”’ too often; and in the
same way Isocrates, who spoke of those “‘ who rush
together ’’ in the assemblies.° And as Lysias says
in his Funeral Oration, that it was right that
Greece should cut her hair at the tomb of those who
fell at Salamis, since her freedom was buried along
with their valour. If the speaker had said that it
was fitting that Greece should weep, her valour
being buried with them, it would have been a
metaphor and a vivid one, whereas “ freedom” by
the side of “‘ valour” produces a kind of antithesis.
And as Iphicrates said, “* The path of my words leads
through the centre of the deeds of Chares”’; here
the metaphor is proportional and the words “ through
the centre ” create vividness. Also, to say that one
“calls upon dangers to help against dangers” is a
vividmetaphor. And Lycoleon on behalf of Chabrias
said, “ not even reverencing the suppliant attitude of
his statue of bronze,’’* a metaphor for the moment,
not for all time, but still vivid ; for when Chabrias is in
danger, the statue intercedes for him, the inanimate
becomes animate, the memorial of what he has done
for the State. And “in every way studying poor-
ness of spirit,” ¢ for “‘ studying ”’ a thing implies to
which he had ordered his soldiers to take up when awaiting
the enemy. ‘The statue was in the agora and could be seen
from the court. Lycoleon points to it, and bases his appeal
on its suppliant attitude.

* Isocrates, Panegyricus, 151.
403

ARISTOTLE

av&ew Te eoTiv. Kal Ore Tov vodv 6 Oeds pas
avipxbey ev rH pox: apdw yap SqAot vt. “od yap
Svadvopeba Tous moX€mous, aN’ dvaBadAdueba”’
dupes yap €ort peMovra, Kad 4 dvaBoAy Kat 7
Tovavrn eipyvn. Kal TO Tas owOjKas pdvat
‘a TpOomaLoy elvan mod KddAvov TaV ev TOIS mohépous
yevojLevenv: TO. peev yap wv7ép _bucp@v Kal judas
TUXIS, adrar 5° dmeép mravros Tob TroA€uou’’* audw
yap vikns onucta. Ste Kat at modes TO poy
Tav avOpdirwy jweydAas <d0vvas SiSdacw" » yap
srr BAaBn TIS Sucaia cori.

"Ore pev obv Ta aoreta ex preradopas re
ey dvddoryoy Aéyerat Kal TH 7pPO Gmparewv Troveiy,
eipntar. Aexréov dé Ti A€yomev mpd Oppdreov,

2 Ka rt movovat yiyveran Tooro. Aéyen 37) mpo
Oppareow TavTA To“eiv, Goa evepyodvTa onwaiver.
olov tov ayabov dv8pa davar eivat TeTpaywvov
petadopa- appw yap tédeva, GAN’ od _ onpeaiver
evepyevav. adda, TO " avbodoay € €XOVTOS THY. auKpny
évepyela, Kal TO “oe 8 woamep aderov”’ evepyeta,
Kal

rouvrebbev ody “EAAnves a&avres trootv

A + | uy 9 \ / ‘ ¢€
TO aéavres evepyera Kal petadopd. Kat ws

« Metaphor from species to genus (p. 398, n.), “ studying ”
being a species of “increasing.” As a rule one studies to
increase some good quality, not a bad one.

> Ibid. 172. ¢ Ibid. 180 (apparently from memory).

4 «¥@vva (see note on p. 399) further implies the punish-
ment for an unsatisfactory statement of accounts.

¢ Simonides, Frag. 5 (P.L.G. ii.). Both a good man and
a square are complete as far as they go, but they do not
express actuality. f Isocrates, Philippus, 10.

9 Ibid. 127. ‘This speech is an appeal to Philip to lead
the Greeks against Persia. As a sacred animal could roam

4.04

RHETORIC, III. x. 7—x1 2

increase it.¢. And that “reason is a light that God
has kindled in the soul,” for both the words reason
and light make something clear. “ For we do not
put an end to wars, but put them off,’? for both
ideas refer to the future—putting off and a peace of
such a kind. And again, it is a metaphor to say that
such a treaty is “‘a trophy far more splendid than
those gained in war; for the latter are raised in
memory of trifling advantages and a single favour of
fortune, but the former commemorates the end of
the whole war” ;° for both treaty and trophy are
signs of victory. Again, that cities also render a
heavy account to the censure of men; for rendering
an account @ is a sort of just punishment.

11. We have said that smart sayings are derived
from proportional metaphor and expressions which
set things before the eyes. We must now explain
the meaning of “‘ before the eyes,’’ and what must
be done to produce this. I mean that things are set
before the eyes by words that signify actuality. For
instance, to say that a good man is “ four-square ” ¢
is a metaphor, for both these are complete, but the
phrase does not express actuality, whereas “ of one
having the prime of his life in full bloom”? does ;
similarly, “ thee, like a sacred animal ranging at
will’ 9 expresses actuality, and in

Thereupon the Greeks shooting forward with their feet ”
the word “shooting ’’ contains both actuality and

where it pleased within the precincts of its temple, so Philip
could claim the whole of Greece as his fatherland, while
other descendants of Heracles (whom Isocrates calls the author
of Philip’s line) were tied down and their outlook narrowed by
the laws and constitution of the city in which they dwelt.

» Euripides, Iphig. Aul. 80, with dopt for roctv.

405

ARISTOTLE

Kéxpnrat “Opnpos modaxod TQ ra apvya Embvya
3A€yew Sia THs perapopds. ev maior S€ TO evep-
yevav mrovety eddoKipet, olov ev Totade,

avris emt damedovde KvAivdSero AGas ava.dys,

Kal
” > Dee /
emTat dtords,
kal
> 7 . 1
emimTéo0at peveaivwy,
\
Kal
> / a , 5 |
1412 4 €v yatn totavto AtAaiopeva xpods doar,
‘
Kal

> \ \ / la 4
aixpn S€ oTépvo.o di€covTo paywmwoa.

ev maou yap rovrous Sua, TO euipvya elvar evep-
yoovra paiverau’ TO avaroxuvTely yap Kal pauav
Kat TaAda évépyera. Tatra dé mpoonie dia Tis
Kar’ avadoyiay petapopas: ws yap 6 Aibos mpos
Tov Liovdov, 6 avaoxvvTav mpds Tov davatoyuv-

4 rovpevov. moet dé Kal ev tais eddoxysovaats
elkoow ent Tav apiywy Tatra:

KupTa, padypwwrra: mpo wev tT GAN, adrap én
»”
8

4 A \ ~ a / ¢ 7 ee
Kwovpeva yap Kat Cdvra move mavra, » 8 evépyeva
Kivnots.

Cal A , / ” /

5 Act d€ petradépew, Kabdmep elipnrar mporepor,
amd oikelwy Kal pa) pavep@v, olov Kal ev dudo-
cogia TO dpovov Kal ev odd diéxovar Dewpeiv
evoToxov, woamep “Apxvras bn tadrov elvac
duautyTiy Kal Bwyov en dudw yap To aduKov-

@ Odyssey, xi. 598, with érecra wédovde for émi ddaedbvde.
406

RHETORIC, IIT. x1. 2-5

metaphor. And as Homer often, by making use of
metaphor, speaks of inanimate things as if they were
animate ; and it is to creating actuality in all such
cases that his popularity is due, as in the following
examples :

Again the ruthless stone rolled down to the plain.‘

The arrow flew.’

The arrow] eager to fly [towards the crowd].°

The spears] were buried in the ground, longing to take

their fill of flesh.¢
The spear-point sped eagerly through his breast.°

For in all these examples there is appearance of
actuality, since the objects are represented as
animate : “ the shameless stone,” “ the eager spear-
point,’ and the rest express actuality. Homer has
attached these attributes by the employment of the
proportional metaphor; for as the stone is to
Sisyphus, so is the shameless one to the one who is
shamelessly treated. In his popular similes also he
proceeds in the same manner with inanimate things :

Arched, foam-crested, some in front, others behind ; /

for he gives movement and life to all, and actuality
is movement.

As we have said before, metaphors should be drawn
from objects which are proper to the object, but not
too obvious ; just as, for instance, in philosophy it
needs sagacity to grasp the similarity in things that
are apart. Thus Archytas said that there was no
difference between an arbitrator and an altar, for
the wronged betakes itself to one or the other.

» Tliad, xiii. 587. ¢ Ibid. iv. 126. 4 Ibid. xi. 574.

© Ibid. xv. 541.

? Ibid. xiii. 799. The reference is to the “boiling waves
of the loud-roaring sea.”

407

ARISTOTLE

‘
pevov Katradedyer. 7 el tis dain ayKupay Kal
KpeudOpav +o abro elvary audw yap tadrd 71,

; ~ : A
GAAd Siaheper TH avwbev Kal Katwhev. Kal TO
>
“@padicbar tas moXeus’’ ev moAd Bvéxovar TavTO, EV
emipavela. Kal Suvdect TO icov.
wv A \ A > tal \ a \

6 “Eor d€ Kal Ta doreia Ta mAciaTta Sia peta-
popas Kat ex tod mpockamarav: paddov yap
ylyverat SiAov Gru E4abe mapa TO evaytiws exew,

\ ” / ¢ \ ce le > ~ > A >
Kat €oue Aéyew yYvx} “ds aAnbds, eyd 8
Heaptov.” Kat tav aropbeyparav dé Ta adored
> > A \ @ , \ ~
eoTw ek Tod p17) 6 dyor A€yew, olov To Tod Utyar-
xXOpov, Ott of TéTTLyes EavTois yapcley doovrat.
kal Ta €0 jveypeva dia TO adTo Hdea> paOnows

/ \ / 4, Va Ar / 4)
yap, kat A€yerau petaghopd. Kal 6 Aéyer Oeddwpos,
TO Kawd Aéyew. yiyverar dé, Grav Tapddokov 7,
Kal pon, ws éxeivos A€yer, mpds THY Eumpoobev
dd€av, ad’ womep ot ev Tots yedolois Ta Tapa-
TeTrounweva. Omep SUvaTar Kal Ta Tapa ypdupa
oxmppata: e€ataTd yap. Kal €v tots pérpois:
od yap worrep 6 akovwy d7éAaBev:

« The anchor keeps a ship steady below, the pot-hook is
above, and the pot hangs down from it.

» Cope, retaining dvwyadicba (as if from dvouadifer,
aequalitatem restituere Bonitz, cf. dvouddwots) says: “the
widely dissimilar things here compared are the areas of
properties and the state offices and privileges, which are to
be alike equalized,” translating: ‘“‘ And the re-equalization
of cities, when the same principle is applied to things stand-
ing wide apart, viz. to surface (area) and powers (functions,
offices),”’ (dv- is not negative, eon But the passage
quoted by Victorius from Isocrates, Philippus, § 40: “for I
know that all the cities of Greece have been placed on the
same level (auadicdac) by misfortunes” suggests this as a

408

RHETORIC, III. x1. 5-6

Similarly, if one were to say that an anchor and a
pot-hook hung up were identical ; for both are the
same sort of thing, but they differ in this—that one
is hung up above and the other below.*. And if one
were to say ‘the cities have been reduced to the
same level,’ this amounts to the same in the case .
of things far apart—the equality of “levelling ”’ in
regard to superficies and resources.?

Most smart sayings are derived from metaphor,
and also from misleading the hearer beforehand.’
For it becomes more evident to him that he has
learnt something, when the conclusion turns out
contrary to his expectation, and the mind seems to
say, “ How true it is! but I missed it.” And smart
apophthegms arise from not meaning what one says,
as in the apophthegm of Stesichorus, that “ the
grasshoppers will sing to themselves from the
ground.” And clever riddles are agreeable for the
same reason; for something is learnt, and the ex-
pression is also metaphorical. And what Theodorus
calls “‘ novel expressions’ arise when what follows
is paradoxical, and, as he puts it, not in accordance
with our previous expectation; just as humorists
make use of slight changes in words. The same
effect is produced by jokes that turn on a change
of letter; for they are deceptive. These novelties
occur in poetry as well as in prose; for instance,
the following verse does not finish as the hearer
expected :

preferable reading here, ®uadoc@ac meaning (1) have been
levelled to the ground (although the Lexica give no instance
of this use), (2) reduced to the same level of weakness.

¢ rpockararav. Or, reading mrpoceéararay, “* by adding de-
ception.”

4 See ii. 21. 8.

409

ARISTOTLE
eoretxe 5° exwv bd Toool xiebAa:

6 8 weto media epetv. tovrov 8 dua Aeyouevou
det SijAov elvar, ra S€ mapa ypdppa moved ody 6
déyer A€yew, GA’ 6 peraorpeder dvoma, olov ro
®codapov eis Nixwva tov Kibapwddv “ Oparrer*”’
mpoomoveira, yap Aéyew to “ Opdrrer ce” Kat
e€amata: dAdo yap déyer: 81d pabdvrr 730, émet
1412b €¢ pur) V7roAapBaver Opaxa eivar, od S6£er aoretov
Telvar. Kat To “ Bovder abrov mépoa.” Set Se
dpporepa mpoonkovtws AexOfvar. otrw Se Kal
Ta daoteia, olov to pavat “AOnvaiois tiv THs
Badrarryns apxnv pn apxnv eva tay KaKdyv-
dvacbar yap. 1 womep “looxpdrns tiv apyjv
mode apx7v elvar THY KaKa@v. apdhotépws yap oO
ovK av wn Tis epeiv, TOOT’ <ipynTar, Kal eyvaabn
ore aAnbés: TO TE yap THY apxnv Pavar apyny elvat
ovfev copdv: add’ ody otrw Aéyer GAN’ adAws,
8 Kal apynv ody 6 elmev amddnow, adv’ ddAws. ev
dao. S€ TOUTOLS, Ea TPOOHKOVTWS TO GvOpLA EveYK?
Opovupia 7) petabopa, Tore TO €d. olov “ *Ava-

@ According to Cope, Opdar7’ el, ““ you are no better than
a Thracian slave-girl.”

» There is obviously a play on wépoam (aor. 1 infin. of
mép0w) and Ilépoa (Persians), but no satisfactory inter-
pretation of the joke has been suggested.

¢ The paradoxical and verbal. ‘Suitably’? may refer
to the manner of delivery ; to being used at the proper time;
or to taking care that the word is one that may be used in
the two senses.

4 Philippus, 61; De Pace, 101. ‘The point in the illus-
trations lies in the use of épy7%, first in the sense of ** empire,”
then in that of ‘* beginning.” It could be said that the

410

RHETORIC, III. x1. 6-8

And he strode on, under his feet—chilblains,

whereas the hearer thought he was going to say
“sandals.” This kind of joke must be clear from
the moment of utterance. Jokes that turn on the
word are produced, not by giving it the proper
meaning, but by perverting it; for instance, when
Theodorus said to Nicon, the player on the cithara,
“you are troubled ” (Oparrev) ; for while pretending
to say “something troubles you,” he deceives us ;
for he means something else.* Therefore the joké
is only agreeable to one who understands the point ;
for if one does not know that Nicon is a Thracian, he
will not see any joke in it. Similarly, “ you wish to
destroy him (vepra:).”’® Jokes of both these kinds °
must be suitably expressed. Similar instances are
such witticisms as saying that “the empire of the
sea’’ was not “the beginning of misfortunes” for
the Athenians, for they benefited by it; or, with
Isoecrates,4 that ‘empire’? was “the beginning of
misfortunes for the city”; in both cases that which
one would not have expected to be said is said, and
recognized as true. For, in the second example, to
say that ‘empire is empire’ shows no cleverness, but
this is not what he means, but something else ; in
the first, the apy which is negatived is used in a
different sense. In all these cases, success is attained
when a word is appropriately applied, either by
homonym or by metaphor. For example, in the
phrase Anaschetos (Bearable) is Unbearable,’ there

* empire” of the sea was or was not ‘ the beginning of mis-
fortunes” for Athens; for at first it was highly beneficial to
them, but in the end brought disaster, and thus was the
** beginning ”’ of evil.
¢ Usually translated, ‘“* There is no bearing Baring.”
411

©

ARISTOTLE

> > ,_ 9) ¢ / > /
oxeros ovK avacxeTos’”’ opuwruplay amépnoer,
aAAG mpoonkovTws, €t andys. Kal

> nn / a ” 7 / ;
otk av yévouo paddrov 7 Edvos E€vos-

a“ > a “ A al \ > / Ni 66). 2D “ ‘
H od padrrov 7 o€ det, TO adro. Kai “‘od de? Tov
/ / 9:2 »? > / \ \ ~
Eevov Edvov aet elvat’’’ adAdrpiov yap Kal Tobro.

\ Pe} A \ 2A: ry is A > ,
To avro Kat To “Avatavdpidov 7d emawovtpevor,

Kadov y? amobaveiy mpiv Oavarouv Spay aé.ov-

Tavrov yap €oT. TH eimetv dkvov yap dmobavely py
x »” > ~ nn“ + 4 > > 7
évTa aéwov amobaveiv, 7 abiov y amobavely pH
Bavarou afiov ovTa, 7 7) wovwodvTa Oavdarov aéva.
\ A od \ 7 ~ / t4 > >
TO pev odv €ldos TO adbto THs AcEews TovTwv: GAA
dow av eAdrrov Kal avruxeysevws AexOH, rocodTm
> a ~ ‘ > ” hud ¢€ / A
edvdoKiuel uGAdrov. To d° aitioy ote H paPnows dia
A \ > al AAA 8 \ A \ > 5X
pev TO avtiketobar paGdAdAov, dua de TO ev ddiym
Oarrov yivera. Set 5’ det mpoceivar 7 TO mpds
“A , ”“ \ > ~ /, > \ /,
dv déyerar 7 TO dpbds AéyecOar, ei 7d A/eyopevov
aAnbes Kal pn émimddavov: Ear. yap Tadra xwpis
éxew, olov ““ dzrobvjoKew Set unbev dpaprdvorra ”’*
GAN odK doreiov. if TI agiav det yapety Tov
dEvov"'” aA’ ovK doretov. aN’ eav dua. dupe
exn’ * * doy ati dmroBavety py afvov ovTa. Tob
amoQavety.’ dow 8 dv mdaciw xn, tTocovTw
aorelorepov paiverat, ofov «i Kal Ta ovopmara

* Kock, C. A.F. iii. 209, p. 448. In the two first examples
**stranger’”’ refers to a distant and reserved manner, as we
say **don’t make yourself a stranger ’’; in the third éévos is
apparently to be taken in the sense of “alien.”’ Cope
translates: ‘‘for that too is of a different kind” (foreign,
alien to the two others; a\dérpior, belonging to something or
somebody else, opposed to olxetov). But the whole passage
is obscure.

412

RHETORIC, III. x1. 8-10

is a contradiction of the homonym, which is only
appropriate, if Anaschetus is an unbearable person.
And, ‘Thou shalt not be more of a stranger than a
stranger,’ or “not more than you should be,”
which is the same thing. And again,

The stranger must not always be a stranger,

for here too the word repeated is taken in a different
sense.? It is the same with the celebrated verse of
Anaxandrides,

It is noble to die before doing anything that deserves
death ; °
for this is the same as saying that “ it is worthy to
die when one does not deserve to die,” or, that “ it
is worthy to die when one is not worthy of death,”’
or, ““ when one does nothing that is worthy of death.”
Now the form of expression of these sayings is the
same; but the more concisely and antithetically
they are expressed, the greater is their popularity.
The reason is that antithesis is more instructive and
conciseness gives knowledge more rapidly. Further,
in order that what is said may be true and not
superficial, it must always either apply to a particular
person or be suitably expressed ; for it is possible
for it to have one quality and not the other. For
instance, ‘“ One ought to die guiltless of any offence,”
“The worthy man should take a worthy woman to
wife.’”’ There is no smartness in either of these
expressions, but there will be if both conditions are
fulfilled; ‘‘ It is worthy for a man to die, when he
is not worthy of death.”” The more special qualities
the expression possesses, the smarter it appears ;
for instance, if the words contain a metaphor, and a

> Kock, C.A.F. ii. Frag. 64, p. 163.
413

11

1413 a

12

13

ARISTOTLE

petadopa ein Kat petapopa Tovadi Kal avribeots
Kal mapiowots, Kal éyou évéepyeray.

Kioi 5€ Kal ai eixdves, dormep elpnrat Kal ev Tots
dvw, del eddoKyuotca tpdmov twa peTadopal.
del yap ex Sdvoiv éyovtar, womep 7 dvadoyov

/ e ¢ > ‘ / > / ”
peradhopa: olov 4 doris dayev éoru diddy “Apeos,

\ / / x ud \ = /
kat To€ov popuuy€ axopdos. ovTw pev obv Aéyovow
ody amdobv, TO 8 eimetv 7O TéEov Pdépuryya 7 THY
> / / ¢ ~ \ > / A A
aomida didAnv amdotv. Kai eikdlovor dé ovTas,

e / ? / 4 / ,
olov miOjKkw addAnriy, Aiyvw paxalouevw pdwra-
apdw yap ovvayerar. TO dé ed coTW Gray peTa-

\ Ss . ” \ > / \ > is ar aay
opa H* €or. yap <ikdoar THY aomida PiddAn “Apeos
Kal TO €peimiov pdaKe oikias, Kat tov Nuciparov

/ / .) / ¢ \ /
pavat Diroxrirnv civar Sednypevov tao Iparvos,
wotep eikace Opactpuaxyos iddv tov Nuxiparov
yTTnpevov td I[Ipdrvos paypwdotvra, Kopa@vra
d€ Kal adyynpov ert. ev ols pwadvoTa exmimrovow
of mountai, €dv pur) €0, Kal eay ed, eddoKipodow.
éyw 8 bray aodwWdow,

womep aéAwov otAa Ta oKéAn dope,

C4 / a a 4

dorep DiAdupwv Cvyouaxdv TH KkwpdKw.

‘ \ ~ / > > / > of i > > /
Kal Ta TowabTa mdvT eixdves ciciv. at 8 eikdves
ort peradopal, elpnrar modAdKis.

”

@ Or, reading ai for del, “approved similes are. . . .

> In the simple metaphor “ goblet”’’ is substituted for
‘* shield,” but sometimes additions are made to the word as
differently applied, such as ** of Ares’ and * without strings.”
These additions, besides involving greater detail (a char-
acteristic of the simile), distinctly bring out the contrast of the
two terms and make a simile, whereas the metaphor simply
transfers the meaning.

¢ In posture.

414

RHETORIC, III. xr. 10-13

metaphor of a special kind, antithesis, and equality
of clauses, and actuality.

Similes also, as said above, are always in a manner
approved metaphors ;% since they always consist of
two terms, like the proportional metaphor, as when
we say, for instance, that the shield is the goblet of
Ares, and the bow a lyre without strings. But such
an expression is not simple, but when we call the bow
a lyre, or the shield a goblet, it is.» And similes may
be formed as follows: a flute-player resembles an
ape,° a short-sighted man a spluttering lamp ; for in
both cases there is contraction.? But they are ex-
cellent when there is a proportional metaphor ; for it
is possible to liken a shield to the goblet of Ares and
a ruin to the rag of a house ; to say that Niceratus
is a Philoctetes bitten by Pratys, to use the simile of
Thrasymachus, when he saw Niceratus, defeated by
Pratys in a rhapsodic competition, still dirty with
his hair uncut. It is herein that poets are especially
condemned if they fail, but applauded if they succeed.
I mean, for instance, when they introduce an
answering clause : /

He carries his legs twisted like parsley,
or again,
Like Philammon punching the leather sack.

All such expressions are similes, and similes, as has
been often said, are metaphors of a kind.

4 Contraction of eyelids and flame.

¢ Like Philoctetes on Lemnos after he had been bitten by
the snake.

* When the concluding corresponds with the introductory
expression. This ‘‘answering clause’ is called apodosis
(p. 371), not restricted, as in modern usage, to the conclusion
of a conditional sentence.

415

ARISTOTLE

14 Kai ai Tapoysiar jueradopat d amr cidous € em €ldds
etow" olov dv Tis ws dyabov _TELoopevos avros
emaydynrar, etra BraBA, os 6 Kaprdfids pyar
TOV Aayes: Supe yap TO etpnLevov merovOaow.
obey jeev oby Ta, aoteta Aéyerar Kal didT1, ayedov
elpntat TO airvoy.

15 EKioi be Kal <ddoxyrodoae drrepBodat perapopat,
olov eis Urrwmuaopevov fs a) nTe © dv avrov
clvau avkapivwy Kddabov”’: épupov yap TL 70
dmramuov, aAAd To moAd ofddpa. 7d S€ wWomep TO
Kat 76, drepBoAr TH AcEer Svaddpovea.

dorep DrAdupwv Cvyopaydv To KwptvKw-
@nens So av adrov DiAdpupwva e«ivar pax pevov
TO KwWpvKw.
woTep aéAwov obAa ra oKxédAn dopetv-

@nOns 3° av od oxédAn GdAa oéAwa exew odrws oda.
16 etal Se daepBodal peipaxwwdes* sfodpdrnra yap
Snrodow. 510 dpyrlopevor Aéyovor padAvora*

ovd €t or TOoa doin doa Ydpalds Te KOVIS TE.
Kovpynv 5° od yapew >Ayapeuvovos >Arpeidao,
ovd” «i xpvaein “Adpodirn KdAdos épilor,
épya & ’A@nvaty.
usb xp@vrar dé podAvora rovrw oi “Arrucol piropes.
510 mpeoButepw A€yew amperes.

* Or, “he says it is a case of the Carpathian and the
hare.’’ Aninhabitant of the island of Carpathus introduced a
brace of hares, which so multiplied that they devoured all
the crops and ruined the farmers (like the rabbits in Australia).

> Iliad, ix. 385.

¢ This must be taken as a parenthetical remark, if it is
Aristotle’s at all.

416

RHETORIC, IIL. x1. 14-16

Proverbs also are metaphors from species to species.
If a man, for instance, introduces into his house
something from which he expects to benefit, but
afterwards finds himself injured instead, it is as the
Carpathian® says of the hare; for both have ex-
perienced the same misfortunes. This is nearly all
that can be said of the sources of smart sayings and
the reasons which make them so.

Approved hyperboles are also metaphors. For
instance, one may say of a man whose eye is all
black and blue, ‘‘ you would have thought he was a
basket of mulberries,’ because the black eye is
something purple, but the great quantity constitutes
the hyperbole. Again, when one says “‘ like this or
that” there is a hyperbole differing only in the
wording :

Like Philammon punching the leather sack,

or, “ you would have thought that he was Philammon
fighting the sack ”’ ;

Carrying his legs twisted like parsley,

or, ““ you would have thought that he had no legs,
but parsley, they being so twisted.” There is some-
thing youthful about hyperboles; for they show ”
vehemence. Wherefore those who are in a passion ©
most frequently make use of them :

Not even were he to offer me gifts as many in number as
the sand and dust . . . but a daughter of Agamemnon, son

of Atreus, I will not wed, not even if she rivalled golden
Aphrodite in beauty, or Athene in accomplishments.”

(Attic orators are especially fond of hyperbole.°)
Wherefore ¢ it is unbecoming for elderly people to
make use of them,
# Because they are boyish.
25 417

ARISTOTLE

12. Act d€ pur) AeANOEvan bru GAAH Exdorw yéver
apporre. Adkis. od yap % adr ypaduct) Kal
aywvioTicn, obd€ SnunyopiKn Kal Sicavikn. dppw
de avayen eidévar: ro ev ydp eorw €dAAnvilew
eriotacba, TO dé pr) avayKalecbar KaTaow7ar,
yw / ~ ~ + id
av tt PovAnrat petradodva. tots dAdo, dmep
maoXovaw ot pa) emuoTdevor ypddew. €oTr Se

/ \ A ¢€ > /, > A A
A€Eis ypadixn pev 7) axpiBeordrn, aywroruc dé
9 UmoKpitiKwraTn. Tavrns dé dvo «idn: 7) per
yap nbn 7 dé mabynricn. 80 Kal ot dmoKpurai
7a TovabTa TOV Spaydrwv SidKover, Kal of mounral
tovs Towvrous. PBacrdlovra: dé of avayvworuKol,

tA > \ \ ¢ /
olov Xawpjywr (axpiBis yap wdomep oyoypados)
Kat Aucdprios tv di0vpayBoroy. Kal mapa-
Badddpevor of pev Tdv ypadiKdv ev trois ay@ot
A / e A ~ ¢ / Ss ,
arevol paivovrar, ot dé THV pyrdpwv eb AexOevres
iduwwrucol ev Tats xepatv. atriov 8 dtu ev TH aya.
4 ~
apporrer’ 610 Kal Ta UroKpituKd adnpnuevyns THs
broKkpicews od TowdvTa TO adbtav epyov daivera
e070, ofov Ta Te aovvdera Kal TO moAAdKIS TO
a ~ ~ ~ 4
abro eimeiy ev TH ypadikh dp0Ds amodoxyualerac,
ev b€ aywvioTiKH Kal ot pyTopes xp@vrat* eor1
3 yap vroKpitiKd. avaykn dé peraBadArew 7d adro
A ~ ,

Aéyovras: Sep ws mpoodotorel TH troxpiveoBar:

“obrdés eoTw 6 KAcbas budv, obTos eoTw 6 e&-

amaTioas, obTos 6 TO EaxXaTov mpodobvas emLxELp7,-

cas.’ olov Kat DiArjpwv 6 droKxpiris émoier ev
@ See 2. 13 of this book.
» What follows, to the end of § 3, is of the nature of a
parenthesis, not immediately connected with the subject. of

the chapter.
¢ The variation in the form of the expression suggests a
similar variation in the form of the delivery or declamation.

418

bo

RHETORIC, III. xi. 1-3

12. But we must not lose sight of the fact that a
different style is suitable to each kind of Rhetoric.
That of written compositions is not the same as that
of debate ; nor, in the latter, is that of public speak-
ing the same as that of the law courts. But it is
necessary to be acquainted with both; for the one
requires a knowledge of good Greek, while the other
prevents the necessity of keeping silent when we
wish to communicate something to others, which
happens to those who do not know how to write.
The style of written compositions is most precise,
that of debate is most suitable for delivery. Of the
latter there are two kinds, ethical and emotional ;
this is why actors are always running after plays of .
this character, and poets after suitable actors. How-
ever, poets whose works are only meant for reading
are also popular, as Chaeremon, who is as precise as
a writer of speeches, and Licymnius * among dithy-
rambic poets. When compared, the speeches of
writers appear meagre in public debates, while those
of the rhetoricians, however well delivered, are
amateurish when read. The reason is that they are
only suitable to public debates; hence speeches
suited for delivery, when delivery is absent, do not
fulfil their proper function and appear silly. For
instance, asyndeta and frequent repetition of the
same word are rightly disapproved in written speech,
but in public debate even rhetoricians make use of
them, for they lend themselves to acting.’ (But one
must vary the expression when one repeats the same
thing, for this as it were paves the way for declama-
tion: ¢ as, “ This is he who robbed you, this is he
who deceived you, this is he who at last attempted
to betray you.” This is what Philemon the actor.

419

4

14l4a

ARISTOTLE

~ > / ld Li 4
te tH "“Avatavdpidov yepovropavia, dre Aé€yer
ce *P 8 4, a] A Ul Xr AD) a? ‘ > ~

addpavOus Kat IlaAapndns,” Kai év 7 mpo-
/, ~ > ~ ‘ ce" D> 7399 baa} /, ‘A
Aoyw tav EiceBdy ro “éyw’ eav yap tis Ta
To.atra pn vmoKpivyTat, yiverau “6 tiv SoKov
pepwr.”
>
Kat ra dovvdera woadtws “ 4dOov, amijvrnca,
ededunv’’’ avayKn yap vroKpivecbar Kal pa) ws
év déyovta TH adr@ Oar Kal tovw eimeiv. Ere
” ” / \ > 7 > ow \ / \
€xet loudv TL Ta aovvdeTa: ev low yap xpovw TroAAG
Soke? eippabat: 6 yap advvdeopos Ev movel Ta TOAAG,
7 > >A > a ~ Lj > / ” ‘
wor eav eEaipeOH, SHdov drt Ttobvavriov €orat TO
év odd. exer odv av&naw: “FAPov, SicAexOnv,
e , 99 ‘ tal ¢ cal hi
ixérevoa’’ moda SoKet dtrepideiv doa etzev.
~ \ 4 cal \o y ~
totTo d5é BovAeTrau trovety Kai “Opnpos ev TO

Nipeds ad Lvunber,
Nweds *AydAains,
Nipeds ds KaddAdoros.

\ A \ ‘ ” > , \ 4
mept od} yap moAXa elpnrat, avdyKn Kal moAAdKis
> A > & ‘ / \ ‘ a
eipjoOar €¢ otv Kal toAAdkis, Kal moAAa Soxel,
4 »” ov \ A \ /
wore nvénoey arak puvnobeis 51a Tov tapadoytopor,

« 'The meaning of this has not been satisfactorily explained.
On the face of it, it seems to mean that the excellence of
Philemon’s delivery consisted in his way of declaiming
passages in which the same words were repeated. Philemon
is not to be confused with the writer of the New Comedy,
the rival and contemporary of Menander.

® Used of a stiff, ungraceful speaker.

¢ Spengel’s reading here is: mo\\d doxet ‘* brepeidey boa
elrov,”” moda doxet being parenthetical, and wtwepeider boa

420

RHETORIC, III. x1. 3-4

did in The Old Man’s Folly of Anaxandrides, when he
says ** Rhadamanthus and Palamedes,’’ and when he
repeats the word “I”’ in the prologue to The Pious.*
For unless such expressions are varied by action, it
is a case of “the man who carries the beam” ? in
the proverb.)

It is the same with asyndeta: “I came, I met, I
entreated.”” For here delivery is needed, and the
words should not be pronounced with the same tone
and character, as if there was only one clause.
Further, asyndeta have a special characteristic ; for
in an equal space of time many things appear to be
said, because the connecting particle makes many
things one, so that, if it be removed, it is clear that
the contrary will be the case, and that the one will
become many. Therefore an asyndeton produces
amplification: thus, in “I came, I conversed, I
besought,” the hearer seems to be surveying many
things, all that the speaker said. This also is
Homer’s intention in the passage

Nireus, again, from Syme .. .,

Nireus son of Aglaia . . .,
Nireus, the most beautiful . . .;4

for it is necessary that one of whom much has been
said should be often mentioned ; if then the name is
often mentioned, it seems as if much has been said °;
so that, by means of this fallacy, Homer has increased

eirov part of the quotation. Jebb translates: ‘I came, I
spoke to him, I besought’’ (these seem many things); ‘‘ he
disregarded all I said” (which certainly gives a more natural
sense to tepetder).

4 liad, ii. 671 ff.

¢ Cope translates: **they think that, if the name is often
repeated, there must be a great deal to say about its owner” ;
but can this be got out of the Greek (eipijc@ac)?

421

ARISTOTLE

Kal pevenv memoinxer, ovdapod voTepov avTod
dyov momaduevos.

5 “H pev odv Snpnyopuch Aegis kal mavrehas € €0LKE
Th oxuaypagig: dow yap av mAciwy H oO oxos,
Toppwrépw 7 Yea, du0 Ta aKxpibH mepiepya Kat
xelpw paiverar ev ddorépois: dé SuKaviKy aKpt-
Beorépa. ete d€ paddAov 1 evi KpirH: eAdyvorov
yap €oTw pytopicfs: evovvorrov yap paAXAov 7d
oiketov Tod mpdyparos Kal To aAAdrpiov, Kal 6
ayav ameotw, wote Kalapa % Kplow. 810 ody
of avrot ev maou. tovrois evdoKyLoboL prTopes:
GAN Sov pddiora broKxpicews, evTad0a HKioTa
axpiPewa évr. Todro dé, drov dwvis, Kal padiora
O7rov peydAns.

‘H pev otv emideuk TUT) Adéis ypapuccrrdrn

67O yap épyov abtis avdyvwots* Sevrépa de an
LKaVLKT}. TO be mpocd.atpetobar id Ackw, OTL
Hoctav Set Kal peyadomperh, mrepiepyov" Ti yap
paArov 7 7H ocppova. Kad eAevbépiov Kal et tis aAAyn
"ous dpe} ; TO yap ndetav elvat moujoet Sijdov
OTt TA elpnpeva., elmrep opbas cprorau a) apern Tis
Aefews: Tivos yap eveca Set capt Kal p41) Tamewny
elvar aAAa mpémovoav; av Te yap adoAccyA, ov

4 Intended to produce the effect of finished work at a
distance before a large number of spectators.

» The meaning apparently is that there is no discussion,
as might be the case when there were several judges, so
that the decision is clear and unbiased. dydv and dywricrixh
héés are terms used for debate (e.g. in the law courts) and
the style suited to it (cf. § 1). Cope’s editor refers to Cicero,
Ad Aitticum, i. 16. 8 ** remoto illo studio contentionis, quem
vos [you Athenians] d-yéva appellatis.” Jebb translates: “the

422

RHETORIC, III. x1. 4-6

the reputation of Nireus, though he only mentions
him in one passage ; he has perpetuated his memory,
although he never speaks of him again.

The deliberative style is exactly like a rough
sketch,* for the greater the crowd, the further off is
the point of view; wherefore in both too much
refinement is a superfluity and even a disadvantage.
But the forensic style is more finished, and more so
before a single judge, because there is least oppor-
tunity of employing rhetorical devices, since the
mind more readily takes in at a glance what belongs
to the subject and what is foreign to it; there is no
discussion,’ so the judgement is clear. This is why
the same orators do not excel in all these styles 5"
where action is most effective, there the style is
least finished, and this is a case in which voice,,,
especially a loud one, is needed.

The epideictic style is especially suited to written
compositions, for its function is reading ; ° and next to
it comes the forensic style. It is superfluous to
make the further distinction that style should be
pleasant or magnificent. Why so, any more than
temperate, liberal, or anything else that indicates
moral virtue? For it is evident that, if virtue of
style has been correctly defined, what we have said
will suffice to make it pleasant. For why, if not to
please, need it be clear, not mean, but appropriate ?
If it be too diffuse, or too concise, it will not be

turmoil is absent, so that the judgement is serene” (in a
note, ** unclouded ’’).

¢ This does not seem to agree with the general view.
Funeral orations of the nature of panegyrics, for instance,
were certainly meant to be spoken; but the épyov or proper
function of an epideictic may be said to consist in reading,
in its being agreeable to read. Its réAos or end is to be ead:

423

ARISTOTLE

/, A oN , \ a
cadns, obd€ av avvTopos. GAA SHAov drt TO pwécov
¢ a
apporrer. Kat TO yOelav Ta €ipnueva Troimoer, av
my 0A \ > 0 \ \ / \ ¢ C4 /, \
ed wx07, TO etwOos Kat Eevikdv, Kal 6 puljds, Kal
To mavov €k Too mpémovTos. Tepl pev ody THs
/ A
AgEews eipnrar, Kat Kowh mept amdvtTwy Kal tdia
\@ / Xr \ \ \ / > a
mept Exactov yévos* Aowrov Sé wept TaEews €izreiv.
13. "Eore 5€ rot Adyou 800 pépy avayKatov
yap TO Te TpAyjwa elzelv TEpl od, Kal TOT GmrodEtEaL.
PS) \ > / \ > a ”“ > cal A
LO €lmovTa py amrodei~ar 7 amodetfar put) mpo-
elmovTa aOUvVaTOV: O TE yap amodeLKVUWY TL aTroO-
Seixvuct, Kal 6 mpodéywy evexa Tod amodei&au
2 mpodéyer. todtrwr Se ro prev mpdbecis eort TO dé
, ° a” ” / bid \ A /,
mioris, womep av et Tis Su€AoL Ott TO prev TmpOBAnLa
\ \ 32 / ~ A ~ / v4
3 70 d€ amdderis. vov dé Siatpodar yeAoiws: Sinynats
yap mov Tod dikaviKod povov Adyov éotiv, emt-
SevxTixod dé Kal Snunyopikot mas evddxerau
elvar Sunynow olay Aێyovow, 7} Ta mpos TOV avTi-
1414 Ouxov, 7 emiAoyov Tav amodeukTuK@v; mpoolpuov
S€ Kal avrurapaPoAy Kati emdvodos é€v traits Snun-
yoptais Tore yiveTat, Grav avTWoyia 7. Kal yap
€ / \ i? > A / AA / > > >
4 KaTnyopia Kal 4 aroAoyia moAAdKis, add’ ody
4 ovpBovaAy: adr’ 6 eémidoyos ere odd€ StixaviKod
mavrTos, olov é€dav puKpos 6 Adyos, 7) TO mpayya

« The generally accepted divisions are: mpooluov (exordium),
dupynors (narrative), wicris (proof), éri\oyos (peroration).
(deiyynots is a species of mpddecrs, which is used instead of it
just before.) Aristotle objects that it is (as a rule) only the
forensic speech which requires a regular dijynous, a full and
detailed statement of what has happened before. In
epideictic and demonstrative (deliberative) speeches, the

424

RHETORIC, III. x1. 6—x111. 3

clear ; but it is plain that the mean is most suitable.
What we have said will make the style pleasant, if
it contains a happy mixture of proper and “ foreign”
words, of rhythm, and of persuasiveness resulting
from propriety. This finishes what we had to say
about style; of all the three kinds of Rhetoric in
general, and of each of them in particular. It only
remains to speak of arrangement.

13. A speech has two parts. It is necessary to
state the subject, and then to prove it. Wherefore
it is impossible to make a statement without proving
it, or to prove it without first putting it forward ;
for both he who proves proves something, and he
who puts something forward does so in order to
prove it. The first of these parts is the statement
of the case, the second the proof, a similar division
to that of problem and demonstration. But the
division now generally made is absurd; for narrative
only belongs in a manner to forensic speech, but in
epideictic or deliberative speech how is it possible that
there should be narrative as it is defined, or a refuta-
tion; or an epilogue in demonstrative speeches ? %
In deliberative speeches, again, exordium, compari-
son, and recapitulation are only admissible when
there is a conflict of opinion. For both accusation
and defence are often found in deliberative, but not
qua deliberative speech. And further, the epilogue
does not even belong to every forensic speech, for
instance, when it is short, or the matter is easy to
object of which is to prove something, there is no need of
another existing division called the refutation of the adversary,
and in the demonstrative there can be no room for an epilogue,
which is not a summary of proofs and arguments. ‘Thus
the necessary divisions of a speech are really only two:

mpidects and mioris, or at most four.
425

ARISTOTLE

evpvypovevtov’ ovpBaiver yap tod juxKovs ad-
atpetobar.

4 “Avayrata dpa popia mpdbeow Kat miotis. ida
pev odv tadra, Ta dé wAciota mpooimiov mpdbeats
miotis émtAoyos’ Ta yap mpos Tov avridiKov TOV
mlOTEw@VY €OTL, Kal 7 avTiTapaBoAn avEnaws TaV
adrod, woTe pépos TL TOV miaTewv' amodEiKVUaL
yap TL 6 mowWdv TobrTo, GAN’ od 76 mpooimiov, odd”

56 émidoyos, aX dvapysuwioKer.s €orar odv, av
Tis Ta Tovabra Siaiph, dmep emolovy ot mept Ocd-
Swpov, Sipynow Eerepov Kal emdinynows Kal mpo-
dinynots Kat édeyyos Kat émeEeAeyyos. Set Sé
cidds te A€yovta Kai Svadopdv dvoua ridecOar.
et 5€ pu}, yiverar Kevov Kal Anpddes, ofov Aucdpvios
Tout ev TH Téxvn, emovpwow dvoudlwv Kal azro-
mAdvnow Kal dlovs. :

14. To peév odv mpooipidy eorw dapyi) Adyou,
Omep ev Trowoet mpddoyos Kal év adAnoer mpoavAvov:
mdvTa yap apxat tar” eici, Kal ofov ddomoinats
T@ €MOVTL. TO [ev OvV TpoavALoy OuoLov TH TOV
ETLOELKTLK@Y TpooyLiw* Kal yap ot avAnrat, O TL
av «0 €é€xwow avtdAjoa, tTodro mpoavdAjaavtes
ouvjibay TH evdociw, Kal ev Tots émidevKTuKots
Adyous Set otTw ypddew: 6 Tu yap dv BovAnra
e000 c<imdvra evdobvar Kal ovvdibar. Omep mavrTes
movovow. Tapddevypa To THs “looxparous “EXévyns

« 4,¢. its use is to recall the main facts briefly (§ 4 end),
which in a short speech is needless.

» Plato, Phaedrus, 266 p, where the additional kinds of
narrative are omitted, and their place taken by wicrwors and
émimlorwors (confirmation of the proof).

426

RHETORIC, III. xm. 3—xtv. 1

recollect ; for in the epilogue what happens is that

there is a reduction of length.* a

1So then the necessary parts of a speech are the

statement of the case and proof. These divisions |

are appropriate to every speech, and at the most
the parts are four in number—exordium, statement,

proof, epilogue ; for refutation of an opponent is part

of the proofs, and comparison is an amplification of
one’s own case, and therefore also part of the proofs ;
for he who does this proves something, whereas the
exordium and the epilogue are merely aids to
memory.’ Therefore, if we adopt all such divisions
we shall be following Theodorus ® and his school,
who distinguished narrative, additional narrative, and
preliminary narrative, refutation and additional re-
futation. But one must only adopt a name to express
a distinct species or a real difference ; otherwise, it
becomes empty and silly, like the terms introduced
by Licymnius in his “ Art,” where he speaks
of “being wafted along,’ ‘wandering from the
subject,’ ° and “ ramifications.’?

14. The exordium is the beginning of a speech, as
the prologue in poetry and the prelude in: flute-
playing ; for all these are beginnings, and as it were
a paving the way for what follows. The prelude
resembles the exordium of epideictic speeches ; for
as flute-players begin by playing whatever they can
execute skilfully and attach it to the key-note, so
also in epideictic speeches should be the composition
of the exordium; the speaker should say at once
whatever he likes, give the key-note and then attach
the main subject. And all do this, an example
being the exordium of the Helen of Isocrates ; for

¢ Or, ** diverting the judge’s attention.”
427

}
}

ARISTOTLE

/ cal a
mpooyitovs odfev yap oikeiov tmdpyer Tots €pt-
oruxois Kat “EXevn. dua d€ Kat eay exromion,
apporrer jun) 6Aov tov Adyov juoedH elvac.

2 Aéyerat d€ Ta TaV emideiKTiKaVY mpooima €&
> / “ / Ul \ > ~ >
emaivov 7 yYdyou: olov Topyias wev ev TH “OAvp-
7UK@ Aoyw “dad TwolA@v d&vor OavpdleoOar, @
avdpes “EAAnves:’’ érawet yap rods tas mav-
nyvpets avvdyovras: "Iooxparns Sé eye, Ste Tas
pev TOV cwudrwy dpetas Swpeais ériunoav, Tots

30° €d dpovotow ovfev aOAov émoincav. Kal amd

~ e Ad an \ > A ~ ‘
oupPovdArs, ofov dru det tods ayabods Tysdv, S16
Kat adros “Apioreidnv érawe?, 7) Tods Tovwvrous
a“ / ? ~ 7 ~ > > oe
ov ponte evddoKyotor ponte datAou, add’ door

1415a dyabot dvres ddndAor, womep *AdeEavSpos 6

4 [Ipidpov: obros yap ovpBovreder. err 8 ex TOV
dicavixdv mpooiwv: tobro 8 early é« t&v mpds
TOV akpoaTHV, ef mept mapaddéov Adyos 7 mepl
xarerot 7 epi TteApvdAnpwevov zodAois, ware
ovyyvepnv exew, olov Xoupidos

vov & oére mavra dédacrat.

Ta bev otv TOV emideckTiKdv Adywv mpoolpia eK
/ ~
rovTwv, e€ emaivov, ex ydoyou, ek mpotpomas, e€
amoTpoTs, €k T&V mpos Tov aKpoaThy: Set Se 7
féva 7) oixeta elvar Ta evddcya TO AOyw.
\ \ lot ~ / a ~ Ld
5 Ta d€ rod diuxavixod mpooimua det AaBety dre

* The subject of the oration was the praise of Helen, but
Isocrates took the opportunity of attacking the sophists.
This exemplifies his skill in the introduction of matter not
strictly proper to, or in common with, the subject. The
key-note is Helen; but the exordium is an attack on the
Eristics, with special allusion to the Cynies and Megarians.

» Of Samos, epic poet, author of a poem on the Persian

428

RHETORIC, III. xiv. 1-5

the eristics and Helen have nothing in common.?
At the same time, even if the speaker wanders from
the point, this is more appropriate than that the
speech should be monotonous.

In epideictic speeches, the sources of the exordia
are praise and blame, as Gorgias, in the Olympiacus,
says, ‘‘ Men of Greece, you are worthy to be admired
by many,” where he is praising those who instituted
the solemn assemblies. Isocrates on the other hand
blames them because they rewarded bodily excel-
lences, but instituted no prize for men of wisdom.
Exordia may also be derived from advice, for instance,
«‘ one should honour the good,” wherefore the speaker
praises Aristides, or such as are neither famous nor
worthless, but who, although they are good, remain
obscure, as Alexander, son of Priam; for this is a
piece of advice. Again, they may be derived from
forensic exordia, that is to say, from appeals to the
hearer, if the subject treated is paradoxical, difficult,
or commonly known, in order to obtain indulgence,
like Choerilus ? :

But now when all has been allotted.

These then are the sources of epideictic exordia—
praise, blame, exhortation, dissuasion, appeals to the
hearer. And these exordia° may be either foreign
or intimately connected with the speech.

As for the exordia of the forensic speech, it must

war, from which this half-line and the context preserved in
the Scholiast are taken. He complains that whereas the
poets of olden times had plenty to write about, the field of
poetry being as yet untilled, it was now all apportioned, and
he, the last of the poets, was left behind, unable to find “a
new chariot for the race-course of his song.”’

¢ évddoiua here = mpootuia.

429

for)

«J

ARISTOTLE

> A , id ~ 4, c /,
ravTo Svvarar omep Tov Spaydrwy of mpodAoyot
Kal TOV éem@v TA Tpooiwias Ta prev yap T@V Ot-
OvpapBwv cpora Tots émiderxTucots*
‘ \ \ \ a ” ~
dua oe Kal Tea O@pa elite oxdAa.

ev S€ Tots Adyous kal emeat detypud. €or Tod Adyov,
iva mpoevdaor mept ob jv 6 6 Adyos Kai pr) Kpepyrat
u) Sidvoua TO yap ddpiorov avg 6 bods obv
woTep eis THY xeipa TH dpxny TOLet EXOWEVOV
aKorovbeiy TH Adyw. Sia TooTO

pv dewde Ded,

avopa pou evverre bali

nyEO Hou Adyov dAdov, dmws ‘Agias amo yains
nAGev és Edvpawrnv aéAquos peéyas.

Kal ot Tpayucol SnAobou zrepi TO Spap.a,, Kav a)
evOds Gomep Edpuridns, adv év 7 mpodrdyw ye
mov, Womep Kal LodokAjs

euot tatip Av I1déAvBos.

Kal 7 Kwumdla woatrws. TO wey odv avayKatd-
TaTov €pyov Tob mpooysiov Kat Ldvov TobTO, SnADoau
Ti €oTL TO Tédos ob éveca 6 Adyos. 8107p ay
dfjAov a Kat putKpov TO mpaypa, od xpnoréov
mpoousiw. Ta d€ aAda €ldn ols xp@vrar, iarped-

« A parenthetical remark to the effect that epideictic
exordia are different. Those of a forensic speech are like
prologues and epic exordia, but it is different with epideictic,
which may be wild, high-flown, as in the example given from
an unknown author.

» That is, forensic speeches. dpduact has been suggested
for Adyors.

© Jliad, i. 1. 4 Odyssey, i. 1.

430

RHETORIC, III. xiv. 5-7

be noted that they produce the same effect as
dramatic prologues and epic exordia (for those of
dithyrambs resemble epideictic exordia :

For thee and thy presents or spoils).?

But in speeches ® and epic poems the exordia provide
a sample of the subject, in order that the hearers
may know beforehand what it is about, and that the
mind may not be kept in suspense, for that which is
undefined leads astray; so then he who puts the
beginning, so to say, into the hearer’s hand enables
him, if he holds fast to it, to follow the story. Hence
the following exordia :

Sing the wrath, O Muse.°

Tell me of the man, O Muse.?

Inspire me with another theme, how from the land of
Asia a great war crossed into Europe.®

Similarly, tragic poets make clear the subject of their
drama, if not at the outset, like Euripides, at least
somewhere in the prologue, like Sophocles,

My father was Polybus.’

It is the same incomedy. So then the most essential
and special function of the exordium is to make clear
what is the end or purpose of the speech ; wherefore
it should not be employed, if the subject is quite
clear or unimportant. All the other forms of exordia
in use are only remedies,’ and are common to all three

¢ From Choerilus (§ 4).

* Sophocles, Oed. Tyr. 774. But this can hardly be called
the prologue.

9 That is, special remedies in the case of the hearers suffer-
ing from ‘inattention, unfavourable disposition, and the
like” (Cope).

431

ARISTOTLE

para Kat Kowd. Aéyerar 5é€ tadTa ex Te Too
Aéyovros Kal Too adKpoatod Kal Tod mpdyyatos
~ ~ ~ >
Kal Tod evayTiov. mept av’Trod pev Kal ToD avTL-
/ a ‘ A ~ ‘ ~
dixov, doa epi SdiaBoAjny Aboar Kal Tovpoat,
” \ ° c , > , A ‘
cote Se ovx opolws: arrodoyoupevm ev yap
~ \ \ / ~ r Bae ~
mp@tov Ta mpos SiaPodAjv, KarnyopodvT 8 ev TH
> /, > “A , > »” \ \ \
emiAdym. Sd 6 dé, odK ddndAov- Tov pev yap
> , bid 7 > / € ri >
amoAoyovpevov, oTav wedAn eiod€ew adrov, avay-
Katov | aveAeiy ta KwAvovTa, Wore AUTéov TpPaToV
tiv SvaBodAjnv: 7H Se SivaBaddAdAovte ev TO emriAdyw
diaBAnréov, va prvnwovedvowor padAdov,
& Ta dé mpds Tov aKpoariy EK TE TOD evvoUV
Tounoar Kal eK TOD opyloat, Kal eviote 5é eK TOD
A hal > , > \ on /
mpooeKTiKov 7 Tovvavtiov’ od yap del oupdeper
a , \ A > / ~
Tovey mpoceKTiKov, 510 oAAoi eis yeAwra meipa@v-
/ > A > / id > 4,
Tat mpoayew. eis de evpabevay dmavra avdger,
77 7, \ A > ~ /
edy tis BovAnTat, Kal TO emetKh paiveoBar: mpoc-
1415 b €xovor yap paAdAov rovTos. mpooeKruKol dé Tots
peydAots, Tots idtows, Tots Pavpaorois, Tots 7d€ow*
\ a > al ¢ \ 7, ¢ , oA
S10 Sel eurroveiy Ws Tept TovovTwy 6 Adyos. edv
dé put) mpocektucos, OTL puiKpov, OTe ovdEev mpos
exeivous, OTe Avmnpov.
a ”
8 Act dé pr) AavOdvew Gri wdvra eEw Tod Adyou
~ ~ >
Ta Towadra* mpos hatdov yap axpoarny Kal Ta

é£w Tob mpdyparos aKkovovTa, Emel av jut) TOLODTOS
432

RHETORIC, III. x1v. 7-8

branches of Rhetoric. These are derived from the
speaker, the hearer, the subject, and the opponent.
From the speaker and the opponent, all that helps
to destroy or create prejudice. But this must not be
done in the same way ; for the defendant must deal
with this at the beginning, the accuser in the
epilogue. The reason is obvious. The defendant,
when about to introduce himself, must remove all
obstacles, so that he must first clear away all pre-
judice ; the accuser must create prejudice in the
epilogue, that his hearers may have a livelier re-
collection of it.

The object of an appeal to the hearer is to make
him well disposed or to arouse his indignation, and
sometimes to engage his attention or the opposite ;
for it is not always expedient to engage his attention,
which is the reason why many speakers try to make
their hearers laugh. As for rendering the hearers
tractable, everything will lead up to it if a person
wishes, including the appearance of respectability,
because respectable persons command more atten-
tion. Hearers pay most attention to things that are
important, that concern their own interests, that are
astonishing, that are agreeable; wherefore one
should put the idea into their heads that the speech
deals with such subjects. To make his hearers in-
attentive, the speaker must persuade them that the
matter is unimportant, that it does not concern them,
that it is painful.

But we must not lose sight of the fact that all
such things are outside the question, for they are
only addressed to a hearer whose judgement is poor
and who is ready to listen to what is beside the case ;
for if he is not a man of this kind, there is no need

QF 433

ARISTOTLE

i aA ~
}, odBev Set mpooysiov, adr 7) daov Tod Tmpaypa
> A ~ 7 ” C4 ~ ta
eimety kehadawwdas, va éxn worep capa Kehadjpy.
” ~ ~
9€TL TO TpocEKTLKOvS TroLEiy TdavTWY TOV pep@v
/ vA a ~ A > ~ ~ n”
Kowov, eav dS€n* mavtTaxod yap davidcr pwaddov 7
> , a“ ~
apxopevot. 810 yedotov ev apy trarrew, dre
pddwora mavres mpooéxovres akpo@vTa. wore
Omov av % Kappos, AeKréov “Kai por mpooeyxeTe
‘ ~ > A A ~ > \ a . , a”
Tov vodv' ovfev yap paddrov euov 7) béerepov
kat ““ép@ yap tyiv olov oddemdrore”’ aKknKkoare
dewdv 7 ovTw Bavpacrdv. tobro 8 éoriv, womep
” / 7 / @ > ,
epn IIpdducos, dre vuordlovev of aKpoaTai, map-
LAA ~ 8 / > a a de
10 <uBaddAew THs mevrnKovradpdxpyou adrois. Ort de
\ \ > a > ~
m™pos Tov akpoaTny odx Hmep axpoarys, dHAov-
mavres yap 7 SiaBdAAovow 7 ddBovs amoAvovrat
€v Tots Tpooutots.

” 2 A \ > ¢ eA
avag, €pW MEV OVX OTTWS oTovons vumr0.

/ /
ti ppoualy;
\ ¢ ‘ \ ~ ” ” ~
kal of movnpov TO mpayua exovres 7) SoKodvTes:
mavraxod yap BéAriov SiarpiPew 7 ev TO mpaypare.
‘ ¢ ~ > \ > / / > A \
S10 of dodAot od Ta epwrupeva A€yovow aAAa Ta
, \ / / > A a
ll KUKAw, Kal mpoowwdlovrar. mdbev 8° edvous Se?
mov, elpnra, Kat tTav GAAwy ExaoTov Tay
4 > \ > > /
rovovtwy. eel & «bd Adyerat

-* 4.e. to claim the hearer’s attention at the beginning, for
every one is keen to listen then, but later on attention
slackens,

* The hearer gua hearer should be unbiased, but in fact

434

RHETORIC, III. x1v. 8-11

of an exordium, except just to make a summary
statement of the subject, so that, like a body, it
may have a head. Further, engaging the hearers’
attention is common to all parts of the speech, if
necessary ; for attention slackens everywhere else
rather than at the beginning. Accordingly, it is
ridiculous to put this? at the beginning, at a time
when all listen with the greatest attention. Where-
fore, when the right moment comes, one must say,
“And give me your attention, for it concerns you
as much as myself’’; and, “I will tell you such
a thing as you have never yet ” heard of, so strange
and wonderful. This is what Prodicus used to do;
whenever his hearers began to nod, he would throw
in a dash of his fifty-drachma lecture. But it is
clear that one does not speak thus to the hearer
qua hearer;® for all in their exordia endeavour
either to arouse prejudice or to remove their own
apprehensions :

O prince, I will not say that with haste [I have come
breathless].°

Why this preamble ? 4

This is what those also do who have, or seem to have,
a bad case; for it is better to lay stress upon any-
thing rather than the case itself. That is why slaves
never answer questions directly but go all round
them, and indulge in preambles. We have stated °
how the hearer’s goodwill is to be secured and all
other similar states of mind. And since it is rightly
said,

hearers often suffer from the defects referred to in §7, for
which certain forms of exordia are remedies.

¢ Sophocles, Antigone, 223.
@ Euripides, Iphig. Taur. 1162. © 175 8.

435

12.

1416a

ARISTOTLE

dds pw” es Dainxas dpirov eAbeiv 78° edeewov,
tovTwr det do atoydlecbar.

°E de a > 5 a ” PS) lal a

v O€ Tots emiderkTiKois olecfar Set rovety
ouvevawetobar Tov akpoarnv, 7 avdTov % ‘yevos
H emirndedpar’ advrod 7 auds yé mws 6 yap A€yet

/ > “ > / > / 7 > ‘
LwKparys ev TH emitadiw, adnbes, Ort ov xaXerrov
> / > > / > a“ > >
A@nvaiovs ev "AOnvaious émaweiv aAX’ ev Aaxedat-
foviots.

Ta dé tod Snunyopixod ex ta&v Tod SucavuKod
Adyou €oriv, dice 8 AKvora exer Kal yap Kal trepl
od toact, Kai oddev Seirar TO mpaypa mpoouysiov,
> > n” > > \ nn A > , ” A \
arr’ 7 dv’ adrov 4 Tovds avTWéyovTas, 7) eav jr)
nAikov BovAer drrokapBdvwow, GAN 7 peilov 7
eAarrov. S10 7 duaBdArcw 7) arodvecPar avayKn,
Kal 7 avfjoa 7) per@oar. rovtwy dé evexa mpo-

/ aA ”“ / / e > /
oysiov deirar, 7 Kdopov xapw, ws adroxaPdadra
paiverar, eav pn éxn. Towdrov yap to Topytov
> 7 > > / OA \ ,
eykwwov eis “HAeious: oddev yap mpoeEayKwvioas

OA / ) \ »” cep /
ovde mpoavaxwioas evOds dpxerar “*HXis woAts
evoaimwr.”

15. Ilepi dé SiaBoAjs &v pev ro &€€ dv ay tis
broAnypw Svoxeph amodvoato: odfev yap Svadhéper
elre e€imovros Twos €lTe uj, WoTe TodTO Kabddov.
dAXos Tpdm0s worTe mpos Ta apdioBynrotpeva
> ~ ”“ ¢ > ” a“ € > r. / ” >
amavrTav, 7 ws odK €oTw, 7 ws od BAaBepdv, 7 od
TOUTW, 7) Ws ov THALKODTOV 7) odK adLKOV 7) Od pEeya

@ Odyssey, vii. 327. > See i. 9. 30.
¢ Another reading is ré7os (topic) and so throughout.
436

RHETORIC, III. xrv. 11—xv. 2

Grant that on reaching the Phaeacians I may find friend-
ship or compassion,

_ the orator should aim at exciting these two feelings.

In epideictic exordia, one must make the hearer
believe that he shares the praise, either himself, or
his family, or his pursuits, or at any rate in some
way or other. For Socrates says truly in his Funeral
Oration that “it is easy to praise Athenians in the
presence of Athenians, but not in the presence of
Lacedaemonians.”’ ?

Deliberative oratory borrows its exordia from
forensic, but naturally they are very uncommon in
it. For in fact the hearers are acquainted with the
subject, so that the case needs no exordium, except
for the orator’s own sake, or on account of his
adversaries, or if the hearers attach too much or too
little importance to the question according to his
idea. Wherefore he must either excite or remove
prejudice, and magnify or minimize the importance
of the subject. Such are the reasons for exordia ; or
else they merely serve the purpose of ornament, since
their absence makes the speech appear offhand. For
such is the encomium on the Eleans, in which Gorgias,
without any preliminary sparring or movements,
starts off at once, “‘ Elis, happy city.”

15. One way of removing prejudice is to make use
of the arguments by which one may clear oneself from
disagreeable suspicion; for it makes no difference
whether this suspicion has been openly expressed or
not; and so this may be taken as a general rule.
Another way° consists in contesting the disputed
points, either by denying the fact or its harmfulness,
at least to the plaintiff; or by asserting that its
importance is exaggerated ; or that it is not unjust

437

w

or

ARISTOTLE

7 odK alaxpov 7 odK Exov péyeDos* TrEpl yap ToLOv-—
Tw 7) adoByrnots, woTrep "Idixparns mpos Navar-

4 ” \ ~ Aa \ 4 > >
Kparnv: epn yap mounoa 6 eAeye kai BAdzbar, GAA

° > ~ mal > 4 > ~ >
ovK douceiv, 7) avTucaradAdrrecOar adiKobvra, €t
BAaBepov adda Kaddv, ei AvTnpov GAN wdeAysov
4 tt adXo Tovobrov.

” / ¢ > \ ¢ / ”“ > 4

AMos tpéros ws éeotiv duaprnua 7) ariynua
7 avayKaiov, olov LodoxAjs &bn tpemew ody ds
0 diaBadAwy edn, iva Sox yépwr, adr’ e& avdyens:
od yap éxovT. elvat atT@ éTn dydSoyKovTa. Kal
> / \ e LA id > 4,
avrikatadAdrreaBar TO 08 evexa, Ste od PBAdipas
eBovAeto, adda Tdde, Kal od TotTo 6 dveBadAeTo

ond / \ A ce , \ ~
Troujoa, avveBy de BAaBjvar- “‘ dixavov dé pucetv,
el Omws Tobro yevntat ézolovv.”

"AMos, €¢ eurepreiAnrtat 6 dvaBddAwy, 7 viv

* / ”“ ya ”“ a > , ” > »
1 MpoTepov, 7 avTos 7 THV eyyts. GAAos, €i aAAow
eutreptAapBavovrar, ovs duodoyodot pu evdxous
elvat TH SiaBoAf, olov ei drt Kaldpios pouyds, Kal
6 deiva Kai 6 deiva dpa.

"AdXos, «i dAdovs SdiéBadev, 7 aAAos adrovs,
a” + cond ¢ / 4 > ‘ “~
n avev diaBoAjs dbredapBdvovto womep adbros viv,
ot mepyvaow ovK Evoxot.

« Sophocles had two sons, Iophon and Ariston, by different
wives; the latter had a son named Sophocles. Iophon,
jealous of the affection shown by Sophocles to this grandson,
summoned him before the phratores (a body which had some
jurisdiction in family affairs) on the ground that his age
rendered him incapable of managing his affairs. In reply
to the charge, Sophocles read the famous chorie ode on
Attica from the Oedipus Coloneus, beginning: Rviwmov, téve,
raode | xwpas (668 ff.), and was acquitted. The story in this
form is probably derived from some comedy, which intro-
duced the case on the stage (see Jebb’s Introd. to the tragedy).

> In the reading in the text, avrov’s must apparently ad be

438

RHETORIC, III. xv. 2-6

at all, or only slightly so; or neither disgraceful nor
important. These are the possible points of dispute :
as Iphicrates, in answer to Nausicrates, admitted
that he had done what the prosecutor alleged and
inflicted damage, but denied that he had been guilty
of wrongdoing. Again, one may strike the balance,
when guilty of wrongdoing, by maintaining that
although the action was injurious it was honourable,
painful but useful, or anything else of the kind.

Another method consists in saying that it was a
case of error, misfortune, or necessity ; as, for ex-
ample, Sophocles said that he trembled, not, as the
accuser said, in order to appear old, but from neces-
sity, for it was against his wish that he was eighty
years of age.* One may also substitute one motive
for another, and say that one did not mean to injure
but to do something else, not that of which one was
accused, and that the wrongdoing was accidental :
“ IT should deserve your hatred, had I acted so as to
bring this about.” :

Another method may be employed if the accuser,
either himself or one closely related to him has been
involved in a similar charge, either now or formerly ;
or, if others are involved who are admittedly not
exposed to the charge ; for instance, if it is argued
that so-and-so is an adulterer, because he is a dandy,
then so-and-so must be.

Again, if the accuser has already similarly accused
others, or himself been accused by others ;° or if
others, without being formally accused, have been
suspected as you are now, and their innocence has
been proved.

to the defendant, and one would rather expect airév. Spengel’s
suggested 7 dAdos 7) avrés for # dAXos avrovs: ‘if he (i.e. the
adversary) or another has similarly accused others.”

439

ARISTOTLE
7 “Ados ex rob avriduaBddrAew tov dvaBdAdovra:

aromov yap «i ds adros amuoTos, of TovToOv Adyou
»” /
€oovTal moro.

s “AMdos, «i yéyove Kpiow, worep Edpimidns mpos
‘Yyvaivovra €v TH avTiddce KatTyyopobyTa ws
aceBys, ds y’ emoinoe KeAedwv emiopKetv

9 yAdoo’ ducdpox’, 7 Sé dpi dvaporos.
eon yap avrov aduceiv Tas eK Tob Avovyovarod
dydvos Kpiceis eis TA Sucaornpla. dyovra. exe’
yap adr&v dedwkevar Adyov 7 Swcew, ei BovAerat
Karnyopely

9 "AMos € €K TOO SiaBohiis KaTnyopely, HAucov, Kad
TovTO ore dMas Kpiceis moet, Kal OTs OV moTEVEL
TO Tpaypwate.

1416 b _Kowos 5° apdoiv 6 TOTOS TO ovpBoda Acyew,
olov ev T@ Tevxpy 6 ‘Odvaceds ore olxetos T@
IIpudpuw: fj yap ‘Hovovy adeAdr 6 dé 6 OTL O marnp
€x9pos TO ITpudpp, 6 6 TedAapdv, Kal ott od Karetre
TOV KaTacKoTTWY.

4 When a citizen was called upon to perform a “ liturgy”
or public service (e.g. the equipment of a chorus), if he
thought that one richer than himself had been passed over he
could summon him and compel him to exchange properties.

» Hippolytus, 612. ‘This well-known verse is three times
varidied 3 in Aristophanes (Thesmophoriazusae, 275; Frogs,
101, 1471). In the first passage, the sense is reversed:
Euripides has dressed up a certain Mnesilochus as a woman
in order that he may attend the Thesmophorian assembly.
Mnesilochus first requires Euripides to take an oath that he
will help him out of any trouble that may arise. Euripides
takes an oath by all the gods, whereupon Mnesilochus says
to Euripides: * Remember that it was your mind that swore,
but not your tongue.”

When Euripides was engaged in a lawsuit, his adversary
quoted the line, implying that even on oath Euripides could
440

RHETORIC, III. xv. 7-9

Another method consists in counter-attacking the
accuser ; for it would be absurd to believe the words
of one who is himself unworthy of belief.

Another method is to appeal to a verdict already
given, as Euripides did in the case about the exchange
of property;* when Hygiaenon accused him of
impiety as having advised perjury in the verse,

My tongue hath sworn, but my mind is unsworn,?

Euripides replied that his accuser did wrong in
transferring the decisions of the court of Dionysus
to the law courts; for he had already rendered an
account of what he had said there,° or was still ready
to do so, if his adversary desired to accuse him.

Another method consists in attacking slander,
showing how great an evil it is, and this because it
alters the nature of judgements,’ and that it does
not rely on the real facts of the case.

Common to both parties is the topic of tokens, as,
in the Teucer, Odysseus reproaches Teucer .with
being a relative of Priam, whose sister his mother
Hesione was; to which Teucer replied that his
father Telamon was the enemy of Priam, and that
he himself did not denounce the spies.’

not be believed; Euripides replied that his adversary had no
right to bring before the law courts a matter which had
already been settled by the theatrical judges.

© In the great Dionysiac theatre.

4 Or, ““makes extraneous points the subject of decision ”
(Cope), “‘ raises false issues ’’ (Jebb).

¢ Of Sophocles.

* Who had been sent to Troy by the Greeks to spy upon
the Trojans. It seems that he was afterwards accused of
treachery, the token being the fact that Teucer was a near
connexion of Priam; to which he replied with another token
that his father was an enemy of Priam, and further, when
the Greek spies were in Troy, he never betrayed them.

441

ARISTOTLE

10 “AMos 7H SiaBd\Aovtt, TO erawobdvTt puikpov
~ / 4 / ” \ > 4A
pakpas peEar péya avvtouws, 7 moda ayaba
/ “a > \ ~ / “a /
mpolévra, 0 eis TO mpayua mpopeper ev ear.
ToLooToL O€ OL TEXVIKwWTATOL Kal GdiKWTATOL’ Tots
ayaboits yap BAdrrew reipdvrar, puyvvtes adTa
TQ KAKQ.
Kowov d6€ 7@ SiaBaAdovts Kal TH arrodvopevy,
> \ A >? \ > , / 7
emeor) TO adTo evdexeTar TAcLOVwWY EveKa Tmpax-
Oijvar, TH pev SiaBdddAovt. Kaxonfioréov emi To
a > / an A > , Les, A
xetpov exrapPdvorvt., TH Sé drroAvowevw emt To
BéAtvov: ofov ére 6 Avopndns tov ’Odvacea mpo-
, ~ A ov A \ Ed € /,
etAeTo, TH prev OTe Sia TO dpioTov vdoAauPavew
A > / ~ 7 @ »” > \ LY 4 / \
tov ‘Odvocéa, T@ 8° Ste od, GAA Sia TO pwOvov pA)
> a ¢e A \ \ \ ~
avraywvioteiy ws padAov. Kal mept pev diaBodAjs
elpjobw Tocatra.

16. Aujynos 8 ev pev rots emidecktixots ear
> > ~ > \ \ /, lal \ A ‘
odk édeEfs aAdka Kara pépos: Se prev yap Tas
mpates SueADety e€ dv 6 Adyos: ovyKerrar yap
” ¢€ / ‘ \ ” 1D\ A ” c
éxywv 6 Adyos TO pev aTexvov (odev yap aitios 6
Aéywv tav mpdewv) ro 8 ek THs TEXvyS’ TOOTO
> > A n” Lg ” al oA a a“ 4 :
8’ €or 7} 6re €ore Sei€ar, avy 7} amuorov, 7} drt

/ "“ @ / ”“ \ AA \ »Y a>

2 mov, 7) OTL TOGdV, 7) Kal amavTa. Sia dé TOOT
> 7 b] > ~ a a i] / id

eviore ovK eheEfs Set Sunyetobar mavra, sre

Svopvnpovevtov TO Sevxvivar otrws. eK pev OvP

4 Jebb refers ro:odra to the accusers, translating rexvixol
* artistic,” certainly the commoner meaning.
» Involving a continuous succession of proofs.

442

RHETORIC, III. xv. 10—xv1. 2

Another method, suitable for the accuser, is to
praise something unimportant at great length, and
to condemn something important concisely; or,
putting forward several things that are praiseworthy
in the opponent, to condemn the one thing that has
an important bearing upon the case, Such methods 4
are most artful and unfair; for by their use men
endeavour to make what is good in a man injurious
to him, by mixing it up with what is bad.

Another method is common to both accuser and
defender. Since the same thing may have been
done from several motives, the accuser must disparage
it by taking it in the worse sense, while the defender
must take it in the better sense. For instance, when
Diomedes chose Odysseus for his companion, it may
be said on the one hand that he did so because
he considered him to be the bravest of men, on the
other, that it was because Odysseus was the only
man who was no possible rival for him, since he was .
a poltroon. Let this suffice for the question of
prejudice.

16. In the epideictic style the narrative should
not be consecutive, but disjointed; for it is neces-
sary to go through the actions which form the subject
of the speech. For a speech is made up of one part
that is inartificial (the speaker being in no way the
author of the actions which he relates), and of another
that does depend upon art. The latter.consists in
showing that the action did take place, if it be
incredible, or that it is of a certain kind, or of a
certain importance, or all three together. This is
why it is sometimes right not to narrate all the facts
consecutively, because a demonstration of this kind ®
is difficult to remember. From some facts a man

443,

ARISTOTLE

, > al > A ~ \ “ /
TovTwy avdpeios, ex dé tavde aodds 7) Sixasos.
Kat amAovaTepos 6 Adyos obros, éxeivos S€ mouiAos

3Kat od Ards. Set Se Tas ev yrwpipmouvs ava-
/ A ¢ \ ? \ / /

buyvnoKew* 510 ot root oddev SéovTar SinyHoews,

olov et OéAeus ’AyiAdEa erraweiv: ioact yap mdvTes

\ / > \ a b) cal ~ 3A A
Tas mpdgeis, adAAa xphoba adrais det. eav Se

4 Kpiriav, Set: od yap moAXoi tcacw. . . . vov Sé
yedowws rhv Sijynoiv daor Sev efvar rayetav.
KaiTol WoTep 6 TH pdtToOVTL epomevw mOTEpoV

Xr \ ”* A A 4 ce / > ”? “y e On
oxAnpavy 7 padakny patn, “ti 8; ey, “ b
advvarov;’’ Kat évradla opoiws: Se? yap pr)
paxp@s Sunyetobar womep otd€ mpooymdleobar
pakp@s, odde Tas TiaTes Aéyew: obde yap evradbd
> A bm "“ \ \ ” A / > \ ‘
€oTl TO €U 7) TO Taxd 7) TO GUVTOUwWS, GAAA TO
petpiws: todro 8 e€ori ro Aeyew doa Sdyddoer

47a TO TpGyya, 7} Goa Troujoe. droAaPely yeyovevat 7)
BeBradévar 7 nducnkevar, 7) THAKadTa HAiKa

5 BovAeu r@ SE evaytiw Ta evavria. mapadunyetobar

\ hud > \ \ > \ / ; 3 &¢: 2 \ >

dé daa «is THY ov apernv Peper, olov “ey 8
evovbérouy det Ta Sikara A€ywv, pa) Ta TEKVA
eyKaradeimew.’ 7) Oarépov Kaxiav: “6 8° aameKpt-

/ a Xi} > > / ” »” / ”
vaTo poe OTL od av 7 adrds, Eorar aGAAa TraLdia’

a \ > / Ae / > / of /
6 Tovs adiotapevovs Aiyumriovs amoKxpivacbai
dnow 6 ‘Hpddotos. 7) dca %déa Tois Sikacrais.
6 2A A / de 2\ / ¢ 8 / ec 8°
moAoyoupevw Se €Adtrwv % Sinynots, at

“ Something has been lost here, as is shown by the
transition from epideictic to forensic Rhetoric. All the mss.
have a gap, which in several of them is filled by introducing
the passage éore 5° érawos . . . weraredy (i. 9, 33-37).

» ji. 30.. The story was that a number of Egyptian
soldiers had revolted and left in a body for Ethiopia. ‘Their
king Psammetichus begged them not to desert their wives

Adds

RHETORIC, III. xvi. 2-6

may be shown to be courageous, from others wise or
just. Besides, a speech of this kind is simpler,
whereas the other is intricate and not plain. It is
only necessary to recall famous actions ; wherefore
most people have no need of narrative—for instance,
if you wish to praise Achilles ; for everybody knows
what he did, and it is only necessary to make use of
it. But if you wish to praise Critias, narrative is
necessary, for not many people know what he did. . . .*

But at the present day it is absurdly laid down that
the narrative should be rapid. And yet, as the man
said to the baker when he asked whether he was to
knead bread hard or soft, ““ What! is it impossible to
knead it well?” so it is in this case; for the narra-
tive must not be long, nor the exordium, nor the
proofs either. For in this case also propriety does
not consist either in rapidity or conciseness, but in
a due mean; that is, one must say all that will make
the facts clear, or create the belief that they have
happened or have done injury or wrong, or that
they are as important as you wish to make them.
The opposite party must do the opposite. And you
should incidentally narrate anything that tends to
show your own virtue, for instance, “I always re-
commended him to act rightly, not to forsake his
children”; or the wickedness of your opponent, for
instance, ‘“‘ but he answered that, wherever he might
be, he would always find other children,”’ an answer
attributed by Herodotus ® to the Egyptian rebels ;
or anything which is likely to please the dicasts.

In defence, the narrative need not be so long ; for

and children, to which one of them made answer (rév 6é
Twa éyera SéEavTa Td aldotoy elreiv, tvOa av TodTo H, erecOau
avroto. évOatra xal réxva Kal yuvaikas).

445

Os,

ARISTOTLE

approPyrices 7 pr yeyovevar 7 pu) BAraBepdv
elvae 7) pu) GduKov 7) [1) TnAuKobrov, WoTE TeEpt To
dpodoyovpevov od Sdwarpimréov, éeav pr Te eis
exeivo avuvreivn, olov ef mémpaxrat, ad ovK
7 aduKov. rt _ Tempayyeva det Adyew, doa Ha)
MparTojLeva oiKTov 7) deivwow Peper. Tapa.
devypa 6 >AAkivov dmdroyos, 6 Ort mpos THY IInve-
Aomnvy ev €EnKxovtTa emreou meTolnran. Kal ws
Ddiidros Tov KvKAov, Kat 6 ev T@ Oivet mpodroyos.
8 “HOuenv d€ xpi) tiv Sunynow elvar. ora dé
Tobro, av «iddpuev ti 700s movety ev pev dy TO
mpoaipeaw SydAody, mowv dé To AOos TH rovav
TavTnv’ 7 dé mpoatpeois mou. TH TéAeL. Siva TOdTO
? y ¢ \ , ” Ld 29O\
ovK €xovow ot walypatikot Adyor HOn, dru ovdeE
mpoaipecw* TO yap ob evexa ovK Exovow. GAd
of LwKparikol: epi rowtTwy yap A€yovow.
+ > \ \ c / ¢ / »” a
9 aAAa 7OuKa ta émopeva Exdorw WOer, olov ort
dja. Aéyew ePddilev: dnhoi yap OpacvrnTa Kal
dypouctay 7Oovs. Kal a) abs aro Siavotas Aéyew,
womep ot viv, add” ws amd mpoaipecews. “ eye
> / \ / \ ~ GAN’
eBovrdpnv: Kai mpoeAdunv yap tovro:
el pr) wviunv, BédAtiov.”’ To bev yap dpovipov
\ » fie. ~ , \ \ > ~ \ > /
To d€ ayalod: dpovimou pev yap ev TO TO WHEAyLov
diudKew, ayalod 8 ev TH 70 Kaddv. dv 8 dmrvorov
Ss / A Leas > dé ov > AA
H, Tore tiv airiav émAdyew, worep Lodordjs
Trovet Tapdderypa TO ex THS ’Avruyovyns, Tt waAAov

@ Odyssey, xxiii. 264-284, 310-343. ‘The title referred to
the narrative in Books ix.-xii. It became proverbial for a
long-winded story.

> He apparently summarized it.

¢ Of Euripides. It was apparently very compact.

446

RHETORIC, III. xvr. 6-9

the points at issue are either that the fact has not
happened or that it was neither injurious nor wrong
nor so important as asserted, so that one should not
waste time over what all are agreed upon, unless
anything tends to prove that, admitting the act, it
is not wrong. Again, one should only mention such
past things as are likely to excite pity or indignation
if described as actually happening; for instance,
the story of Alcinous, because in the presence of
Penelope it is reduced to sixty lines,* and the way

in which Phayllus dealt with the epic cycle,® and the
prologue to the Oeneus.°

And the narrative should be of a moral character, -

: and in fact it will be so, if we know what effects
this. One thing is to make clear our moral purpose ;

for as is the moral purpose, so is the character, and
as is the end, so is the moral purpose. For this
reason, mathematical treatises have no moral char-
acter, because neither have they moral purpose ; for
they have no moral end. But the Socratic dialogues
have ; for they discuss such questions. Other ethical
indications are the accompanying peculiarities of each
individual character ; for instance, “‘ He was talking
and walking on at the same time,’’ which indicates
effrontery and boorishness. Nor should we speak as
if from the intellect, after the manner of present-day
orators, but from moral purpose : “‘ But I wished it,

and I preferred it ; and even if I profited nothing, it

is better.”’ The first statement indicates prudence,
the second virtue; for prudence consists in the
pursuit of what is useful, virtue in that of what is
honourable. | | ‘if anything of the kind seems incred-
ible, then the reason must be added; of. this
Sophocles gives an example, where his Antigone says

447

10

1417 b

11

ARISTOTLE

Tob adeApoo EKHOETO 7) Gvopos 7) TEKVWY" TA [el
* yap av yevéobar arodopeva,

pnTpos 3 ev doov Kal marpos BeBnxoraw

otk a7 ddeApds ds tus av Brdorou more.
eav d€ pu) Exns airiav, GAN’ dre ovK ayvoeis amare
déywr, dAAd, pvoer ToLooTOS et: amuorovat yar

O TL mparrew EKOVTA TAnY TO GUpdeporV.

“Exe eK TOV mabnrux av Aéyew, Supyoupevon
Kai ra, émopeva. Kal & ioaot, Ka 7a, dia 7) adre
] ekelvm tpoodvTa: “6 8 wyeTo pe broprapas.’
Kal ws mept KpartdAov Aioyivys, ore Sdiacilan
Kal Toiv xepoiv diaceiwy: mibava yap, Store op:
Boda yiverat Tatra & icacw éexeivw wv odK toaow
mrciora 5€ Tovadra AaBeiv e€ “Opjpov eorw.

“ 4 > + \ \ a \ /
Os ap’ edn, ypnvds Sé Karéoxero xepol mpdowma*

¢ \ y > / > / ~
ot yap Saxpvew apydpevor emiAapPdavovtar Ta
> ~ \ > \ > / \ /
opbaduav. Kat «d0ds <ciodyaye ceavTov row
Twa, Wa ws TowdTov Yewp@or Kal Tov avriducov
/ \ / Ld A cs a cal >
avOdvav dé moter. drt dé pddwov, dpdv Set «1
T&v amayyeAAdvTwy epi dv yap pnlev topev
opws AapBdvowev broAnpiv twa.
~ a a >
IloAAayod Sé Set Suenyetoar, Kal eviore ovK €

2 Antigone, 911-912, where the mss. have xexev@éroi
instead of Aristotle’s BeBnxérwr.

> Whereas this man makes his temperament responsibl
for the strange things he does; he is built that way an
cannot help it.

¢ Supposed to be Aeschines called Socraticus from hi
intimate friendship with Socrates. A philosopher and write
of speeches for the law courts, he had a great reputatio
as an orator. ‘

448

RHETORIC, III. xvi. 9-11

that she cared more for her brother than for her *
husband or children; for the latter can be replaced
after they are gone,

but when father and mother are in the grave, no brother
can ever be born.*

If you have no reason, you should at least say that
you are aware that what you assert is incredible,
but that it is your nature; for no one believes that
a man ever does anything of his own free will except
from motives of self-interest.’

Further, the narrative should draw upon what is
emotional by the introduction of such of its accom-
paniments as are well known, and of what is specially
characteristic of either yourself or of the adversary :
“ And he went off looking grimly at me”; and as
Aeschines ° says of Cratylus, that he hissed violently
and violently shook his fists. Such details produce
persuasion because, being known to the hearer, they
become tokens of what he does not know. Numerous
examples of this may be found in Homer :

Thus she spoke, and the aged nurse covered her face with
her hands ; @

for those who are beginning to weep lay hold on
their eyes. And you should at once introduce yourself
and your adversary as being of a certain character,
that the hearers may regard you or him as such;
but do not let it be seen. That this is easy is per-
fectly clear from the example of messengers; we
do not yet know what they are going to say, but
nevertheless we have an inkling of it.

Again, the narrative should be introduced in several

4 Odyssey, xix. 361.
¢ de? (omitted by others) =“* one cannot help seeing.”

2G 449

ARISTOTLE

apx7. €v Se Sypnyopia TKvora. dunynots éorw,
dre mepl TaV pe\dvreov ovbels Sunyetras GAN’
edv mep Sunynois 7}, TOV yevouevwy ora, WwW”
dvapynoberres exeivov BédArvov Bovrcdowvrar mept
TOV dorepoy. oe diaBadAovres, 7) emawobrres. ada
TOTe ov TO TOD cuvpPovdAov movet epyov. av 8
dmotov, vmuxvetobat [re] Kal airiay A¢yew edOus,
Kal duatarrew ois BovAovrat, olov 7 “loxdern 1
Kapxivov év t@ Oidimodse del trvoxvetrar mvvba-
vouevov Tob Cytobvtos tov vidv. Kal 6 Aipwv
6 LodokAéovs.

17. Tas 65€ mioreis Set amodeikTiKas elvan:
amodetKvivat bé Xp, eel mepl TeTTApwV 1 dupe ~
ofirnows, Tept Too dpproBnroupevov péepovTa THV
dmodettw: otov et OTL od yeyovev dppioBnre?, ev
TH Kploet dei TovTov pddvora THY dmdderew pépew,
el 0° ott ovk EBAaev, TovToV, Kal dtu od TOGOVdE
q OTe Sucaiws, woatTws Kal <i mepl Tod yeveoBar

2 toro y dppvoBryrnots. pq AavOavéerwm 8 ore
dvayKatov ev TavTn TH apdioPyTHoer pdovn TOV

* Omitting re. The difficulty jis dvardrrew, which can

apparently only mean “arrange.”’ Jebb retains re, and
reads ws for ofs: “‘ the speaker must make himself respons-
ible for the fact . . . and marshal his reasons in a way

acceptable to the hearers.” The old Latin translation vadiare
quibus volunt suggested to Roemer diarynrais, “to the
arbitrators they approve.’

» According to Jebb, Jocasta tells the inquirer incredible
things about her son, and pledges her word for the facts.
ee says: ‘promises (to do something or other to satisfy

im

° Mais 683-723. On this Cope remarks: * This last
example must be given up as hopeless; there is nothing in
the extant play which could be interpreted as required here.”

450

RHETORIC, ITI. xvi. 11—xvir. 2

places, sometimes not at all at the beginning. In
deliberative oratory narrative is very rare, because
no one can narrate things to come; but if there is
narrative, it will be of things past, in order that,
being reminded of them, the hearers may take
better counsel about the future. This may be done
in a spirit either of blame or of praise ; but in that
case the speaker does not perform the function of
the deliberative orator. If there is anything in-
credible, you should immediately promise both to
give a reason for it at once and to submit it to the
judgement of any whom the hearers approve ;% as,
for instance, Jocasta in the Oedipus of Carcinus ®
is always promising, when the man who is looking
for her son makes inquiries of her; and similarly
Haemon in Sophocles.°

17. Proofs should be demonstrative, and as the
disputed points are four, the demonstration should
bear upon the particular point disputed ; for instance,
if the fact is disputed, proof of this must be brought
at the trial before anything else; or if it is main-
tained that no injury has been done; or that the
act was not so important as asserted; or was just,
then this must be proved, the three last questions
being matters of dispute just as the question of
fact. But do not forget that it is only in the case
of a dispute as to this question of fact that one of

According to Jebb, the “incredibility ’’ consists in the fact
that Haemon, although in love with Antigone, and strongly
opposed to the sentence pronounced upon her by his father
Creon, still remains loyal to the latter. Haemon explains
the reason in lines 701-3, where he says that he prizes his
father’s welfare more than anything else, for a father’s good
name and prosperity is the greatest ornament for children, as
is the son’s for the father.

451

ARISTOTLE

€repov elvar Tovynpdov* od ydp éorw dyvoia airia,
@omep av el Twes trepi Tod dixalov apdioPyroier,
a > > 4 / > A a“ * La
wot ev To’Tw xpovioréov, ev d€ Tots aAAows ov.
a - \

3 “Ev 5d€ tots émiderkrixois TO TOAU, STL KaAd Kal
> / ¢ Ld ” \ \ Is a
wopera, 7) av& hows Eora Ta yap mpdypara det
muoreverbar’ oAvyaKis yap Kal tovTwy drrodelEeLs

/ oA Ra >» 4 2\ + ey ”
pépovow, €av amora 7 7) eav aAdos airiay éyn.
> \ a a an“ e > ” 2
4 Ev € rots SnunyopiKois 7} ws odK EoTat audi-
, * a” ¢ ” A a“ 4 > >
aoByntyceev av Tis, 7 Ws EoTas wev G KeAEver, GAA
> , ” > > / a” > ~ a
ov Sikaa 7 otk wdeApa 7) od THAKAadra. Bde?
Sé Kal dpav ei te pevderar exTds TOD mpdyparos-
TEKUNpLA yap Tadra daiverar Kal tav aGAAwY srt
1418 a pevderar.
” \ ‘ \ , ,

5 “Kore d€ ra pev rapadetypara Snunyopucwrara,
Ta 8 evOupjpara Sixavixwrepa 7 bev yap mept
TO méAAov, War’ ex T&V yevoevwy avdyKn Tapa-
delypara Aéyew, 7 S5é mepl dvtwy 7) jun) dvTwr,

~ > /, / > ‘ > "4 ” \
oS padAov amddekis éore Kal avdyen exer yap
\ A > 4 > ~ A > a rs ‘\
670 yeyovos avayKnv. od det de epeEfs A€yew Ta

@ Aristotle’s argument is as follows. But it must not be
forgotten that it is only in a dispute as to this question of
fact that one of the two parties must necessarily be a rogue.
For ignorance is not the cause (of there being a dispute
about the fact, e.g. ‘you hit me,” “no, I didn’t,” where
both know the truth), as it might be in a dispute on what
was right or wrong, so that this is the topic on which you
should spend some time (i.¢. because here you can prove or
disprove that A is rovnpés).

The passage is generally taken to mean that when it is a
question of fact it is universally true that one of the dis-
putants must be a rogue. Cope alone among editors makes
any comment. In his note he says: “all that is meant is
that there is a certain class of cases which fall under this

452

RHETORIC, III. xvi. 2-6

the two parties must necessarily * be a rogue; for
ignorance is not the cause, as it might be if a question
of right or wrong were the issue; so that in this case
one should spend time on this topic, but not in the
others.

In epideictic speeches, amplification is employed,
as a rule, to prove that things are honourable or
useful; for the facts must be taken on trust, since
proofs of these are rarely given, and only if they are
incredible or the responsibility is attributed to
another.?

In deliberative oratory, it may be maintained either
that certain consequences will not happen, or that
what the adversary recommends will happen, but
that it will be unjust, inexpedient, or not so important
as supposed. But one must also look to see whether
he makes any false statements as to things outside
the issue; for these look like evidence that he
makes misstatements about the issue itself as well.

} Examples are best suited to deliberative oratory
and enthymemes to forensic. The first is concerned
with the future, so that its examples must be derived
from the past ; the second with the question of the
existence or non-existence of facts, in which demon-
strative and necessary proofs are more in place{; for
the past involves a kind of necessity.° ‘ One should
not introduce a series of enthymemes continuously
issue, in which this topic may be safely used.” For instance,
A may on justifiable grounds charge B with theft; B denies
it, and he may be innocent, although the evidence is strongly
against him. In such a case, neither of the parties is
necessarily rrovnpés.

> Or, reading 4)dws, “ if there is some other reason.”

¢ It is irrevocable, and it is possible to discuss it with some

degree of certainty, whereas the future is quite uncertain,
and all that can be done is to draw inferences from the past.

453

ARISTOTLE

> / > >
evOupjpara, aA dvapvyvivary et 8€ pj, Kara-

/, + ” lol ~
BAdrre. dAAnAa. eor yap Kat Tod mood Spos:

Ss ¢\> > ‘ , / 7

@ pir’, evel td0a cimes Go’ dv memvupevos avip,

> > “~
7 aAX’ od rovabra. Kal pi) mEpt mavTwv evOvpypara
Cnreiv: ei 5€ uj, Trounjoers SmEp Eviot Tmovoder TOY
procogovyvtwy, ot avAoyilovrar TA yrwpyswrepa
8 Kai mordotepa 7) e€ dv Aéyovow. Kal drav mabos
lod A / > , ”“ \ > , ‘
Tons, pn Aé€ye evOdunua 7 yap eKKpovoe. TO
10 na / > / ” \ > Ad; ‘6
mafos 7 parnv eipnuevov eorar TO evOdunpna
> / \ « / > / chm A
exkpovovot yap ai Kiwiaets aAAjAas at aua, Kal
a 9 , a be a a 29> «9
7 adavilovow 7 aocbeveis mowdow. o8d drav
nOuxov Tov Adyov, od Set evOdpnpd te Cyreiv apa:
> \ ” ” on ” / SF > /
od yap exe ove 700s ovTE mpoaipeow 4 amdderéts.
9 [vapors 5€ ypnoréov Kai ev Sunyjoe Kal ev
\ a>
miore: HOiKov ydp. “Kal éyw dédwKa, Kat TAT
cldws ws od Set morevew.” eav d¢ mabyriKds,
ce \ > , Uy 5] 8 , ,
Kal ov perapeAcr por Kaimep NOUKnLEV@* TOUTW
\ ‘ / \ /, 5 > \ de \ dé. ”
fev yap mepicote TO Kepdos, ewol S€ TO SiKator.
10 To d5é Snunyopety yaderwrepov tod SuxdleoPar,
A ‘ ‘
eikorws, Sudte mept To péAAov: eet Se mepi TO
yeyovos, & emioTnTov dn Kal Tois pdvTeow, ws
a ‘ lal
épn "Emevidns 6 Kpjs: éxeivos yap mept tav
> / > > 7, > \ \ ~ ,
eoopeveny odK euavreveTo, aAAd mEept TAY yeyovo-
454

RHETORIC, III. xvi. 6-10

but mix them up; otherwise they destroy one
another. For there is a limit of quantity ; thus,

Friend, since thou hast said as much as a wise man would
say,*
where Homer does not say rovaira (such things as),
but réca (as many things as). Nor should you try
to find enthymemes about everything ; otherwise
you will be imitating certain philosophers, who draw

‘conclusions that are better known and more plausible
than the premises from which they are drawn.? And
whenever you wish to arouse emotion, do not use an
enthymeme, for it will either drive out the emotion
or it will be useless; for simultaneous movements
drive each other out, the result being their mutual
destruction or weakening. Nor should you look for
an enthymeme at the time when you wish to give
the speech an ethical character ; for demonstration
involves neither moral character nor moral purpose.

Moral maxims, on the other hand, should be used
in both narrative and proof; for they express moral
character ; for instance, “ I gave him the money and
that although I knew that one ought not te trust.”
Or, to arouse emotion : “ I do not regret it, although
I have been wronged; his is the profit, mine the
right.”

Deliberative speaking is more difficult than
forensic, and naturally so, because it has to do with
the future ; whereas forensic speaking has to do with
the past, which is already known, even by diviners,
as Epimenides the Cretan said; for he used to
divine, not the future, but only things that were past

@ Odyssey, iv. 204.

» For this passage see i. 2. 12-13. The meaning is that it
is absurd to prove what every one knows already.

455

ARISTOTLE

A LO aN Py la \ c ld € 50 > an

Twv pev adyjAwv Sé. Kal 6 vouos brd0eots ev Tots
duxavixots: exovta dé apxiv pdov edpeiv amdderew.

es eer \ ; a qe. Sa oe
Kat ovK exet ToAAds SiarpiBds, olov mpos avTidiuKov
Tept avTod, 7 maOnrikov moveiv. GAN AKOTA
TdvTwr, eav pn e€iorntar. Set ody amopodvra
TobTo Tovey Omep of “AOyvynot prropes rovodot
kat *“looxpatrns: Kal yap ovpBovredwv karnyopet,
otov Aaxedaysoviwy pev ev TH mTavyyupiK®,
Xdpytos 8 év TH ovppaykd. |

> \ a > cal a ‘ /, ?

ll °Ev 6€ rots émidevxtixots def Tov Adyov ezeo-
odvobv émaivois, oiov *looxpdrns movet- del yap
twa elodye. Kai 6 eAeye Lopyias, ore ody
brodeirer adrov 6 Xdyos, Tobro éorw: «i yap
"Axirrda Aéyer, IInAea errawve?, eira Aiaxdv, cira
Tov Oedv, dpoiws dé Kal avdpiav, ) Ta Kal Ta

12 wove? 7) Tovovde eoriv. exovTa pev ovdv amodeibeis

A > ~ / \ > ~ 7. A \

141sb kal HOuKads AeKTéov Kal amodecKTiK@s, €av SE j47)
exns vOvurjuata, HOuKds: Kai wGAAov TH emvercet
dpuorrer xpyorov daiveobar 7 Tov Adyov axpipy.

is Tév b€ evOupnudrwy ta édeyKTiKa paddAov
evdokiysed TOV SeuxTiK@v, ote doa EAeyxov zrove?,

* The remark of Epimenides is by many editors inter-
preted as a sarcasm upon the fraternity of soothsayers, who
pretended to be able to foretell the future. But how is this
to be got out of the Greek? The point is perhaps some-
thing like: ‘*it is easy enough to talk about the past, for
even soothsayers know it.’”” What Aristotle says here is that
Epimenides practised a different kind of divination, relating
to the obscure phenomena of the past. The following is an
instance. After the followers of Cylon, who tried to make
himself tyrant of Athens (¢. 632) had been put to death by
the Alemaeonid archon Megacles, in violation of the terms
of surrender, a curse rested upon the city and it was de-
vastated by a pestilence. On the advice of the oracle,

456

RHETORIC, III. xvi. 10-13

but obscure.* Further, the law is the subject in
forensic speaking; and when one has a starting-
point, it is easier to find a demonstrative proof.
Deliberative speaking does not allow many oppor-
tunities for lingering—for instance, attacks on the
adversary, remarks about oneself, or attempts to
arouse emotion. In this branch of Rhetoric there is
less room for these than in any other, unless the
speaker wanders from the subject. Therefore, when
at a loss for topics, one must do as the orators at
Athens, amongst them Isocrates, for even when de-
liberating, he brings accusations against the Lace-
daemonians, for instance, in the Panegyricus,® and
against Chares in the Symmachikos (On the Peace).°

Epideictic speeches should be varied with laudatory
episodes, after the manner of Isocrates, who is always
bringing somebody in. This is what Gorgias meant
when he said that he was never at a loss for some-
thing to say; for, if he is speaking of Peleus, he
praises Achilles, then Aeacus, then the god ; similarly
courage, which does this and that,¢ or is of such a
kind. If you have proofs, then, your language must
be both ethical and demonstrative ; if you have no
enthymemes, ethical only. In fact, it is more fitting
that a virtuous man should show himself good than
that his speech should be painfully exact.

Refutative enthymemes are more popular than
demonstrative, because, in all cases of refutation, it

Epimenides was summoned from Crete, and by certain rites
and sacrifices purified the city and put a stop to the pestilence.
> 110-114. Cris
4 He enumerates all the deeds that proceed from courage.
Another reading is # ra xal rd, roe? 6 rowdvde éoriv, 4.€.
when praising courage, and this or that, he is employing a
method of the kind mentioned.
457

ARISTOTLE

padAov Sfdov dre avAreAdytorat: wapaAdAnAa yap
14 waAAov ravarvtia yvwpilerar. ta Sé€ mpds Tov
> / cd 4 / a> > 4 ~ /
avTiducov od» €Tepov ru eldos, GAAa Tov micTEwv
” ‘ \ ~ > 7, \ \ la
€oTt Ta poev Adoau evordoer Ta Se avdAdoyropa.
al A XN) 12 ~ \ 3 / > A \
det 5€ Kat ev ovpBovdn Kal ev dikn apyopevov prev
¢ ~
Aéyew Tas eavtod tioreis mporepov, vaTepov dé
mpos Tavavtia amavray MovTa Kai mpodvacpovTa.
dv S€ moddyous 4 1% évartiwois, mpdorepov Ta
evavtia, olov émoinoe Kaddiotpatos ev rH Meo-
“a a 7
onviakn ekKAnoia: & yap époda. mpoaveA@y ovTws
15 tore adros ecimev. totepov dé Aéyovra mp@rov
‘ A A > / / , , \
Ta mpos Tov evavtiov Adyov Aexréov, AvovTa Kal
> / A 7 nv > /
avriavAdoyilopevov, Kat pdAvora av evdoKysnKoTa
,
9° womep yap avOpwrov mpodiaBeBAnpevov ov
4 ¢ / \ > \ / 2O\ /
S€yerar 7 Yuyy, Tov advrov tpdmov ovde Adyor,
oA i >E! / > ~ > , lal = lA
eav 6 evavtios «0 Sox eipnKkevat. Set odv ywpay
Tov ev TH akpoarh t@ péAAovte Adyw: Eorat
, nn > / \ a” ‘ 4 an“ A / nn
dé, av avéAns. 510 7 mpos mavTa 7 TA peyrora 7
7a eddoKYyLobyTa 7) Ta evédeyKTA paxeodpevov
ovTw Ta adTOD MOoTA ToLNnTEoV.

« There is no difference in form between the demonstrative
and refutative enthymeme, but the latter draws opposite
conclusions; and opposites are always more striking when
they are brought together, and a parallel drawn between
them. It is then easy to see where the fallacy lies. Cf. ii.
23.30: “ Refutative enthymemes are more effective (popular)
than demonstrative, because they bring opposites conetliae in
a small compass, which are more striking (clearer) to the
hearer from being put side by side.”

458

RHETORIC, III. xvi. 13-15

is clearer that a logical conclusion has been reached ;
for opposites are more noticeable when placed in
juxtaposition.* The refutation of the opponent is
not a particular kind of proof; his arguments should
be refuted partly by objection, partly by counter-
syllogism. \In both deliberative and forensic
rhetoric he who speaks first should state his own
proofs and afterwards meet the arguments of the
opponent, refuting or pulling them to pieces before-
hand. But if the opposition is varied,’ these argu-
ments should be dealt with first, as Callistratus did
in the Messenian assembly ; in fact, it was only after
he had first refuted what his opponents were likely
to say that he put forward his own proofs. He who
replies should first state the arguments against the
opponent’s speech, refuting and answering it by
syllogisms, especially if his arguments have met with
approval. For as the mind is ill-disposed towards
one against whom prejudices have been raised before-
hand, it is equally so towards a speech, if the adver-
sary is thought to have spoken well. One must
therefore make room in the hearer’s mind for the
speech one intends to make ; and for this purpose
you must destroy the impression made by the adver-
sary. Wherefore it is only after having combated
all the arguments, or the most important, or those
which are plausible, or most easy to refute, that you
should substantiate your own case:

» In the translation rév rlcrewy is taken with éorc: it is
the business of, the proper function of, proofs. Others take
it with 7a pév . . . ra O€: some... . other (of the opponent’s
arguments).

¢ If the opponent’s arguments are numerous and strong,
by reason of the varied nature of the points dealt with.

459

16

L7

ARISTOTLE

Tais Jeatou TpOTa avppayos yevyoouar.
eyw yap “Hpav . ..

ev TovTois ybaTo mpa@Tov Tod ev’nfeordrov.

Tlepi pev ovv mlorewy TabTa. els dé To 7100s,
e€mreLo7) . Evia. mrepl avToo Adyew 7 éipBovov 7
paxpodoyiay 7] iY dvrihoyiay € EXEL, wat mept aAdAov 7
Aowopiav 7 dypouctay, eTEpov xp7) A€yovra movetv,
Omrep ‘looxpdrns moet ev TH DiAdimrw Kal ev TH
dyrBoaet, Kal ws *Apxidoxos eye arovet yap Tov
marépa A€yovra epi tis Ovyarpos ev TH iduBw

xpnudatwr 8 deArrov otbev éorw 08d’ amuporor,
Kat Tov Xdpwva Tov Té. vy T@ iduBw od 7
cab p ov TéeKTova ev T@ idm ov 7
apx)
” \ r
ov po. Ta Tvyew.

Kal ws LodokAjs tov Atwova trép ris ’“Avruyovns

\ \ / e / S jem! 4 cal \
mpos Tov matépa ws Acyovtwy érepwv. Set Se

@ Euripides, Troades, 969-971. Hecuba had advised
Menelaus to put Helen to death; she defends herself at
length, and is answered by Hecuba in a reply of which these
words form part. Her argument is that none of the three
goddesses who contended for the prize of beauty on Mt. Ida
would have been such fools as to allow Argos and Athens to
become subject to Troy as the result of the contest, which
was merely a prank.

> 4-7. Isocrates says that his friends thought very highly
of one of his addresses, as likely to bring peace.

¢ 132-139, 141-149. Here again Isocrates puts compli-
Heres on his composition into the mouth of an imaginary
rien

# Archilochus (c. 650) of Paros was engaged to Neobule,
the daughter of Lycambes. Her father broke off the en-
gagement, whereupon Archilochus pursued father and

aughter with furious and scurrilous abuse. It is here said

460

RHETORIC, III. xvu. 15-17

at will first defend the goddesses, for I [do not think] that
era... .*

in this passage the poet has first seized upon the
weakest argument.

So much concerning proofs. In regard to moral
character, since sometimes, in speaking of ourselves,
we render ourselves liable to envy, to the charge of
prolixity, or contradiction, or, when speaking of
another, we may be accused of abuse or boorishness,
we must make another speak in our place, as Isocrates
does in the Philippus ® and in the Antidosis.© Archi-
lochus uses the same device in censure; for in his
iambies he introduces the father speaking as follows
of his daughter :

There is nothing beyond expectation, nothing that can be
sworn impossible,?

and the carpenter Charon in the iambic verse be-
ginning
I [care not for the wealth] of Gyges ; ¢

Sophocles, also,/ introduces Haemon, when defending
Antigone against his father, as if quoting the opinion

that, instead of attacking the daughter directly, he represented
her as being attacked by her father. The meaning of
dedrrov is not clear. It may be a general statement: the
unexpected often happens; or, there is nothing so bad that
you may not expect it. B. St. Hilaire translates: ‘* There is
nothing that money cannot procure,’’ meaning that the
father was prepared to sell his daughter (Frag. 74).

¢ The line ends: Tod zodvypicov pwé\e. Archilochus
represents Charon the carpenter as expressing his own
disapproval of the desire for wealth and of the envy caused
by others possessing it.

* Here again, Haemon similarly puts his own feelings as
to Creon’s cruel treatment of Antigone into the mouth of
the people of the city, and refers to popular rumour.

461

ARISTOTLE

A :
Kat petaBadr\ew ta evOuuypara Kal yrdpas
a Rip “ec \ \ \ my a
moueiv eviote, olov “‘ xpi) dé Tas dvadAayas zroveiv
\ ~ “a an”
Tovs vodv éyxovras evrvyodyTas’ ovTw yap av
/ a cal
péytora amdAcovextotev.”’ evOvunmatuds S¢ “ei
yap ei, drav wWdheApwrara. Bow Kal mAeov-
exTUKwTaTaL at KaTadAayal, ToTe KaTaAAdTrecOaL,
> ~ A 7, »
evrvyobvTas Set KaradAdrreobar.
18. [lepi dé epwrijcews, evKaipov éote trovetobau
4 \ hid \ Ld > ‘ e ,
14194 pddtora bev oTav TO ETEPOV ELPT)KWS } WOTE EVOS
, a \ »”
mpocepwrnGevtos ovpBaiver To atotrov: otov [epi-
KAjs Adutwva émnpero rept Ths TeAeTHS TOV THs
‘owreipas lep@v, eimdvtos dé dtu ovdx oldv Te
> / > 7, ” > > / ,
aréAeoTrov axovew, HpeTto i oldev adrés, PacKov-
a ce \ ~ > / ” 3?) ta : A
270s b€ “Kal Bs aréAcotos wv;”’ Sevrepov dé
oTav TO pev havepov 7, TO 5é epwrncavTe SHAov H
A ,
ott Shoe: mvOdpmevov yap Set THY play mpdTacw
a la
pt) Mpocepwray To davepdv, aAAa TO ovpTEepacpa
> ~ , vA > /
eizreiv, olov Lwxpdrns MeAjrov ob ddoKovros
> \ A / ” > / / ,
abrov Beods vouilew [pero] et Sayovidy te A€yot,
¢ 4 8 \ > t} c Py / ~ 0 ~
oporoynoavros dé Hpero ei ody of Saipoves NTOL Oeav
a > nn” afl , \ ¢¢ gS 9)
matdes elev 7) Ocidv tr, djoavros de “ €orw ovr,
~ a 1%
éfn, “doris Oedv pev matdas olerar etvar, Oeods

w

@ The words grav . . . # have been variously translated:
(1) when one of the two alternatives has already been stated ;
(2) when the opponent has stated what is different from the
fact; (3) when the opponent: has already conceded so much,
**made one admission ”’ (Jebb).

» Reading pero.

462

RHETORIC, II. xvir. 17—xvuit. 3

of others. One should also sometimes change enthy-
memes into moral maxims ; for instance, “ Sensible
men should become reconciled when they are pros-
perous; for in this manner they will obtain the
greatest advantages,” which is equivalent to the
enthymeme: “If men should become reconciled
whenever it is most useful and advantageous, they
should be reconciled in a time of prosperity.”

18. In regard to interrogation, its employment is
especially opportune, when the opponent has already
stated the opposite, so that the addition of a question
makes the result an absurdity*; as, for instance,
when Pericles interrogated Lampon about initiation
into the sacred rites of the saviour goddess. On
Lampon replying that it was not possible for one
who was not initiated to be told about them, Pericles
asked him if he himself was acquainted with the
rites, and when he said yes, Pericles further asked,
“* How can that be, seeing that you are uninitiated ?”’
Again, interrogation should be employed when one
of the two propositions is evident, and it is obvious
that the opponent will admit the other if you ask
him. But the interrogator, having obtained the
second premise by putting a question, should not
make an additional question of what is evident, but
should state the conclusion. For instance, Socrates,
when accused by Meletus of not believing in the
gods, asked ® whether he did not say that there was
a divine something; and when Meletus said yes,
Socrates went on to ask if divine beings were not
either children of the gods or something godlike.
When Meletus again said yes, Socrates rejoined, “ Is
there a man, then, who can admit that the children
of the gods exist without at the same time admitting

463

ARISTOTLE

d€ od;”” Ere dray HEAD 7) evavTia A€yovra detfew
47) Tmapdbofov. TéTaprov Be, érav pa evi} an’ 7
copuoTiKas daroKpwdpevov Aioat: éav ap ovrws
droKpivnTat, OTL €oTe pev éort 8 od, 7 TO pev Ta.
8 ov, 7 7H pev aH 5° ov,” GopuBotow o Ws aropobrros.
alias 82 BY, eyxeupely” eav yap evori, Kexparhabat
doxe? ob yap olov te moda epwrav dua THY a-
ob évevay Tob axpoarod. 610 Kal Ta evOvprwara
ort pdAvora ovotpedew Set.

5 ’Amoxpivacbar dé Set mpos pev Ta. dupiBora.
diarpobvra. Aoyw Kal fe) ovvTdpws, mpos dé Ta
Soxobvra evavria Thy Avow pepovra. et0ds TH
daroxpicet, mplv ETEPWTHOAL TO émov 7 ovMoyica-
ofa: od yap xaderov mpoopay ev tit 6 Adyos.
davepov 8° niv core eK Tay TomuKay wal Tobro

6 Kal at Avoeis. Kal OVULLTEPALVOMEVOY, EaV EpwTH LG
moun TO oupmépacpc., THhv aitiay eimeiv: otov
LodokAfs epwruevos bro Ilevodvdpou et edokev
avTt@ womep Kal tots dAdo mpoBovdAo.s, Katra-
aTnoa. Tovs TeTpakociovs, edn. “Ti dé; ov
Tovnpa cor Tatra eddKxet eivar;” édn. “ odKodv

* For the first of the quibbles Sandys refers to Aristo-
phanes, Acharnians, 396, where Cephisophon, being asked
if Euripides was indoors, replies, ‘* Yes and no, if you under-
stand me’’; and he gives the explanation, his mind is outside,
collecting scraps of poetry, while he avr) is upstairs
(dvaBddynv, unless it means “ with his le p’’) composing
a tragedy. The reference in the secon sianes is to the
adversary being reduced to such a position that he cannot
answer without having recourse to sophistical divisions and
distinctions, which seem to imply uncertainty. Aristotle
himself is fond of such ‘‘cautiously limited judgements”
(Gomperz).

The translation is that of the reading dmropodvros, a con-
jecture of Spengel’s. The audience will be ready to express

464

RHETORIC, III. xvi. 3-6

that the gods exist ?”’ Thirdly, when it is intended
to show that the opponent either contradicts himself
or puts forward a paradox. Further, when the
opponent can do nothing else but answer the question
by a sophistical solution ; for if he answers, “‘ Partly
yes, and partly no,” “Some are, but some are not,”
«‘ In one sense it is so, in another not,” the hearers
ery out against him as being in a difficulty. In other
cases interrogation should not be attempted ; for if
the adversary raises an objection, the interrogator
seems to be defeated ; for it is impossible to ask a
number of questions, owing to the hearer’s weakness.
Wherefore also we should compress our enthymemes
as much as possible.

Ambiguous questions should be answered by de-
fining them by a regular explanation, and not too
concisely ; those that appear likely to make us con-
tradict ourselves should be solved at once in the
answer, before the adversary has time to ask the
next question or to draw a conclusion; for it is not
difficult to see the drift of his argument. Both this,
however, and the means of answering will be suffi-
ciently clear from the Topics.° If a conclusion is
put in the form of a question, we should state the
reason for our answer. For instance, Sophocles.¢
being asked by Pisander whether he, like the rest
of the Committee of Ten, had approved the setting
up of the Four Hundred, he admitted it. ‘‘ What
then?” asked Pisander, “did not this appear to
you to be a wicked thing?’’ Sophocles admitted it.
its disapproval of his shuffling answers, which are evidence
of his perplexity. The ordinary reading dazopoivres attributes
the ** perplexity ’’ to the hearers. Or, ‘‘ the hearers, thinking

he is puzzled, applaud us [the interrogator] ” (Jebb).
> viii. 4. ¢ Cp. i. 14. 3.

2u 465

ARISTOTLE

Ay lol ” \ F** 2p: ce £99 ce ?
ov Tatra empatas TA Tovnpda.; val,’ édn: “od
\ te tA Xr / ” \ c ¢ / > /
yap jv dda BeAtiw.” Kai ds 6 Adkav edbuve-
a / ~ a“
pevos THs efopias, epwrapevos et Soxodow adbta@
/ > / Nd ” ¢ A ce > ~
Sixaiws dmoAwhévar arepor, edn. 6 Se “ odKody
A 4 > \ ” ?) \ “a mv ce > ~
ov tovTos tavTa <Oov;’’ Kat os Epn. “ovKodv
5 / Bd) ” ” ce \ \ > / a? ce ?
ucalws av, €épn, “Kat od amodAow; ov
on >> »F 3 ce + V- ‘ , A / ~
hra,” edn: “ot pev yap xpnuata AaBovres Tatra
” > \ > A > \ 7 ” ‘ L, shard
empatav, eyw 8 ov, adda yrapn.’ 810 ovr
emepwrdv Set peta TO CUpTEepacpa, OUTE TO GUUL-
1419b 7€pacua emepwrav, eav pn TO moAd TEpLA Too
aAnbods.
\ \ ~ , > /, al lo

Ilepi 5€ tév yedoiwv, érerdy Twa SoKet xphow
éxew ev tois ay@or, Kai Sev éfn LTopyias tiv
poev amrovdrny Sdiadbeipew trav evavtiwy yedwri
Tov d€ yéAwra omovds, dp0@s Aéywv, elpynrar
mooa €ldn yeAoiwy éoTiv ev Tots mepi mounTiKs,
Gv To ev apporre: eAevOepw Td 8 ov. Smws odv

‘ ¢ / ¢ ral / ” > ¢ > ,
TO apporrov att@ Anierar. E€otr 8 7 ecipwveia
Ths Bwpodroyias éAevbepi@tepov’ 6 ev yap abTod
éveka Trovet TO yeAotov, 6 5é Bwodrdxos ETEpov.

19. ‘O 8 émidoyos ovyKeitar €K TETTApwV, EK
TE TOU mpos E€avTOV KaTACKEVaCaL €D TOY GKpoaTHY
Kal Tov evavtiov davAws, Kal ex Tod avéfoat Kal
Tamew@oat, Kat ek Tod eis TA TAaOH TOV aKpoaTny
Kataorhoa, Kal e€ avapmvicews. mépuke yap

a ~ ‘
pera TO amrodeiEar adrov ev adnOA Tov Se evayriov
wevdh, odrw TO erauveiy Kal péyew Kal emxad-
Kevew. Svoiv dé Oardpov det oroxalecbar, 7 drt
rovros ayabos 7) dtu amADs, 6 8° Ste KaKos ToUTOLS

~1

@ The chapters are lost (ep. i. 11. 29),
> Or, ‘‘ mould the hearers to one’s will” (L. and S.).

4.66

RHETORIC, III. xvii. 6—xrx. 1

**So then you did what was wicked?” “ Yes, for
there was nothing better to be done.’’ The Lacedae-
monian, who was called to account for his ephoralty,
being asked if he did not think that the rest of his
colleagues had been justly put to death, answered
yes. “ But did not you pass the same measures as
they did?” “ Yes.” “ Would not you, then, also
be justly put to death?”’ “No; for my colleagues
did this for money ; I did not, but acted according
to my conscience.’’ For this reason we should not
ask any further questions after drawing the con-
clusion, nor put the conclusion itself as a question,
unless the balance of truth is unmistakably in our
favour.

As for jests, since they may sometimes be useful
in debates, the advice of Gorgias was good—to con- '
found the opponents’ earnest with jest and their jest
with earnest. We have stated in the Poetics * how
many kinds of jests there are, some of them becoming
a gentleman, others not. You should therefore
choose the kind that suits you. Irony is more
gentlemanly than buffoonery ; for the first is em-
ployed on one’s own account, the second on that of
another.

19. The epilogue is composed of four parts: to -
dispose the hearer favourably towards oneself and
unfavourably towards the adversary ; to amplify and
depreciate ; to excite the emotions of the hearer ;
to recapitulate. For after you have proved that you
are truthful and that the adversary is false, the
natural order of things is to praise ourselves, blame
him, and put the finishing touches.? One of two
things should be aimed at, to show that you are
either relatively or absolutely good and the adversary

467

ARISTOTLE

vA c ~ > e A \ , 4
7 OTL aTADs. e€&€ av 5€ 57) Tovwovrouvs KaracKevalew
de?, elpyvrat of Tér0t 7O0ev oTrovdaious Set Kara-
¥ \ , \ \ A ~
2 oxevalew Kal davdous. To dé pera Todro Sedevy-
péevav non adfew ort Kata dvow 7 Tamewodv:
del yap Ta mempaypeva spodoyetabar, ef peArex
TO Toaov épeiv: Kal yap 4 TOV owudTrwv avEnows
> +. / > / ov A a ” ‘
Ex TpovmapxyovtTwy eativ. dOev Sé€ Set avSew Kal
3 Tamewobv, EKKewTaL Of TdOTOL TpOTEpov. fEeTa
\ lot id wv \ ‘ ey\7 > A
de ratra, SiAwy dvrwy Kai ola Kal WAiKa, eis TO
/ ” ‘ > / an > > \ ”
7a0n dyew Tov axpoatnv: tabra 8 éarw €Aeos
a \
Kat Seivwois Kal opyi) Kal picos Kal dOdvos Kat
CijAos Kat épis. eipnvrar dé Kal TovTwy ot Td70L
4 mpotepov. wore Nowrov dvayvioa Ta mpoeupy-
~ ~ 4 7
péva. tovro dé apporre: movely ovTws woTep
fdaciv ev tots mpoomiow, otk op0ds Aéyovres:
7 \ > ~ > / / > ~
va yap «vpabh 7, KeAevovor moAAaKis eizeiv.
a a ~ a /
e€xel pev odv Set TO mpaypa iret, iva pr) AavOavy
‘ e ¢€ z > ~ \ > - /
mept od} 4 Kpiow, éevratOa Sé dv dv dédercrat
Kedharawdods.
> A / / “a ¢ ld > 7 id
5 Apxn dé, diudte & dréoyeTo amodedwKev’ ware
A \ 4 Dh. /, 4 \ > >
. & te Kab du’ 6 AeKréov. Adyerar Sé €€ avTimapa-
~ a > / / a7 > Ld \
Bodfjs tod évavytiov. rrapaBddAew Se 7) doa mepl
\ > A »” bal A £ «¢ 3 >
To avro apdw elzov, 7) pt) Karavticpd. ““aAX
4 / \ , >? ‘ \ / \ A
obTos pev Tad Tepl TovTov, éyd Sé radi, Kal dia
~ ”» a” ? > , e “e b \ sy?
14202 TADTAa. 7 €& eipwreias, olov “odros yap Tad
>? \ \ / \ / ” > / > /
elmev, ey® de rdde. Kal Ti dy émolet, et TadE
edeev, adAa pur) Tadi;”’ 7 e& epwrycews: “ri

* 1.9. > ii. 19. ¢ ii. I-11.
468

RHETORIC, III. x1x. 1-5

either relatively or absolutely bad. The topics which
serve to represent men as good or bad have already
been stated. After this, when the proof has once
been established, the natural thing is to amplify or
depreciate ; for it is necessary that the facts should
be admitted, if it is intended to deal with the ques-
tion of degree; just as the growth of the body is
due to things previously existing. The topics of
amplification and depreciation have been previously
set forth.2 Next, when the nature and importance
of the facts are clear, one should rouse the hearer to
certain emotions—pity, indignation, anger, hate,
jealousy, emulation, and quarrelsomeness. The
topics of these also have been previously stated,’ so
that all that remains is to recapitulate what has been
said. This may appropriately be done at this stage
in the way certain rhetoricians wrongly recommend
for the exordium, when they advise frequent repeti-
tion of the points, so that they may be easily learnt.
In the exordium we should state the subject, in
order that the question to be decided may not escape
notice, but in the epilogue we should give a summary
statement of the proofs.

We should begin by saying that we have kept our
promise, and then state what we have said and why.
Our case may also be closely compared with our
opponent’s ; and we may either compare what both
of us have said on the same point, or without direct
comparison: “ My opponent said so-and-so, and I
said so-and-so on this point and for these reasons.”
Or ironically, as for instance, “He said this and I
answered that ; what would he have done, if he had
proved this, and not simply that ?”’ Or by interroga-
tion: ‘‘ What is there that has not been proved ? ”

469

ARISTOTLE

od dédeura;” 7 “odros ti edekev;” 7 87)
ovTws ex trapaBodfs, 7) Kata pvow, ws eddxOn,
? \ 2 ~ \ , 2A , ‘ ‘
ovTw Ta adtod, Kal maAw, éav BovdAn, xwpis Ta
6700 evaytiov Xdyouv. tedevTH Sé THs AdEews
¢ 4 ¢ > 7, ov b say t > \ A
apuorre. 7 aavvdeTos, Saws émidoyos adda ju7)
Aoyos 7° “‘eipnKxa, axnkdare, éxere, Kpivare.’’

* Reading re\evr7, a conjecture of Victorius. With
redevTh, the sense will be: ‘‘as a conclusion, the asyndetic
style is appropriate.”

» It is generally supposed that this example of a suitable

470

RHETORIC, III. x1x. 5-6

or, ‘‘ What has my opponent proved?’’ We may,
therefore, either sum up by comparison, or in the
natural order of the statements, just as they were
made, our own first, and then again, separately, if
we so desire, what has been said by our opponent.
To the conclusion of the speech * the most appropriate
style is that which has no connecting particles, in
order that it may be a peroration, but not an oration :
‘“T have spoken; you have heard; you know the
facts ; now give your decision.” ®

peroration is an echo of the conclusion of the speech of
Lysias Against Eratosthenes.

471

SELECT GLOSSARY
OF TECHNICAL AND OTHER TERMS

[As a rule, only the meanings of words in Aristotle's ‘ Rhetoric” are noticed,
without reference to later rhetoricians. }

dywnorikds (i. 5. 14): ** fit for athletic contests ” ; (iii. 12. 1)
of style: ‘suited to debate” (dyév), including both
deliberative and forensic speeches. It is opposed to
ypagixy, the style of compositions meant to be read.

axpiBea (iii. 12. 5), dxpBoroyla (i. 5. 15), dxpeBis (iii, 17. 12):
of style, ‘* precise,” ** nicely finished,” * highly correct ” ;
of statements, ‘‘ exact,” ‘* closely reasoned.”

dmorAdvyors (iii. 13. 5): throwing dust in the eyes of the
judge and diverting his attention from what is unfavour-
able ; unless it is taken in a neuter sense, wandering from
the subject, ‘‘ digression.”

dppovia (ili. 1, 4): lit. joining; here, pitch or tone, accent,
modulation of the voice.

apxy . .. alriov (i. 7, 12): the latter (cause) precedes the
former (first principle or beginning). ‘In a plant, the
seed is the apy, the power of vegetation the atriov.”

direxvo (i, 2. 23 15. 1); of proofs, those which are inde-
pendent of art, being already in existence and ready for
use ; évrexvoc are those which have to be invented by the
orator: alias esse probationes quas extra dicendi rationem
acciperet orator, alias quas ex causa traheret ipse et quo-
dammodo gigneret ; ideoque illas aréxvous, inartificiales, has
évréxvous, artificiales, vocaret (Quint. Inst, Orat. v. 1, 8).

avénots (i. 9. 39), avénrixd (i. 9. 38), adgew (ii, 18. 4): ** ampli-
fication.” Its object is to increase the rhetorical effect
and importance of a statement by intensifying the circum-
stances of an object or action.

avroxaBdddws (iii, 7. 2): ** off-hand, lightly, at randon ;”

472

GLOSSARY

avroxdBdanos (iii. 14. 11) is used of a hastily built ship by
the poet Lycophron (see note on iii. 3.1). It is said to be
properly applied to badly kneaded meal.

agedjs (iii. 9. 5): ‘* simple,” the equivalent of dois or
povdxwdos as applied to the period; that is, consisting of
only one x@\ov (member, clause) as opposed to the com-
plex, which allowed more than one, but was not supposed
to exceed four x@)a.

Braicwors (ii. 23. 15): retortion of a dilemma upon the pro-
poser of it: a form of enthymeme in which, from each of
two contraries, some good or evil follows, each contrar
to the other. The adj. B\aiods is translated (1) bow-legged,
or (2) bandy-legged ; but the connexion of this with the
examples given is obscure. Cope suggests that the word

roperly means ‘straddling of the legs”; ‘‘ legs irregu-
arly diverging” (Welldon).

y\Grra (iii. 3. 2): an obsolete, foreign, or dialectal word, in
any way out of the common, which needs to be explained.

yroun (ii. 21. 2): a moral maxim or sentiment; a general
fet particular) statement relating to the conduct of life.

axims are to enthymemes as premises are to syllogisms,
not in the case of every enthymeme, but only those that
deal with the actions and passions of ordinary life.
ypagixh déés (iii, 12. 1): ‘suited for writing,” ‘‘ literary,”
opposed to dywrierixh d.

detyua (iii, 14. 6): **sample, pattern”; the prologue or
proem in an epic poem or drama, so called from its
giving a sample of what is to follow, thus making the
hearer acquainted with the nature of the subject to be
treated of.

decxrixd evOuyrhwara, (ii. 22. 14): direct arguments (as opposed
e.g. to the reductio ad absurdum), the object of which is
to demonstrate or explain: they are opposed to édeyxriKa
é., the object of which is refutation; de@és (iii. 7. 6):
** method of proof.”

deivwors (ii. 21. 10): ** exaggeration,” ‘‘ intensification,” de-
fined by Longinus as a form of avénois ; also ‘* indigna-
tion,” or the arousing of this feeling. Cicero (De inventione,
i. 53. 100) describes it as a form of speech whereby
intense hatred of a person or disgust at anything is
aroused.

dialpeois (ii. 23. 10): distribution or division into parts or

473

GLOSSARY

heads, dealing with the different bearings of the case; in
Poetics (1461 a 23) it is more or less equivalent to punctua-
tion, although it includes every kind of break. dcatpety
T@ oyy (iii. 18. 5) is used of giving a detailed explanation,
as opposed to cuvréuws, one that is concise.

diarexrixy (i. 1. 1): logical discussion, properly by way of
question and answer ; here and elsewhere in Aristotle, the
logic of probabilities, as opposed to strict demonstration
or scientific proof (drédeés). The premises of the latter
being incontrovertibly true, the conclusions drawn from
them must be equally true. The premises of the dialectic
syllogism and the rhetorical enthymeme on the other hand
are only probable, such as appear to be true to certain
persons, and therefore the conclusions drawn from them
can only be probable.

Rhetoric is here stated. to be a counterpart of, not
absolutely identical with, Dialectic (Cicero, Orator, 114,
quasi ex altera parte respondere dialecticae), since there
are points of difference as well as resemblance between
them. Elsewhere it is called an offshoot, or likeness, of
Dialectic. Both are, theoretically, of universal application
(although practically Rhetoric is limited to Politics in the
widest sense, including the ethical sciences) and deal with
material which to a certain extent is within the knowledge
of all and belongs to no separate science. Neither has
any special first principles, like those of a particular
science, which cannot be transferred to another.

Dialectic proceeds by question and answer, whereas
Rhetoric sets forth its ideas in a continuous speech,
addressed, not to a select audience, but to a miscellaneous
crowd with the sor 04 of persuading them to embrace a
certain opinion. hile the dialectical syllogism leads to
general conclusions, the rhetorical, dealing rather with
individual questions, leads to particular conclusions ; for
instance, whether punishment is to be inflicted in a
particular case.

Both take either side of a question and are ready
to prove either a negative or affirmative, whereas the
conclusions of demonstrative proof are universal and
necessary, and cannot be used to support one view or its
opposite indifferently.

didvoa (i. 13. 17; iii, 10. 4, 5): ** meaning,” * intention” ;

474

GLOSSARY

(ii. 26. 5; iii. 1. 7): ‘* thought,” the logical or inventive
part of Rhetoric; (iii. 16. 9): ‘‘intellectual capacity,”
contrasted with the moral purpose.

duacrifew (iii. 5. 6): ** to punctuate ” (see diaipecis).

diarpyf (iii. 17. 10): opportunity for dwelling on a subject
(commoratio) ; occasion for digression.

duypnuéry (iii. 9. 7): disjointed (of style), in which the mem-
bers or clauses of a period are marked off by a connecting
particle.

divayes: (1) power, strength, of body or authority: (2) faculty,
natural capacity, cleverness: (3) potentiality, virtual
existence or action, as opposed to évépyea, actuality,
actual existence or action.

éyxdusov (i. 9. 33): eulogy of achievements, bodily or mental,
distinguished from éraivos, praise of virtuous qualities.

eldos: (1) form, appearance; (2) particular kind, sort:
(3) species, as contrasted with genus : (4) ‘* special topics.”

eixés (i. 2. 15): probability, a proposition in contingent
matter, which is true in the greater number of cases
5 aragiestr men hate those whom they envy), but not in all.
ts relation to the conclusion to be drawn is that of the
universal to the particular.

eixwsy (iii. 4, 3): a metaphor with the addition of the particle
of comparison “as,” *‘like.” Quintilian, /ns¢. Orat. viii,
6. 8, 9 metaphora est brevior similitudo, eoque distat, ywod
illa comparatur rei, quam volumus exprimere, haec pro
ipsa re dicitur.

elpouévn dééts (iii. 9. 1): continuous, running style (lit, strung
together), such as that of Herodotus, in which the only
connexion is that of the cvvdecuol ; the sentences resemble
straight lines which may be produced indefinitely, keeping
an uninterrupted course.

évddcmov (iii. 14. 1): the key-note in music ; (iii. 14. 4) the
key-note in a speech, almost the same as tpoolmor.

évépyea (iii. 11. 2): actualization, vividness, representing
things inanimate as animate (see dvvayis).

évOdunua (i. 2. 8): an enthymeme (lit. thought, argument)
in the Rhetoric is a rhetorical syllogism, that is, it is
drawn from probable premises and is therefore not a
strictly demonstrative proof. The use of the term for a
syllogism in which one of the premises is suppressed
is due to a misunderstanding of the word dredjs [unless

A475

GLOSSARY

this is an interpolation], ‘‘incomplete,” in Anal. Priora,
ii. 29 [27]. 2, which refers to its logical value, not to its
form. In the same treatise Aristotle defines an enthy-
meme as a syllogism from probabilities or signs (see R. C.
Seaton in Classical Review, June, 1914).

évoraots (ii. 25. 1): in logic, an objection directed not against
an opponent’s conclusion, but to the proposition advanced
by him. This being universal if his conclusion is to be
universal, the objection may be universal or particular.
The establishment of the denial of one particular is
sufficient to destroy the universal.

évrexvou miaress (i. 2. 2): see drexvor wicrets.

és (ii. 12. 2): a formed and permanent habit of mind, the
result of mpaés ; it tends to the production of certain
actions and is bound to produce them, unless external
circumstances prevent it.

érauos (i. 9. 33): see éyxwmor.

éme.cod.oby (iii, 17. 11): to introduce an érewdécov or accessory
incident.

éreckys, émcelxeca (i, 2. 4): goodness; (i. 13. 13): reasonable
treatment, equity.

érlOerov (iii. 2. 14; iii. 3. 3): not limited to adjectives, but
used for any strengthening, descriptive, or ornamental
addition (e.g. Tydides),

éridoyos (iii, 13. 3): peroration, winding-up of a speech, in
which the chief points are recapitulated.

émorthun (i. 1. 1), émornrds (ii. 24. 10): science, that which
can be scientifically known, opposed to réxvy, a system or
set of rules, and to éumrepia, experience, knack, without
knowledge of principles.

éroxodouely (i. 7. 31): ** building up of one phrase upon
another, one rising above another step by step like the
rounds of a ladder, xAjuaé” (Cope). They are so arranged
that the last important word of one is repeated as the first
of the next, as in Romans, v. 3-4 Tribulation worketh
patience, and patience experience, and experience hope.
‘** Climax ” is hardly a suitable rendering, which in modern
popular language generally implies the highest point,
culmination.

épwrnors (iii. 18. 1): a question put to the adversary, which
only requires a simple affirmative or negative answer,
opposed to refers or ricua, which needs an explanation.

476

GLOSSARY

etHOns (ii. 12. 7): good-natured, simple, opposed to kakoyOns ;
— 1. 9; 12. 2): of speeches and style, foolish, lacking
orce, empty.

eWoyxos (iii. 7. 2): lit. bulky: of style, “* weighty,” ‘*im-
portant,” opposed to eredrjs, ‘* cheap,” ‘* poor,” ** meagre.”

edpuys (i. 6. 29): possessed of good natural gifts, as distinct
from powers that are the result of practice and study.

00s: originally, a man’s natural bent, his habitual temper
or disposition, moral character; it furnishes an indirect
proof (1) from the character of the speaker, who wants to
convince his hearers of his own virtue (i. 2. 3); (2) from
the characters of the different forms of government (i. 8. 6)
and the various conditions of men (ii. 12-17), to which
different language and methods of conciliation are suitable ;
in style (iii. 7. 6; 16. 8, 9), from exhibiting a knowledge
of and due regard for the characteristics of individuals.

larpeduara (iii. 14. 7): **correctives,” ‘* antidotes” to the
listlessness and indifference of the hearer, of general
application, capable of being used in any part of a
speech.

iéca dvduara (iii. 5. 3): ** specific,’
** general” terms.

Karackevdtew (ii. 24, 4): ‘*to construct” an argument,
opposed to dvackevdfev, dvacpeiy, ** to demolish ”; (ii. 2. 27 ;
iii. 19. 1) **to put into a certain frame of mind”; kara-
oxevacrikés (ii. 26. 8): ** constructive.”

Kareorpampévn déks (iii. 9. 3): ** close” or periodic style, in
which the period, as distinguished from sentences in the
elpouévn X., resembles a circular line, which returns and
ends at a certain point.

kbptos (i. 1. 11; i. 8. 1,25 15. 9, 21): ** authoritative,” ** effec-
tive”; (i. 3. 4) opportune,” “appropriate”; (iii. 2. 2)
of words, ‘‘ established,” ‘* vernacular,” used in their
natural sense, opposed to “ foreign,” figurative, or archaic
words, in fact, to any that are unusual or out of the
common.

k@dor (iii. 9. 5): ** member,
period.

Nexrixés (iii. 8. 4): belonging to the language of ordinary
life and conversation.

erés (iii. 16. 2): lit. smooth ; of style, ** plain,” ** unadorned.”

Néyos: ** speech,” ‘‘ oration ” ; (iii. 6. 1) ** description,” ** de-

ATT

>

opposed to repéxovra,

”

‘‘ clause,” a subdivision of the

GLOSSARY

b

finition,” opposed to évoua, the noun or term; (iii. 2, 7)
prose ; (ii. 20. 2) ** story,” ** fable’’; (ii. 2. 18) ** account,”
‘* consideration ” (Ady év undéve elvat),

Hadaxds (i. 10, 4): ** effeminate” ; (ii. 17. 4) ** mild,” ** unim-
passioned ” ; (ii. 22. 10) of reasoning, ** slack,” ** loose.”

péyeOos (i. 5. 18): ** stature,” ; (iii. 1. 4) of style, ** grandeur.”

Mecody (il. 18. 4): ** to extenuate,” ** depreciate,”’ opposed to
avé&ew, av&ors.

Meloupos, ytovpos (iii. 9. 6): **docked,” ‘‘ curtailed,” of a
clause or period which seems to end too soon.

Mecpaxradns ii. 11. 16): of style, characterized by youthful
force and vehemence and therefore not becoming to the
old. In other rhetorical writers, ‘* puerile.”

Helwors (uecody, ii. 18. 4; 26. 1): ** depreciation,” ** extenua-
tion,” opposed to avénos, avfewv.

peravdorns (ii. 2. 6): “immigrant,” ** vagrant,” opposed to a
native. It appears to be the same as the later uérockos
(resident alien): cp. Politics. iii. 5. 9, where dripyros is
explained as ‘‘ having no share of office.” It might also
mean ‘‘of no value,” one whom anybody could kill with
impunity (see Leaf on Jliad, ix. 648).

perapopa (iii. 10. 7): ‘* transference,” ‘* metaphor.” ‘** Meta-
phor is the application to a thing of a name that belongs
to something else, the transference taking place from
genus to species, from species to genus, from species to
species, or proportionally ” (Poetics, 21).

wérpov: ** metre,” ** measure”; see pududs.

povixwros (iii. 9. 5): of a period, consisting of only one
clause or member,

vouos: sometimes used in the sense of ** convention,” as
opposed to picts.

dyxos (iii. 6. 1): ‘* weight,” ‘* importance,” “dignity.” It
also has the sense of ** bombast” (Longinus, iii. 4).

oiketos (i. 5. 7): ** one’s own,” that which one can dispose of
as one wishes ; (i. 4. 12), that which is peculiar to some-
thing, as to a form of government; (iii. 2. 6; 7, 4): of
style and the use of words, *‘ appropriate,” much the same
as kuptos.

opovuula (ii. 24, 2; iii, 2. 7): the use of words in an equivocal
sense and such words themselves, i.e, those that have the
same sound but a different sense.

dvoua: asa general term, includes nouns, adjectives, articles,

‘478

GLOSSARY

and pronouns; as a special term, ‘“‘ noun” opposed to
VEER.”

md0os, macxev (ii. 16. 1, 2): mental condition or affection
enerally ; (ii. 1. 8; iii. 17. 8), ‘* passion,” ‘* emotion ” ;
i. 2. 1) ** quality,” ‘‘ property” of things; (i. 9. 15)
‘* suffering”; (iii. 7.3) a pathetic style ; so wa@yrixh déEs
and radnrixas Neyer.

rapaBor% (iii. 19. 5): ** placing side by side,” ** comparison ” ;
(ii. 20. 4) ** illustration.”

mapdbevryua (ii. 20. 1, 2): ‘* example,” ‘‘ instance,” including
both the historical (zapa8od\7) and the fictitious (Adyos) ;
(i. 2. 8) proof from example, ‘‘ rhetorical induction,” con-
trasted with év@vunua.

mapddoyos (i. 13. 16): ** beyond calculation,” ‘* unexpected ; ”
mapadoyiter Oa (i. 14. 1), ** to cheat,” ‘* defraud ”; (ii. 24. 4)
**to reason falsely, or be led astray by false reasoning ”
(also in an active sense); maparoyorixds (i. 9. 29),
‘‘ fallacious,” rapadoyiopds (iii. 12. 4), ** fallacy.”

mapicwors (iii. 9. 9): ‘* balancing of clauses ;” rdpucos, of a
clause, ‘* exactly balanced.”

rapouoiwors (iii. 9. 9): *‘* making like,” ‘‘ assimilation” of
sounds at the beginning or end of clauses.

memonuévov dvoua (ili. 2. 5): a word coined or invented for
the occasion.

repiodos (iii. 9. 3): a complete sentence, composed of several
clauses, from one full stop to another ; 7. rs yijs (i. 4. 13):
a traveller’s description of the countries visited by him.

meperéreva (i. 11, 24): sudden change or reverse of fortune
In tragedy, the word implies ‘ta complete change or
reversal of situation within the limits of a single scene or
act” (Bywater on Poetics, 10).

miors (i, 14. 5): pledge of good faith, distinguished from
bpxos and deka; (i. 1. 11. and elsewhere): means of
persuasion, ‘‘ probable” opposed to ‘* demonstrative ”
proof.

mpaxrixds (i. 6. 11): ‘able to do,” followed by the genitive,
unless here it be translated ‘ efficient,” ‘“ practical,” not
connected grammatically with trav dyabav.

mpdbecis (iii, 13. 2): ‘* setting forth,” ‘* statement of the
case,” like a problem (pé8\yua) in geometry.

mpootmov (i. 1. 9; iii. 14. 1): ‘* preamble,” ** exordium,” com-
pared to the mpédoyos in tragedy and comedy, ‘‘ all that

ATQ

GLOSSARY

part of the play which comes before the first song of the
chorus ” (Poetics, 12. 4).

mporaors (i. 3. 7): ** proposition,” ** premise” of a syllogism ;
combined with 66£a, ‘*notion,” ** popular opinion” as
useful for producing persuasion (ii. 1. 1).

mraous (i. 7. 27): used by Aristotle as a general term for the
inflexions, not only of a noun, but also of a verb, generally
marked by a difference of form; thus, the adjective
xarxobs from xaxés (iii. 9. 9) and the adverb dvdpeiws from
dvdpia (i. 7. 27) are instances of *‘ inflexions” (Bywater
on Poetics, 20. 10).

pjua: (1) generally, that which is spoken ; (2) grammatically,
a verb as opposed to a noun (évoua). The term also
appears to be applied to an adjective when used as a
predicate.

pyropikn: see dvadexriKy.

puOuds (iii, 1. 4, 8. 2): “time”; in general, any regular,
harmonious movement. in sound or motion, which can be
measured by number; thus, it may be applied to the
tramp of a body of soldiers, the flapping of birds’ wings,
the dance, music, and writing, in the last expressed in
long and short syllables. ‘* Rhythm consists of certain
lengths of time, while metre is determined by the order
in which these lengths are placed. Consequently, the
one seems to be concerned with quantity, the other with

uality [the syllables must be in a certain order]...

rhythm has unlimited space over which it may range,
whereas the spaces of metre are confined; . . . further,
metre is concerned with words alone, while rhythm extends
also to the motion of the body ” (Quintilian, /nst. Orat.
ix. 4, 45, Loeb Series translation).

capns déés (iii. 2. 1): ** clear,” ‘* perspicuous,” defined (iii.
12. 6) as the mean between dédodecxia (garrulity, prolixity)
and cuvrouia (excessive conciseness).

cewvh dréévs (iii. 2. 2): ** noble,” ** majesty ** dignified.”

onuetoy (i. 2. 16): ** sign,” a probable argument as proof of
a conclusion. Signs are of two kinds, one having the
relation of particular to universal, the other that of
universal to particular. rexuipiov, on the other hand, is
a necessary sign, and such signs can be made into a
demonstrative syllogism, which cannot be refuted. Thus,
‘**sign ” is both a general and special term. As a general

480

GLOSSARY ‘

term, it embraces the rexu7pua; as a special term, the two
kinds of signs, which are capable of refutation.

godotxos (ii. 16. 2): ‘tone who offends against good taste or
manners”; also one who speaks incorrectly (codocxigev,
iii, 5. 7).

orevds (iii. 12, 2): of style, ‘* thin,” ‘* meagre,” ‘* jejune.”

aroxetoy (ii. 22. 13; 26. 1): ** element” of an enthymeme,
identified by Aristotle with rézos.

orpoyyvnos (ii. 21. 7): ** rounded” ; of style, ‘‘ terse,” ‘* com-

ct.”

cuxopavria (ii. 24. 10): ‘* false accusation,” here used for
** sophism,” a specious but fallacious argument.

giuBoroy (iii. 15. 9, 16. 10): ** sign,” ‘*token™; not to be
confused with cvpSorH (i. 4. 11), * contract.” ciuBoror
itself elsewhere = mutual covenant.

ouvdyew (i. 2. 13; ii. 22. 3, 15): **to conclude,” ‘‘ draw an
inference”: (iii. 11. 12) ** draw together,” ‘* contract.”

civdecuos (iii. 5. 2): ** connecting particle”: it includes the
preposition, the copulative conjunctions, and certain
particles.

cuvectpaypevws (ii. 24. 2): ‘twisted up,
ovorpépery, iii. 18. 4).

ctoroxa (i. 7. 27): conjugates,” ‘* co-ordinates ” ;, \éyerat
6¢ cvororxa péev TH ToLdde oloy Ta Sikara Kal 6 dikatos TH diKaro-
civyn Kal Ta avdpeta Kal 6 dvdpeios 7H dvdpia (Topics, ii. 9. 1).

oxeTNacpuds (ii. 21. 10): ** passionate complaint ”’ of injustice
or ill-fortune: one of the parts of the peroration, in which
we endeavour to secure the commiseration of the hearer,
the first thing necessary being to put him into a sympa-
thetic and pitying frame of mind (Forcellini, s.v. con-
questio).

oxijua (ii. 24. 2; iii. 8. 1): ‘* form,” ‘‘ figure” of a speech.
It does not correspond to the modern expression *‘ figure of
speech,”’ but is an ‘‘ attitude” or ‘‘ turn of meaning given
to the language when it comes to be actually spoken”

. ‘ta difference of sense resulting from a difference

of some kind in the mode of enunciation” (Bywater,
Poetics, 19. 7).

rdés (iii. 13-19): the arrangement or distribution of the
parts of a speech.

ramew éécs (iii. 2. 1): ** low,”’ ‘* poor,” ** mean”’; ina moral
sense, ** base,” ‘‘ vile” (ramecvérns, ii. 6. 10).

ya 481

”

** compactly ” (cp.

GLOSSARY

Texunprov (i. 2. 16, 17): see onueiov.

réxvy (i. 1. 3): set of rules, ** handbook” of Rhetoric: else-
where of the ‘‘ tricks ” of rhetoricians ; rexvodoyety (i. 1. 9):
to bring under the rules of art, reduce to a system.

rémos (ii, 26. 1): lit., a place to look for a store of something,
and the store itself; a heading or department, containing
a number of rhetorical arguments cf the same kind (rézos.
els 6 moka évOuynjuara éurlmrre). These are all classified
and placed where they can be easily found ready for use.
réro are of two kinds: (1) xowol rédao (** commonplaces ’’)
or simply réra, the topics common to the three kinds of
Rhetoric (i. 2. 21; ii. 18. 3-5); (2) et6n or téa (i. 2. 21),
specific topics, propositions of limited applicability, chiefly
derived from Ethics and Politics.

bmdxpors (iii. 1. 3): ** delivery” of a speech, under which
declamation, gesticulation, expression, and everything
connected with acting are included ; broxpirixh défts (iii.
12. 2), **style suited for delivery,” ‘lending itself to
acting ” ; [réxvy] (iii. 1. 7): ** the art of acting.”

x@pa (iii. 17, 15): ** room” for our own arguments as well
as those of the adversary in the hearer’s mind, ** to get a
footing” for what we are going to say; (ii. 24, 2): the
proper place, province.

yrds (iii. 2. 3): ** bare,” ** bald,” of prose as opposed to
poetry.

yuxpés (iii. 3. 1): * cold,’”’-* frigid,” ‘* insipid.” As a noun,
7d wuxpdv means generally any defect of style as opposed
to apery AdEews.

482

INDEX OF NAMES

a ae i. 3. 65 ii. 22. 12, 24.6; iii.
— iii. 10. 7; Aeginetans, ii.

Aenesidemus, i. 12. 30

Aeschines (Socraticus), iii. 16. 10

Aesion, iii. 10. 7

Aesop, ii. 20. 5, 6

Aesopian (fables), ii. 20. 2

Agathon, ii. 19. 13, 24. 10

Agesipolis, ii. 23. 12

Ajax (tragedy), ii. 23. 20, 24

Alcaeus, 1.

Alcibiades (iescendants, ii, 15, 3

Alcidamas, i. 18, 2; ii. 23. 11; iii.
8. 1, 2, 4

Alcinous, iii. 16. 7

Alemaeon (tragedy), ii. 23. 8

Alexander (Paris), ii. 23. 125 iii, 14.
8

Alexander ete), | ii, 23. 8, 24.7 ©
Alphesiboea, ii. ‘

Amasis, ii. 8. 12

Amphiaraus, ii, 12. 6
Anaxagoras, ii. 23. 11
Anaxandrides, iii. 10. 7, 11. 8, 12. 3
Androcles, ii. 23, 22

Androtion, iii. 4. 3

Antigone, iii. 16, 9

Antimachus, iii. 6. 7

Antiphon, ii. 2. 19, 6. 27, 23. 20
Antisthenes, iii. 4. 3

Archelaus, ii. 23. 8

Archibius, i. 15, 15

Archidamus, iii. 4. 3
Archilochns, ii. 28. 11; iii. 17. 16
Archytas, iii. 11. 5

Areopagus, i. 1. 5; ii, 23. 12
Ares, iii. 4. 4, 11. il

Argos (Argives), i. 14, 4
Aristides, iii. 14. 3

Aristippus, ii. 23. 12

Aristogiton, i. 9. 38; ii. 24. 5

Aristophanes, iii. 2. 15

Aristophon, ii. 23. 7

Athenians, i. 15. 135 ii. 22, 5, 23.
11; iii. 10. 7, 14. 11

Athens, ii, 23. 11

Athos, iii. 9. 7°

Attic (neighbour), - Ws. 2s, (hos
one iii. 11. 16; phiditia, iii.

Raeiclan: ii. 23. 12

Babylonians (comedy), iii. 2. 15
Bias, ii. 13. 4

Boeotians, iii. 4. 3

Bryson, iii, 2. 13

Callias, iii. 2. hye

Calliope, iii.

Callippus, i. i 30: (Art of rhetoric),
ii. 21

Callisthenes, ii, 3. 13

Callistratus, i. 7. 13, 14. 1; iii. 17.
14

Calydon, iii. 9. 4

Carcinus, ii. 23. 28 ; iii. 16. 11
Carthaginians, i. 12. 18
Cephisodotus, iii. 4. 3, 10. 7
Chabrias, i. 7. 13; iii. 10. 7
Chaeremon, ii. 93. 29; iii. 12, 2
Chares, i, 15, 15; iii. 10. 7, 17. 10
Charidemus, ii. 23. 17

Charon CDnchaatieys iii. 17. 16
Chians, ii. 23, 1

Chilon, ii. 12. ie i 13, 23. 11
Choerilus, iii, 14. 4

Cimon (descendants), ii. 15. 3
Cleon, iii. 5. 2, 8.1

Cleophon, i. 15. 13; iii. 7. 2
Conon, ii. 23. 12, 29

Corax, ii. 24. 11

Corinthians, i. 6. 24

483

INDEX OF NAMES

Cratylus, iii. 16. 10
Critias, i. 15. 18; iii, 16. 3
Croesus, iii, 5. 4

Cycnus, ii. 22. 12
Cydias, ii. 6. 24

Darius, ii, 20. 3

Delphi, ii. 23. 12

Demades, ii, 24, 8

Democrates, iii, 4. 3

Democritus, iii. 9. 6

Demosthenes (? general), iii. 4,

Demosthenes (orator), ii. 23. 3

Diogenes (the Cynic), iii. 10, 7

Diomedes, ii. 23. 20; iii. 15, 10

Diomedon, ii, 23. 8

Dion, i, 12. 29

Dionysius (of Syracuse), i. 2, 19 ; ii.
6. 27; ii. 15. 8

Dionysius (orator and poet), iii, 2.

eo

Pte (general name), ii. 24. 5
Dionysus, iii. 4. 4

Diopithes, ii. 8. 11

Dorieus, i. 2. 13

Draco, ii, 23. 29

Egypt, ii. 20. 3

Egyptian “pen iii. 16. 5

Eleans, ii, 23. 27

Elis, iii. 14. 11

Empedocles, i. 13.2; iii. 5, 4

Epicharmus, 1% 31: ; iii. 9. 10

Epidaurus, iii. 10. 7

Epimenides, iii. 17. 10

Ergophilus, ii, 3. 18

Eubulus, i. 15. 15

Euripides (Hecuba), ii. fate, 2; (Hippo-
lytus), ii, 22. 35 iii, 8; Uphig.
Auw.), iii, 11s 25 Cphtg, Taur.),
iii. 6. 4, 14. 10; (Medea), rats A A
63 (Orestes), i. i. 20; (Troades),
fi. 21. :5, 28. 293 iii, IT, 20.5
Fragments (Andromeda), i. 11, 8;
(Antiope), i. 11. 28; (Meleager),
LK? or 44 (Oeneus), pha Be 1 eal Oe
(Stheneboea), ii. 21. 2; (Telephus),
lii, 2.10; (unknown play), ii. 28,
1; (reply to the Syracusans), ii. 6.
20; (his choice of words), iii. 2. 5

Euthydemns, ii, 24. 8

Euthynus, ii. 19. 14

Euxenus, iii, 4, 3

Evagoras, ii, 23. 12

Gelon, i, 12. 30

Glaucon (of Teos), iii. 1. 3

Gorgias, iii. 1. 9, 3. 4,7, 11, 14. 2,
15. 11, 14, 11, 18. 7

Gyges, iii, 17. 16

Haemon, iii. ye 11, 17. 16

Halys, iii. 5.

Harmodius, i 9. 385 ii, 24. 5

be faerie: ii, 23. 29 ‘
egesippus, see any Ss

Helen, Re 28, 12, 24. 9 ig

Heraclidae, ii. de, 6

Heraclitus, iii. 5, 6

Hercules (Pillars of), ii. 10. 5

Hermes, ii, 24. 2

Herodicus, i, 5. 103 ii, 23, 281

Herodotus, iii. 9. 2, 16. 5

Hesiod, ii. 4. 21, 10. 6

Hesione, iii. 15. 9

Hieron (wife of), ii. 16. 2

Himera (people), ii. 20. 5

Hipparchus, ii, 24. 5

Hippolochus, i. 9. 38

Homer, i. 15. 13; ii. 28. 11; ang a
25; (liad) L., iii. 14. 6; ii.’2 A
20; ii. 2. 6; IL., i. 6. 22; ii. 2.

Hie ht es BAS i. 18. 18; IV., iii.

ieee 1 o. i, 7 813 iit, 9.9, 11.
16; ii. 2. 6: XL., ii. 9. ll; iii, yl
3; XO Bore XIU. iii, 11.
3; xv iii, 11, 3; XVIIL, Et
9: ii. 2 2, 21. 11; XX, iii. 4. 1;
rash es a; ras ears
16 _ ii, 14 i
iro: ¥ iff. 14. 11: TX, ik, 8.
16; Xr, th 11. 8; XIV., iii, 10. 2;
XV, , te 8; XIX., iii, 16. 10:
XXII. aR Fi 333 XXIIL, iii, 16.7

Hygiaenon, iii. 1b. 8

Ida, ii. 24, 7

Idrieus, iii, 4. 3

Iphicrates, i. 7. 82, 9, 81; ii. 28. 6,
7, 8, 17; iii. 2. 10, 10, 7

Ismenias, ii, 23, 11

Isocrates, i, 9, 88; ii, 28. 12; iii.
17. 10, 11; ii. 19. 14, 28. 12; iii.
14. 1, 17. 16 Gepepchesr ee ioe
iii. 11. 7, 17240°* GF
iii. 7. 11, 0. 7, 10. ”, 14, 2, 17. 10;

1 In both these passages it is proposed to read Prodicus,

484

INDEX OF NAMES

(Ad Philippwm) iii. 10. 5, 7, 11.
Italiotes, ii. 23. 11
Jason (the Thessalian) i.

(hero), ii. 23, 28
Jocasta, iii, 16, 11

12. 31;

Lacedaemonians, i. 5, 6, 9. 263 ii
it 3

Laeonian (apophthegms), ii. 21, 8

Temper, en ‘ H 4
mpsacus (people of), ii. 23. 11

Eaodnmnaa, toy. 19 3 ii. 28, 25

Leptines, iii. 10. 7

Leucothea, ii. 23. 27

Libyan (fables), ii. 20. 2

Licymnius, iii. 2. 13, 12. 2, 13. 5

Locrians, ii, 21. 8

Lycoleon, iii, 10, 7

Lycophron, iii. 3. 1, 9. 7

Lycurgus, li. 23, nw

Lysias (frag.), ii. 23. 19 ; (Funeral
Oration), iii. 10. 7

Mantias, ii. 23, 11

Marathon, ii, 22. 6

Medea (play), ii. 23. 28
Megara, i. 2. 19
Melanippides, iii. 9. 6
Melanopus, i. 14. 1

Meleager (play), ii. 2, 19, 23. 20
Meletus, iii. 18, 2

Miltiades (decree of), iii. 10. 7
Mixidemides, ii, 28. 12
Moerocles, iii. 10. 7

Mysia, iii. 2. 10
Mytilenaeans, ii. 23. 11

Nausicrates, iii, 15, 2
Nicanor, ii. 23. 3
Nicon, iii. 11. 6
Niceratus, iii. 11, 13
Nireus, iii. 12. 4

Odysseus, ii. 23. 24; iii. 15. 9
Odyssey, iii. 3. 4
Oedipus (lost play), iii. 16. 7

Olympian (victor), i. 7. 32, 9. 31;

(prize), i. 2, 13
Olynthian (war), iii. 10. 7
Orestes (lost tragedy), ii, 24. 3

Palamedes, iii. 12. 3
Pamphilus, ii. 23.21

Paralus, iii. 10, 7

Paros (inhabitants), ii. 23. 11

Penelope, iii. 16. 7

Pentheus, ii. 23. 29

Peparethus (speech on), ii. 23. 11

Periander, i. 15, 18

Pericles, i. 7. 34; iii, 4. 3, 10, 7, 18.
1; (descendants), ii. 15. 3

Phalaris, ii. 20. 5

Phayllus, iii, 16. 7

Philammon, iii. 11. 13

Philemon, iii, 12. 3

Philip (of Macedon), ii. 23, 6

Philocrates, ii. 8. 13

Philoctetes, iii. 11. 13

Philomela, iii. 3. 4

Pindar (quoted), i. 7.14; ii, 24. 2

Piraeus, ii. 24. 3

Pisander, iii. 18. 6

Pisistratus, i. 2. 19

Pitholaus, iii. 9. 7, 10. 7

Pittacus, ii. 12. 6, 25. 7

Plato (comic poet), i, 15. 15

Plato (philosopher), ii. 23. 12;
Laparic) f iii. 18. 2; (Menexenus),

. 9. 803 iii, 14, ul; (Phaedrus),

iit. 4s 11; (Republic), iii. 4. 3

Polus, ii. 23, 29

Polybus, iii, 14. 6

Polycrates, ii. 24. 3, 6

Polyeuctus, iii. 10. 7

Potidaea (people), ii. 22. 7!

Pratys, iii, 11, 13

Prodicus, iii. 14. 9

Protagoras, ii. 24. 11; iii. 5. 5

Pythagoras, ii. 23. 11

Rhadamanthus, iii. 12. 8

Salamis, i. 15. 3, ii. 22. 6, iii. 10. 7

Samians, iii. 4. 3

Sappho, ii, 23, 11, 12

Sestus, iii. 10. 7

Sigeum teeep oy 15. 18

Simonides, 24; i. 7, 82;
81; ii. 16. a iii. 2. 14

Sisyphus, iii. 11. 3

Socrates, i. 9. 30; ii. 15. 3; ii, 23.
8; iii, 14, 11, 18. 2; (oration by
Theodectes), ii. 23, 13

Socratic emereriecns) is
(discourses), iii. 16.

Solon, i. 15. 13; ii. 23. *Y

Sophocles, iii. 15. 3; (Antigone), i.
13. 2,15. 6; iii. 16. 9, 11, 17. 16;

485

20. 4;

INDEX OF NAMES

(Oed. Tyr.), iii. 14. 6 ; (Tewcer), iii.
15. 9; (T'yro), ii, 23. 92

Sophocles, (orator and politician),
i, 14, 3; ili. 18. 6

Speusippus, iii. 10, 7

Stesichorus, ti. 20. 5, 21. 83 iii. 11,
6

Stilbon, ii. 23. 11
Strabax, ii. 23, 17
Syracuse (people), ii. 6. 21

Telephus (lost play), iii. 2. 10
Tenedos (people), i. 15. 13

Teweer (lost play), ii. 28. 7; iii. 15.9
Teumessus, iii. 6. 7

Theagenes, i. 2. 19

Thebes, ii. 23. 11

Themistocles, i, 15. 14

Theodamas, iii. 4. 3

486

Theodectes, iii. 9. 9; (Ajaz), ii. 23
24; ; (Alemaeon), i ii, 23. 8; (reste),
ii, 24, 8; (Socrates), ii. 23, 135
(Law), ii. ‘2. Haz

Theodorus (rhetorician), ii. 23. 28;
iii. 11. 6, 18. 5

Theodorus (tragic actor), iii. 2, 4

Theseus, i. 6. 25; ii, 23. 5, 12

Thettalisens, ii. 23. 11

Thrasybulus, ii. 23, 29

Thrasymachus, ii. 28, 29; fii. 1. 7,
8. 4, 11, 18

<a 1..15, 303 ii, 23. 18,
2

Xenophon (Helleniea) ii. 28. 12
Xerxes, ii. 20. 3

Zeno, i. 12, 10

tit eee ©

GENERAL INDEX

Aberration, iii. 13. 5

Aborigines, i. 5. 5

Accident (fallacy of), ii, 24. 6

Account (rendered on leaving
office), iii. 10. 7, 18. 6

a (of enthymemes), ii.

4, 2

Accusation and defence, i. 8. 3,
10. 1

Actions (yoluntary and involun-
tary), i. 10.7

Actors and acting, iii. 1. 8. 4, 7,
12. 2; see also Delivery

Actualization, see Vividness

Ages and their characteristics, ii.
12-14

Agonistic style, iii. 12. 1

‘Aim, see End

Alliteration, iii. 9. 9

eee a terms, ii. 4 9; (topic
of) 24. 2; iii. 5. 4, 18.

Amplification, i. 9. 388, oa. 65. ii
18. 4, 19. 26, 26. 1: iii. 6. 7, 12. 4

Amusements, i, 11. 15, 29

rach (in enthymemes), ii, 23.
5,1

Analytic, i, 4.5
ser ee ii. 2. 1; (and hatred), ii.
81

Netanedeie and consequent, ii. 19.
6, 20. 21

Antistrophic Odes, iii. 9. 1

Antithesis, iii. 9. 7, 10, 10. 5

Apophthegms, ii. 12, 6, 21. 8; iii.
11. 6

Appetite, Appetition, see Longing

Appropriate (diction),see Propriety

Arbitration, i, 13. 19

Arguments (refutation of), ii. 25.
1; (comparison of), iii. 13. 8, 19.
5; (four classes of), ii. 18

Aristocracy, i. 8. 4, 5

Arrangement (of mpeeeh ge 13-19

Arrogance, i, 2. 7; ii.

Article, the (use of), ‘it ‘i 5

Artificial proofs, i. 2. 2

** Arts” of Rhetoric, i. 2. 4, 5

Assault (and battery), i. 12.5; ii.
24. 11

Asyndeta, iii. 6. 5, 6, 12. 2, 4. 19, 6

ert (of clauses), iii. 9. 9,
- 10

Ball’ (playing at), i. 11. 15

Beautiful, or Noble, the, i. 6. 7,
9. 3, 14, 15

Beauty (personal), i. 5. 113. (of
words and style), iii. 2. 13, 10. 1

Benevolence, see Favour

Better method (topic of), ii. 23. 26

Birth (nobility of), i. 5. 55 ii. 15. 2

Blame, i. 11. 27

Body (excellences of), i. 5. 10

Bodyguards and tyrants, i. 2. 19
(argument from Example)

Boorish(ness), ii. 21. 9; iii. 16. 9

Boxer, i. 5. 14

Branch (of a speech), iii. 13. 5

Building up (Climax), i. Talos
Glossary, 8.v. émrotxodopuetv

Calumny, see Prejudice

Categories, ii. 7. 6

Cause (topic of), ii. 28. 18, 25;
(and effect, fallacy of), ii. 24. 8

Censure, i. 9. 41

Challenge (legal), i. 15, 29

Chance, see Fortune

Change, i. 11. 20; (of mind), ii.
23. 19

Character (moral), see Ethos

Children (blessing of), i. 5. 4, 6

Choice (deliberate moral), i. 1. 14,

487

GENERAL INDEX

8. 6 ; (things deliberately chosen),
i. 6. 26

Circle (defined), iii. 6. 1

Clause, see Member

Clearness (of style), iii, 2. 1

Cleruchies, ii. 6. 24

Climax, i. 7,81; see Building up

Comic poets, ii. 6. 20

Commonplaces, i. 2, 21; see also
Topics

sorig te wid (wrongs against the),
i. 18,

Comparison, ii. 20. 2, 5; iii, 19. 5
Compound words, iii. 2. 5, 8. 1,
11

Compulsion (acts of), i. 10. 14
Conciseness, iii. 6. 1, 6, 15. 10
Confidence, ii. 5, 16-18, 14, 1
Conjunctions (connecting par-
ticles), iii. 5. 2, 6. 6, 12. 4
yr ee (topic of), ii. 23. 14,
24

Constructive (enthymemes), ii.
26. 8

Contempt, ii. 2. 4, 11. 7
Continuous style, iii, 9. 1
Contracts, i. 1. 10, 2. 2, 15. 20
Contraries (topic of), ii, 19. 1
Contumely, ii. 2. 3-5, 4. 30
Co-ordinates, i. 7, 27
Cordax (rhythm of the), iii. 8. 4
Counter-syllogism, ii. 25. 2; iii.
17. 15
Courage, i. 9. 8
Covetousness, ii. 6. 5
Cowardice, i. 9. 8; ii. 6. 3
Cupping-glass (riddle), iii. 2. 12
Customary things, i. 10. 18

Danger, ii. 5. 2

Definition (topic of), ii. 23, 8

Degenerate descendants, ii. 15. 3

Degree, see Greater and Less

Deliberative rhetoric, i. 3. 8-6, 6-8 ;
(its style), iil. 12. 5; (harder than
forensic), iii. 17. 10; (least admits
narrative), iil. 16, 11

Delivery (declamation) iii. 1. 7,
12. 2,5 ’

Democracy, i. 8. 4

Demon (Sacuérov), ii, 28. 85 iii,
18

Demonstration, iii, 18. 2; (rhetori-
cal), i. 1, 11
Depreciation see Extenuation

A488

Description (substituted for the
name), iii. 6. 1

peat (ériypappa) of a charge,
i. 13. 9

Desire (ércOvpia), i. 10. 18 ; (rational
and irrational), i, 11. 5

Dialectic, i. 1. 1

Dicast, i. 3. 2

Diction (fallacies of), ii. 24. 2;
(prose and poetical), iii. 1. 9; see
also Style

Difficult (things), i. 6. 27, 7. 15

Dignity (of style), iii. 6. 1 (6yKos) ;
ii. 17. 43 iii. 8. 41(ven

Digression (aberration), iii. 18. 5

Dilemma, ii, 23. 15

Diminutives (use of), iii. 2. 15

Dithyrambic (preludes), iii. 14. 5;
(poets), iii. 3. 3, 12. 2

Division (topic of), ii. 23. 10

Dog (praise of), ii. 24. 2

Draughts (game), i. 11. 15

Easy (things), i. 6. 27
Effect and cause (fallacy of), ii.
4,8

24,

Elegances (of style), iii. 10

Element (orocxeiov), i. 6. 13 ii.
22. 18, 26. 1 (=7ér0s)

Emotions, see Passions

Emulation, ii. 6. 24, 11. 1

Encomium (distinguished from
praise), i. 9. 33

End (réAos), i. 7. 3

Enigma, see Riddle

Enjoyable (things), i. 5. 7

Enmity, ii. 4. 30

Enthymeme (a kind of syllogism),
i. 1, 11, 2. 8; (two kinds), i. 2.
20, 22; (nature and use of), ii.
22. 1, 25. 8; (elements of), ii. 23;
(apparent, false), ii. 24; (destrue-
tive and constructive), ii. 26. 8;
(use of in proof), iii. 17. 6

Envy, ii. 9. 8, 10. 1

Epic cycle, iii. 16. 7

Epic poets, iii. 8. 3

Epideictic rhetoric, i. 8. 3-6, 9. 1;
(points of agreement with deliber-
ative), i. 9. 85; (amplification use-
ful in), i. 9. 88; (uature of), ii.
22. 6; (best for written composi-
tions), iii. 12. 5; (narrative in),
iii, 16. 1; Qess important in
proof), iii.1 7. 8

GENERAL INDEX

Epilogue, see Peroration

Episodes, iii. 17. 11

Hpithets, iii. 2. 14, 3. 3, 6. 3, 7

Equity, i. 13. 12-19

Eristic, ii. 24. 10, 11

Error, i. 13. 16; iii. 15. 3

Ethos (moral character) (of the
speaker), i. 2.3; (what produces
it), iii. 16. 8; (of different stages
of life), ii, 12-14; (its accompani-
ments), iii. 16. 9; ethical (proof),
i. 2. 3, ii. 1-18; (style), iii. 7. 1;
(speeches), ii. 18. 1, 21. 16; (used
in amplification), i. 9. 38

Euphemism, i. 9. 28; iii. 2. 10

Euphony, iii. 2. 11

caves cor (Seivwors), ii. 21. 10,

4

Example, i. 2. 8; ii. 20; (best for
deliberative rhetoric), i. 9. 40;
(from history), ii. 20. 3; (reason-
ing from), ii. 25. 8; (refutation
of), ii. 25. 18

Excess and the exceeded, i. 7. 2;
(as a virtue), i. 9. 29

Exchange of properties (avriSocts),
iii. 15. 8

Exhortation (xporpomy, opposed to
amorpomm), i. Bs 3

Exordium, i. 1. 9; iii. 13. 3; 14

Expedi -ent, -ency, i. 6. 1, 7. 1

Extenuation, ii. 26. 1

Eyes (the seat of shame), ii. 6. 18;
(=the seat of light or wisdom),
iii. 10. 7; setting before the eyes,
see Vividness

Fable, ii. 20. 2, 5

Fact (question of), ii, 19. 16-25

Fallacies (paralogisms), ii, 24. 25,
10; iii. 12. 4

Favour, ii. 4. 29; 7

Fear, ii. 5, 1-15

Flattery, i. 11. 18; ii. 6. 8

‘* Foreign ” (words and style), iii. 2.
5, 3.3

» 3.

Forensic rhetoric, i. 1. 10, 11, 3. 3-6;
10-15 ; (style), iii. 12. 5

Form (of diction), ii. 24. 2; iii. 8. 1

Fortunate (people), ii. 17. 5

Fortune (chance, good luck), i. 5.
17, 10. 125 ii. 12. 2, 17. 5

Foul language, iii. 2. 13, 6. 2

Friends, i. 5. 16

Friendship, ii. 4.°1-29

“ Frigidity ” (of style), iii. 3

Garrulity, ii. 13. 12

Genders, iii. 5. 5

Generalities, ii, 22. 12

Gift, i. 5. 9

Good fortune, i.'5. 17; ii. 17.5; good
old age, i. 5. 15; good qualities
(real and apparent), i. 9. 28

Good, the, i. 9. 3, 14; (and the ex-
pedient), i. 6; (greater good and
expediency), i. 7

Goods (internal and external), i. 5.
4; (indisputable and disputable),
i. 6. 17, 18

Goodwill, ii. 1. 8

Government (forms of), i. 4. 12; 8

Gratitude, ii. 7

Great and Small, ii. 19. 26

Greater and Less, i. 7; i. 14; (topic
of), ii. 23. 4

Guard-houses, i. 4. 9

Guilt, see Injustice

Habit, i. 10. 15 ; (moral), ii. 12. 2;
iii. 7. 7

Hair (worn long in Sparta), i. 9. 26

Happiness, i, 5. 1-18

Harmony, iii. 1. 4, 8. 4

Hatred and anger, ii. 4. 30, 31

Health, i. 5. 10-14 ~

Hearers (number of), i. 3. 1; (char-
acter of), ii. 12. 2

Heroic rhythm, iii. 8. 4

Hexametric rhythm, iii. 8. 4

Homoeoteleuton, iii. 9. 9

Homonymy (fallacy of), ii. 24. 2;
(useful to the sophist), iii. 2. 7

Honour, i. 5. 9, 7. 80; (is pleasant),
i. 11. 16

Hope, i. 11. 6

Horror, ii. 8. 13

Hunting, i. 11. 15

Hyperbole, iii. 11. 15, 16

Iambic (metre), iii. 1. 9; (Whythm),
iii. 8.

Ill-doing, ii. 12. 15, 13. 14, 16. 4

Imagination (gavracia), i. 11.6; ii.
2.2, 6. 14

Imitation, i. 11. 23

Imports and exports, i. 4. 11

Impossible things, ii. 19

Inartificial proofs, i. 2. 2; 15

Inconsistency (topic of), ii. 23, 19

489

GENERAL INDEX

Incontinence, i. 9. 9 (axodagcia) ; i.
akpacia)

Incredibility (topic of), ii. 23. 22

Indifference, i. 11. 4; ii. 2, 26

Indignation (vénecrs), ii. 9(Setvwors);
see Exaggeration

Induction (rhetorical), i. 2. 8, 19;
ii. 20. 2; (topic of), ii. 23. 11

a $F a i. r. 27-5 .1i, 128, 9+;

. 9

Injury, i. 13. 6 :

Injustice (causes and motives of),
1. 10. 4-6; (state of mind that
prompts it), i. 12; (acts of), i.
13. 1, 3, 16; (degrees of), i. 14;
(definitions of), i. 9. 7, 10. 3

Insult, see Outrage

i Fat pea ii. 2. 243 iii. 7 11,
18,

Irony, ii. 2, 24; iii, 18, 7,19. 5
Irrefutable arguments, i. 2. 18; ii.
25, 14

POR Sener sayings), iii, 11. 6,
18.

Justice (a component of virtue), i.
9. 7; (spurious), i. 15. 7; (un-
written), i. 18. 11, 14. 7

Key-note (év8dgipov), iii. 14. 1
Kindness, i. 5. 9 (evepyecia); 9. 19
(ebepyérmpua)

Knuekle-hones (dice), i. 11. 15

Laconian apophthegms, ii. 21. 8

Land (grants of), i. 5. 9

Laughter, i, 11. 29; (laughable
things), iii. 18, 7

Law, i. 4. 12, 18; (special and
general), i. 10. 8, 13. 2; (written
and unwritten), i. 10. 3, 13. 2;
(violation of), i. 14. 7; (in proofs),
i, 15, 3-12; (ambiguous), i. 15. 10;
sometimes = convention

Learning (causes pleasure), i. 11. 21

Legislation, i. 4. 18

Liberality, i. 9. 10

Libyan fables, ii. 20, 2

Literary (written) style, iii. 12. 2

Little-mindedness, see Meanness

Liturgy (public service), ii. 28, 17

Logographers, ii. 11. 73 iii. 7. 7,
12. 2

Longing (Speécs), i. 10. 8
490

Lot, offices by, ii, 20, 4
Lo i. 11. 11,17; see also Friend-
ship

Magnanimity (ueyadowuyxia), i. 9,
Li ies

Mscutneenes (ueyadorpérera), i.
. 12

Malice, ii. 18. 8; (prepense), i. 14. 5
Manheod, fi.14
Marginal note, iii. 8. 6

Maxims, ii. 21; (when to use), iii.

Meanings (topic of different), ii,
23. 9

Meanness (utxpowvyia), i. 9. 11;
(uxpompéreca), 1% 12; (dvedev-
Gepia), 1. 9. 10; (of language), iii,
Qk'2

Member (=clause), iii. 9. 5,19

Memory, i. 11. 6

Messes (f.8irva), iii. 10. 7

Metaphors, iii. 2. 6-15; rar we
use of), iii. 3. 4; (and simile), iii.
4. 1; (four kinds of), iii. 10. 7;
(produce vividness), iii. 11. 5

Metrical style, iii. 8. 1

Mildness, ii. 3

Misfortune, i. 18. 16; iii. 15. 3

Mistake, see Error

Monarchy, i. 8. 4

Moral character; see Bthos

Motives, ii. 28. 16, 21; iii. 15, 11

Mysteries, ii. 24. 2

Name (topic of the), ii. 28. 29;
(used instead of description),
iii. 6. 1

Names (nouns), see Words

Narrative, iii. 18. 8, 5; 16,

Nature, natural things, i. 10. 18,
ll. 25

Necessary sign (tekmérion), i, 2,
16, 17

’
Necessity (acts of), i. 11. 4
Negations (in producing amplifica-
tion), iii. 6. 7
Noble (of birth), i. 5. 5; ii, 15. 3
(evyevjs, contrasted with yevvaios,
generosus, which connotes high-
mindedness) ; see also Beantiful
Nouns and verbs, see Words
Novelties (of language), iii. 11. 6
Number, iii. 5. 6

GENERAL INDEX

Oaths, i. 15. 27; aa oath), i.
15. 5, 12; ii. 25. 10

Objections ‘(logical), ii. 25. 8, 26. 4

Obscurity of style, iii. 5. 7

Odd and even (game), iii. 5. 4

Old age, i. 5. 15; ii, 13

Oligarchy, i. 8. 4

Opinion, i. 7. 36

Opposites, see ceased

Oracles, iii. 5. 4

Outrage, ii. 2. 3, 5

Paean (rhythm), iii. 8. 4-6

Pain and painful things, i. 11. 29

Pancratiast, i. 5. 14

Paradox, ii. 23. 16; iii. 11. 6

Parenthesis, iii. 5, 7

Parisosis, iii. 9. 9, 11. 10

Paromoiosis, iii. 9. 9

Particles (connecting), i iii. 5, 2,12. 4

Parts (topic of), ii. 23. 13

Parvenus, ii. 9. 9, 16..4

Passions, ii. 1-17

Pathetic style, iii. 7. 3, 11

Pathos, iii. 1. 7

eae pep i. 5. 11

Period, iii. 9. 5-7

Peroration, vit 13, 8; 19

Personification, see Vividness

Perspicuity (of style), iii. 2. 2

Pious, The (comedy by Anaxan-

drides), iii, 12. 3

Pity, ii. 8. 2, 12. 15; (opposed to
envy and indignation), ii. 9, 35
(pitiful and terrible contrasted),
li. 8. 12

Pleasure, i. 11. 1, 6-8

wis (a kind of imitation), i. 11.

Politics (science of), i. 2.

Possible ont. impossible nee é
6. 27; ii.

Poverty ie of crime), i, 12, 15

Power (is pleasant), i. 11. 7; (men
in power), ii. 17

Praise, i. 9. 33

sor hers® i, 1, 45. ii. 28,245 iii.

15.

Prelude (dithyrambic), iii.
(on the flute), iii. 14, 1
Prime of life, i. 5. 11; ii. 14
Probability, i. 2, 15, 15. 17; ii.

25. 8-11
Prologue, see Exordium
Proof (inartificial), i. 15; (ethical),

9, 65

i. 2. 8; (general or common), i. 1.
12; ii. 20. 1; (generally), iii, 17

Proportion (analogy), i. 7. 4; iii. 4.
3, 6. 7, 7. 10; (topic of), ii. 23. 17;
(in inetaphor), lii. 2. 9

Propositions castorient 4‘; y

Propriety (of style), iii. 2. 1, 7. 1

Proverbs and Taree bak: sayings, A
6. 20, 22; i,.11. 253 i. 12.-20, 28;
is 15. 14; ii. 4. 21, 10. 6; ii. 6. 5,
18; ii. 10. 5; ii. 21. 11, 12; ii. 23.
15, 2%; ii, 24. 25 ii. 25. 4; iii. 11,
143 (are evidence), i, 15. 4; (are
metaphors from species to
species), iii. 11. 14 .

Punctuation, iii. 5. 6

Punishment baer ip Ph differs from
Tipwpia), i. 10. 17, 1

Puns, iii. 11. 7

Purity (of style), iii. 5

carey (euphemism for robbers),
iii. 2. 10

Rare words (yAéocat), iii. 2. 5, 3. 3

Reason (arguments from), ii, 23.
20, 24

Recrimination, iii. 15. 7

Refutation, ii. 22. 14, 25; iii. 9. 8;

(topic of), ii. 23. 23; ;* refutative

enthymemes, ii. 23. 30; iii, 17. 13

Relatives (topic of), ii. 23. 3

Reply (to an adversary), ef 18. 5, 6

Reputation (defined), i. 5.

Retortion (of a ya ey i, 23,15

Revenge, i. 9. 24, 10. 1

Revenues (State), i. 4. a

Rhapsody, iii. 1. 3, 8

Rhetoric (definition), i, 2. 13 (off-
shoot of Politics and Dialectic),
i. 2. 7, 4. 5; (three ee £435
(three parts of), iii. 1; (style
suited to each kind), iii, ‘a

Rhythm, iii. 1. 4, 8. 2-7

Ribaldry (buffoonery), iii. 18. 7

Riddles, ii. 21. 8; iii, 2. 12

Ridicule, iii. 18. 7

Rivals (to be feared and envied), ii.
5. 9, 10. 6

Salutary things, ii. 5. 16

Science (émorjpun, epgener to
Svvapts, faculty), i. 4.

ef ty and scofiers, ii. *. 12, 3, 9,

6. 2
senlpture, i, 11. 23
491

GENERAL INDEX

Selection (topic of), ii. 28. 12

Self-control, see Temperance

Selfishness, i. 11. 26

Shame and shamelessness, ii. 6

Sign, i. 2. 14, 16; ii. 24. 5, 25. 8

Similarity (objection from), ii. 25. 6

Simile, ili. 4; 10. 3; (a kind of
metaphor), iii. 11. 11

Slander, see Prejudice

Slight (three kinds of), ii. 2. 3

Smart sayings, iii. 10

Solecism, iii. 5. 7

Solution, see Refutation

Soothsayers, i. 15. 14; iii. 5. 4

Sophists (and dialecticians), i. 1. 14

Sorrow (sometimes pleasant), i.
11. 12

Soul (a kind of motion), ii. 23, 13

Special terms (better than general),
iii. 5, 3

Speech (its three points and re-
quisites), iii. 1. 1, 4; (its parts),
iii. 13-19

Spite, ii. 2. 3, 4. 30

Statement (of a case), iii. 13. 2

Stature, i. 5. 13

Strength, i. 5. 12

Style (excellence of), iii. 1. 5; 2;
(frigidity), iii. be {ourity), iii. 5;
Gignity), iii. ; (propriety),
15: By tecnidainbee E693 2'S
(periodion iii. 9. 3; (wittiness),
iii. 10. 1 ; (three things desirable),
iii. 10. 6; (which kind suited to
each kind of rhetoric), iii. 12;
(style of debate and the written
style), iii. 12. 1; (of public speak-
ing), iii. 12. 5; (ethical), ii. 18. 1,
21. 16; iii. 16. 8; (of acting), “
12. 2; ’(“foreign’ ”), lil. 2.8, 8,
8; (pathetic), iii. 7. 3, 11; (imple),
iii. 16. 2

Superiority, i. 7. 2, 31, 9. 25

Suppression (of the how and when,
fallacy of), ii. 24. 7, 8

Syllogism, i. 2. 9, 18

Synonyms, iii. 2. 7

Talent (natural), i. 6. 15, 29; iii.

“get

Tekmérion, i. 2. 16, 17

Temperance (self-control), i. 9. 9

Temple-builders, i. 14, 1

Ten, —_ (legislative committee),
iii,

Tesnimetan iii. 1. 9, 8. 4

Theft, i. 13. 10

Time (topic of), ii. 23. 6

Tokens (indications),
16. 10

Tones, iii. 1. 4

Topic, i. 2 21; fi, 22. 18; 28-24;
(of degree), ii, 19. 26; iii, 19. 2

Torch-bearer (at Eleusis), iii, 2. 10

Torture, i. 15. 26

Tragedy, tragic poets, iii. 1. 3, 14. 6

Travel, books of, i. 4. 18

Trophies, iii. 10. 7

Tyranny, i. 8. 4-5

Tyrants and body-guards, i. 2. 19
(argument from Example)

iii, 15. 9,

Universal arguments, ii. 18
Unrhythmical (style), iii. 8. 1, 7
Unselfishness, i. 9. 16

Useful (things), i. 5. 7

Vanity, see Arrogance!

Vehemence, iii. 11. 16

Vice and virtue, i. 9. 1-31

erg (a kind of superiority), ii.
be

Vividness, lii. 10. 6, 11. 1-4

Voice, iii. 1. 4, 7. 10

Voluntary acts, i. 10. 8

War and peace, i, 4. 9
Ways and means, i. 4. 8

Wealth, i. 5. 73; (effect on char-
acter), ii, 16. 1

Will,i. 10.8 -

Wines (mixed), iii. 2. 4

Wisdom At ig hical > Se
cal, Pts vyors), i. 9 5, 18,
ads

Witheaves; i. 16, 18; 185 li. 20. 95
(false), i. 14. 6
Mb ce ss (eitpamedia), ii. 12. 16,
15

words Ae and uses of), iii, 2.
5-7, 3. 2,8; (beauty of), iii. 2. 13;
(topie from different meanings
of), ii.

Wroigdotng see Injustice

Youth (character of), ii. 12

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